Critical Readings on the Manchus in Modern China (1616–2012)

Volume Four

Edited by
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PART FIVE

SOCIETY AND KNOWLEDGE

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THE CULTURED NATURE OF IMPERIAL FORAGING IN MANCHURIA

David Bello[1]

The Changbai Mountain Nature Reserve, established in 1960, was one of the earliest biosphere reserves created in the People's Republic of China. Centered as it is on the original homeland of Jurchen, later known as Manchu, peoples who established the Qing dynasty, the historical continuity between the modern reserve and the dynasty's restricted resource enclaves like "ginseng mountains" and "pearl rivers" is striking, as is the ongoing threat to the area's considerable biodiversity that attracts legitimate and illegal resource extraction by humans.[2] One significant contrast between the two projects, however, is the Qing concern with maintaining a type of cultured nature in these enclaves to ensure a steady supply of resources, both human and otherwise, vital to the dynastic state. State-managed foraging became a primary and often conflicted strategy for the sustainable exploitation of these unique, interdependent northeastern resources.

My analysis attempts to take into greater account the fact that northeastern biodiversity was not the passive background for the play of human agencies, but that it interacted with humans to condition and transform identity and environment in ways that any particular plan to culture nature could not anticipate and control.[3] It is thus critical to recognize that the Qing attempt to culture nature did not entirely "consist of human-to-human connections . . . or of object-to-object connections, but . . . zigzag[ged] from one to the other."[4] In other words, it is necessary to minimize artificial analytical distinctions between the social (or cultural) and the material because both are actually interdependent and mutually constitutive. Restated in terms of the specific historical context of my article, any Manchu identity and space had to arise from sustained and mutually conditioning interaction with the nature and culture of the northeast, not simply from Qing fiat, conquest or other relations with indigenous peoples or outside invaders, but from relations with the regional biodiversity that included humans.

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[1] I am grateful for valuable comments on the article from Robert B. Marks and the two anonymous readers for *Late Imperial China*, as well as those arising from invited talks at Columbia University, Renmin University, University of Virginia, and Liaoning University. Generous support for research was provided by the Post-Doctoral Program of Stanford University's Center for East Asian Studies, the American Council of Learned Societies, the Fulbright Scholarship/Council for International Exchange, and Washington and Lee University's J.M. Glenn and H.F. Lenfest grants.

[2] Xiu Yang and Ming Xu, "Biodiversity Conservation in Changbai," 885, 896.

[3] Studies of links between Chinese imperial borderlands and environment are hardly new and perhaps classically embodied in English in Lattimore, *Inner Asian Frontiers of China*. My approach here is intended to augment more recent studies deeply informed by such links, including Menzies, "Strategic Space"; Shephard, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800*; Vermeer, "Population and Ecology along the Frontier in Qing China"; Marks, *Tigers, Rice, Silk, and Silt*; Williams, *Beyond Great Walls*;

Broadly speaking, this dynamic is how and why "Manchus" in China proper became different from northeastern peoples left behind in the wake of the 1644 conquest. In the simplest terms, some of them moved south of the Great Wall. This move altered their cultural and natural, terms I would prefer to combine as environmental, context. While I am mainly concerned with the construction of a distinct Manchu identity north of the Great Wall, and even north of the Willow Palisade (*Liutiao bian*) separating southern Manchuria, or Fengtian (modern Liaoning province), from Jilin to the northeast and Heilongjiang to the north, it is important to clarify briefly the cultural significance of this major spatial difference between what may be called the Manchu "diaspora" throughout China proper and those peoples who remained behind. The former group was, in the language of postcolonial studies, "hybridized" through its physical

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Zhao Zhen, *Qingdai xibu shengtai bianqian yanjiu* (Studies in ecological change in the Qing dynasty's northwest); Perdue, *China Marches West*; Yong Xue, " 'Treasure Nightsoil As If It Were Gold' "; Xiao Ruiling et al., *Ming-Qing Nei Menggu xibu diqu kaifa yu tudi shahua* (The development of western Inner Mongolia in the Ming-Qing period and soil desertification); Jiayan Zhang, "Environment, Market, and Peasant Choice"; Jiang Zhushan, "Shengtai huanjing, renshen caiji yu guojia quanli" (Ecological environment, ginseng gathering and state power); Qin Heping, "Yumi de zhongzhi ji dui Dai, Luoluo deng shandi minzu de yingxiang" (Corn cultivation and its influence on indigenous Yi and Lisu mountain ethnicities).

[4] Latour, *Reassembling the Social*, 75, 83–84. See also Haraway, "The Promises of Monsters." For an analysis of the significance of their respective enterprises for environmental history, see Asdal, "The Problematic Nature of Nature." I am aware that "nature" can, and according to Haraway inevitably does, function as another anthropocentric construct inextricable from human culture. Despite my occasional juxtaposition of the two terms, my point of emphasis is that such distinctions between nature and culture are largely based on a false dichotomy. Finally, my approach stands in contrast, but certainly not in diametric opposition, to relevant studies exhibiting more cultural approaches to ethnic identity; *e.g.*, Jiang Fan, *Manzu shengtai yu minsu wenhua* (Manchu ecology and folk culture); Crossley, Siu, and Sutton, introduction to *Empire at the Margins*.

proximity to Han culture while the latter was not, or at least not as thoroughly or as quickly.

This hybridity encompasses a "cultural rootedness modified by openness to the available resources of one or more cultures" to form a composite identity that thereby enjoys a more constructive multicultural constitution as it builds a new culture.[5] Hybridity's emphasis on the almost dialectically progressive results of multicultural encounters elucidates a China proper "Manchu" diasporic identity that is neither sinified nor nativist, but creatively combines elements of both. The concept can similarly elucidate the significance of "Manchus" who did not migrate.

Historically perceptible results of Manchu diasporic hybridization included the Qing dynasty and the formation of Manchuria, as well as the emergence of multiple Manchu identities basically distinguished by their degree of alienation from interactions with the flora and fauna of the northeast. The article traces the nascent, pre-diasporic Manchu state's initial dependence on the region's biodiversity for its very existence as it evolved, after the 1644 conquest and most crucially during the Kangxi reign (1662–1722), into a deliberate state policy to preserve, encourage, and even substantially determine hunting and gathering culture for purposes other than immediate material sustenance. I call the resulting set of relations "imperial foraging," which was intended to embody and maintain Manchu identity in the Qing borderland of Manchuria, which is the focus of this article, as opposed to the Manchu diasporic identity in China proper. This borderland identity was also hybridized, not only, however, through ties to the Manchu diaspora but also through those to the nonhuman ecology of Manchuria.

Foraging and Manchu Identity

Qing authorities sought to preserve some of these ecological ties among the diaspora despite the physical separation entailed by the conquest of China proper. Foraging, encompassing both hunting and gathering, was integral to the ongoing formation of a distinct imperial Manchu identity, across both sides of the Great Wall, that dynastic authorities considered the apex of their state's ethnic hierarchy. In the view of Qing rulers like the Yongzheng emperor, Manchus were of the "greatest concern" because they were the "root of the state" and, as such, "comparable to no others."[6] The formation of Manchu identity was, moreover, not a passive process for the participants, but one in which the dynasty's ethnic exemplars, bannermen in particular, were commanded "to do their utmost to become studied in Manchu frugality, the Qing [i.e. Manchu] language, mounted archery, labor service, the arts of drill, and ritual usage."[7] Many of these practices, including those related to foraging like archery and labor services, could be pursued only under certain social and environmental conditions that required maintenance of amenable spaces sufficiently isolated from the empire's Han Chinese majority, necessitating the assembly and maintenance of considerable material diversity beyond the Manchu diaspora in China proper.[8]

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[5] Young, *Postcolonialism*, 347. The most influential articulation of hybridity is attributed to Bhaba, *The Location of Culture*. For a critical discussion of the term, see Moore-Gilbert, *Postcolonial Theory*, 129–30, 181–82, 192–95. Despite great limitations, which include anachronism and a semiconscious reliance on monolithic binary juxtapositions (like Manchu-Han) that elide the diverse elements that compose them, hybridity can help to refine arguments based on Manchu "acculturation" that legitimately try to blend similarity and difference to explain Manchu ethnic identity; Elliot, *The Manchu Way*, xiv.

Manchuria's eastern and northern expanses inevitably became the empire's main reserve for borderland Manchus to be insulated from "contamination," in effect hybridization, by "Han customs," including the drinking, gambling, cock-fighting, and profligate expenditures so decried by Qing rulers.[9] Unlike Fengtian and its capital of Shengjing in southern Manchuria, Jilin and Heilongjiang had not been subjected to large-scale Han migration, and were considered relatively pristine, if endangered from around the mid-eighteenth century.[10]

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[6] Ji Yun et al., *Baqi tongzhi* (Comprehensive annals of the eight banners), Yongzheng 5/4/13, 1:194.

[7] Ji Yun et al., *Baqi tongzhi*, Yongzheng 2/3/28, 1:174.

[8] Anthropologists have generally recognized environmental relations as a critical component in the formation of ethnic identities. Tim Ingold, in his study of hunter-gatherer identity, has even rejected anthropocentric assertions that "nature is a cultural construction" as "incoherent" and argued for the validity of "the hunter-gatherer economy of knowledge" that holds "the constitutive quality of intimate relations with non-human and human components of the environment is one and the same"; Ingold, "Hunting and Gathering as Ways of Perceiving the Environment," 117, 129. Ingold also rejects the term "foraging," which he feels connotes properties associated with animals; ibid., 147. While this point is certainly reasonable, it does not really address the larger problem that any common name for this human activity generally connotes inferiority, or a semicivilized condition at best.

[9] Ji Yun et al., *Baqi tongzhi*, Yongzheng 5/4/13, 1:194–95. For further examples of Han contamination, see ibid., Yongzheng 4/12/27, 1:190; Qianlong 58/4/19, 1:278; *Qing shilu* (The veritable records of the Qing Dynasty), Qianlong 48/4/3, 23:790b.

[10] For official comments on the spatial dimensions of Han Manchurian migration, see, for example, *Qing shilu*, 21:868a–b, 29:700b–701b. For ethnic-administrative studies of

Even before the Qing conquest of China proper in 1644 dynastic authorities sought control over the forage resources of Jurchen/Manchu home territory, roughly centered in southeastern Jilin and including the Korean border. Nurhaci formulated one of the earliest dynastic rationales for such control in 1623:

> Previously, all pelts, eastern pearls, and sable were foraged by one hundred men sent out by the 8 *beile* princes' households, each of which retained its own respective catches. Things like this raise fears of internal disorder, so . . . eastern pearls, sable, lynx pelts, tiger pelts, wolf pelts, otter pelts, and squirrel pelts foraged will all be equally divided into eight portions.[11]

Here, the progenitor of the Qing imperial house acknowledges the importance of foraging for the formation of Manchu political identity within the first decade of the establishment of the Jin state, which became the Qing in 1636. Foraging was too politically sensitive to be left to the comparatively random intersection of people and nature existing before 1623. Instead, a more equitable distribution of forage would be enforced for the state's ultimate benefit. This is one early manifestation of an imperial foraging policy in the northeast and of the critical role played by these resources in structuring human relations.

Within a decade or so, the throne was exerting even greater control of foraging space, often making even elite subjects' access dependent on imperial approval. Nurhaci's son the Jin ruler Hong Taiji (Ch. Huang Taiji) prohibited unauthorized entry into hunting grounds and issued related venery regulations on the eve of a hunt in Kaiyuan in 1633.[12] From "the early years of the state," probably prior to 1644, access was restricted to imperial clansmen, ranked from prince (*wang*) to duke (*gong*), who had the privilege of sending out foragers into the Buteha Ula (Ch. Da-sheng Wu-la) region of Jilin for eastern pearls (Ch: *dongzhu; Unio dahuricus*),

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Manchuria beyond Fengtian, see Lee, *The Manchurian Frontier in Ch'ing History*; Matsuura, Shinchō no Amūru seisaku to shōsū *minzoku* (Qing policy towards the Amur district and minorities); Zhou Xifeng, *Qingchao qianqi Heilongjiang minzu yanjiu* (A study of ethnic groups in Heilongjiang in the early Qing).

[11] Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan, et al., *Manwen laodang* (The old Manchu chronicles), 1:406.11. This new regulation was put into practice three days later when 1,493 sable pelts, 102 otter pelts, 936 squirrel pelts, 281 raccoon dog pelts, 16 lynx pelts, 4 tiger pelts, 8 fox pelts, 20 weasel pelts, and 104 pairs of eagle pinions were distributed in various quantities according to banner officer ranks; ibid., 1:407–08.14, 15.

[12] Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan Manwen dang'an yi bian* (Translated compilation of Manchu archives of the early Qing Inner Historical Office), Tiancong 7/11/25, 1:46.

sable pelts (*diaopi*), and ginseng (Ch: *renshen; panax ginseng*). Foragers of qualifying senior dynastic officials were permitted to gather ginseng, but only until 1648, when they lost that privilege. Even clansmen had their access to items other than ginseng revoked by 1651. The number of foragers was also limited by rank, ranging from fifteen to 140.[13]

Unauthorized foreign access was, of course, prohibited entirely. Nevertheless, in 1635 alone, in addition to several incidents of illicit hunting and fishing, a total of at least thirty-two Korean ginseng poachers were encountered by Manchu troops, some of whom were also involved in ginseng gathering at the time, in four separate incidents. After several exchanges of diplomatic notes, a Korean state investigation in mid-year discovered over seventy more of its subjects involved in criminal activities related to ginseng poaching.[14]

These incidents were particularly disturbing to the Jurchen in the context of their contemporary, intensifying struggle with Ming Dynasty China, which Korea was being pressured to support. Ginseng made a critical economic contribution to the Jurchen ability to carry on this conflict. In fact, many of the northeast's principal forest products were so important that by 1617 conquests of nearby Jurchen rivals enabled the Jin state to control the trade in "ginseng, pine nuts, pearls, and sable pelts, which daily increased its wealth and power" until it was beyond control of Ming forces.[15] Humans came into both commerce and conflict over these products mainly because of their regional uniqueness; they could not be obtained elsewhere, constraining those who sought them in spatial and seasonal terms.

It is hardly surprising, then, that one of the Jin's 1635 official diplomatic protests about poaching to Chosŏn Dynasty Korea's King Injo (Ch. Renzu, r. 1623–49) expressed the fear that "subjects of the Great Ming are also moving into our territory to dig ginseng."[16] Regional poaching of ginseng by Han subjects of the Ming had actually been going on nearly a century earlier at the expense of the Qing's Jurchen forebears, as attested circa 1538 when Han Chinese were poaching sable pelts and fish in "their search for profit" north of the Ming's Liaodong border. Ming Chinese were still engaged in illicit foraging activities in 1616, the year the Jin was founded.[17]

Conflicts generated by unique northeastern natural resources among Han, Korean, and Jurchen/Manchu were thus endemic, almost traditional, by the mid-seventeenth century, and poaching was mutual.[18] The Manchu attempt to restrict access to spaces containing strategic natural resources, which were economically profitable and politically critical, was quite compatible with regional historical trends extant for at least a century by the mid-1630s. This is an important context for the development of banner lands in general, and their subdivisions of specialized foraging preserves such as ginseng mountains, pearl rivers, and imperial hunting grounds. Korean officials had already commented on this Jurchen forager construction of northeastern space in 1536: "The barbarian [that is, Jurchen] custom is to defend separate mountains and derive benefit from their produce. Should any fail to hold their traditional mountain, they will be without any dwelling place."[19] Under such conditions Jurchen identity and mountain micro-ecosystems were intimately, even from some perspectives existentially, related.

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[13] *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi) (Collected statutes of the great Qing, Kangxi edition), 727:6593–94. Here, as throughout, the taxonomic nomenclature for various species mentioned in premodern documents must be qualified, particularly in Sinophone cases like "*dongzhu*," which can refer to pearls from one or more of several mussel species native to the Amur basin that include *Unio mongolicus* as well as *Unio* (or possibly *Margaritifera*) *dahuricus*. My translation of "*panax ginseng*" for *rensheng* is also imprecise. I have only provided this nomenclature in select instances in an attempt to provide limited clarification of vague, but important, forage terms.

[14] Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan, *Qingchu neiguo shiyuan Manwen dang'an yi bian*, Tiancong 9/3/22, 9/44/12, 9/6/13, 9/7/6, 9/7/12, 9/12/10, 1:157, 159, 173, 178, 179, 215–16; Guan Jialu et al., eds., *Tiancong jiunian dang* (Archive of the ninth year of the Tiancong reign), 117. For accounts of Qing-Korean conflict over ginseng in the context of inter-state boundaries, see Seonmin Kim, "Ginseng and Border Trespassing Between Qing China and Chosôn Korea"; Li Huazi, *Qingchao yu Chaoxian guanxi shi yanjiu* (A study of the history of Qing-Korean relations).

[15] Peng Sunyi, *Shanzhong wenjian lu* (A record of things heard and seen amidst the mountains), 3:9. For similar statements, focused on the importance of ginseng, see those cited in Symons, *Ch'ing Ginseng Management*, 9–10.

[16] Guan Jialu et al., *Tiancong jiunian dang*, 91.

[17] (Jiajing) *Liaodong zhi* (Gazetteer of Liaodong), 559a; *Qing shilu*, Tianming 1/6/1, 1:65b.

[18] Korean records from the 1540s into the 1590s reveal violent clashes with Jurchen violating Korean space in efforts to poach valuable ginseng and hunt; *Chosŏn wangjo sillok* [Veritable records of the Yi Dynasty], Chungjong (Ch. Zhongzong) era, 36.12.28 (western date 1.13.1542) 18.537b–538a; Myŏngjong (Ch. Mingzong) era, 3.9.14 (western date 10.15.1548) 19.613a; Sŏnjo (Ch. Xuanzu) era, 28.8.23 (western date 9.26.1595) 22.545b–546a and 28.10.7 (western date 11.8.1595) 22:575a and 28.11.7 (western date 12.7.1595) 22.593b and 29.1.30 (western date 2.27.1596) 22.640a–44b and 29.2.29 (western date 3.27.1596) 22.653b–654a.

[19] *Chosŏn wangjo sillok*, Chungjong (Ch. Zhongzong) era, 31.1.6 (western date 1.28.1536) 17.628b–629a.

Of course, mountains teeming with forage would not remain an existential prerequisite for Jurchen, particularly once they began to expand beyond their immediate home territory. The Jurchen relation to their foraging spaces certainly changed over time, particularly as Qing power expanded. Nevertheless, foraging space continued to be intimately related to an inevitably idealized Manchu identity as large numbers of indigenous peoples moved physically and culturally farther from the northeast.[20]

The pristine nature of the region and its peoples is easily exaggerated, especially in terms of the dynasty's northeastern "quarantine policy" (*fengjin zhengce*) rooted in the dense thickets of the Willow Palisade, which had been planted to delineate the boundary between Han-inflected southern Manchuria and "Manchu" northern Manchuria. This policy has been interpreted in terms ranging from absolute to superficial depending on the sources and periodization employed.[21]

Analysis of pristine foraging has also been problematic for contemporary western anthropology. Scholarship from the late 1980s challenged prior assertions of the existence of "primary" hunter-gatherers, conceptualized as dependent on foraging for subsistence without any significant support from agricultural or trade activities. In contrast, "secondary" hunter-gatherers are understood as diversifying their subsistence activities, although some scholars dismiss the category of forager altogether as a purely subjective construction of modern observers. More recently, a basic consensus has emerged on retaining hunter-gatherers in a less essentialized and anachronistic conceptual form to accommodate the diversity of their lifeways, especially in the present.[22]

Different levels of the Qing state made conflicting distinctions between foragers as well. During 1676 Qing operations to move locals out of the way of Russian Cossack incursions into the Amur region, an administrative decision was made to shift agrarian peoples southward, but leave foragers like the Hejen of the lower Amur to fend for themselves "since these people do not farm and so are able to move anywhere out of the way." Officers of the nearly five thousand Warka being moved to Jilin's administrative center of Ningguta, objected that most engaged in little or no farming, and were generally partial to hunting with many being pastoral. Some of these people, who were being reformed into "New Manchus" to resist the Cossacks, soon tried to "desert" back to the Amur in search of game, which Ningguta lacked.[23]

While reflecting past and present categorical ambiguities, the evidence suggests the existence of some sort of distinctive foraging practices in the northeast that required space for the maintenance of mutually constituting human and natural resources. Such enclaves could be existential prerequisites for the preservation of a forager identity depending on when, where, and how this identity is defined. From the perspective expressed in the Korean account of 1536, individual forage mountains in Jilin were necessary to the physical survival of any Jurchen tribe, who all appear as pristine foragers; whereas from the Ming perspective in 1617 amalgamated forage was critical to the political survival of the Jin state, which by that time was clearly engaged in secondary foraging augmented by agriculture. Once the Qing state had overcome both the Koreans and the Ming and consolidated itself in China proper, the significance of foraging areas diminished in these brute existential terms, but increased, from the dynasty's eighteenth-century perspective, for the cultural preservation of the embodiments of "the old, pure and honest Manchu traditions." This deliberate state policy to preserve, encourage, and even determine hunting and gathering culture for purposes other than immediate material sustenance, constitutes a third conceptual dimension I will term "imperial foraging."[24]

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[20] For the complex relations between Manchu identity and the historical cultural space of Manchuria, see Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary."

[21] A recent and valuable discussion of the issues can be found in Zhang Jie and Zhang Danhui, *Qingdai dongbei bianjiang de Manzu* (The Manchus of the Qing northeastern frontier), 295–305. For a study of the Willow Palisade, see Edmonds, "The Willow Palisade."

[22] Barnard, "Hunter-Gatherers in History, Archaeology and Anthropology," 4–5. For general discussions of the debate, see Stiles "The Hunter-Gatherer Revisionist Debate"; Bird-David, "Beyond the 'Hunting and Gathering Mode of Subsistence.'" Much of the controversy concerns the interpretation of the conditions under which present-day groups of foragers exist, as well as how far and to what extent definitive practices can be projected back into the past.

[23] Ningguta fudutong yamen dang'an (Ningguta Vice Commander-in-Chief's Office Archive) Kangxi 1–1676:143–48, Kangxi 2–1676: 39–54, 91–93, 98–102, 102–05, 276–77. For a study of New Manchus, see Zhang Jie, "Qing chu zhaofu Xin Manzhou Shulue" (A brief overview of New Manchu recruitment in the early Qing). I have generally followed Juha Janhunen's transliteration and identification of indigenous ethnonyms with the exception that I distinguish between subgroups of the modern Ewenki by adding a hyphenated prefix of the conventional Qing term; i.e. "Solon-Ewenki," "Kiler-Ewenki." Finally, the conventional Qing terms of Hejen and Fiyaka (Ch. He-zhe and Fei-ya-ka, respectively) have been retained throughout because it is difficult to decisively link either term to one or the other of their modern ethnic equivalents the Ghilyak and the Nanai, both of which comprised various, often indistinguishable elements of the Hejen and Fiyaka. For brief ethnographies of indigenous peoples mentioned in this article, see Juha Janhunen, *Manchuria: An Ethnic History*, 50–52 (Dagur), 61, 125 (Kiler-Ewenki), 68–70 (Orochen), 101 (Warka), 101–02 (Solon-Ewenki), 115 (Hejen), 126 (Fiyaka). Zhou Xifeng, *Heilongjiang minzu*, 142–70, 187–202 also covers some of these groups.

[24] *Qing shilu*, Qianlong 42/6/21, 21:868a–b. For the significance of hunting preserves in particular for Manchu identity and the Qing imperial order, see Menzies, "The Mulan

Imperial Foraging: The Administrative Space of Cultured Nature

After the Qing conquest of 1644, and again from the dynastic perspective, the environment for best cultivating imperial foraging comprised areas of Jilin and Heilongjiang that could be kept largely isolated from corrosive non-Manchu elements, especially those manifested by Han urban and agricultural practices. In fact, incompatibility between Han farming and Manchu hunting had already left a pre-conquest record and legacy.

In 1642, when elite hunters' horses damaged fields, Hong Taiji reminisced that in his father's time this offense merited at least a whipping, or was even a capital crime if sufficiently serious. Nine years previously while on a fishing trip in Fushun the emperor had pierced the ears of two offenders whose horses he saw freely grazing in peasant fields. In 1635, again harkening back to a prohibition from his father's reign, Hong Taiji scolded clansmen for hawking near fields and livestock, declaring that whenever he "deployed troops for the hunt, all bivouac in the outskirts, even during seasons of bitter cold, and do not enter villages for fear of harming people and property."[25]

Hong Taiji's son, the Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644–61) faced a similar problem, but under different conditions after the Manchus had ridden south to occupy China proper. A March 1651 Shunzhi decree reflected growing pressures on traditional Manchu foraging practices amidst Han fields:

> [Han] commoners... all rely on the land for sustenance. We have heard that commoners' fields are being everywhere enclosed to provide bivouacs for hunters passing through. Now while hunting is a military exercise the people of old held to, We fear it will inevitably cause agricultural grievances to the detriment of commoners' affairs. How can commoners carry on with their places now wrested from the plough and hoe, and their route to food and clothing cut off; this is a great burden Our heart cannot bear. The Board of Revenue will immediately order local officials to return the whole of the lands previously enclosed to their original masters and charge them to cultivate it as opportunity permits.[26]

In this instance, enclosure, a major controversy between Manchu and Han in the wake of the conquest that possibly amounted to over 1.6 million hectares (over 4 million acres) of land mainly in the greater Beijing area, appears as a deliberate extension of northeastern foraging spatial practice into China proper.[27] This practice was already interfering with important agricultural activities in Fengtian locales like Fushun before the conquest, but had become unsustainable in north China during the Shunzhi reign.

Nevertheless, live Manchurian fauna continued to embody attempts to maintain some northeastern foraging conditions south of the Great Wall. Tigers (*hu, Panthera tigris altaica*), bears (*xiong, Ursus arctos manchuricus*), and leopards (*bao, Panthera pardus orientalis*) from Shengjing and Jilin were caught and sent to Beijing until 1822, when captures were restricted to tigers used to stock the Nanyuan hunting preserve near the capital for banner training exercises. Other animals went for breeding stock, like the five different types of Manchurian fish fry procured in the early 1750s or the ten Manchurian moose (M. *kandahan, Alces alces cameloidus*) calves captured in the Kangxi reign.[28]

It was during the same reign that a large-scale bureaucratic transformation took place as the Qing administrative apparatus shifted capitals from Shengjing, which became an auxiliary capital, to Beijing. A Shengjing branch of Beijing's Imperial Household Department (*Neiwu fu*) emerged to manage northeastern foraging space, in addition to important tasks related to the management of other crown lands, like imperial tombs and Fengtian's manor system. The bulk of this immense territory was intended for the plow, guided, ideally, by demobilized banner soldiers on banner fields set aside for them with banner serfs laboring on the imperial clan's own manor farms centered in southern Manchuria.[29]

The Beijing Imperial Household Department was separated from the regular bureaucracy to manage the extraction of wealth empirewide for the emperor's extended and extensive household. The Department was exclusively staffed by bannermen from the "Three Superior Banners," namely the Plain Yellow, the Bordered Yellow, and the Plain White, which were

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Weichang Imperial Hunting Enclosure"; Chia Ning, "The Lifanyuan and the Inner Asian Rituals in the Early Qing (1644–1795)." For the critical role of hunting across Eurasia, see Allsen, *The Royal Hunt in Eurasian History*. Hunting, however, constituted only one dimension of the Manchu's northeastern system of cultured nature.

[25] *Qing shilu*, Tiancong 5/6/9, 9/6/25, Chongde 7/6/5, 2:123a, 311a, 830a.

[26] *Qing shilu*, Shunzhi 8/2/28, 3:424b.

[27] For an account of enclosure, see Wakeman, *The Great Enterprise*, 1:469–75.

[28] *Qing shilu*, Daoguang 2/intercalary 3/5, 33:569a; Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'an guan, ed., *Kangxi chao Manwen zhupi zouzhe quan yi* (Complete translation of Manchu palace memorials from the Kangxi reign), 1537, #3706; Manwen lufu zouzhe, 16:1513, #684.1. The fish fry included sturgeon (M. *kirfu, Huso dauricus*) and Siberian salmon (M. *niomošon, Brachymystax lenok*) as well as chum salmon (M. *dafaha, Oncorhynchus keta*).

[29] *Da Qing Huidian shili* (Guangxu) (Collected statutes and precedents of the great Qing, Guangxu edition) 12:680a–b; Qi Meiqin, "Guanyu Shengjing Neiwu fu de sheli shijian wenti" (Concerning the problem of the chronology of the Shengjing Imperial Household Department's establishment) *Qingshi yanjiu*, 3 (1995): 98–100; Isett, *State, Peasant and Merchant in Qing Manchuria 1644–1862*, 56.

directly controlled by the emperor.[30] The other five "lower" banners also participated in foraging activities as well as select groups of manor serfs.

In order to supervise the imperial house's northeastern dominions, the Shengjing branch worked with a number of subsections of the Beijing Imperial Household Department as well as with parts of the regular Six Board bureaucracy, particularly certain offices under the Board of Works (*Gong bu*).[31] The most pertinent subsection was the "Office of the Imperial Hunt" (Ch. *Duyu si* [formerly the Foraging Office, Ch. *Caibu yamen* 1661–76, M. *Buthai jurgan*]), coordinating foraging matters between Shengjing and Beijing. Finally, administrative elements of the local banner system were also components of the foraging bureaucracy.

A brief bureaucratic anatomy of fish foraging circa 1727 in the Buteha Ula enclave may convey some of the system's complexity. The sixteen specialized detachments, *"juhiyan"* in Manchu (Ch. *zhuxuan*) responsible for fishing would turn their catches over to their immediate superior, the Ula Superintendant (*Zongguan*), who would then have sturgeon conveyed directly to Beijing; "fine-scaled" fish to the Shengjing Board of Rites, and the sea perch to the Palace Larder (*Yu chashan fang*), a sub-branch of the Beijing Imperial Household Department that served up imperial meals. The foragers' supply needs, mainly in the form of grain and salt, were requisitioned through the Shengjing Imperial Household Department, which could even provide wives for single Ula foragers.[32] Fish foraging in Ula involved elements of the local banner system and the Shengjing regional and Beijing central bureaucracies, while contributing comparatively little to the direct subsistence of the foragers involved.

Escalating elite imperial demand approached mass consumption of forage over time. The earliest function of all Ula units from roughly the 1620s to the 1640s had been to acquire forage for sacrificial rituals at dynastic temples and tombs. In 1700 Ula fish foragers had to procure only sixty fine-scaled fish, used for sacrifice at imperial mausoleums, in addition to their sturgeon-catching duties, imposed four years earlier. By the early

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[30] For overviews of the Imperial Household Department, see Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department*; Qi Meiqin, *Qingdai Neiwu fu*.

[31] Shengjing also maintained five boards corresponding to the traditional Six Boards, minus the Board of Personnel. These five boards overlapped with the Shengjing branch's management in certain instances. For details, see Xie Huijun, "Qingdai Shengjing cheng liubu jianzhi ji zuoluo weizhi" (The establishment of the Six Boards in the city of Shengjing and their location).

[32] *Da Qing Huidian shili* (Jiaqing) (Collected statutes and precedents of the great Qing, Jiaqing edition), 700:7940–41; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 5:40.56–59; 8:23.72–73.

1880s, foragers were scouring ten rivers just to obtain their quota of 5,382 fine-scaled fish.[33]

The scale and complexity of operations like Ula fishing is another distinguishing characteristic of imperial foraging, but the uses to which such immense amounts of forage were put is also distinctive. In this instance, fish were not intended simply for consumption, but for veneration of dynastic tombs, as were the sable and otter pelt tribute from various indigenous northeastern peoples like the Hejen and Fiyaka.[34] Indeed, the very act of hunting and gathering these products was intended to nurture the corresponding "Manchu" virtues among the various inhabitants of northeastern foraging spaces. Imperial foraging in these terms was one strategy to maintain spatial and cultural conditions for the preservation of the dynasty's pre-conquest, non-Han ethnic identity endangered by exposure to powerful Han acculturation pressures.

Consequently, a fundamental prerequisite for the pursuit of Qing imperial foraging was sufficient, and sufficiently isolated, space, which pre-conquest resource competition had already established to form the cores of post-conquest imperial foraging enclaves. These enclaves, often defined by basic geographic features like mountains and rivers, fell into three basic classifications.

Each of the eight Manchu banners had access to ginseng mountains (*renshen shan*), foraging mountains (*caibu shan*) and battue hunting mountains (*weilie shan*), between two to nineteen in each category. Sometimes several banners shared access to a particular enclave. The two red banners, for example, shared ten battue hunting grounds between them. While it is difficult to precisely locate each of the ninety-six ginseng enclaves, twenty-six foraging enclaves, and forty-five battue hunting enclaves appearing in banner records, most of those that can be located lie scattered across the border between eastern Fengtian and southwestern Jilin over much of the core of the original Manchu homelands. Mountains defined such enclaves in this generally sub-boreal region possibly because their higher and so more developed boreal microclimates nurtured distinctive flora and fauna. "Korean ginseng" (*Panax ginseng* C.A. Meyer), for example, is a product of the unique mixed broadleaf-conifer forests of southeastern Manchuria.[35]

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[33] Yun Sheng and Yingxi, *Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu* (Comprehensive annals of Buteha Ula), 14, 96–97; *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi), 727:6594–95.

[34] Da Qing huidian shili (Guangxu), 6:1041a.

These resource enclaves were special administrative subdivisions of northeastern space for military and foraging purposes integral to the pursuit of a banner lifestyle. The Buteha Ula enclave was formally established "in the early years of the state" as a specialized banner administrative region, in effect a prefecture, with a perimeter of over 400 *li* (an area of over 6,400km²) and staff to ensure the acquisition and relay of forage as well as the execution of military duties such as patrols, both of which functioned to protect the enclave's integrity. Enclave authority was complicated, overlapping for certain purposes and at different times, mainly between the Imperial Household Department and Jilin's military governor, who could not, for example, levy taxes on Buteha Ula. Moreover, the units stationed in the enclave itself were divided into a hierarchy of the Department's Three Superior Banners and the Five Lesser Banners, which could be subject to different administrative regulations on forage quotas and related matters.[36] This statutory complexity reflected environmental diversity.

Specialized distinctions also arose between soldiers and foragers that had not previously existed and that often altered previous relations between people and animals. In 1682, upon returning from an imperial tour through Jilin, the Kangxi emperor decided to reduce the burdensome foraging duties of regular banner troops in Ula, who probably numbered about 2,500 men around this time.[37] Henceforth, the capture of nestlings of eagles and hawks, usually pursued in early spring to "the detriment of agriculture," would be abolished. Foraging of "sturgeon and other fish," however, would continue in Buteha Ula with specialized forager *juhiyan*, ordered to take on fishing in 1666. Finally, hunting, because it constituted

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[35] Ji Yun et al., *Baqi tongzhi*, 2:1265–68; Cong Peiyuan, *Dongbei sanbao jingji jianshi* (A brief economic history of the three northeastern treasures), 76–80. For suggestive analyses of climate and corresponding species variation in Manchuria's boreal sub-zone, see Grishin "The Boreal Forests of North-Eastern Eurasia," 18–19; Yang and Xu, "Biodiversity Conservation in Changbai," 887–89.

[36] *Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu*, 23–25; *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng) (Collected statutes of the great Qing, Yongzheng edition), 787:13,434–35. The figure for Buteha Ula's area is based on a ratio of 0.5km/*li*. The enclave's size was thus roughly equivalent to that of small prefecture-level cites, the modern Chinese successors to the imperial prefecture. Yangzhou, for example, covers 6,634km²; Taizhou covers 5,790km².

[37] Ortai et al., eds., *Baqi tongzhi* (Comprehensive annals of the eight banners), 1:527. During the Kangxi reign Ula garrison troops numbered between an initial 700 in 1670 and a peak of over 3,900 around 1692; ibid.

the primary form of military exercise for banner troops, would continue, but not "incessantly," with the paramount concerns being the preservation of the horses' condition and protecting personnel from "undue harm" when "encountering wild beasts."[38]

The emperor's decision to scale back troopers' foraging duties was made in the context of over forty years of Tsarist Cossack incursion into northern Manchuria, which the Qing ended through military operations in the mid-1680s and the Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689. The Qing victory required an unprecedented military and administrative mobilization into regions far north of Buteha Ula, like the Amur basin, where previous dynastic presence had been sparse or nonexistent. The mobilization's results included an increased emphasis on standing armies, a local agrarian logistical infrastructure, and a commensurate reduction in any activities like foraging that hindered this strategy.[39]

The conditions that arose in Jilin and Heilongjiang, whose territorial administration was established only in 1683, intensified the influence of the imperial state on local foraging practices, which were fundamental manifestations of a traditional indigenous culture that had not made such absolute distinctions among hunting, gathering, and fighting. Moreover, this cultural contraction in what activities legitimately defined a banner soldier as distinct from a banner forager did not arise from Han migration, usually cited as the main cause for the erosion of traditional Manchu identity, but from the highest levels of the Qing state in response to military exigency under particular environmental conditions.

Imperial Foraging: The Cultured Nature of Tribute

The administrative structures built up throughout Manchuria within the first fifty or so years after the conquest permitted the Qing state to exert unprecedented control over a foraging bureaucracy that spanned the northeast. Although this bureaucracy handled the "tribute" (Ch. *gong*, M. *alban*) of indigenous peoples, such exchanges were not precisely the same as those connected to Qing state-to-state guest ritual, particularly because the Manchu term *alban* could also mean "tax" or even "official duty." Consequently, the Manchurian practice retained to varying degrees in different times and contexts the sense of all three definitions. The areas under discussion generally were, moreover, under Imperial Household Department or banner jurisdictions and so outside the regular bureaucracy and its taxation system. I have selected the term "tribute" to describe general hunter-gatherer obligations under imperial foraging to emphasize this more direct relationship to the imperial house itself in contrast to "outer court" Board of Revenue (*Hu bu*) tax payments that were more standardized, usually as silver or grain, and so did not allow for a wide range of alternative remittances (see Table I below).[40]

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[38] *Qing shilu*, Kangxi 11/5/21, 5:32a–b.

[39] The Kangxi emperor forgave 1685 shortfalls in annual sable pelt tribute from indigenous Solon-Ewenki and the Dagur since many of them now constituted "the great army of Heilongjiang"; *Qing shilu*, Kangxi 24/10/2, 5:294a. There is also evidence that by the mid-Qianlong period, some demobilized Dagur and Solon were being pensioned off at half rations to hunt sable in places like Hulun Buir; *Qing shilu*, Qianlong 25/4/2 16:855a.

In addition to twenty-five ten-man detachments gathering mainly pearls, fish, pelts, and ginseng in Buteha Ula in the late seventeenth century, Shengjing had forty-five otter pelt hunters operating in nine *juhiyan*, thirty Siberian salmon fishermen, ten stork hunters, fifteen beekeepers, thirty game hunters and fifty-five wild honey foragers. Sixty-five fishermen were based in Niuzhuang in southern Fengtian. There were also fox hunters and falconers hunting pheasants.[41] In addition, northeastern ginseng and honey foragers were frequently supplemented by foragers sent from Beijing.[42] There were also tribal groups operating exclusively outside Fengtian in Heilongjiang and Jilin, mainly trapping sable (M. *seke*, Ch. *zi diao, Martes zibellina*), as well as some small groups operating on the north China frontier, engaged primarily as falconers. Finally, banner military units continued to engage in foraging, especially hunting.

Although engaged in specialized activities, these groups could be reassigned by administrative fiat. In 1710, for example, Buteha Ula *juhiyan* were held to be gathering enough wild honey to suspend the activities of the manor honey producers, and virtually all of Shengjing's fishermen, banner personnel and commoners alike, were disbanded in 1726. The Buteha Ula honey foragers had themselves been shifted to alternate years of honey gathering and ginseng digging in 1693, but had undergone an even more profound change in 1686 when *juhiyan* were ordered to stop trapping sable, "a hardship" that had resulted in mainly low-quality pelts, and start gathering pearls.[43]

The Buteha Ula foragers' tribute had originally been fixed by statute solely in terms of pelts, fifteen per man annually, raised to twenty in 1653. Thus, the 192 pelt foragers active in 1685 would have owed 3,840 pelts. While some foragers, like those ordered to grow crops or specialize in sturgeon, were excused from this tribute altogether, most continued to pursue their quarry under an elaborate system of substitute forage that the trappers could turn over to meet their basic sable pelt obligations.[44]

This system of equivalents, in effect, rendered sable pelts a unit of account, which continued in use even after the actual use of pelts as a medium stopped. Subsequent surpluses or shortfalls in Buteha Ula pearl quotas, for example, were still expressed in sable pelts because, as a 1694 report stated, "if there are no sable equivalents made for pearls, the apportionment of reward and punishment will be difficult." This situation was probably compounded by the fact that the other equivalents had been eliminated in 1682, when foraging was suspended for ten types of "animals useless for sacrifice" (*wuyong shengwu*) whose pelts or pinions would no longer be convertible into sable. Silver, nevertheless, could enter into wider regional circulation through the quota system's normal operation, which generally allotted cash rewards for surpluses, although cloth awards were also common. Shortfalls earned lashes. Equivalents and rewards particularly distinguish forage remittances from regular taxes.[45]

A different quota system existed to the south in Fengtian, one not based on sable pelts, which were primarily available only much farther north.

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[40] Chinese-language statutes often describe state collection of forage under Imperial Household Department purview in terms related to taxation (*zheng, nafu*); *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng), 787:13432; *Da Qing huidian Shili* (Jiaqing), 700:7934.

[41] *Qingdai Neige daku sanyi dang'an xuanbian, huangzhuang* (Selected archives missing from the main vaults of the Qing Grand Secretariat, imperial manors, vol. 1), 1:19.327–28; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 7:19.32–33, 7:14.22–23, 13:18.18, 17:30.41–45; *Shengjing shenwu dang'an shiliao* (Historical materials from the Shengjing ginseng administration archives), Kangxi 30.9.18, p. 62. There were 361 fox and "8.5" pheasant hunters in 1661; *Da Qing huidian shili* (Jiaqing), 700:7935–37. Manpower numbers varied over time, mainly because of population increase and mortality.

[42] For example, 57 Beijing personnel joined 55 others from a manor to collect honey in 1648; in 1650 282 ginseng gatherers also arrived from Beijing; *Manzu lishi dang'an ziliao xuanji* (Selected compilation of materials from Manchu historical archives), 106, #28, 117, #50.

[43] *Da Qing huidian* (Yongzheng), 788:14,919, 14,871; *Da Qing huidian shili* (Qianlong) (Collected statutes and precedents of the great Qing, Qianlong edition), 625:311a; *Qingdai Neige daku*, 1:19.327.

[44] *Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu*, 85; *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi), 727:6594–95. Buteha Ula's population probably had a total of 399 foragers in 1685, including 57 sturgeon fishermen, 100 honey gatherers, and 50 "new men" whose duties arc not enumerated. This coincides almost exactly with the figure of 400 said to be operating prior to 1664, but contrasts starkly with the figure of 1,871 cited in a 1670 document on a regional grain supply shortfall, which also mentions 954 foragers in 1651; *Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu*, 43, 85; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 8:19.63–65. There is a further estimate of 3,993 foragers active in 1791, with 3,347 gathering pearls and the remaining 646 catching fish; *Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu*, 43.

[45] *Qingdai Neige daku*, 1:19.327, 331; *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi), 727:6595.

Table I. Sable pelt equivalents for Buteha Ula forage, Kangxi reign

Forage	Sable Pelt Equivalent	Forage	Sable Pelt Equivalent
River Pearls			
< 8 *fen*–1 *qian*	10/*fen*	Otter pelts	3/pelt
8 *fen*	80	Top grade	2.5/pelt
7.5 *fen*	67.5	Second grade	2/pelt
7 *fen*	63	Third grade	1.5/pelt
6.5 *fen*	52	Fourth grade	1/pelt
6 *fen*	48	Fifth grade	.5/pelt
5.5–.5 *fen*	5/*fen*; 2/half *fen*	Bottom grade	
> .5 *fen*	1/*fen*		
Pearls	1/*fen*	Leopard pelts	
		Top grade	5/pelt
		Second grade	4/pelt
		Third grade	3/pelt
Lynx pelts	6/pelt	Tiger pelts	
Top grade	5/pelt	Top grade	4/pelt
Second grade	4/pelt	Second grade	3/pelt
Third grade	3/pelt	Third grade	2/pelt
Fourth grade		Fourth grade	1/pelt
Fox pelts	2/pelt	Squirrel pelts	
		Top grade	20/pelt
		Bottom grade	25/pelt
Wolf pelts		Eagle pinions	2/pair
Top grade	3/pelt		
Second grade	2/pelt		
Bottom grade	1/pelt		
Raccoon dog pelts	.5/pelt	Stork pinions	1/pair
Jackal pelts	1/pelt		

Source: *Da Qing huidian* (Kangxi), 727: 6596–99. (10 *fen* = 1 *qian* = 3.7 grams)

There were fewer equivalents and a much wider range of forage with specified quotas. Equivalents were specific to some forage categories, two otter cubs the equivalent of one adult or a sea eagle equivalent to two storks. Rewards were expressed in terms of silver taels for salmon, for example, with an award of 0.2 of a tael for every five fish over quota. Shengjing's "honey raisers," probably beekeepers, were also rewarded with money.[46]

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[46] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 8:16.56–58, 17:30.42, 21:21.20–24, 22:16.12.

Table II. Fengtian forager annual quotas, 1666–78

Forage Type	Annual Quota	Shortfall Penalty (lashes)	Foragers Assigned (men)
Fish	32,500 *jin* (19,396kg)	3/20 *jin*	65
Otter pelts	75	5/otter	45
Pheasants	3,000	n/a	30
Siberian Salmon	1,500	n/a	30
Storks	150	3/2 birds	10
Wild Honey	15,600 *jin* (9,310kg)	5/2 bottles	312

Source: Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 5:18.20, 6:3.2–4, 8:16.56–58, 17:30.41.

The Qing state sought to subject ginseng, the single most valuable forage item in the northeast, to a more complicated system of control, although this system was continuously constrained by human action and environmental change. Systemic adaptation was particularly pronounced during the Kangxi period. One primary reason was the exhaustion of ginseng in Ula and Ningguta between 1684 and 1685, when only 156 Shengjing diggers were active. The reasons are not difficult to comprehend if a 1694 report of over 5,000 authorized foragers gathering root on behalf of their noble patrons or contemporary assertions by Heilongjiang military governor Sabsu of over 30,000 diggers are accurate. The state had already reduced banner authority over alpine ginseng fields by ending the allocation of specific ginseng mountains to each of the eight banners for exclusive foraging around the same time exhaustion surfaced in 1684. The apparent motive was to tighten field access, certified through a permit system largely instituted during the Kangxi reign, to stop infiltration by illicit diggers.

The natural limits of these measures, however, is suggested by the shift of gathering to new, less convenient locales farther northeast on the Ussuri river.[47]

Another major change occurred in 1709 when foraging was formally militarized with the certification of 1,300 Buteha Ula "Manchu troops" in thirteen units with an annual quota of 1,000 *jin* (about 597kg); any surplus would be at the disposal of these self-supporting units. Shengjing would dispatch another 4,000 Manchu troops, who, in conjunction with 4,000 from Ningguta and 2,000 from Ula, would engage in state-supported forage of another 1,000 *jin* mainly for the Imperial Household Department. Ula foraging, the last major form of banner ginseng gathering, would formally end in 1750. The 300 remaining foragers, whose annual ginseng duties had been resumed in 1746, included 100 troops, who could not find their way to the fields without forager guides. In 1749, exclusive reliance on these troops resulted in a 72 percent shortfall of the 3,000 *jin* quota. A year later the emperor decided that Ula ginseng digging was going on "in name" only and sent the 300 foragers to gather pearls exclusively.[48]

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[47] Yang Bin, *Liubian jilue* (Outline of the Willow Palisade), 3:6b; *Shengjing shenwu*, KX 23.11.20, p. 30, KX 24.3.10, p. 31, KX 33.7.17, p. 62. For permits, see ibid., KX 11.6.28 p. 6, KX 18.6.8, p. 13; GX *HDSL*, 3:727a–b; Symons, *Ch'ing Ginseng Management*, 42; Cong Peiyuan, *Dongbei Sanbao*, 75, 85.

Despite administrative differences between foraging regimes, there was a discernable common bureaucratic principle at work that reconstituted relations between foragers and their forage. Under this system it was possible to deliberate on whether gathering pine nuts and pinecones should be a considered a distinct foraging activity or combined with others. Hunting dogs were assigned state rations.[49] Pearls and stork pinions could be equated in terms of sable pelts, or storks themselves in terms of sea eagles. Some animals could be dropped from these equations entirely as "useless" or be rarified into accounting abstractions when their real numbers declined. Such "unnatural" relations indicate that the Qing state sought to make northeastern forage more exploitable, or legible in James Scott's term, even as it sought to preserve a Manchu cultured nature within a wider ecological context not entirely subject to human control.[50]

Imperial Foraging: The Sustainability of Cultured Nature

The various administrative regimes imposed on foragers do not seem unambiguously intended to preserve a borderland "Manchu" identity. At least some forager groups, like some banner units, were multiethnic. Ratios between the two basic ethnic categories of Han and Manchu are

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[48] Symons, *Ch'ing Ginseng Management*, 11–12; Cong Peiyuan, *Dongbei Sanbao*, 65, 72; *Da Qing huidian shili* (Jiaqing), 700:7943; *Da Qing huidian shili* (Qianlong), 624:100b; *Da Qing huidian shili* (Guangxu), 726b–727a. Both Symons and Cong made major studies of the Qing ginseng regime, but were unable to employ new Manchu documents that have since come to light; moreover they do not always precisely concur, as in the cases cited herein, on the details from their available sources.

[49] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 7:35.91, 11:14.22–24. Dogs were vital for otter hunting and also used to hunt sable and flush out tigers; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 11:14.22–24; Yang Bin, *Liubian jilue*, 3:3.8a; Gao Shiqi, *Hucong dongxun rilu* (Diary of an eastern progress in the emperor's entourage), 106; Fang Shiji, *Longsha jilue* (Frontier notes), 8:4173. Shengjing's game hunters, who mostly pursued deer and wild boar, were literally known as "people who set dogs on game" (M. *niyahašara urse*); Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 13:18.18.

[50] Scott, *Seeing Like a State*, 3–5.

often unclear.[51] Some units give the impression of ethnic uniformity, as among a group of Han fox, goose, and eagle hunters newly settled in Mukden in 1663, or as among a number of Manchu banner units looking for pearls in Jilin in 1686.[52] Qing authorities themselves were sufficiently uncertain about the Buteha Ula ranks to order a detailed inquiry in 1662. One group of 114 was found almost equally divided between Han and Manchu troopers, intermixed with a few Koreans.[53]

Whatever their actual ethnic composition, forager groups generally operated within the sphere of the Manchu banner system in lands exclusively set aside for the livelihoods of banner members and technically barred to Han commoners. The Kangxi emperor bluntly expressed this principle, predicated on ties between identity and forage, in 1712 when he asserted that "Manchu troops can go dig ginseng, Han cannot."[54] Consequently, all banner personnel, regardless of their ostensible ethnicity, were pursuing a borderland "Manchu" lifestyle, which was significantly defined by military and foraging practices that distinguished them from the Han residents of agro-urban China proper.[55]

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[51] See, for example, a 1649 Buteha Ula casualty list; *Manzu lishi dang'an*, 112, #39. Banner detachments sent on elite foraging operations may have been more uniformly Manchu, if the apparently Manchu names of nineteen pine nut gathering troopers from the two yellow banners who were rewarded for their tree-climbing abilities are representative; ibid., 98, #10.

[52] *Qingdai Neige daku*, 1:286, 311–18.

[53] *Qingdai Neige daku*, 1:283–84. With the usual caveats on the problematic relations between banner affiliation and ethnic identity, the composition of the Buteha Ula military garrison in the closing decades of the eighteenth century appears considerably less polarized, with Manchu troops making up 85 percent, Bargut troops from western Heilongjiang making up 11 percent and Hanjun troops making up 4 percent; Ji Yun et al., *Baqi tongzhi* [1786] 2:612–13.

[54] *Shengjing shenwu*, Kangxi 51.3.27, p. 105.

[55] Discussion of Qing ethnic issues, while certainly not ignoring the empire's immense diversity, tend to center on Manchu-Han dichotomies, characterized in terms of race, ethnicity, "constituency," and caste distinctions; Crossley, *Translucent Mirror*, 2–3, 10–14; Elliott, *Manchu Way*, xiv–xv, 2–6; Isett, *State, Peasant and Merchant*, 44, 54–55, 57. This binary focus can elide significant variation within both major categories, particularly as expressed in regional historical contexts in languages other than Chinese. Kangxi-period Manchu-language official reports from the northeast, for example, maintain a reasonably consistent distinction between *niyalma* and *irgen*, which both technically mean "person." *Niyalma* could refer to both banner (i.e. "caste") members and indigenous unaffiliated peoples like Kiler-Ewenki. *Irgen* seems an exclusive reference to Han commoners with neither banner nor tribal affiliations; Heilongjiang Jiangjun yamen dang'an (Archives of the Heilongjiang Military Governor's Office), Kangxi 1–1684:41–53, 228. A concept of ethnic identity that does not primarily depend on the standard Han-Manchu dichotomy seems best able to account for, if not absolutely define, the range of variation visible in documents under discussion here.

This lifestyle was profoundly affected by the demands of state foraging as well as Han demographic and cultural pressure as conditioned by the region's environment. These relations are exemplified in a fox-hunter group's 1668 application for transfer from a Shengjing banner company. The hunters had ended up in Shengjing after a series of state-mandated transfers had split them off from their original group. The hunters' petition described "intolerable" conditions, under which they spent the entire fall and part of the winter, around four months, hunting foxes, then spending an additional two months conveying the tribute to Shengjing and returning to their homes. Monthly musters in Shengjing for mandatory inspection filled the hunters' remaining half-year. All these time-consuming obligations compelled them to traverse an area so large that it left them no time to fulfill their other tribute duty, grain cultivation. Their main complaint was that Shengjing-imposed obligations both to hunt foxes and grow grain constituted an extraordinary and "unbearable" double tax.[56]

Tribute demands imposed on fox hunters may have upset a balance that depended on limited cultivation as a supplement to foraging. A similar dynamic is visible among Salon and Dagur hunters in Heilongjiang, who successfully petitioned to resume hunting for subsistence and pelt tribute precluded by their previous reassignment to cultivation of state fields. Hunter-gatherers did not normally have to spend months each year relaying their tribute and assembling at distant administrative centers for inspection, mainly conducted to supervise additions or reductions in personnel.[57]

Although it is impossible to be certain, there are indications that intensification of hunting and gathering, brought on by standardizing practices in order to fulfill large annual quotas as well as illicit poaching and environmental degradation related to Han migration, seem to have contributed to the depletion of resources. Official concern over resource exhaustion was certainly expressed, as in 1684 when "large masses" of ginseng poachers threatened catastrophic depletion of Ula sable and pearls, and may have actually caused a steep decline in regional fish and pearl forage a decade later.[58]

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[56] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 6:29.39–43.

[57] Manwen lufu, QL 8/2/2; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 7:19.32–33. Foraging supplements are also visible among twentieth-century indigenous peoples; Jean Treloggen Peterson, "Hunters-Gatherer/Farmer Exchange," *American Anthropologist*, 80.2 (June, 1978): 344.

[58] *Qingdai Neige daku*, 1:19.327; *Shengjing shenwu*, Kangxi 23.1.24, 26.

In 1686 Shengjing foragers were relieved of their pine nut tribute, which was to be taken up by Buteha Ula.[59] This decision was probably influenced by quota shortfalls that began to emerge around 1669. The Office of the Imperial Hunt proposed that the shortfall in the annual 200kg tribute be made up through purchase on the private market, as it was autumn and pine nuts were cheap.[60] This suggests that while pine nuts were still common in Fengtian as a whole, they may have been increasingly difficult to find in banner areas exclusively reserved for comparatively intense and highly organized hunter-gatherer tribute operations.

The Office of the Imperial Hunt tended to interpret shortfalls in anthropogenic terms that were centered on human idleness, incompetence, or greed. Thus, the Board suspected a 1670 shortfall in the wild honey quota might be due to "lazy people" who did not make consecutive searches of designated hills as a statutory forager group, but unofficially split up to cover multiple locales simultaneously, and much less comprehensively. The Office also felt that it was possible its honey gatherers were being diverted by their own personal foraging activities. This suspicion reveals the Office's hostility to informal foraging, which it held to interfere with imperial quotas. The solution was an increase in administration through the appointment of an official to oversee honey-gathering activities by this group.[61] In 1690 officials came to a similar conclusion about pine nuts, deciding that some of the throne's own foragers were diverting tribute nuts to commercial Fengtian. In 1747 the Qianlong emperor himself concluded from pelts whose "color was not as it had been" that his pelt foragers were "concealing the good ones," because past poaching by "Russian Orochen" peoples had been stopped.[62]

A general intensification of human labor was the standard bureaucratic response to hunter-gatherer shortfalls even in the face of strong evidence of ecological dearth. The failure of Shengjing's thirty pheasant hunters to fulfill their annual quota of 3,300 fowl by 2,200 birds in 1669 brought a reprimand and an order to go out and try again. The fact that the birds caught were considered too skinny did not affect the Office's deliberations, and it simply issued a standard order that surpluses would be rewarded and shortfalls punished.[63]

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[59] *Da Qing huidian shili* (Jiaqing), 700:7939.

[60] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 7:36.91–92. Of course, the 1694 and 1686 depletions only indicate that the resource base had declined near or below the point making imperial foraging practical, but do not necessarily mean absolute resource exhaustion.

[61] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 8:18.60–62. Wild honey was known as "Manchu honey," probably to distinguish it from the "Chinese (M. *Nikan*) honey" probably raised by beekeepers.

[62] Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu, 86; Qing shilu, Qianlong 11/11/18, 12:641a.

A more pronounced decline occurred in the stork (M. *weijun, Ciconia boyciana*) quota, which was supposed to be fulfilled by 10 men bringing in 150 birds each year. In 1673 the men brought in 112; in 1674, 43; and in 1675 a mere 23.[64] The Office's solution was to press the hunters to bring in more storks over the normal quota of 150 per year to make up for previous shortfalls, despite a report explaining that the quota shortfalls of these years arose from there being too few male storks, presumably the ones most sought after because of the size of their pinions, and too many females. The Office's response was an exhortation to overcome these conditions of what was probably over-hunting.[65]

Storks were among the ten "useless" animals whose capture would be suspended in 1682, four years after this exhortation was issued. Given the precipitously steady decline in the stork quota from 1673, in addition to considerable shortfalls for 1669 and 1670, it may be that storks became useless only after they became scarce.[66] The Kangxi emperor made a relatively unambiguous demonstration of this type of rationale in 1695 in response to a shortfall in the Buteha Ula sable tribute. The emperor noted that "for the past several years sable have decreased because of frequent hunting . . . yet [pelts] are not a necessity, and We have no pressing need for them."[67]

An even more explicit acknowledgement of the excesses of imperial foraging came a century later in 1796 when the newly enthroned Jiaqing emperor was told the only way to obtain pine nuts and pinecones was to cut down trees, then happening throughout the northeast. The emperor

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[63] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 6:3.2–4, 36.55–56.

[64] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 10:41.40.

[65] Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 11:11.20.

[66] In 1669 79 storks were caught; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 7:14.22–23. In 1670 only 39 storks, and 4 sea eagles, which were the administrative equivalent of 8 storks, were caught; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 8:16.56–58.

[67] *Qing shilu*, Kangxi 34.12.19, 5:838a–b. The decline in sable may also have affected regional honey quotas because foragers found many wild honey hives by following the tracks of hungry sable, a skill that in turn was dependent on an adequate snowfall to see the marks; Hei-tu dang, Kangxi 6:26.35–37. A more than 50 percent shortfall in the 1668 honey quota was attributed to inadequate snowfall for sable tracking. The shift from Ningguta north to Ilan Hala (Ch. Sanxing) as the main center for the reception of sable tribute from indigenous tribal peoples, such as the Fiyaka, Hejen, and Kiler-Ewenki, around 1732 may indicate the contraction of sable range to the lower reaches of the Amur where these peoples generally lived. For a study of the considerable pelt trade that developed there, see Wang Dehou, "Qingdai Sanxing difang maoyi shulun" (Overview of local trade in Qing dynasty Sanxing), *Shehui kexue zhanxian/Dongbei lishi yu wenhua*, 4 (1994): 177–83.

decreed an end to this practice and ordered that "a method must be established to climb the trees" instead. Honey gatherers were included in the 1796 decree as well.[68] Bannermen had actually been climbing pines to gather nuts as far back as 1647 and, significantly, being recognized for it. Given the preference of sable for old growth forests, pine felling may also have driven sable elsewhere or even reduced them over time.[69]

While it is difficult to trace the ultimate causes of many accounts of resource depletion in the historical record, shortfalls in pheasants, storks, pine nuts, and sable indicate that imperial foraging, rather than Han poaching, could play a primary role. This is certainly not to minimize evidence for Han encroachment into banner resource enclaves, particularly in search of valuable ginseng and most evident from the mid-eighteenth century on. Banner personnel nevertheless poached as well, and foragers had been regularly warned by the Board of Works from at least 1666 that they were not permitted to cut down trees containing honey, to fish, or even to carry bows and arrows when on ginseng-gathering expeditions. Yet, ginseng cases involving banner foragers emerged, like that of the twelve Plain White Banner honey gatherers apprehended in the wave of violations investigated in the first decade of the eighteenth century.[70]

However, a relatively exclusive focus on ginseng, and especially ginseng poaching, tends to divert attention from dearth of other resources and, consequently, from other causes like imperial foraging. Imperial foraging and Han encroachment could synergistically operate to erode borderland Manchu identity as well as foraging space, and the relations between tree climbing and the gathering of pine nuts and honey are representative. Abandonment of the foraging skill of tree climbing and a commensurate rise in tree felling may both be a response to the steady or increasing demands of bureaucratized hunting and gathering, as well as any commercial market substantially sustained by Han consumption that developed alongside it. Human resources, tree climbers in this instance, are simultaneously degraded as skills incompatible with demands are abandoned, ultimately affecting other members of the ecosystem, like sable, and so creating further declines. A distinct and more sustainable form of relations between people and their environment is gradually eroded mainly to produce substantial quantities in a relatively short time to supply both modes of consumption.

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[68] Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu, 86.

[69] *Manzu lishi dang'an*, 98, #10, 105, #25, 114, #45; *Da-sheng Wu-la zhidian quanshu*, 86. For sable affinity for old-growth forests, see, Buskirk et al., "Winter Habitat Ecology of Sables (*Martes Zibellina*) in Relation to Forest Management in China," 323–24.

[70] *Shengjing shenwu*, Kangxi 5.6.11, p. 1, KX 43.10.12, pp. 99–100. Violations began to emerge just after a 1699 imperial decree suspending all ginseng gathering; ibid., Kangxi 38.2.28, p. 67.

Ethnic and environmental change were interrelated in such instances as not-always-intended effects of the larger program to preserve the cultured nature of Manchuria for the dynasty's exclusive use. The Kangxi reign was a critical period for the onset of pressures and contradictions arising from these changes, which were driven in substantial measure by Qing attempts to maintain its privileged access to the northeast's human and natural resources. While by no means permanently exhausting even the most valuable resources, like ginseng and sable, which persist, albeit in an endangered condition today, the scale of the dynasty's northeastern extractions proved insupportable by the early nineteenth century.[71]

This unsustainable consumption, in addition to Han migration driven in large measure less by culture than by agriculture, was reconfiguring northeastern space and so hybridizing a putatively pristine borderland Manchu identity. The land problem is especially evident in Fengtian, where incomplete and problematic figures indicate that the ratio between registered land cultivated by banner people and Han commoners, respectively, decreased rapidly between 1644 and 1734 from almost 44:1 to a little under 8:1. Land to population ratios almost certainly dropped in similar fashion, and this doubtlessly helped to push nearly 30 percent (just over 734,000) of the whole of Manchuria's population of just under an estimated 2.5 million people into Jilin and Heilongjiang by 1820.[72]

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[71] As late as the early twentieth century, *Panax ginseng* C.A. Meyer is believed to have existed in the wild across a vast area of Manchuria from latitudes 40° to 48° north and longitudes 125° to 137° east; Koren et al., "Inheritance and Variation of Allozomes in Panax Ginseng C.A. Meyer (Araliaceae)," 189. This is approximately the area encompassing the entirety of Qing Dynasty Jilin and roughly two-thirds of Qing Heilongjiang east of Mergen (present-day Nenjiang). The quantity, quality, and accessibility of this ginseng, which might include species of quite different chemical properties such as Siberian ginseng (*Eleutherococcus senticosus*), in imperial foraging terms are, however, unclear. Currently, wild ginseng has almost disappeared from the whole area, which is now roughly split north-south along the Amur between Russia and China.

[72] For figures, Liang Fangzhong, ed., *Zhongguo lidai hukou, tiandi, tianfu tongji* (Chinese historical statistics on population, land, and land taxation), 273; Diao Shuren, "Shilun Kang Qian shiqi liumin chuguan yiken yu dongbei qidi de bianhua" (On shifting land clearance by migrants beyond the passes and the transformation of northeastern banner lands in the Kangxi and Qianglong periods), 227–28; Reardon-Anderson, *Reluctant Pioneers*, 49–50. For some discussions, see Isett, *State, Peasant and Merchant*, 26–27; Diao Shuren, "Lun Qingdai dongbei liumin de liuxiang ji dui dongbei de kaifa" (On the flow of migrants into the Qing

The significance of scarcity nevertheless goes beyond a shortage of forage like pine nuts or ginseng for imperial coffers or even land for cultivators to amount to a shortage of people for imperial military service. In 1804, the prominent Qing official Na-yan-cheng issued a particularly forceful statement of relations between northeastern space, game, Manchu identity, and its hybridization by Han, when he asserted that Manchu proximity to Han residence in southern Manchuria eroded hunting skills, so that Manchus farther north in Jilin were "superior" to those in Fengtian and those in Heilongjiang "superior" to those in Jilin.[73] The Manchu diaspora, manifest here in the policies that seek to orchestrate all these elements, made its commensurate contribution to borderland Manchu hybridization as well.

The regime's cultured nature of imperial foraging maintained in Manchuria was not, however, a coordinated construct of human culture alone. Foraging enclaves and their microclimates functioned as preserves for the interdependency of unique northeastern biodiversity like ginseng and unique borderland Manchu identities like New Manchus. Some Warka refused to lose their quarry along with their old identities. Sable pelts still counted even when they were discarded as a forage material equivalent. The evaluation of stalkers of stork and pheasant was tied directly to their prey's elusiveness, and latently to its fecundity. Banner groups had to choose between maintaining environmental relations with cultivated crops or wild foxes, with distinct hybridizing implications for each alternative.

The zigzags of these environmental relations leave behind as complicated and elusive a trail as that imperial foragers had to rely on in the snow to track sable to acquire wild honey to be taken from intact trees back for ritual presentation and royal consumption in Beijing. The range of interdependencies between species, climate, and culture in this single streamlined example of Manchurian borderland environmental relations ensured that a forage crisis would inevitably include, if not absolutely

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north-east and its exploitation), 32–34; Yang Xulian et al., *Qingdai dongbei shi* (A history of the Qing northeast), 165–85.

[73] *Qing shilu*, JQ 29:700b–01b. Long before in 1777 the Qianlong emperor was expressing concern that the proximity of Jilin to Fengtian's itinerant Han population endangered the former area as a reserve for borderland Manchu identity; Liaoning sheng dang'anguan, ed., *Qingdai Sanxing fu dutong yamen Man-Han wen dang'an xuanbian* (Compilation of Qing Manchu archival selections in Chinese translation from the Sanxing Vice Commander-in-Chief's Office), #4, 133–36.

determine, an identity crisis. For the dynasty, however, the ultimate unit of account for northeastern forage was not sable pelts, much less an equivalent in storks or raccoon dogs, but Manchus, who were in critically short supply by the nineteenth century. By this characteristically Qing measure, imperial foraging had become unsustainable.

Glossary

bao	豹
caibu shan	採捕山
Caibu Yamen	採捕衙門
Da-sheng Wu-la	打牲烏拉
diaopi	貂皮
dongzhu	東珠
Duyu Si	都虞司
fen	分
fengjin zhengce	封禁政策
Fushun	撫順
gong	貢
gong	公
Gong bu	工部
hu	虎
Hu bu	戶部
jin	斤
Kaiyuan	開原
li	里
Liutiao bian	柳條邊
Nanyuan	南苑
Neiwu fu	內務府
Niuzhuang	牛莊
qian	錢
renshen	人參
renshen shan	人參山
Renzu	仁祖
Sanxing	三姓
Wang	王
weilie shan	圍獵山
wuyong shengwu	無用牲物
Xiong	熊
Yu chashan fang	御茶膳房
zhuxuan	珠軒
zi diao	紫貂
Zongguan	總管

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MANCHU EDUCATION

Pamela Kyle Crossley

The title of this chapter contains an intended confusion, indicating both education of unspecified persons in the Manchu language and education of Manchus in unspecified languages.[1] These are separate issues, but they are linked in ways that reveal distinctive aspects of the institutional and ideological lives of the Ch'ing dynasty. To a degree, both the Manchu language and the Manchu people were inventions of the state, which attempted to control their development to serve its inner priorities. These priorities mandated a transformation of Manchu culture from an orally transmitted to a classicized heritage, a program to prepare bannermen generally to serve as the foundation of state administration, and finally a hope on the part of the court to specialize, redefine, and reacculturate the Manchus. The alterations in state outlook that prompted these changes, as well as some of the reasons for the overall failure of these policies, are examined in this chapter.

Language and Authority Under the Ch'ing

The late eighteenth century was a watershed in the development of the programs applied to banner education and the role of the Manchu language in it. The fundamental cause of the changes overseen by Hung-li, the Ch'ien-lung emperor (r. 1736–95), in his very old age may have been an earlier but ongoing movement toward ideological absolutes.[2] Many of these developments fall outside the scope of this chapter, but it is important to understand the two roles that the Manchu language played in the historical and cultural reconstructions of the Ch'ien-lung court. The first role was symbolic. Like the Mongolian great-khans, Hung-li considered himself as ruling a universal realm that had no external boundaries but was internally marked by distinctions of history, culture, and status. A monumental expression of the universal integration of historical particulars—the role of the emperor, or the *čakravartin*, as Hung-li characterized himself—was found in polylingualism. Architecture and literature could equally be put to monumental uses. Like the Mongolian khans before him who had expressed their universalism in displays such as that which survives at Chü-yung Kuan, Hung-li used both. His state was, indeed, heavily dependent on Mongolian, which since Yüan times had remained intimately connected with expressions of imperial universalism in China. Manchu, as the orthographic expression of the origins and nature of the Manchu people, was also a necessary visual component in such displays. One result was a visual ubiquity of Manchu and Mongolian, which is still evident in the architectural relics of Peking and Shenyang. Another result was the symbolic use of literature, publishing, and curatorship.

Manchu was a problematic element in bureaucratic and intellectual life in Ch'ing China. The perception of the late seventeenth- and eighteenth-century emperors was that Manchu noblemen were deficient in the language and Manchu bannermen were becoming all but ignorant of it, while the emperors themselves bore the burden of personally perusing edicts translated into and out of Manchu (and Mongolian) in order to minimize errors resulting from carelessness or incompetence. It is somewhat ironic that this language, which the Manchus themselves wrote with such difficulty and such (for the emperors) traumatizing results, was the descendant of one of the earliest and best-attested languages of the Tungusic branch of the hypothesized Altaic language family.[3] Jurchen was relatively closely related to Evenk, Gold, Orochon, Nanai, and other languages of the tribal peoples of northeastern China and the Soviet Maritime Province and is evidently much more remotely connected to Korean, Japanese, and Okinawan. In Ch'ing and modern times, Manchu has had, apart from the standard language, one important dialect in Sibo, which is recognized by the government of the People's Republic of China as a distinct language.[4] Manchu proper has had many subdialects, from the earliest times to the present day, though the eighteenth-century Ch'ing court did all it could to minimize dialects and all other forms of cultural informality.

Like their Jurchen predecessors, Manchu speakers in areas affected by Chinese commerce or settlement have freely adopted Chinese loanwords, which in a majority of cases have been assimilated—verbs being declined according to Manchu rules, nouns being pluralized according to Manchu rules. The result was an enlargement of the Manchu vocabulary, though the Ch'ien-lung emperor, in particular, lamented the apparent mongrelization of the tongue. Moreover, anyone working with Manchu documents soon comes to realize that many dialectal and colloquial usages were incorporated into certain Manchu writings, and few of these were ever recognized by the compilers of Ch'ing period dictionaries or their derivatives. Such "errors" were likely to be committed by writers who understood the phonetic principles of Manchu and were able to record their own speech. Examination candidates—whether banner or civilian—who took up the practice of memorizing Manchu writings from memorials and copybooks with little or no understanding of the phonetics were likely to pass as competent until their memories failed.[5] It should be stressed that imperial concern for the decline of Manchu was strictly limited to standard Manchu speech (*Ch'ing-yü*, or *kuo-yü*) and writing (*Ch'ing-wen* or *kuo-wen*)—both creations of the court and extensions of its authority—and not to the popular forms of Manchu, Sibo, and the Manchu-Chinese (or Chinese-Manchu) dialects that are known to have survived in Manchu communities into the twentieth century.[6]

The history of the orthographic representation of Jurchen/Manchu has been rather unusual and took its toll on attempts by the Ch'ing state to make Manchus universally literate in Manchu. In the twelfth century, the Jurchens of the northeast created the Chin dynasty and for a time (1121–1234) controlled a portion of northern China. Their language, which was ancestral to Manchu, was written in a script adopted virtually without alteration from the Kitans, whose Liao dynasty the Jurchens had destroyed in 1121. The Kitans had spoken a language more closely related to Mongolian, probably, than to any other surviving language. As such it was not identical to Jurchen. But as an Altaic language, Kitan was what is often called "agglutinative," meaning that case and tense were established by particle endings on words (as well as by other devices), and thus in its basic grammatical structure resembled Jurchen. By contrast, medieval Chinese was monosyllabic and without case particles. The Kitans had devised a so-called "large-character" script, which used ideographs derived from Chinese but unintelligible to the Chinese. They also created a "small-character" script that contained phonetic elements compounded in a schematic form conceptually resembling the *han'gul* script of Korea, with particle markers.[7] This small-character script was adopted by the Jurchens, who over the course of time made small alterations to bring it into greater agreement with the special characteristics of Jurchen itself. During the course of the Jurchen Chin dynasty, it appears that Jurchen translations of the Chinese works *I-ching, Shu-ching, Shih-ching, Lun-yü, Li Chi, Meng-tzu, Lao-tzu, Yang-tzu, Wen-chung-tzu, Ch'un-ch'iu, Liu-tzu, Hsin T'ang-shu, Shih-chi, Han-shu*, and *Chen-kuan cheng-yao* (see also

Elman, chap. 4 of this volume) were completed. Some material from these works was the foundation for the Jurchen-language *chin-shih* examinations, under which Jurchens competed for appointment to bureaucratic office.[8]

The Jurchen script survived the downfall of the Chin dynasty (which was destroyed by the Mongols in 1234) and had at least some official recognition under the Yüan, who carved *dhārani* in the language on major gateways and other monumental displays. In Ming times, it was the official mode of communication between the Jurchen functionaries of the *wei-so* system in the northeast and the Chinese court; the Yung-ning Ssu, at the military settlement in present-day Heilungkiang province, was inscribed in Chinese, Mongolian, and the Jurchen script.[9]

In later times, however, Jurchens protested against the use of the medieval script in official communications. The Chien-chou Jurchens from whom the early Ch'ing state arose, for instance, were part of the eastern Jurchens—those who were in much closer contact with the Yi Korean court than with the Chinese—who had lost this script. The point at which they ceased to use it is unclear, but the "translators' bureaus" (*ssu-i kuan*) received a communication from the western Jurchens in 1444 that stated, "Nobody out here in the forty garrisons (*wei*) understands Jurchen script, so please write to us in Mongolian (*ta-ta*) from now on."[10] Korean emissaries to the headquarters of the Chien-chou chieftains in the late sixteenth century had noted repeatedly that the headmen demanded communications not in Jurchen but in Uigur-script Mongolian. It is evident that the Jurchens actually spoke Jurchen but for purposes of written communication translated their tongue into and out of written Mongolian.

Cultural legend attributes the great change in this policy to Nurgaci. It is reported that one day in 1599 he had the idea of using the phonetic Mongolian script to write not Mongolian but Jurchen and instructed two of his *baksi*, or literate men (from Mongolian *bagshi* and ultimately from Chinese *po-shih*), Gagai and Erdeni, to devise a suitable system. The two men demurred at first, protesting that the present method of using Mongolian was ancient and seemed in no need of alteration, which caused Nurgaci to thunder, "The Chinese write their own speech, the Mongols write their own speech. Are you telling me that it is better for us all to continue learning and writing a foreign language than for you to find a way for us to write our own?" The two learneds, according to tradition, withdrew and devised a new Jurchen script.[11] Thus, the construction of Nurgaci's role as cultural interventionist provides both a chronological horizon for Manchu civilization and a model for the Ch'ing ruler. The creation of a new script for Manchu was the historical marker for the end of the Jurchen language and the beginning of Manchu. And the regional particularism in Nurgaci's expression would remain, to the end of the dynasty and beyond, a well from which Ch'ing authority would continue to be drawn.

The shift to the new script was troublesome, and there is no evidence that an upsurge in literacy among Jurchens ensued. The Koreans, who knew both old Jurchen and Mongolian, did not know this new thing, and for a considerable time foreign communications were handled just as they had been before; Mongolian remained the *lingua franca*.[12] Moreover, the new device, which like all of its Syriac-derived ancestors up to Mongolian was unvocalized, confused many readers who could not easily associate the written word with the spoken, partly due to the impracticability of using Mongolian vowel harmony in deciphering Jurchen words. Not until 1632 did [Giolca] Dagai, with license from the next khan, Hung Taiji, begin to invent a means of vocalizing the script by the addition of circles and dots, which was thereafter called the "circled and dotted script" (*tongki fuka i hergen*).[13] This allowed the state, for the first time, to represent the sounds of the language that would soon come to be known as "Manchu."

The design of the state under Nurgaci's successor Hung Taiji made possible the survival of the recently formalized Manchu orthography, and by extension the Manchu language. It was unavoidable that in its early stages the state would be partially dependent on a class of Chinese and Korean scribes who were competent in Chinese, Mongolian, the new Manchu script, or all three. There seems, however, to have been a strong desire to bring an increasing number of state functions into the hands of Jurchen/Manchus. Together with the apparent nationalism voiced by Nurgaci, this political concern may have been the impetus behind the creation of a formal Manchu literature, education and examination programs in Manchu and for Manchus, the elaboration of state organs accommodating selected political traditions of the northeast, the primary military role of the bannermen, and the strategic advantages and increasing symbolic significance of Manchu as a medium of official communication. Translations from Chinese into Manchu proceeded apace with the development under Hung Taiji of a bilingual bureaucracy, which was completed as the "civil departments" (*wen-kuan*) in 1636. The first Board of Appointments (*li-pu*) was headed by [Suwan Gūwalgiya] Garin (Kang-lin), who was granted a *chü-jen* degree in 1634. Together with two other Manchus and three Oirat Mongols who had learned Mongolian script, all *chü-jen*, he continued to draw up the plans for elaboration of the civil government. For the state to grow, examinations had to be established, and it appears that the first examination of Manchus, Mongols, and Chinese martial bannermen was held at Mukden in 1638.[14] The content of subsequent examinations, in both Manchu and Chinese, was established by Cabuhai and Giyanghedei in 1639.[15]

The continuing functions of Manchu in the Ch'ing state and in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Chinese society were sufficient to continue the need for at least limited education in Manchu. Indeed, as the state bureaucracy, and particularly its interior communication channels (and the system of "secret memorials" refined by the K'ang-hsi emperor) became more elaborate in the very late seventeenth and earlier eighteenth centuries, Manchu began to take on a greater documentary role than ever before. State organs such as the Court of Colonial Affairs (*tulergi golo be dasara jurgan, li-fan yüan*) and the Grand Council (*cooha-i nashûn i ba, chün-chi-ch'u*), both of which represented Ch'ing innovations in the imperial bureaucratic structure, continued in the use of documentary Manchu and Mongol for reasons of both strategy and protocol.[16]

There are other aspects to the role of Manchu in the middle Ch'ing period that deserve mention.[17] It was preferred that ritual communications (for example, *ch'ing-an che*) from garrison officers to the court be accomplished in Manchu, and most administrative matters for the Eight Banners were handled in the language. It was also the normal medium of diplomatic exchange between Russians and Chinese officials before the Treaty of Aigun in 1727 and was used by tributary states in their communications to the Ch'ing court.[18] The role of the language in governance made it necessary that a certain number of civilian bureaucrats be educated in Manchu, and selected recipients of the *chin-shih* degree were normally sent to the Hanlin Academy for instruction. It has not been sufficiently noted in previous scholarship that it was usual for high-ranking civilian administrators to have had some training in Manchu and that evidence of such preparation can be found in the backgrounds of virtually all the outstanding bureaucrats of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. A formal application of Manchu and Mongolian skills was demanded by the Ch'ien-lung court in the Four Treasuries (*Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu*) program of the later eighteenth century. Related to this, extant materials also suggest that Manchu readers—whether banner or civilian—exerted themselves to create and maintain a field of recreational literature that went far beyond what the state was requiring. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a private scholarship of Manchu and Mongolian emerged, clearly prompted by interests in geographical questions—as when Kung Kung-hsiang took up the study of the two languages in order to augment the strategic geographical treatises of his father Kung Tzu-chen—and comparative linguistics, as was the case with Liang Chi (father of Liang Shou-ming) and Wang Kuo-wei. Finally, there was during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in particular an intense foreign interest in Manchu, which was often used as a bridge for the study of classical Chinese texts. Trafficking in Manchu materials contributed to the establishment of the great "oriental" collections of Europe, which still contain vast reserves of unexploited materials for the study of Ch'ing culture.[19]

From the earliest times, Manchu education was guided by state priorities. The Ch'ing attempted to provide the pedagogical materials necessary to import Chinese historical, legal, and ethical materials into Manchu and—later—to allow Chinese speakers to manage communications in written Manchu. Following the creation of the Manchu script, there was still no Manchu literary corpus. Hung Taiji commissioned "Confucian officials" (*ju-ch'en*)—who were not "Chinese" exclusively, but included Garin, Cabuhai, and others registered as Manchus—to translate selected works into Manchu "in order to instruct the national population (*kuo-jen*, i.e., bannermen)."[20] Though the original texts are not extant, there are indications that during Hung Taiji's regime the *Hsing-pu hui-tien, Ssu-shu, San-lüeh, Meng-tzu, San-kuo chih, T'ung-chien kang-mu, Hsing-li*, and *Ta ch'eng-ching* were all translated, while the translation of the histories of the Liao, Chin, and Yüan dynasties (from all of which Hung Taiji claimed legitimacy) was ordered.[21] The flagship of Hung Taiji's translation project was the *Chin-shih*, of which Hung Taiji proclaimed himself an avid reader and from which he learned both the necessity and the dangers of bicultural education for the Manchus.[22] Among Hung Taiji's intentions in sponsoring these translations was very obviously a program for the importation and legitimation of terms and concepts, primarily emperorship and its corollaries, that were not well established within the later Chin khanate.

The postconquest state continued to facilitate the creation of pedagogical aids for the study of Manchu. The K'ang-hsi emperor had authorized the compilation of a glossary, published in 1708 as *Han i araha manju gisun i buleku bithe* (*Yü-chih Ch'ing-wen chien*). One of the most commonly used works was the *Ch'ing-wen ch'i-meng* of 1729. The *Ch'ing-wen hui-shu* (*Manju isabuha bithe*) was authored in 1750 by Li Yen-chi. The earlier K'ang-hsi text was revised and much elaborated in *Han i araha nonggime toktobuha manju gisun i buleku bithe* (*Yü-chih tseng-ting ch'ing-wen chien*), 1772, and [Aisin Gioro] I-hsing's *Manju gisun be niyeceme isabuha bithe* (*Ch'ing-wen pu-hui*) was first published in 1786, then revised and reissued by his son-in-law Fakjingge in 1802.[23]

By virtue of its state-within-a-state structure, the Ch'ing regime preserved the history of and, in some form, the institutions (the Translators' bureaus, the *T'ai-ch'ang ssu*, the *Hung-lu ssu*) that in earlier ages had managed written intercourse with non-Chinese speaking regions. At the interface of the remnant state and the novel state was the role of translators. The Ch'ing had a choice of dependency on Chinese—which in the eyes of the emperors would mean overwhelming historical, ideological, strategic and personal sacrifices—or dependency on translators. This meant systematic cultivation of skills in translation, which was always a problematic proposition. Whether from the vantage of northeastern culture or of Chinese classicism, a translator's status was inferior. In the early Ch'ing, state translators were normally captured (and often enslaved) Chinese, Koreans, or Mongols who worked as high-level factotums for the princes and khans. The unrealistic and unrealized hope of the early emperors was that bannermen would be adept at all imperial languages and so would be spared the degradation of either serving as translators or needing the services of translators. For Chinese officialdom the question of translators was equally distasteful, not in the least because of its obvious association with conquest regimes. China had long had translators, and though they had never been a caste, as they were for a time in Korea, they remained condemned by, and in the shadows of, the examination elite.[24]

The early history of interpreting and translating in China can be only partially reconstructed, but it appears to have been recognized as a profession only in the T'ang period. Translation and management of tributary ritual were amalgamated through similar departments during the Sung era, until the destruction of the institutions of translation and ritual subordination under the Yüan. The Ming claimed to restore the ritual congruence of sovereignty over foreign peoples and the translation of foreign scripts, but there is reason to believe that, contrary to the ideology of the Hung-wu court in particular, Mongolian remained a significant consideration. Certainly, in their communication institutions the Ming were quick to adapt to the strategic importance of competence in Mongolian. A preliminary measure was continuation of the Mongolian Hanlin Academy, chartered at Nanking in 1376, which remained distinct from the translators' bureaus that were revived in 1407. Though attached to the regular Hanlin, the translators' bureaus themselves enjoyed no improvement in their reputation.[25] Their task was not regarded as important, and the faculty and students were so irresponsible that in 1580 they were denounced by their own director, Li K'ai-hsien.[26]

Though their pre-conquest experience with the translators' bureaus engendered a certain contempt for the institution in the Manchus, the Ch'ing decided, for reasons that may have been more ideological than anything else, to retain them. The purpose of the translators' bureaus under previous dynasties, after all, had been to isolate and thus denigrate visual representations of foreign cultures, and the Ch'ing had uses for such an institution. Indeed, Tso Mou-ti, when he arrived at Peking in 1645 on a mission from the Ming remnant court in the south, was directed straight to the translators' bureaus.[27] They were, however, a tiny and hollow appendage within the imperial bureaucracy. Certain languages—Mongolian, Manchu, and Tibetan for the early dynasty, these three plus Uigur for the later dynasty—were taken extremely seriously by the Ch'ing, and the embarrassing history of the translators' bureaus was not permitted to encumber communications in the these languages. In the period of their early state formation, the Ch'ing had developed their own Mongolian Bureau (*monggo yamun* [*monggo i jurgan*], *Meng-ku ya-men*), which after 1638 became the Court of Colonial Affairs (*tulergi golo be dasara jurgan*, *li-fan yüan*) and expanded its jurisdiction to Turkic, Tibetan, and in some cases Russian affairs. Thus, in the Ch'ing period the translators' bureaus retained a symbolic and curatorial role, but all bureaucratic functions that they occasionally had been intended to fulfill were superseded by new forms, many of which had evolved in the predynastic period.

Whether in domestic, tributary, or diplomatic matters, the Ch'ing court was scrupulous in denying the historical claim of Chinese as the sole vehicle of imperial expression. It was an ancient and constituent role of the Ch'ing khanship that the Manchu language should be actively nurtured, but Mongolian (for its historical link to the great khans and to the contemporary Mongol nobility), Tibetan (for its access to the spiritual legitimacy of the Ch'ing), and Uigur (as the expression of Ch'ing sovereignty over Central Asia) all became profoundly valued, while Chinese (as a vehicle of ethical self-validation of the Chinese bureaucracy) was certainly indispensable. Indeed, in the eighteenth century, as the court became more explicit in its formal claims to universalism, the emperorship's "simultaneous" (*kamciha, ho-pi*) expression in two or more languages took on a fundamental symbolic role in the imperial culture. But the court was not precise or consistent in its ascription of language use to sectors of society. Until the middle eighteenth century, languages in the imperial scheme were linked to function and, to a certain extent, to taste—not to identity. The reformism of the Ch'ien-lung era was too late and, in terms of social impact, too superficial to alter the evolution of cultural identities that had taken on vitality and momentum in the century and a half since the conquest.

"The Eight Banners take *ch'i-she* as their root, to their left is *wu*, to their right is *wen*."[28] This retrospective and not altogether graceful formulation from "Draft History of the Ch'ing" (*Ch'ing-shih kao*) attempts to summarize the very contradictory state objectives in education of the bannermen. The educational policies laid out by the Ch'ing court for the banner populations in the early postconquest period were a weathervane of the uncertain direction of the early regime in China. What is obvious is that the state did not envision a career for the bannermen in China proper that in any important way resembled that of the Mongols under the Yüan dynasty. The nobility was not enfeoffed in China proper, the military population was not given direct land rights, and the economic life of the Manchus underwent a profound and irremediable transformation after the immurement of the population in the Chinese provinces. The common ranks of the soldiery were in permanent occupation of the country and made none of the economic contributions that had been part of their role in the northeast. And the elite of the military sector were subjected to a series of educational policies whose purposes can be misunderstood if they are removed from the general context of Manchu social development in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

Banner Education and the Conquest State

In the early postconquest period, the court hoped that the bannermen would learn to serve as an omnifunctional governing class. Banner officers were instructed to learn Chinese, the better to manage state affairs. The K'ang-hsi emperor, whose official profile was that of an exemplar in combining both military and civil brilliance, was uncompromising in his demand that the bannermen should follow his model. "The Manchus take riding and archery as the root (*pen*), and this was originally no impediment to book learning. Those bannermen examined as *hsiang* and *hui* candidates should also be required to show proficiency in riding and archery."[29] The book learning in question was Chinese classical studies. Though there were deviations from the policy during the K'ang-hsi and Yung-cheng reigns, as late as the 1750s the Ch'ien-lung emperor was still assuming that Manchu was the first language of most Manchus and that the only advances to be wrought through education were improvements in the bannermen's grasp of Chinese. Several misapprehensions underlay this program, but there is little evidence that they were explicitly recognized. Rather, they were merely superseded by new state ambitions of an even more unattainable nature.

Whatever functions the examinations for bannermen may have served in terms of identifying and cultivating talent, their administration was also affected by social and political developments. The court never stated an intention of supporting a growing banner population forever. On the contrary it seems to have utilized the examinations as a means of attracting a certain proportion of men (and their families) out of the garrisons and out of the military altogether, to become self-supporting in the world of civilian officialdom. In accord with this aim, incentives were often applied, though the examinations never became as attractive for the bannermen as the court hoped. Preferential routes for Manchus into the bureaucracy were a reflection of the early state strategy to gradually diminish the dependent banner population. A more acute example of the social and political significance of the examinations was the changing design of quotas in such a way as to sharply restrict the access of Chinese martial bannermen, a policy that was consonant with a host of social and ideological developments of the early and middle Ch'ing periods. The result was the progressive elimination of a significant portion of the Chinese martial population from the banner rolls by the late eighteenth century. Vacant places went, in a majority of cases, to Manchus. The very large advantage given to Manchus in the examinations becomes quite distinct when illuminated by figures recently published suggesting that in the immediate postconquest period the Chinese martial bannermen may have represented as much as 40 percent of the military population; in the decades immediately following the conquest of northern China, their numbers may have ballooned to as large a proportion as 70 percent.[30] Manchu bannermen were enticed to use the quotas and—when they were available—the special banner examinations to transfer themselves to the bureaucracy, while Chinese martial bannermen (who were given a large role in the first decade of governing because of their expertise in the use of Chinese) were gradually deterred from use of the banner quotas and examinations.

As early as the reign of Hung Taiji, maturation of the civil bureaucratic institutions had established an examination for the selection of prospective banner officers. The role of examinations remained small in the ensuing years, however, as clan affiliation, hereditary status, and merit gained in the ongoing campaigns of conquest continued to be the more powerful determinants of elevation within the banners. Two major factors enlarged the role of examinations after 1644. The first was the consolidation of the conquest in northern and inland regions, narrowing the theater of battle merit and making systematic selection by examination necessary. Second, the establishment of the garrisons both at the capital and in the provinces created an unprecedented demand for new officers to administer the stations.

In 1643, Hung Taiji had decreed that literate bannermen should be sent to the academy (*shu-yüan*) in Shun-t'ien (Abkai Imiyangga) prefecture, which remained the center for all banner examinations until 1814. They were permitted to take the *hsiang-shih* there, and those who succeeded in the examinations eventually became officials; this remained the policy until 1657. For a brief period, a special examination was devised for bannermen featuring the option to do all work in Manchu. In fact, the bannermen were poorly prepared for the special examinations, and between 1659 and 1675 the banner examinations were sometimes held, sometimes not, depending on whether a minimum of candidates could be collected. From 1663 to 1685, the bannermen were again allowed to participate in the Shun-t'ien *hsiang-shih*.[31] Absolute quotas for the banner *hsiang* examination were established in 1653 at fifty Manchus, fifty Chinese martials, and twenty Mongols, which was afterward altered to a proportional quota of one in five for Manchus and Chinese martial, and one in four for Mongols. After readmission of bannermen to the civil *hsiang-shih* at Shun-t'ien, absolute quotas were reestablished for bannermen in 1671, when they were fixed at fifty each for Manchus and Chinese martial, and twenty for Mongols.[32]

In 1669, a primary distinction was made for the first time between Manchus and Mongols on the one hand and Chinese martial on the other: the *man-tze hao* was thereafter to apply to Manchus and Mongols and the *ho-tze hao* to Chinese martial, each of which comprised ten places. In comparison to the evident population of the Chinese martial, this ratio was a distinct disadvantage to them and adumbrated the gradual narrowing of their opportunities (often through reversal of Mongol and Chinese martial ratios) through the eighteenth century. A very small number of bannermen generally went on to the *hui-shih*, and in 1662 the Board of Appointments (*li-pu*) attempted to make the *chin-shih* more attractive by stipulating that *baksi* (erudites) and *bithesi* (lit., "scribes," but trained to serve as clerks and translators as well) who participated in the examinations would automatically become sixth and seventh *pin* officials and would concomitantly be released from military service. Three years later, the lineage leaders (*mukūnda, tsu-chang*), under the jurisdiction of the garrison yamens, were instructed to act as leaders in preparing bannermen for the new *hui* and *hsiang* examinations.[33] All preliminary examinations for bannermen were also to be held within the Shun-t'ien jurisdiction, and for the *sui* and *k'o* held before 1661, the following absolute quotas pertained: Manchus, and Chinese martials 120 each, Mongols sixty. During the K'ang-hsi period, this was altered—and, importantly, the ratios of the Mongols and Chinese martial were reversed—to Manchus and Mongols forty each, Chinese martial twenty.[34]

In 1687 the Board of Appointments (*li-pu*) drew up a new plan for banner participation in the examinations, and under the terms of this new design bannermen took the examinations of 1688. The effect of the *man-tze hao* was to cause Manchu and Mongol candidates to be graded in one group (*pang*) rather than separately as they had been before.[35] It was also stipulated that Manchus and Mongols could take the Chinese or the Manchu examinations, and absolute quotas for the *hui-shih* at Mukden (after which candidates could join the *tien-shih* at Peking) were fixed at twenty each for Manchus and Chinese martial, ten for Mongols. At the same time, it was ordered that the banner *hsiang-shih* be reinstituted, and *baksi* and *bithesi* serving in a yamen were required to prepare for the Mukden *hui-shih*.[36]

The plan of 1687 seems to have been the court's nearest approach to actually being rooted in *ch'i-she* yet balanced between *wen* and *wu*. It allowed garrison and provincial officials to ascertain that candidates were to some degree proficient in horsemanship and archery, since they were examined separately on these skills before being admitted to the *k'o, sui*, or *hsiang* examinations. At this time, bannermen participating in the *man-tze hao* were required at both the *hsiang* and *hui* levels to prepare an examination essay in either Manchu or Mongolian. Chinese martial candidates had to prepare one essay each on calligraphy and the arts as well as one on the Classics. In fact, it appears that the introduction of a Manchu or Mongolian essay presented an option to Chinese martial as well as civilian candidates to demonstrate their skills in these languages, an opportunity that was in at least a few instances exploited. The open *hsiang* and *hui* examinations, to which bannermen could be admitted after satisfactory demonstration of martial skills and to which they had to contribute an essay in either Manchu or Mongolian if they were participating in the *man-tze hao*, remained the general pattern through the late eighteenth century, though it was suspended for short periods of experimentation.

A proportional quota for the *hui-shih* was introduced in 1744 that limited Manchus and Mongols to one successful candidate per ten aspirants, with absolute totals of no more than twenty-seven, while Chinese martial successes could number no more than twelve.

An additional route to the *chü-jen* and *chin-shih* degrees was offered by the gradual refinement of the "translators" or *fan-i* examinations. In 1653, when the first bannerman's *hsiang-shih* was held, those who did not know Chinese wrote an essay in Manchu and then progressed to preparation for the special *hui-shih*. The *fan-i* examination was first introduced in 1661; students translated either from Manchu into Chinese or from Chinese into Manchu. In 1722, *fan-i* degrees were introduced at *sheng-yuan*, *chü-jen*, and *chin-shih* levels. There seems to have been a fear that devoting a certain portion of the examination to translation, which was after all a technical skill like mathematics or astronomy, would lower the intellectual cachet of the test. In 1738, the provision was therefore added that besides the translations there must be an original composition, limited to three hundred words, in Manchu. In 1742, it was ordered that each first sitting of the *hui-shih* also require a Manchu essay on the Four Books (Ssu-shu), the Filial Classic (*Hsiao-ching*), and the "Principles of Nature" (*Hsing-li*); the second sitting concentrated on translation skills. All banner *kung-sheng*, *chien-sheng*, and *bithesi*, whether Manchu or Chinese martial, were required to participate in the *hsiang-shih*. Both those prepared for the regular examinations and those who had prepared for the military examinations but could also translate were eligible for the *hui-shih*, so long as all had passed their tests in riding and archery, as the regulations required.

A Mongolian option was added to the *fan-i* track in 1730.[37] Thereafter in *hsiang-shih* and *hui-shih*, Mongols could translate selections from the Four Books from Manchu into Mongolian. This was slightly altered in 1735, when it was decreed that Mongols would sit for the translation examination on the "Principles of Nature" (*Hsing-li*) and "Lesser Learning" (*Hsiao-hsueh*) together with the Manchus but would be graded as a separate group. Whatever the motive for the comparative leniency in examining Mongols, it was also reflected in the contemporary quotas, which stood at 33 out of 500 or 600 for Manchus in the *hsiang-shih* and 6 out of 50 or 60 for Mongols. In reality, there were never enough participants from either group, and as further incentive it was stipulated that those who participated in the *hui-shih* examinations would automatically become secretaries (*chu-shih*) in one of the Six Boards. From 1757 to 1778, the *fan-i* examinations were suspended because of lack of interest among the bannermen and poor performance by those who participated. After 1778 they were reestablished with some minor modifications and continued as an institution to the end of the nineteenth century.[38]

A factor in the disappointing performance by bannermen in the examinations was the failure of the state to devise a universal, effective means of elementary education for the banner populations—a failure that is possibly akin to the absence of state-sponsored elementary educational institutions in the civil sector but also is characteristic of many aspects of garrison financing. Instead of creating a school system, the state created and supervised the examination system on the apparent principle that control of standards through the medium of the examinations obviated control of the institutions of education (and responsibility for their maintenance).

The system of schools authorized by the Ch'ing for the education of imperials, nobles, and bannermen might best be conceived of as a set of concentric circles, which from the center out represent decreasing degrees of prestige, state aid, and political demands. The model for most of the education programs was the National Academy (*kuo-hsueh*), an adjunct institution of the National University (*kuo-tzu chien*).[39] It was originally chartered for the education of those who had been ennobled by the court, a status that in the aftermath of the conquest encompassed a great many people within the loose confines of the banner world. In spirit and design, it was the direct descendant of the Mongolian National University (*Meng-ku kuo-tzu chien*) under the Yuan, to which the old Mongolian Hanlin Academy had been attached and where Mongolian nobles were educated. It should be emphasized that a characteristic of Ch'ing relations with the bannermen generally also marked the policies of the National Academy with regard to banner enrollment: attendance at the school was largely voluntary, and those who were "of a mind to study" were invited to enroll.[40]

In time, Manchu students' and instructors' statuses were defined within the Academy. The curriculum, derived from that devised by Cabuhai and Giyanghedei in the preconquest period and adjusted to encompass the territory of the civilian examinations, comprised the Four Books, Five Classics (*Wu ching*), *Principles of Nature* (*Hsing-li*) *Comprehensive Mirror* ([*Tzu-chih*] *T'ung-chien*), Thirteen Classics (*Shih-san ching*), and Twenty-one Histories (*Erh-shih-i shih*), all of which could be studied in either Manchu or Chinese. The bannermen chosen for study at the National Academy were all officers, and their number was extremely small. At the entry level, then, the National Academy worked to parallel and reinforce the profound stratification that characterized the structure of both the banners and the garrisons. After completing the primary course, students concentrated successively in the National Academy's two subdivisions of astronomy (*t'ien-wen*) and mathematics (*suan-hsueh*).[41] In 1739, the mathematics division, to which students went last, is reported to have enrolled fifty-two students, along these quota lines: twenty Manchus, twenty civilians, six Mongols, and six Chinese martial bannermen. The study text was the "Imperially Commissioned Selection of Standard Writings on Numerical Principles." Banner students who completed the mathematics section were to be replaced with students from their own banners.[42]

The next circle in this schematic conception of elite schools would represent the Imperial Clan Academies (*tsung-hsueh*), which were, in form if not in name, an innovation required by the inner constitution of the Ch'ing state.[43] Here, the sons of men who satisfied the formal requirements for being members of the Imperial Clan were educated according to the strictest cultural requirements of the court. The Imperial Clan Academies remained the last bastion of high standards of *ch'i-she* and when, under Hung-li, cultural formalism struck, it struck the Imperial Clan Academies first and hardest. Members of the imperial clan were liable to be punished if they were found lacking in military skills. Given the high priority placed on the education of Aisin Gioro clansmen, it is yet characteristic of the Ch'ing that the Imperial Clan Academies—though under the jurisdiction of the Imperial Clan Court (*tsung-jen fu*)—were not supported by the state but by the Eight Banners. Each banner was commissioned to establish its own Imperial Clan Academy in 1654, and Manchus who had already qualified as *sheng-yuan* were chosen as instructors.

All *tzu-ti* of the imperial clan who had not been ennobled and who were older than ten *sui* were to enter the school to study literary Manchu.[44] In 1724, the system was established in which the left and right divisions at Peking supported both a Manchu and a Chinese school, each to be overseen by an Aisin Gioro nobleman. These new schools received the *tzu-ti* of the princes (*wang*), nobles (*kung*), garrison generals-in-chief (*chiang-chün*), and unemployed (*hsien-san*) Aisin Gioro who were younger than eighteen *sui* and instructed them in Manchu, Chinese, and *ch'i-she*. The overseer and his assistants were to be chosen from the imperial clan on the basis of seniority. Two Manchu instructors were to be chosen from unemployed banner officers or from among *chin-shih, chü-jen, kung-sheng*, or *chien-sheng* holders who were adept at translation. Two *ch'i-she* instructors were also to be appointed, chosen from among unemployed banner officers or from the ranks of active Imperial Guard (*hu-chün*) officers who were excellent in archery. Each school had ten students with one instructor of Chinese (appointed for three years) chosen by the *li-pu* by examination of *chü-jen* or *kung-sheng*. In 1734, the two schools were assigned two Hanlin scholars each to oversee the curriculum, and on alternate days they lectured first on interpretation of the Classics and then on composition.

The problem of finding suitable employment for the lowlier members of the enormous imperial clan made the examinations administered to the students of the Imperial Clan Academies a priority. In 1736, the Left and Right schools were each assigned a permanent principal and there were monthly examinations on interpretation of the Classics, translation, and archery. It was determined in 1745 that every five years an official of the Imperial Clan Court (*tsung-jen fu*) was to be appointed to examine the two schools together, and the ranks were to be registered as *hui-shih* and *chung-shih*. In each year that the *hui-shih* was administered, the students of the schools were to be examined together with the *fan-i kung-sheng* of the banners, and those chosen as *chin-shih* could be employed in any branch of government. Those who studied Chinese were examined together with all other scholars in the palace examination, and those taking first class honors (*chia-ti*) were appointed to the Hanlin Academy.

In 1746, the court noted that those studying Chinese and translation in the Imperial Clan Academy had inelegant composition in Manchu. Adumbrating future changes, Hung-li said:

> Our dynasty esteems martiality as its primary occupation. *Tzu-ti* of the imperial clan must be thoroughly versed in literary Manchu, and they must be experts at *ch'i-she*. I am frankly concerned that those who study Chinese will gradually become lost in Chinese ways. The Shun-chih emperor once ordered us to stop studying Chinese, the better to serve our primary interests, rather than decline to a state of dissolution (*fou-hua*). From now on, *tzu-ti* of the imperial clan may not study Chinese. They are strictly required to study the military arts in order to preserve themselves as tools for the use of the state.[45]

Enrollment for the Imperial Clan Academies at Peking was fixed in 1747 at sixty students for the Left Wing and sixty students for the Right. By 1756, the prohibition on the teaching of Chinese changed the status of the nine Chinese instructors to instructors of translation, and *ch'i-she* instructors were increased to one per banner.

A similar philosophy of Ch'ing elite banner education dominated the next ranked school, the Gioro Academy (Chueh-lo *hsueh*), where the descendants of the paternal uncles of Nurgaci were educated. Instruction was patterned after that in the Imperial Clan Academy and Gioro bannermen were subjected to fines if they were found incompetent in *ch'i-she*. The academy, established in 1729 adjacent to the garrison offices in the inner city of Peking, had both a Manchu and a Chinese school. Gioro *tzu-ti* ages eight to eighteen *sui* could enter to study reading, writing, and archery. The overseer was a prince or nobleman and examinations were held in the spring and fall. Every three years, the Gioro students were subjected to examination along with the imperial clan students and divided between the advanced and the deficient. When their studies were completed, they were to participate together with the bannermen in the *sui* and *hsiang* examinations and to compete together for employment as bureaucratic secretaries (*chung-shu*) or banner clerks (*bithesi*). The quotas seem to have reflected proportional Gioro representation within the respective Manchu banners.[46]

Another circle out from the center of the concentric model would represent the academies of the Imperial Household Department (*nei-wu fu*), which governed the bondservant (*boo-i, pao-i*) companies of the Three Superior Banners (*san shang ch'i*). It ran its own officer schools at Prospect Hill (*Ching-shan*) and the Hsien-an Palace (*Hsien-an-kung*).[47] The Prospect Hill Officers' School was established 1685, in two buildings at Pei-shang Gate in the north wall of the imperial city (*huang-ch'eng*). Youths selected from the companies of the Imperial Household Department were eligible to attend, to a total enrollment of 360. Three of the rooms of the school were devoted to instruction in Manchu, with three instructors. Three were devoted to instruction in Chinese, with three instructors. At first, retired officials from the Imperial Household Department were chosen as Manchu instructors, and as Chinese instructors the Board of Appointments (*li-pu*) chose by examination those who were proficient in literary composition. This was later changed so that those secretaries from the Privy Council (*nei-ko*) who were expert in both calligraphy and archery were chosen as Manchu instructors, while Chinese instructors were chosen either from new *chin-shih* or from retired secretaries of the Privy Council. After the Yung-cheng period, Chinese instructors were chosen by examination from the ranks of *chü-jen* and *kung-sheng* for a tenure of three years to be followed by transfer to another department. Students studied for three years. Those who passed in the first class in examinations were employed as clerks (*bithesi*), those who passed in the second class as inspectors (*k'u-shih* or *k'u-shou*). In 1779, Muslim banner companies were permitted to select four expectant students.

The Hsien-an Palace Officers' School (*Hsien-an-kung kuan-hsueh*) was established in 1728 for children from the Imperial Household Department companies and outstanding families of the Eight Banners, and a Mongolian section was added in 1747. The school was located in the vicinity of the Wu-ying Palace inside the Hsi-hua Gate. There were ninety students all together, who were instructed by Hanlin officials living in the Hsien-an Palace. Twelve classrooms were devoted to instruction in spoken Chinese and three to Manchu, each with one instructor in Classics, archery, and literary Manchu. The students were examined by an Imperial Household Department official for employment as banner clerks (*bithesi*, seventh or eighth *pin*) on the same schedule as—but possibly not together with—the Prospect Hill Officers' School. In 1735, it was decreed that Chinese instructors should be recruited from among new *chin-shih*, though not much hope seems to have been held out that aspirants with such lofty credentials would flock to the opportunity.[48] Incentives to attract better instructors were added. Should they complete a three-year tenure at the school, instructors were assured of employment as board secretaries (*chu-shih*) or as magistrates (*chih-hsien*), *chü-jen* as magistrates (*chih-hsien*) or instructors in the civil academies. After 1758, regardless of seniority, students were to take the *fan-i* examinations, then to serve as clerks or assistant inspectors. The number of Chinese instructors was at that time fixed at nine, Manchu at six.[49]

The next circle out encompasses the banner commoners of Peking. They could attend the Eight Banners officers' schools (*pa-ch'i kuan-hsueh*), which were independent of the National Academy, though modeled on it in basic ways. In 1644, it was stipulated that each banner would build a college (*hsueh-she*) and that each company (*niru, tso-ling*) of each banner in Peking would send one student to the college. Of the total number of students (which would have been something over seventy in the seventeenth century), ten were to be tutored in Chinese and the rest in Manchu (the latter category includes those attempting to master classical Chinese for the examinations). The next year the size and scope of the school were reduced; it was ordered that two banners would combine to form one school—that is, there would be four schools all together—and that each school would accept ten students, all preparing to qualify as *sheng-yüan*, in exact parallel to the National Academy program.

In contrast to the larger schools established for Gioro and bondservants, these smaller schools established for commoners actually had fewer places than applicants. Competition for the berths was so intense that students who would previously have qualified on the basis of *en, po, fu*, or *sui* privileges were no longer accepted. When vacancies occurred, only students who were already regular *chien-sheng* were permitted to take the entrance examination. In 1723, the officers' schools added a Mongolian section, selecting sixteen tutors from among the *hu-chün, ling-ts'ui,* and *hsiao-ch'i-hsiao* ranks of the Mongolian banners, and students were chosen by banner to compete in the entrance examination.

By 1728, the Eight Banners Officers' Schools at Peking were reaching their maturity in terms of organization, enrollment, and prestige. The student body had now increased to about eight hundred students, on a quota of one hundred students from each of the Eight Banners. Of these, a strict quota gave a substantial advantage to Manchu students, stipulating that 60 percent of all matriculants be Manchu, 20 percent Mongol, 20 percent Chinese martial. Of the Manchu students, half were to be educated in Chinese and half in Manchu, with the division to follow lines of age; the youngest among the students were to study Manchu and the more experienced were to study Chinese.[50] For support of the schools, thirty Manchu, ten Mongol, and ten Chinese martial cadetships (*yang-yü*) within the banners were abolished and the money was given to students in the officers' schools—a small component in the general banner distribution patterns sharply privileging the elite at the expense of the humbler population. Five instructors of Chinese were assigned to each banner classroom. Interestingly, the matching of ages to languages was reversed. In 1735, it was ordered that younger, more accomplished men join the Chinese division and that men willing to concentrate on translation join the Manchu division. In 1743, the period of study was fixed at three years, after which students were examined and either kept on to study or appointed to bureaucratic rank.

As early as the immediate aftermath of the conquest of Peking, officials of the Manchu garrisons at the capital began to complain that it was inconvenient for bannermen of the various and far-flung installations of the capital garrisons (*ching-shih chi-fu*) to travel to the single, small academy that had been established for education of banner officers in the northeast corner of the inner city. Permission was thereafter given for each of the Eight Banners at Peking to create a conveniently located school (*shu-yuan*) for the education of their own personnel. State plans for a centralized, standardized system of banner education at this time may have been rather grand. Each company was supposed to send a student to its respective school, which, taking into account modern revisions of the probable enrollment in banner companies, would mean that the plan projected education for one out of every two hundred or three hundred actively enrolled bannermen, with a total enrollment of something under six hundred. Of these, half were to be educated in Chinese and half in Manchu. Before this plan could be implemented, however, the state planners quickly replaced it with a much more modest design. The new plan called for one school to be shared by two banners, with only ten students in each school, for a total of forty students.[51] The intention seems to have been to shift the financial burden to the banners themselves instead of the state (a policy characteristic of the banner and garrison support systems generally, which were evolving in tandem with the educational system) and to modify the scale of the enterprise accordingly.[52] We know, too, that the court felt confident at this time that education in Manchu was unnecessary for Manchus and that the primary purpose of these schools was to provide a minimal number of bannermen competent in Chinese, the better to oversee the management of the Chinese-based bureaucracy.

The outermost circle finally touches the banner population of the provinces. Garrison (*chu-fang*) examinations were established in 1645, when all literate bannermen and *tzu-ti* were permitted to go to Shun-t'ien to take the examination. During the Ch'ien-lung period, this was changed to allow provincial generals-in-chief (*chiang-chün*) to first examine the students (on a *sui, k'o* schedule) in *ch'i-she*, after which they were sent to the capital for further examination. The patterns and the objectives of garrison education were controlled by the changes in examination and education policy in Peking, since at the provincial and capital levels (which, geographically, were the same for all bannermen) garrison aspirants were expected to compete with graduates of the schools discussed above. How they prepared themselves for the challenge was their own business, and it is probable that many provincial garrisons very rarely if ever furnished candidates to the Shun-t'ien examination halls since, unlike civilians, the bannermen enjoyed no leverage through geographical quotas before 1814. Anecdotal evidence suggests that in many garrisons education took place either in private academies (*shu-yuan*) within the garrisons, many of which were modeled on traditional Chinese academies and many of which employed Chinese scholars as tutors, or in charitable schools run by the banners and by some clans.

Peking bannermen, too, turned to private academies and charitable schools when they were ineligible for or unsuccessful in gaining admission to the state officers' schools.[53] Standards for *ch'i-she* were enforced by the requirement that provincial generals-in-chief regularly examine their bannermen in martial skills and take personal responsibility for preparing them for the examinations at Peking. This may have put a burden on provincial generals-in-chief that actually militated against the cultivation in the garrisons of candidates for examination and service in Peking.

There is ample evidence that garrison officers were punished when their bannermen appeared at the capital deficient in speaking Manchu or shooting from moving horses; there is, by contrast, no evidence that they were punished if no bannermen at all from their garrisons presented themselves for examination. Whether or not bannermen intended to proceed for examination to the Shun-t'ien jurisdiction, there was a need for literacy in both Chinese and Manchu for the conduct of business at all levels of the garrisons, and a requirement for the rank of "corporal" (*bosokū, ling-ts'ui*) was literacy in Manchu. This was normally attained through elementary education within the garrison academies or charity schools.

Students were expected to underwrite a great portion of the cost of their education, particularly at the most introductory levels. This was sometimes direct, as when students were required to pay in cash or supplies—grain, wood, coal, or peat, for instance—for their lessons, but was more often indirect, as garrison and banner administrations were required to found and maintain state-controlled schools. A small number of student stipends were supplied by the state. Stipends and annual rates of increase were established for the Chinese martials in 1643 (very soon after the Chinese martial banners were created) and for the Manchus and Mongols in 1671. Chinese martial stipends were normally awarded at a ratio of half the number awarded to Manchus or Mongols in any given year—again, grossly out of relationship to the proportion of the banner population they represented. For Chihli province—where the capital garrisons were located—the stipends and additional quotas were set at forty per *fu*, thirty per *chou*, twenty per *hsien*, ten per *wei*.[54] Students of high standing who had been in residence six years or less were eligible to receive stipends. This meant, in practice, that two failures—in some cases, one—in the examinations while matriculating would result in a loss of support. Students placing first or second class in the *k'o* examinations were given a raise in stipend and sent on to the *hsiang* examination. Those bannermen who placed in the third class or below in the *k'o* examination could stay at the school if they paid their own fees; those placing in the fourth class had to leave.

The structural defects of the system described above were evident well before the Ch'ien-lung period. Attempts to enforce systematic education were made only at the capital and affected a tiny portion of the adult males of the banner population. Banner males of eligible age must, at any one of these times, have numbered in the hundreds of thousands, of whom not more than a thousand were being educated in the Peking higher schools. Moreover, the proportional emphasis put on educating Aisin Gioro, Gioro, and bondservants was overwhelming; it appears that in the middle eighteenth century this group represented half of all bannermen attending the higher schools in Peking. More compromising, perhaps, was the profound ambiguity in the design of bannermen education in the earlier dynastic era. As Hung-li in his later reign would articulate many times, it was not really possible for the bannermen or anybody else to be rooted in *ch'i-she* and balanced between *wu* and *wen*. The role of governors once envisioned for the bannermen had faded very early in the Ch'ing period under insurmountable pressures to meet continuing military challenges and to give way in civil affairs to the well-entrenched Chinese bureaucratic class. But the curriculum still demanded not only competence in the Four Books and other foundational works of the civil examinations but also technical competence in military skills, translation, mathematics, and astronomy. Small wonder that few bannermen were attracted by either the challenges or the rewards of the banner educational institutions.

Banner Identity and the Ch'ien-Lung and Chia-Ch'ing Reforms

The centralization and reform of banner education came, technically, after the end of the Ch'ien-lung reign but was in fact overseen by Hung-li and was very clearly imprinted with the new attitudes toward Manchu identity and Manchu culture that he had attempted to inculcate during his period as emperor. Specifically, the early, rather vague notion that bannermen should be adept at all governing skills, whether military or civil, was discarded. The idea of the bannermen as a liberally educated governing class was rejected in the same stroke and replaced by an increasingly specialized understanding of who Manchus were and what they were expected to do. The new reforms prescribed rigorous study of the Manchu language, both written and spoken, and of military skills. The educational programs were very deliberately designed to include *tzu-ti* as well as active or prospective bannermen and, by virtue of this design, claimed jurisdiction over a much broader portion of the Manchu population than could ever possibly have exercised their new skills in service of the state. Unlike his father and grandfather, Hung-li was not primarily interested in improving governance by elevating the competence of the bannermen. He was instead bent on refining the cultural character of the Manchus, who were now in his eyes representative not only of the cultural origins of the Ch'ing but of a dedicated component in his universal realm.

From an early period, the Ch'ing court was wary about allowing inadequately educated bannermen to pervade the court and central bureaucracy. Court distrust of Manchu preparation probably led for a time to favorable employment opportunities for middle-level Chinese martial bannermen in the early Ch'ing period and may have been reflected in the restoration of Chinese martial quotas in 1687.[55] In his turn, Hung-li also denounced bannermen whose accomplishments in Manchu and in Chinese were thin, accusing them of averting the challenges of truly mastering either the Manchu language or military skills or the Chinese Classics by always shifting their specialty.[56] They were not only useless but also, he may have suspected, becoming dangerous; there is a strong continuity with the emperor's suspicions of "rough" literacy, whose effects at the popular level have been vividly explored by Alexander Woodside. Indeed, a large number of mid-eighteenth-century bannermen would have resembled those Miao tribesmen Hung-li denounced in 1751; their education was inadequate for the subtleties of the Four Books but made it " 'very easy' to read Chinese novels and heterodox tracts."[57]

At first, like his father and grandfather, Hung-li had been inclined to encourage more effective study of Chinese and continued his ancestors' practice of rewarding development of Chinese erudition among the bannermen.[58] Later, on the basis of better information about garrison conditions and Manchu performance, Hung-li reconsidered the policies he had inherited and in his own right encouraged.[59] After 1765, he advised bannermen that they need no longer disturb him with notifications of their households' success in the examinations unless the candidates had also distinguished themselves at *ch'i-she*.[60] And again he stressed the primary importance of the Manchu language. "Speaking Manchu is the Old Way (*chiu-tao, fe doro*) of the Manchus," Hung-li admonished four Manchu officials of the *li-fan yüan* who had been unable to keep up their end of an audience in the winter of 1762. Though the K'ang-hsi emperor had established himself as a grand exemplar to the bannermen and frequently demonstrated his literary and military skills before them for their improvement, Hung-li had a very different concept of his relationship to the bannermen. He was a paragon of multiliteracy, the esthete of all cultures, and the universal emperor. They were not. The emperor generalized to them the prohibition on Chinese studies that he had earlier applied to the Imperial Clan Academy. They were to apply themselves to their language, their religion, and to *ch'i-she*. "Whether you have studied classical literature is a matter of no concern to me."[61]

In reemphasizing the Manchu military arts in his reform campaigns, the Ch'ien-lung emperor was to a certain extent building on precedents. The earlier postconquest emperors, concerned about the effect of urbanization upon the bannermen, had made riding and archery part of the formal instruction for all bannermen. Hung-li retained these regulations and further stipulated that they should apply to *tzu-ti* as well as to actively serving bannermen. "We fear," the editors of "Researches on Manchu Origins" (*Man-chou yuan-liu k'ao*) said on his behalf, "that in later days the banner descendants will forget the old order and do away with riding and archery, taking up Han customs."[62] A passing mark in riding and archery was made a prerequisite to admission to the examination halls; imperial clansmen and Gioro Manchus were rewarded for their achievement in riding and archery or punished for inadequacy.

Apart from an increasingly abstract emphasis on physical training, Hung-li had also expressed some real concerns about the impact on the bureaucracies of declining command of Manchu speech. Despite an insistence that bannermen preparing for service in the civil or military bureaucracies learn Manchu orthography, unfamiliarity with the spoken language still wreaked havoc with communications in Manchu and Mongolian. In 1779, Hung-li in exasperation ordered that translations of edicts issued in Mongolian be submitted to him for grammatical review, as was already the practice for Manchu; the emperor proposed to augment his normal duties of edict review by becoming a Manchu and Mongolian language tutor as well.[63]

By the latter part of his reign, Hung-li was well on his way to formalization of what he called the Old Way (*fe doro*) of the Manchus. This, as has been suggested, was an ideological construct, a code of life for the banner population that prescribed immersion in the military arts, the speaking and writing of Manchu, shamanism, and reverence for the clans as the basic elements in the correct life of those who the state identified as Manchus.[64] The educational policies were quickly reformed to promote both the speaking and writing of Manchu as primary objectives. In 1791, Hung-li outlined his plan for the establishment of standard banner officer schools in all garrisons. However, it was not until after his abdication of the emperorship (but during a time in which he still controlled fundamental state affairs) in 1796 that he devoted himself to implementing plans for a centralized, standardized educational system for the garrisons; for the ensuing twenty years, additions to the basic program augmented reform of banner education throughout China.

The reforms began at the higher schools in Peking. At the National Academy (*kuo-hsueh*), where enrollment pressures had continued steadily, crowding within the Inner Department had become a serious problem. In 1796, bannermen and students of families residing in the general neighborhood of the National Academy (that is, within Ta and Yüan *hsien*, which encompassed most of the inner city) were ejected from the Inner Department and told they could thereafter enter only by examination (*k'ao-tao*). Those testing in the first and second ranks could take the second round of tests. First- and second-rank *kung-sheng* as well as first-class *chien-sheng* could also enroll in the Inner Department. This meant that bannermen who had received the *chien-sheng* by imperial favor (*en*) or privilege (*yin*), or who were doing the translation curriculum or equine arts (*ch'i-she*), were excluded even from testing for the Inner Department. Moreover, their tenure in the Outer Department was not assured; three unexcused absences from the compound resulted in expulsion.[65]

Special pressure was put on the elite to respond to the court's new educational imperatives. The Imperial Clan Academy (*tsung-hsueh*), whose enrollments had declined rather dramatically in the later eighteenth century (despite a steady population increase for the imperial clan itself), had ten students (to be attracted by handsome stipends) added to each wing in 1795. Three additional Manchus and four Chinese were assigned as instructors to each school. In 1808, enrollment in each wing was raised by another addition of thirty students so that there were one hundred students all together, a number that remained fixed.[66] The conditions under which imperial clan students participated in the examinations were also changed. Before 1801, students of the Imperial Clan Academy were not obliged to participate in the *hsiang* or *hui* examinations but were examined independently by the Imperial Clan Court (*tsung-jen fu*) on *ch'i-she*, arts, and poetry. Now, all imperial clansmen were required to take the *fan-i* examination unless they petitioned to participate in the regular *hsiang* and *hui* tests.[67] Their proportional quota for the Shun-t'ien *hsiang-shih* was one in nine, probably a tight quota in view of the long-term overproportionate representation of imperial clansmen in the higher school system. In the *hui-shih* their numbers were separated from the general *man-tze hao*, but for the *tien-shih* and *ch'ao-shih* they were forced to compete without quotas and those who were successful were rewarded with high bureaucratic appointments.

The greatest change was in the provincial garrisons, where for the first time officer schools under the jurisdiction of the Board of Appointments (*li-pu*) were established and all bannermen became eligible to compete for admission. The curriculum, which was not intended to be distinguished for innovation, was based on the program of the National Academy and the Eight Banners Officers' Schools in Peking: Manchu, Chinese, astronomy (*t'ien-wen*), and mathematics (*suan-hsueh*), with frequent and rigorous testing in riding and shooting. The charters were imbedded in Hung-li's continuing demands that written Manchu be revived among the bannermen. "Every single man has a responsibility to study written Manchu," the emperor had continued his endless and largely unheeded sermon. "This is the root of his mission!" Instructors' salaries in the schools as well as student expenses were covered partly by government grants, partly by banner and clan charities, and when possible were drawn from personal expenditures.[68] It is difficult to know how quickly the various garrisons did in fact manage to find buildings, instructors, and students for their schools, but by 1800 most garrisons were choosing their officers from the new schools established within their own garrisons.[69]

The reform of higher education within the garrisons was, however, quickly seen to be useless without a corresponding emphasis on the cultivation of boys. The perceived cultural and social condition of the garrison populations is revealed in the edict of 1800 (after Hung-li's death) demanding that garrison officers identify talented boys, on the order of about one out of every five or six, to receive intensive instruction from their company corporals in Manchu, *ch'i-she*, and a small number of administrative arts. At the same time, the state affirmed its intentions never to return to the unfocused, comprehensive education policies of earlier times. "Of the Manchus' roots, *ch'i-she* is the first. If the Eight Banner *tzu-ti* concentrate on and are allowed to be successfully examined on [the Four Books], they will despise the bow and the horse, and that will not enhance our military preparedness; on the contrary, they will contravene the very purpose for which the nation established the garrisons. Hereafter, the officers of each provincial garrison will select *tzu-ti* who will be dedicated to the task of preparing for the examinations, and they will thus advance our fundamental interests."[70]

In the same way that the state now recognized that only a minority of the garrison population would represent suitable ground for the cultivation of military dedication, it gradually resigned itself to the fact that the *shu-yuan* traditions within the garrisons had produced a class of Manchu literati who identified themselves with their localities and intended to pursue civil careers.[71] The requirement that all bannermen take the *hsiang-shih* at Shun-t'ien was abolished in 1814, and provincial bannermen were permitted to participate in the regions where they resided. This was a profound symbolic acknowledgment on the part of the court that the bannermen were no longer native "residents" of the imperial core at Shun-t'ien, that they had on the contrary made the provinces their habitats. Proportional quotas were established for the open *hsiang-shih*, with one bannermen in ten being permitted to pass, though an absolute total of three successful bannermen was imposed.[72]

The abandonment of the Shun-chih-K'ang-hsi idea of bannermen as universal functionaries who were as well adapted to the Hanlin Academy as to the command of an elite cavalry corps in favor of a rigid regime of cultural purification, physical reinvigoration, and spiritual reintegration had implications far beyond what the Ch'ien-lung and Chia-ch'ing courts foresaw. What later emperors were advocating, in essence, was a vocational, even professional, course of study for the bannermen in which adeptness in Manchu—as the language of the military sector—was fundamental and in which the more liberal, more obviously civil educational elements had little or no place. There is evidence that the Chia-ch'ing court was far more interested in the professionalizing aspects of the Ch'ien-lung reforms than in their ideology.[73] The significance of this did not emerge until the military and educational reforms of the period after the Opium War. Courses on armaments, both Ch'ing and foreign, were added to the garrison officers' schools, and this inevitably led to limited technical studies—most related to the understanding and manufacture of percussion caps—by mid-century.

Concurrently, the development of hybrid forms of military organization, beginning with the Grand Battalions formed in Kiangnan to attempt to repulse the British invaders in 1841, created a new demand for the talents of translators, as banner officers assigned to these composite armies were required to maintain records in both Chinese and Manchu in order to keep the court informed—in the security language, Manchu—of the movements and internal power alignments within these forces. Indeed, the Tao-kuang emperor, foreseeing renewed need for banner expertise in Manchu as the country's military organization became more complex, required all banner officers to prepare and sit for the *fan-i* examinations from at least the *sheng-yuan* level after 1843, a regulation the court kept until the general attenuation of court administration of the garrisons in 1865.[74] It has, moreover, been hypothesized on very good evidence that the Foreign Language Colleges (*t'ung-wen kuan*) established under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*tsung-li ya-men*) were actually patterned after the banner officers' schools, and it is certainly true that they were administered by garrison officials and attended almost exclusively by Manchu bannermen.[75] By the end of the century, the Foreign Language Colleges had added French, German, and Japanese—in addition to the original English course—and the old Russian school in the imperial city had been absorbed and reformed by the Foreign Language College at Peking. An expanded curriculum ultimately included mathematics, astronomy, and chemistry (an outgrowth of the identification of banner officers with percussion-cap manufacture), so that the Foreign Language College and its provincial branches took on the appearance of the forerunners of the Imperial University founded at Peking in 1896.[76]

If the banner officers' schools were, due to their vocational and later their professional emphasis, the ancestors of the Foreign Language Colleges and the Imperial University, they were nevertheless only ancestors. They did not in and of themselves make the transition to modernity. Indeed, as late as the 1870s I-huan (Prince Ch'un) was still calling for the bannermen to resist any modern reforms that would override their commitment to the ancestral arts of *ch'i-she*. Some of the banner forces were reformed into elite units under the leadership of [Suwan Gūwalgiya] Wen-hsiang, [Suwan Gūwalgiya] Jung-lu, and others that became the foundation of the new armies who led the revolution of 1911–12 and went on to form the vanguard of the forces of Yüan Shih-k'ai and many other warlords. Nevertheless, the Eight Banners themselves went the way of the banner officers' schools, becoming obsolete, decrepit, and overshadowed by the new forms to which they had given birth. And like the Eight Banners, the banner officers' schools endured a protracted senescence before finally being dispatched by the Ch'ing government. Not until 1902, when Hanlin scholar (and Manchu) Pao-hsi made the specific request, did the state allow the buildings of the Imperial Clan Academy, the Gioro Academy, and the officers' schools of Peking to be vacated, cleaned, fixed, and painted for use as elementary and middle school buildings under the jurisdiction of the new education ministry.[77]

The preconquest ideal of the Manchu language as a comprehensive state language and of the bannermen as comprehensive state functionaries appears to have continued to shape imperial educational policies after the conquest. Circumstances ultimately forced the abandonment of such a design, but the lingering three-point emphasis on the Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese languages, as well as on both military and civil preparation for the bannermen, remained the hallmarks of the educational and administrative policies relating not only to the enrolled bannermen but also to the *tzu-ti* until the late eighteenth century. As the universalism of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's style began to change the shape of intellectual preparation and inquiry, the court directed greater attention to the status of Manchu among the Manchu population (still a difficult and in some ways contradictory idea at the time). Reports to the court that bannermen were neglecting both their education in Manchu language and their cultivation of military skills appear to have prompted the frequent admonitions from the emperor that bannermen remedy their defects and avoid become coming "lost" in Chinese culture. The resulting specialization of banner identity and banner education created the foundation for the reprofessionalized military of the late nineteenth century and the emergence of technical, vocational and professionalized education in the languages, sciences, and military arts.

Examinations and Alien Regimes

Without a sensitivity to the ideological issues attached by the Ch'ien-lung court to the problems of language and orthography, it is difficult to reconstruct the impulses behind the Ch'ing preoccupation with Manchu education—and education in Manchu. From the modern perspective, it cannot be demonstrated that a sense of banner or Manchu identity was fundamentally dependent upon their speaking and writing a distinctive language. Like the Chinese Muslims (*hui*), the Manchus maintained and still maintain an ethnic identity in China despite the fact that they are urban and sinophone. For Hung-li, however, it was impossible to realize a universalist cultural mosaic within the empire without well-constructed archetypes of particular cultures, and the Manchus were intended to play this role. It is also clear that Hung-li remained profoundly attached to the notion of the northeast as a wellspring of Manchu history, culture, and legitimacy, the Manchus may, for him, have represented a sense of living legacy and strengthened his insistence on their cultural reconstruction and purification.

However important Manchu may have been to the eighteenth-century court, the policies and institutions created to revive Manchu outside state symbolism failed. As the language of a small minority settled in China, Manchu's decline and virtual disappearance perhaps need no explanation. But certain factors contributing to the state's inability to strengthen the language are worth noting. They are partly structural. Though it is too obvious a point to make much of, the fact was that until the late nineteenth century, educational programs in the garrisons, such as they were, were exclusively for men. The proposition of a garrison culture in which men learned to speak standard Manchu but women continued speaking Chinese dialects (or the hybrid Manchu-Chinese vernacular attested in many garrison communities) was obviously untenable. Moreover, the opportunities for the average bannermen to find advantageous employment for skills in Manchu were not extensive, and educational institutions for boys and young men were entirely neglected by the state until a late period. In the garrisons, the officers' schools remained small and exclusive attendance by the hereditary banner elite (sons of officers) may have been assumed. In Peking, the schools were dominated by a huge group of hereditary nobles and entrenched elites.

Beyond these factors, the history of Manchu and its relationship to Mongolian before and during the Ch'ing period must be recalled. There is first of all the failure of Manchu and Manchu script to gain much prestige before the conquest of China. From the thirteenth century on, Inner Asia had a great lingua franca in Mongolian, which the Jurchens themselves relied on and patterned their own literate culture after. Like the Ming before them, the Manchus had always to deal with the problems of Mongol power, even in a reduced or refracted form, and sustenance of literacy in Mongolian. The Ch'ing emperors were intimately tied to Mongolian through their historical connections to the Mongols (and, they liked to think, their own links to the great-khans) as well as through their own Mongolian empresses and bannermen. In their rhetoric, Manchu and Mongolian were always linked, whether as languages, as cultures, or as people. The emperors, in other words, never put all their weight on Manchu, and certainly Hung-li never believed that Manchu could in fact bear the weight of his universal rule. His policies worked, instead, to isolate, polish and display the language as one might a single stone in a collection of gems.

It is difficult to separate the weakness of Manchu as a cultural vehicle from the neglect of the Ch'ing emperors for the old corpus of works in the Jurchen script. From Nurgaci to Hung-li, the emperors had rejoiced for one reason or another in their ancestral connection to the imperial Jurchens. Yet no effort was ever made to reclaim the medieval "classical" literature in Jurchen either in the original or by means of transliteration into the new script. The reason lies perhaps in the ancient contempt—shared by the Ch'ing—for the translators' bureaus, in whose collections such fragments as survived of the old Jurchen texts and *lai-wen* were preserved. As determined by its function, which was to segregate and demean the ritual stature of non-Chinese cultures, the translators' bureaus and their collections offered nothing to the Ch'ing that seemed worth ruminating on. The institution of the translators' bureaus had stained the Jurchen literary past, and Manchu thus began the seventeenth century as a novel script with no literature.

This neglect is the more marked for the fact that Manchu as a written standard was a state invention to a degree unusual with living languages. At every point, its development was guided by the state and motived by state objectives: the nationalism of Nurgaci, who demanded a distinct mode of communication for his regime; the requirement of Hung Taiji that an easy script be devised to allow the translation into Manchu of important Chinese historical and political works; the desire of the Shun-chih, K'ang-hsi, and Yung-cheng emperors for a competent medium for the conduct of sensitive state business, including secret memorials, certain military communications, and exchanges with representatives of the Romanov rulers; and finally the search by Hung-li for a cultural taxonomy of the Manchus and ideological representation of his own universalism. State creation and control of the Manchu language parallels, not surprisingly, the shaping of the Manchus, who were organized and named by the state, were legally defined by it in ensuing centuries, and were the object of state cultural policy until the nineteenth century.

Quite apart from the special considerations behind Ch'ing treatment of the dynastic language and its constituency, the features of education and examination in Manchu—and of the education of the Manchus—lend themselves to broader comparisons serving the goals of this volume. The features of Manchu education may also be horizontally compared with other components of the Ch'ing education and examination systems. It had been a normal feature of the Ming and Ch'ing examinations to make space, both in terms of quotas and to a limited degree (particularly in the military examinations) in terms of content, for professional diversity. The segment of the examination system dedicated to the review of bannermen may be seen in this context. Indeed, from this perspective the creation of the banner and *fan-i* examinations during the Ch'ing may be seen as only minor alterations in the continuing Ming institutions.[78] (Such a view, however, must not only overlook the degree to which changes in banner education prepared the ground for the rise of technical studies in nineteenth-century China but also ignore the patterns through which the profound ideological ambitions of the eighteenth-century court were revealed.) The fundamental mores of the examination system did not alter greatly from the Ming to the Ch'ing. Nor was the basic intimacy between court ideology and the examinations as an institution attenuated. This final similarity is in fact the great point of divergence between the two last dynasties, for the explosion of imperial universalism under the Ch'ien-lung emperor changed profoundly the court's view of the substance and meaning of knowledge. The impact of those changes is vividly apparent in the microcosm of Manchu education.

Manchu education and examination may be perpendicularly compared to the cognate policies of earlier alien dynasties in China. The Kitans, the Jurchens, and the Mongols during their respective dynasties had faced the problems of formalizing folk cultures, authorizing and enforcing orthographic practices, and familiarizing some critical portion of their population with the Chinese knowledges necessary to stabilize their regimes. In each case, choices were made respecting not only the style of education to which nobles and elites were subjected but also whether the examinations were used to raise those perceived as "commoners" to the ruling class or to rationalize access to high office among the hereditary elites.

Not surprisingly, the Manchu approach to these questions most resembles that of the Jurchens before them. The Kitans and Mongols retained, at least in official policy, a strong attachment to the principles of nomadic life among their peoples and a toleration for traditional segmented political structures. They appear to have been disinclined to effect drastic changes in their economic and social lives by linking status or achievement to time-consuming attainments in civil or literary pursuits. Traditional markers of status, including birth affiliations, were not intruded on by state requirements for examination success. Indeed, Kitans were by edict barred from participating in the examinations held under the Liao, and the suspension of the examinations for the greater part of the Yüan dynasty left the question of Mongol achievement in the examinations moot.[79] It must be underscored that this observation is directed against the question of examination as a criterion for professional advancement and by extension a state tool for the shaping of the cultural life and political influence of its constituency; clearly, neither the absence of examinations nor the official state indifference to Mongolian classical education barred the emergence of Mongol scholars of the stature of Toghto or Qoninci.

In the cases of the Jurchens and the Manchus, however, the establishment of bilingual examinations and official attempts to encourage participation in the examinations by the peoples in question are evidence of a very different state posture. Unlike Mongols and Kitans, neither Jurchens nor Manchus were enfeoffed in China proper, nor were they committed to cultural precepts or political structures that were characteristic of nomadism. Attempts to use the examinations for promotion of commoners and to restrict high access to hereditary elites were characteristic, in the Chin and Ch'ing periods, of aggressive state programs to limit the privileges and influence of the nobility, to centralize the state, and to prepare the dynastic constituency for a broad role in the maintenance of a civil system.

Glossary

A-kuei	阿桂
Cabuhai	查布海
Chang Ta-ch'ang	張大昌
Chao-lien	昭槤
ch'ao-shih	朝試
chap op	雜業
chen-kuan cheng-yao	貞觀政要
cheng k'ao-kuan	正考官
ch'i-she	騎射
Chia-ch'ing	嘉慶
chia-ti	甲第
chiang-chün	將軍
Chien-chou	建州
chien-sheng	監生
Ch'ien-lung	乾隆
chih-hsien	知縣
Chin	金
Chin P'ing Mei	金瓶梅
chin-shih	進士
Ching-shan	景山
ch'ing-an che	情安摺
Ch'ing-shih kao	清史稿
Ch'ing-wen	清文
Ch'ing-wen ch'i-meng	清文啟蒙
Ch'ing-wen hui-shu	清文彙書
Ch'ing-wen pu-hui	清文補彙
Ch'ing-yü	清語
chiu-tao	舊道
chou	州
chu-fang	駐方
ching-shih chi-fu	京飾畿輔
chü-jen	舉人
Chü-yung kuan	居庸關
Chueh-lo hsueh	覺羅學
Ch'un-ch'iu	春秋
chün-chi-ch'u	軍機處
chung-shu	中書
chung'in	中人
en	恩
Erdeni	額爾德尼
Erh-shih-i-shih	二十一史
fan-i	翻譯
fan-i kung-sheng	翻譯公生
fou-hua	浮化
fu	府
fu	副
fu k'ao-kuan	副考官
Gagai	噶蓋
Garin	剛林
Giyanghedei	蔣赫德
han-chün pa-ch'i	漢軍八旗
Han shu	漢書
Hanlin	翰林
ho-pi	合璧
ho-tzu hao	合子號
Hou Chin	後金
Hsi-hua	西華
Hsiang	鄉
hsiang-shih	鄉試
hsiao-ch'i-hsiao	驍騎校
Hsiao-ching	孝經
Hsiao-hsueh	小學
Hsien	縣
Hsien-an-kung	咸安宮
Hsien-an-kung kuan-hsueh	咸安宮官學
hsien-san	閑散
Hsin T'angshu	新唐書
Hsing-li	性理
Hsing-pu hui-tien	刑部會典
hsueh-she	學舍
hu-chün	護軍
huang-ch'eng	黃城
hui	會
hui	回
hui-hui	回回
hui-shih	會試
Hung-li	弘曆
Hung-lü ssu	鴻臚寺
Hung Taiji	洪太亟
I-ching	易經
i-huan	奕環
ju-ch'en	儒臣
Jung-lu	榮祿
Jurchen	女真

K'ang-hsi	康熙
Kao-ch'ang	高昌
k'ao-tao	考到
Kiangnan	江南
Kitan	契丹
k'o	科
Koryo	高麗
k'u-shih	庫使
k'u-shou	庫手
Kung	公
Kung Kung-hsiang	龔公襄
kung-sheng	貢生
Kung Tzu-chen	龔自珍
kuo-hsueh	國學
kuo-jen	國人
kuo-tsu hsueh	國族學
Kuo-tzu chien	國族監
kuo-wen	國文
kuo-yü	國語
lai-wen	來文
Lao-tzu	老子
Li-chi	禮記
Li Chih-t'ing	李治亭
li-fan yuan	理藩院
Li K'ai-hsien	李開先
li-pu	吏部
Liang Shu-ming	梁漱溟
ling-ts'ui	領催
Liu-tzu	六子
Lun-yü	論語
Man-chou yuan-liu k'ao	滿洲源流考
man-jen, man-chou-jen	滿人，滿洲人
man-tzu hao	滿子號
Meng-ku kuo-tzu chien	蒙古國子監
Meng-ku ya-men	蒙古衙門
Meng-tzu	孟子
nei-ko	內閣
nei-pan	內班
nei-wu fu	內務府
o-lo-ssu-wen-kuan	俄羅斯文館
pa-ch'i	八旗
pa-ch'i kuan-hsueh	八旗官學
pai-i	百夷
Pao-hsi	保熙
pao-i	包衣
pen	本
p'in	品

po	拔
San-kuo chih	三國志
San-lueh	三略
san shang ch'i	三上旗
Shen-yang	瀋陽
Shih-chi	史記
Shih-ching	詩經
Shih-san ching	十三經
Shu-ching	書經
shu-yuan	書院
Shun-t'ien	順天
Sibo	稀柏
ssu-i kuan	四夷官
Ssu-k'u ch'üan-shu	四庫全書
Ssu-shu	四書
suan-hsueh	算學
Sui	歲
Sun Wen-liang	孫文良
Sung-yun	松運
Tai Ming-shih	戴名世
T'ai-ch'ang ssu	太常寺
Tao-kuang	道光
tien-shih	殿試
t'ien-wen	天文
tso-ling	佐領
Tso Mou-ti	左懋第
tsu-chang	族張
tsung-hsueh	宗學
tsung-jen fu	宗人府
tsung-li ya-men	總理衙門
T'ung-chien kang-mu	通鑒綱目
T'ung-chien kuan	通鑒館
t'ung-k'ao kuan	同考官
t'ung-wen kuan	同文館
(*Tzu-chih*) *T'ung-chien*	（資治）通鑒
tzu-ti	子弟
wai-pan	外班
Wang	王
Wang Kuo-wei	王國維
Wie	衛
wei-so	衛所
Wen	文
Wen-hsiang	文襄
wen-kuan	文官
Wu	武
Wu-ching	五經
Wu-ying	武英

Yang-tzu	揚子
yang-yü	養育
yangban	兩班
Yi	李
yu chih hsiang hsueh	有志想學
Yü-chih Ch'ing-wen chien	御志　清文鑒
Yü-chih Shu-li ching-yun	御志數理精蘊
Yü-chih tseng-ting Ch'ing-wen chien	御志增定清文鑒
Yuan-ming yuan	圓明園
Yuan Shih-k'ai	袁世凱
Yung-ning ssu	永寧寺

Notes

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1. "Manchus" is used throughout this chapter to identify those within the Eight Banners who were legally classified as Manchus from the ratification of the Manchu Banners in 1635 to the dissolution of the dynasty in 1912. As I have discussed elsewhere, registration within the banners was an administrative process and does not absolutely imply Jurchen/Manchu ancestry or Manchu cultural identity; conversely, there were from the beginning of the dynastic period persons of attestable Jurchen or Manchu ancestry who for various reasons were not registered as Manchus. Finally, the intertwining ambiguities, in both official and common language, between the terms "Manchu" (*manju, manju niyalma, man-jen, man-chou jen*) and "bannerman" (*gūsa i niyalma, ch'i-jen*) must be noted. With respect to the topics discussed here, all Manchus were bannermen, but some bannermen were Mongols or Chinese martial (*han-chün pa-ch'i*) or, in the late seventeenth century, Albazinians (*o-lo-ssu ch'i-jen*), and a very small number of bondservant bannermen were Muslim, which was regarded as a separate classification. On general background of the Eight Banners and the Manchus see these recent studies: Kaye Soon Im, *The Rise and Decline of the Eight-Banner Garrisons in the Ch'ing Period (1644–1911): A Study of the Kuang-chou, Hang-chou, and Ching-chou Garrisons* (Ann Arbor; University Microfilms, 1981); Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Ch'ing World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990); Crossley, "The Qianlong Retrospect on the Chinese-martial (*han-jun*) Banners," *Late Imperial China* 10, no. 1 (June 1989): 63–107.

2. For more extensive discussion, see P.K. Crossley, "*Manzhou yuanliu kao* and Formalization of the Manchu Heritage," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 46, no. 4 (Nov. 1987): 761–90; Crossley, "The Qianlong Retrospect on the Chinese-martial (*hanjun*) Banners"; Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, esp. 20–30.

3. On Jurchen, See Wilhelm Grube, *Die Sprache und Schriften der Jucen* (Leipzig, 1896); Ishida Mikinosuke 石田幹之助, "Joshin-go kenkyū no shin shiryō" 女真語研究の新資料 (New materials for researches on the Jurchen language) in *Tōa bunkashi sōkō* (1943; reprint, Tokyo, 1970); Daniel Kane, *The Sino-Jurchen Vocabulary of the Bureau of Interpreters,* (Bloomington: Indiana University Research Institute for Inner Asian Studies, 1989); Gisaburo Kiyose, *A Study of the Jurchen Language and Script: Reconstruction and Decipherment* (Kyoto, 1977); Chin Kuang-p'ing and Chin Ch'i-tsung, *Nü-chen yü-yen wen-tze yen-chiu* (Researches on Jurchen language and script) (Peking, 1980) Chin Ch'i-tsung, *Nü-chen wen tz'u-tien* (Jurchen language dictionary) (Peking, 1984).

4. Most of the ancestors of the people today recognized as Sibo had been incorporated into the Eight Banners as "New Manchus" (Ice Manju) in the middle and later seventeenth century. They are best known for having been settled in Sinkiang and having retained an unusual degree of traditional culture there. A history of the Sibos with the Chinese title *Hsi-po tsu chien shih* 稀伯族簡史 (Brief history of the Sibo people) but written in Sibo, was published in Peking in 1984 by Wu Yuan-feng 吳元豐 and Chao Chih-ch'iang 趙志強. The most important work on the Sibos, however, is Giovanni Stary, *Geschichte der Sibe-Mandschuren* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1985); the reader is also referred to Stary's extremely valuable study of the contemporary Sibo writer Kuo Chi-nan [Guo Jinan], "Note sulla vita e L'opera di G'ujinan, poeta e scrittore del popolo Sibe" in *Miszellen zur mandschurischen Sprache, Literatur und Geschichte im 17. und 20. Jahrhundert* (*Miscellanea di studi sulla lingua, letteratura e storia mancese del 17° e 20° secolo*) (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrasowitz, 1987).

5. There are many passing references to this practice, but see as an example *Ch'ing Kao-tsung shilu* 清高宗實錄, 1417:17a. This technique was also used by Chinese on the Manchu section of their *chin-shih* examinations; examples may be found among the Manchu materials of the Han Yushan Collection of the University Research Library at the University of California at Los Angeles. I am indebted to Benjamin A. Elman and James Cheng for inviting me to examine these materials.

6. Some of the best surviving evidence of this vernacular is contained in transcriptions of drum songs, particularly of the genre called "bannermen tales," *tzu-ti shu.* See Kuan Te-tung 關得棟 and Chou Chung-ming 周中明, *Tzu-ti shu ts'ung-ch'ao* 子弟書叢炒 (Collected bannerman tales), 2 vols. (Peking, 1984), esp. 1–18. See also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 82–86, 251 nn. 18–21.

7. The comparison here with *han'gul* is meant to convey the visual organization of the characters; *han'gul* was created much later. It is possible that the phonetic script used by the Uigurs (and later adapted by the Mongols) was the inspiration for the use of phonetic principle in the Kitan small characters. Kitan large-character script is still largely undeciphered. On Kitan small-character script, which is partially deciphered but still cannot be phonetically reconstructed with complete confidence, see Cinggertai et al., *Ch'i-tan hsiao-tze yen-chiu* (Researches on the Kitan small script) (Peking: Chung-kuo she-hui k'o-hsueh, 1985).

8. The history and social aspects of the Jurchen examination during the Chin dynasty have been treated in Tao Jingshen, *The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China: A Study of Sinicization* (Seattle: Publications on Asia of the Institute for Comparative and Area Studies, University of Washington, 1976), 57–61. See also Peter K. Bol, "Seeking Common Ground: Han Literati under Jurchen Rule," in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 47, no. 2 (Dec. 1987): 477–78. On examinations during the Liao period, when only those recognized by the state as *han* were permitted to participate, see Chu Tzu-fang and Huang Feng-ch'i, "Liao tai k'o-chü chih-tu shu-lueh," in Ch'en Shu, ed., *Liao Chin shi lun-chi* no. 3 (Peking: Shu-mu wen-hsien, 1987).

9. The Yung-ning Ssu of the Nurgan territories, whose stelae bear Yung-le period and later inscriptions in Jurchen, Mongolian, and Tibetan, has been described in two published works. See Samuel M. Grupper, "The Manchu Imperial Cult of the Early Ch'ing Dynasty: Texts and Studies on the Tantric Sanctuary of Mahâkâla at Mukden" (Ph.D. diss.,

University of Indiana, 1980), 37 n. 34, 39 n. 40, 41; Yang Yang 楊楊 et al., *Ming-tai Nu-erh-kan t'u-ssu wei-so yen-chiu* 明代奴兒干都司及其衛所研究 (Henan: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1982), 52–68.

10. Though the *ssu-i kuan* were small and politically insignificant under the Ch'ing, they had a long and symbolically significant career during the entire later imperial period. There are many studies, but for unsurpassed primary information see Paul Pelliot, "Le Sseu-yi-kouan et le Houei-t'ong-kouan," in "Le Hoja et le Sayyid Husain de l'Histoire des Ming," in *T'oung Pao* 38 (1948): 2–5, app. 3: 207–90; for a more recent interpretation, see P.K. Crossley, "Structure and Symbol in the Ming-Ch'ing Translator's Bureaus (*ssu-i kuan*)," in *Central and Inner Asian Studies* 5 (1991): 38–70.

The quotation comes from Yen Ch'ung-nien, *Nu-erh-ha-ch'ih chuan* (Life of Nurgaci) (Peking: Pei-ching ch'u-pan-she, 1983), 134. The ascendancy of Mongolian as a written medium among the Chien-chou Jurchens was noted at length by Louis Ligeti in his 1958 article "Deux Tablettes de T'ai-tsong des Ts'ing,'" and Ligeti's discussion has been amplified by Cleaves in "A Mongolian Rescript of the Fifth Year of Degedü Erdem-tü (1640)," in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* 46, no. 1 (June 1986): 182–200, esp. 182–83. See also Crossley, "Structure and Symbol," 52–53.

11. *Man-chou shih-lu* 滿洲實錄 (Manchu annual) (reprint, Taipei, 1964), 109; *Huang Ch'ing k'ai-kuo fang-lüeh* 皇清開國方略 (Narrative of the founding of the imperial Ch'ing) (reprint, Taipei, 1966), 75–76. The text, as it was finalized in the eighteenth century, has Nurgaci instructing Erdeni and Gagai on how to accomplish their task.

12. Koreans retained materials and a curriculum for instruction in Jurchen as part of their court bureaucracy long after Jurchen communications had been overshadowed by a revival of communications in Mongolian. See also Hiu Lie, *Die Manschu-Sprachkunde in Korea* (Bloomington: Uralic and Altaic Studies Program, 1972), 14–17, and Song Ki-Joong, "The Study of Foreign Languages in the Yi Dynasty (1392–1910)," in *Bulletin of the Korean Research Center: Journal of the Social Sciences and Humanities* 54 (1981): 1–45.

13. See also J.R.P. King, "The Korean Elements in the Manchu Script Reform of 1632," in *Central Asiatic Journal* 31 nos. 3, 4 (1987): 252–86.

14. Chang Chung-ju et al., *Ch'ing-tai k'ao-shih chih-tu tz'u-liao* (hereafter *CKCT*) (Documents on the examination system of the Ch'ing period) (n.d.; photoreprint, Taipei: Wenhai, 1968) 1:3a.

15. *CKCT*, 1:9a.

16. On the Grand Council, see Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).

17. For more detailed discussion, see Pamela Kyle Crossley and Evelyn S. Rawski, "The Value of Manchu Documents for Ch'ing Research," in *Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies* (forthcoming).

18. Russian was taught in China, with no detectable effectiveness, from the early eighteenth century, when a small language school (*o-lo-ssu-wen-kuan*) was established for the Albazinian bannermen at Peking, and it may have enrolled Manchus from the time, or nearly the time, of its founding. On its chronology and beginnings, see Eric Widmer, *The Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking during the Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard East Asian Research Center, 1976), 109. The school stood outside the Tung-hua Men, very near the present-day office of the Kung-an-chü responsible for processing the affairs of foreigners in Peking, and was administered by the *nei-ko*. The grounds and the school were absorbed by the reformed translators' bureaus in the middle eighteenth century. See also, Crossley, "Symbol and Function of the Ming-Ch'ing Translators' Bureaus."

The extent of tributary communications in Manchu still surviving is unknown to the author, but for an example see the memorial (in very frail condition) from the Liu-ch'iu *wang* Shang-mu 流球王尚穆, dated Ch'ien-lung 21 (1756), retained among the documents once belonging to Joseph Fletcher and now in the possession of the Harvard-Yenching Library.

19. For further discussion, see Pamela Kyle Crossley, "The Inside Edge: Chinese Scholars and Ch'ing Knowledge" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the New England Conference of the Association for Asian Studies, 1990); Crossley and Rawski, "Value of Manchu Documents".

20. [Aisin Gioro] Chao-lien 昭槤, *Hsiao-t'ing tsa-lu* 嘯亭雜錄 (hereafter *HTTL*), *chüan* 1:1b.

21. Sun Wen-liang and Li Chih-t'ing, *Ch'ing T'ai-tsung ch'üan-chuan* (Biography of Ch'ing T'ai-tsung) (Chi-lin: Chi-lin jen-min, 1983), 310.

22. *HTTL, chüan* 1:1b–2b.

23. This is a selection of the most frequently encountered and copied literature. For further discussion, see Crossley and Rawski, "Value of Manchu Documents."

24. In Korea, where under the earlier Yi dynasty castes had made a social phenomenon of technical knowledge, translators were part of the *chung'in*, the adept nonelites who acted as scribes, mechanics, translators, and so on. From Silla times, the *yangban*, the elite of the bone-ranks system, had maintained a monopoly on high administrative office, a situation that in its basic features pertained through the Koryo and early Yi periods. The *chung'in* of lace Koryo and Yi times encompassed both commoners who had managed to qualify for technical administrative and artisanal tasks by means of the *chap op*, the lowest tier of the three-tiered examination system, or who were illegitimate sons of the *yangban* class who had received some technical education. Translating was one of the most fundamental and visible tasks of the *chung'in*, so important that in later Yi times, when trade with Japan, China, and the Jurchens flourished, some translators made fortunes large enough to disrupt the social restrictions by which they would have been hereditarily bound. See also Ki-Baik Lee, *A New History of Korea*, trans. E. Wagner (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1984), 118–19, 174, 230; Edward Willett Wagner, *The Literati Purges: Political Conflict in Early Yi Korea* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asian Research Center, 1974), 12.

25. The *ssu-i-kuan* at this time numbered eight: Mongol, Jurchen, Tibetan, Sanskrit, Persian (*hui-hui*), Shan (*pai-i*), Uigur (*kao-ch'ang*) and Burmese. In 1511, Pa-pai (a Yunnanese dialect) was added; Thai was added in 1579. Thirty-eight students from the National University (*kuo-tze chien*) were assigned as translators (*i-shu*). These students, having passed the *hsiang-shih* but having failed the *hui-shih* were made eligible for a slightly modified *hui-shih* that included the writing of several passages in foreign scripts. Thereafter, they were presented to the Hanlin Academy, which might accept or reject them. *Dictionary of Ming Biography*, 362.

26. *DMB*, 1121. Li K'ai-hsien is famous apart from his connection with the *ssu-i kuan*, of course; he is considered among the possible authors of *Chin P'ing Mei*. See also Mary Elizabeth Scott, "Azure from Indigo: *Honglou meng's* debt to *Jin ping mei*" (Ph.D. diss., Princeton University, 1989).

27. See Arthur Hummel, ed., *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, D.C., 1943) (hereafter *ECCP*), 792; Crossley, "Structure and Symbol," 63 (in which, due to the author's carelessness, part of the line referring to this incident has been lost).

28. Chao Er-hsün et al., *Ch'ing shih kao* (Draft history of the Ch'ing; hereafter *CSK*) (1928; punctuated reprint, Peking: Chung-hua shu-chü, 1977), 108:3160.

Ch'i-she, literally "riding and shooting," is the Chinese attempt to convey what in all Inner and Central Asian languages is a single word (in the Manchu case, *niyamniyambi*) describing the distinctive Inner Asian skill of shooting from a moving horse. See also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 15, 22–24.

29. Liu Shih-che, "Man-tsu 'ch'i-she' ch'ien-shu" (Brief overview of the "riding and shooting" of the Manchus), in *Min-tsu yen-chiu* 5(1982): 53.

30. See particularly Kuo Ch'eng-k'ang, "Ch'ing-ch'u niu-lu ti shu-mu" (Numbers of *niru* in the early Ch'ing) in *Ch'ing-shih yen-chiu t'ung-hsün* 1(1987): 31–35, in which he proposes that Chinese martial companies in the years just prior to 1644 may have numbered 100

out of 500, and increased during 1643–44 to more than 160 out of 500. See also Crossley, "Qianlong Retrospect," 13.

31. *CKCT*, 1:8b. The change in policy was at least in part prompted by a memorial from the *li-pu* recommending that bannermen be sent back to compete in the regular *hsiang-shih*: "Among the Eight Banners are some outstanding talents, who could prepare themselves for examination by enhancing their abilities, and then be sought out by means of *ke, sui, hsiang* and *hui* examinations. The best of them could then be appointed to office." *CSK*, 108:3160.

32. *CKCT*, 1:7a.

33. *CKCT*, 1:12b, 16b.

34. *CSK*, 106:3115. There was subsequent alteration to Manchus and Mongols sixty, Chinese martial thirty.

35. *CSK*, 108:3161.

36. *CKCT*, 1:7a.

37. A general history of Mongolian education is provided by Man-Kam Leung in "Mongolian Language Education and Examinations in Peking and Other Metropolitan Areas During the Manchu Dynasty in China (1644–1911)," *Canada Mongolia Review* (*Revue Canada-Mongolie*) 1, no. 1 (1975): 29–44. In most respects, Mongolian education paralleled Manchu education rather exactly, with the exceptions noted in this chapter. It was often the case, however, that the Mongolian curriculum was introduced at a later date than the Manchu. For instance, it was introduced into the garrison schools in 1691, the Eight Banners Officers' Schools in 1723, and the Hsien-an Palace Officers' School in 1734.

38. It may have been, as Chao-lien has suggested (*HTTL*, 1:18b–19a), that [Janggiya] A-kuei and the officials of the Board of War requested the reinstatement of the *fan-i* degrees in order to attempt to inspire more bannermen to compete and succeed at the examinations, a goal that, while distasteful to the Ch'ien-lung emperor, was accepted.

39. On the *kuo-tzu chien*, see Adam Lui, "The Imperial College (*Kuo-tzu-chien*) in the Early Ch'ing (1644–1795)." in *Papers on Far Eastern History* 10 (1974): 147–66.

40. *CSK*, 106:3099. For a larger discussion of state-bannerman relations, see also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, ch. 13–30, 47–73.

41. Using the same source as myself (CSK), Adam Lui has come to the conclusion that *t'ien-wen suan-hsüeh* represented a single curriculum; see "Imperial College," 150. I read them as distinct and sequential, since the source provides not only an indication of the sequence (*t'ien-wen*, then *suan-hsüeh*) but also of the text for the *suan-hsüeh* course, which evidently did not encompass *t'ien-wen*. *T'ien-wen suan-fa* ("astronomical calculations") was not a curriculum but a discipline. For comments on the differences between Ming and Ch'ing *suan-fa*, see *HTTL*, 1:6b–7a.

42. *CSK*, 106:3110.

43. *CSK*, 106:3111, states that the name *tsung-hsüeh* is found in the Tang and Sung records, but no details regarding its purposes or organization can be ascertained. The Jurchen Chin had established a *kuo-tsu hsüeh* (subordinate to the *kuo-tzu chien*) where instruction in Jurchen and Chinese was administered to Jurchen noblemen. *Chin-shih*, (Peking: Jen-min, 1974), 56:468. There is no direct Mongolian precedent; the Ch'ing *kuo-hsüeh* is the descendant of the Mongolian Imperial University (*kuo-tzu chien*) under the Yüan; provincial Mongols were educated at a *Meng-ku tzu-hsüeh* under the administration of the Central Secretariat. *Hsin Yüan-shih*, Peking: Jen-min, 1976), 64: 621–23. The grounds of the *tsung-hsüeh* were located on the site of the present Nationalities College (*min-tsu hsüeh-yuan*) on Pai-shih ch'iao Road. The education of the imperial clan in this setting should not be confused with the education of princes eligible for emperorship and their siblings, who were tutored in the palace and maintained both literacy and fluency in Manchu until the end of the dynasty and beyond.

44. Literally "sons and younger brothers," *tzu-ti* was used at the end of the Ch'ing period to indicate, loosely, all Manchus. However, prior to the nineteenth century the term was more definitive, and indicated (as it had for previous dynasties in China) the male dependents of an active serviceman. The significance in the pronouncements on educational policy was that not only active bannermen but also *tzu-ti*—any one of whom might become an active bannerman, and all of whom were included under the "Manchu" rubric—were eventually explicitly included in all banner education programs. See also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors* 17, 24.

45. *CSK*, 109, 3110.

46. They were reported as: Bordered Yellow Banner, sixty-one; Plain Yellow Banner, thirty-six; Plain White Banner, Plain Red Banner, forty each; Bordered White Banner, fifteen; Bordered Red Banner, sixty-four; Plain Blue Banner, thirty-nine; Bordered Red Banner, five. Two Manchu and two Chinese instructors were assigned for each banner, with the exception of the Bordered White Banner, which had only one for each language. I suspect that "five" with reference to the Bordered Red Banner is a mistake for "fifty" which would make the passage more reasonable. *CSK*, 106:3112–13.

47. *CSK*, 106:3113. The Plain Yellow, Bordered Yellow and Plain White banners were together known as the Three Superior Banners (*san shang ch'i*) and, being the property of the emperor, were exclusively administered by the Imperial Household Department, under whose auspices the Prospect Hill and Hsien-an Palace schools were administered. These were the two best known of the five schools operated by the Imperial Household Department, which included a facility for the teaching of Arabic and Burmese to bondservants. See Preston Torbert, *The Ch'ing Imperial Household Department: A Study of Its Organization and Principal Functions, 1662–1796*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University East Asian Monographs, 1977), 37–39, for descriptions of all the schools.

48. If there should not be enough *chin-shih* applicants, the new regulations declared, outstanding *chü-jen* could be considered. On the surface, this appears to be a compromise of the standards of the school but may in fact have represented an attempt to elevate them. Tai Ming-shih, for instance, had taught at the school in 1686–89, when still struggling to pass the *hui-shih*. After his service in the school, he was offered a magistracy, indicating that the regulation of 1735 may only have formalized long-standing custom. See *ECCP*, 701.

49. *CSK*, 106:3113.

50. *CSK*, 106:3110.

51. *CSK*, 106:3110.

52. For a larger perspective on this, see Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 47–55.

53. *CSK*, 106:3114. Charitable schools in Peking were located, among other places, in the outlying garrisons, the artillery garrisons, the *Yuan-ming yuan*, and the *hu-chün* garrisons.

54. Newly established schools were overseen by the nearest superior school in the hierarchy. That is, *fu* schools oversaw *chou* schools, *chou* schools oversaw *hsien* schools. If one school divided into two, they split quotas and resources. *CSK*, 106:3117.

55. Certainly, this was the case with high-level Chinese martial bureaucrats, who served disproportionately during the first twenty-five years after the conquest and whose percentages lowered gradually thereafter. See Lawrence Kessler, "Ethnic Composition of Provincial Leadership during the Ch'ing Dynasty," in *Journal of Asian Studies* 28, no. 3 (May 1969): 489–511.

56. For details and discussion, see Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 25–26, 136 nn. 40, 41.

57. "Some Mid-Ch'ing Theorists of Popular Schools: Their Innovations, Inhibitions, and Attitudes Toward the Poor," in *Modern China* 9, no. 1 (1983): 23–24.

58. *CKCT*, 1:40a–b.

59. On language customs in the garrisons, see also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 84, 250–51 nn.15, 16.

60. *CKCT*, 1.41a, 1:50b–51a.

61. Raymond W. Chu and William G. Saywell, *Career Patterns in the Ch'ing Dynasty* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1984) 52.

62. Liu Shih-che, "Man-tsu 'ch'i-she' ch'ien-shu," 54 from *Man-chou yüan-liu k'ao*, 6: 13b.

63. *CKCT*, 1:60b–61a. A portion of this passage has been translated in Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 27, and a different portion has been translated by Man-Kam Leung, "Mongolian Language Education," 40, from a reprinted text in Hsi Yü-fu, *Huang-ch'ao cheng-tien lei-ts'üan* (Taipei, 1969).

64. See Crossley, "*Manzhou yuanliu kao*," 779–81; Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 19–30.

65. *CSK*, 106:3100.

66. *CSK*, 106:3111–12.

67. *CSK*, 108:3170.

68. Lei Fang-shen, "Ching-chou ch'i-hsüeh te shih-mo chi ch'i t'e-tien," in *Min-tsu yen-chiu* 3(1984): 57–59.

69. Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 87–88.

70. *CSK*, 106:3117.

71. Residence, property, and vocational regulations within the garrison administration had already been altered in recognition of these changes during the later eighteenth century. See also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 56ff.

72. *CSK*, 108:3161.

73. For instance, though the commissioning of academies and reform of educational criteria continued, the massive generation and institutionalization of cultural literature did not. Sungyun's *Emu tanggū orin sakda-i gisun sarkiyan*, a didactic treatise in Manchu on social morality that was evidently written to appeal to the Ch'ien-lung court's program for Manchu improvement, was brought to Peking in manuscript in the last years of the eighteenth century but did not gain the patronage of the Chia-ch'ing court. It was later translated into Chinese and is now a curiosity. See also Crossley and Rawski "Value of Manchu Documents."

74. Thomas Taylor Meadows, *Translations from the Manchu with the Original Texts* (Canton: S. Wells Williams, 1849), 19.

75. Nancy Evans, "The Banner-School Background of the Canton T'ung-wen Kuan," in *Papers on China* 22A (May 1969): 89–103. See also Crossley, *Orphan Warriors*, 143–44.

76. T'an I, "Wan Ch'ing T'ung-wen kuan yu Chin-tai hsüeh-hsiao chiao-yu," in *Ch'ing-shih yen-chiu* 5 (1986): 349–50; Lei Fang-sheng, "Ching-chou ch'i-hsüeh te shih-mo," 57.

77. *CSK*, 106:3114.

78. I take this as the implication of the recent discussion of the Ch'ing examinations in Wang Te-chao, "Ch'ing-tai te k'o-chü ju jen yü cheng-fu," in *Hsiang Kang Chung-wen Ta-hsüeh Chung-kuo wen-hua yen-chiu-so hsüeh-pao* 12 (1981): 1–21, esp. 5.

79. It appears that the edict barring Kitans from the examinations was strictly enforced until the late Liao period, and Kitans could be punished even for requesting permission to participate in the examinations. This did not preclude the spread of literacy in both Kitan and Chinese among the Kitans, however, and by the end of the dynasty Yelu Dashi—the imperial scion who in 1121 fled to Central Asia to found the Western Liao (Karakitai) dynasty—was a *chin-shih* recipient of 1114 and a Hanlin appointee. The Ch'ing emperors would note with approval that he was also expert at Kitan writing and *ch'i-she*. See Chu and Huang, "Liao tai k'o-chü chih-tu shu-lüeh," 7.

■ Source: Jami, Catherine, 'Imperial Science Written in Manchu in Early Qing China: Does It Matter?', in Florence Bretelle-Establet (ed.), *Looking at it from Asia: the Processes that Shaped the Sources of History of Science*, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Springer, 2010, pp. 371–391.

IMPERIAL SCIENCE WRITTEN IN MANCHU IN EARLY QING CHINA: DOES IT MATTER?

Catherine Jami

Historiography and Language: China or the Qing Empire?

In the middle of the seventeenth century the Manchus conquered China, taking Beijing in 1644. Their empire extended well beyond the territory controlled by the previous dynasty, the Ming (1368–1644). At its greatest extent, it had five official languages: Chinese, Manchu, Mongol, Tibetan, and Uighur. However, during most of the twentieth century, despite the mass of documents in Manchu kept in archives, the historiography of China under the Qing (1644–1911) relied almost exclusively on sources in Chinese. This has contributed to the construction of an image of China as an immutable empire where, for more than two millennia, the Chinese language was the sole vehicle of bureaucratic as well as scholarly communication, and where all foreign conquerors had to give up their own cultural identity if they were to rule successfully.

In the past two decades, however, this historiographical situation has begun to change. Until then only a few specialists in the Manchu language, who published mainly in German and in Japanese, had long emphasised the importance of Manchu sources for Chinese history.[1] Taking their point on board, and relying on their work, more and more historians of late imperial China have learnt to read Manchu, and have started to use the Manchu documents in the archives. Combining these with sources in Chinese, they have proposed a new vision of the Qing Empire, pointing out that what used to be Ming China only occupied one third of its territory. They have argued that Qing rulers aptly constructed different images of themselves to best match the cultures of the various people they controlled. They have also made apparent how the Republic of China (1912–1949), and then the People's Republic of China (since 1949), whose borders are those of the Qing Empire—except for what is now the

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[1] For a bibliography, see (Stary 1990 and Stary 2003).

Republic of Mongolia—have appropriated the Qing legacy as essentially, nay exclusively, "Chinese".

This appropriation, combined with the hostility of early twentieth century Chinese politicians and intellectuals against the Manchus, has shaped even the apparently more technical aspects of historiography. An interesting example is the date of the beginning of the Qing dynasty, and therefore of the proper way to quote a date for the period: this apparently neutral issue was as fraught with implications in the twentieth century as it had been in the seventeenth.[2] The date accepted today is 1644, when the Manchu took Beijing and made it their capital. However the formation of the Manchu dynasty can be traced back several decades earlier, to Nurhaci (1559–1626), the grandfather of the Shunzhi emperor (r. 1644–1661), who first reigned from Beijing. In 1636, under Nurhaci's son Hong Taiji 皇太極 (1592–1643),[3] the state that was to overtake the Ming changed its name from Jin 金—after the dynasty who controlled Northern China between 1115 and 1234—to Qing 清.[4] The adoption of this new name was intended as the foundation of a new dynasty, following the model of the Chinese tradition. The Ming dynasty, on the other hand, survived until 1662 as the "Southern Ming"; in fact it was not until 1681 that the empire was securely unified under Qing control.[5] During this long and uncertain transition, the choice of using one or the other reign for dating written material was a token of allegiance to one or the other dynasty. It is significant that a number of early Qing Chinese scholars used the traditional sexagesimal cycle alone to mark the years, avoiding both positive allegiance to and explicit rebellion against the conquerors. The Republic of China, founded in 1912 after the fall of the Qing, was constructed on anti-Manchuism; its capital was Nanjing, which had been the first Ming capital. An example of how the historiography of the Republican period was shaped by this reference to the Ming precedent is a widely used table of correspondence between the Chinese and Western calendars, first published in 1940 and still regarded as a reference tool today: for the years 1644–1661, it gives only the Southern Ming reigns. A broader study of Republican historiography would be required to show to what extent this example is representative; what matters here is that one should be aware that basic research tools such as this chronological table, which gives a correspondence between

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[2] (Rawski 1996).

[3] Traditionally erroneously called "Abahai" in Western sources (Hummel 1943, 1–3).

[4] (Roth Li 2002, esp. 63; Elliott 2001, 71–2).

[5] (Struve 1984; Wakeman 1985).

"the Chinese" calendar and "the Western" one over 2000 years, are underlain by assumptions of legitimacy of the power that issued the calendar.[6] In any case, after the People's Republic of China was proclaimed in Beijing in 1949, a consensus seems to have emerged that the Qing dynasty began in 1644, when Beijing became the Qing capital.[7] The notion that different ways of dating simply reflected the fact that there were two simultaneous centres of power, and that historians do not need to and should not choose between them, but simply note their respective claims to legitimacy, has not yet found its way into mainstream historiography.

Apart from the dates of the Qing dynasty, it is worth reflecting on the terms "Chinese" and "Manchu", used to refer to the conquered and to the conquerors, and to their respective languages. Since the present article is written in English, European usages as well as Chinese terms need to be taken into account. In the late seventeenth and eighteenth century, European literature mainly referred to the Qing Empire as "China". More specific phrases were sometimes used. For example, the title of Du Halde's famous work, *Description... de l'empire de la Chine et de la Tartarie chinoise*,[8] represented "Tartary", i.e. the lands from which the Manchus originated, as part of the Chinese empire, rather than China as integrated into a Tartar empire.[9] The word Manchu was also used; however "Tartar" seems to have dominated in European literature. As to the people who inhabited the empire, a distinction was usually made between "the Chinese", and "the Tartars". This reflects the strong divide between Bannermen and "Han people" (*hanren* 漢人)—the conquerors and the conquered—enforced in the Qing Empire. The former were in turn divided into the Manchu, the Mongol and the "Chinese military" (*hanjun* 漢軍) members of the Eight Banners (*baqi* 八旗), the units into which the conquerors of China and their allies had been organised since the early seventeenth century.[10] Named after the Han dynasty (206 BCE–220 CE), the Han were the numerically and culturally dominant group in Ming China. In this context the word "Chinese" as used in English is quite ambiguous: it can refer either to the inhabitants of the "Middle Kingdom" (*Zhongguo* 中國, which is still the name of China in Chinese today) or to members of the "Han Chinese" group, as opposed to all the other groups of which the empire and then the Republic and the People's Republic are composed.

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[6] (Xue Zhongsan and Ouyang Yi 1961); this is not only an issue for Chinese history: the tables use the Julian calendar up to 1582 and the Gregorian calendar thereafter. But protestant countries like Sweden and England only adopted the latter in the middle of the eighteenth century: thus in the period under discussion neither "China" nor "the West" had a unified way of denoting dates.

[7] (Struve 1984, xiii–xiv).

[8] (Du Halde 1735; see Landry-Deron 2002).

[9] On the construction and history of "Tartary", see (Elliot 2000).

[10] (Rawski 1998, 61).

The name "Manchu" (transliterated into Chinese in various ways) was adopted by Hong Taiji in 1635, that is, after the unification of the regions that today form Heilongjiang 黑龍江 and Inner Mongolia had been achieved, and only nine years before Beijing was taken. This new entity referred to the polity that had hitherto been known as Jušen, a term that Hong Taiji banned when coining the new one. It was one year later that he chose Qing as a new dynastic name. He was thus the first emperor of the Qing dynasty, although he never ruled over the territory of Ming China.

The construction of the Manchu written language as used in the documents produced after 1644 is concomitant to the construction of the "Manchu people" and of the Qing state. In 1599 Nurhaci, having unified the Jušen tribes, ordered the creation of a script to render the regional variety of Manchu of current usage. A new version of this script, with diacritical marks added to it around 1640, became the official writing system of the Qing dynasty, and was kept in continuous usage for the Manchu side of the state administration.[11]

So interestingly the Manchu script predated both the terms that were later used to refer to it in Chinese: *qingwen* 清文 ("Qing script") and *manwen* 滿文 ("Manchu script"). As to the lexicon of the language, it was progressively shaped and defined. Glossaries were published in order to standardize the language, until as late as the eighteenth century.[12] This process of the construction of a language as part of that of a dynasty, which was probably not an easy task, would require further study. On the other hand, after the conquest of China, there was a progressive change in the languages spoken by Bannermen: they originally spoke a form of Manchu; gradually, especially through the eighteenth century, Chinese became predominant among the Manchu Bannermen living in China proper, while hybridization and bilingualism continued to survive.[13] This means that by the end of the eighteenth century Manchu survived first and foremost as an administrative language. Eventually its survival was so

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[11] (Crossley and Rawski 1993, 66).

[12] Those produced during the Qianlong reign (1736–95) have been published in (Zhang Hong et al., 1993–2005).

[13] (Ch'en 1976; Wadley 1996, 103; Di Cosmo 1999, 356, 387).

intimately dependent on the Qing state that, when the language ceased to be used in official documents after 1911, it mostly fell into oblivion. This is one of the reasons for the little use made of the material written in Manchu in the twentieth century. Thus ignorance of the language in which they were written, together with Chinese nationalistic and anti-Manchu feelings, explains why sources in Manchu have largely been left aside by historians of Qing China in the twentieth century.

As the language of the state, Manchu obviously had a specific status in the Qing Empire. On the one hand, it functioned as a means to restrict the circulation of information to the circle of officials who had mastered the language. Many bilingual administrative documents kept in the archives contain passages in Manchu that were deliberately not translated into Chinese; such passages usually bear the mention "Do not translate".[14] On the other hand, at an early stage the translation of a number of works from Chinese into Manchu served to introduce young Bannermen to Chinese culture.[15] More generally, the creation of a body of Manchu literature was an essential aspect of the definition and perpetuation of a "Manchu identity", a means for the rulers to differentiate themselves from the populations they controlled. Since in the Chinese tradition writing was equated with the foundations of civilisation, creating a corpus of written literature in Manchu allowed the assertion of difference while abiding by Chinese cultural imperatives. But it was also a way of taking up the Inner Asian heritage: the Liao 遼 (907–1125), Jin 金 (1115–1234) and Yuan 元 (1279–1368) dynasties had all produced autochthonous scripts.

The implications of this renewal of the historiography of Qing China based on the inclusion of sources in Manchu for the study of the history of science, technology, and medicine have yet to be fully drawn. Medicine has been the subject of a number of learned articles; the first attempt at a systematic overview has been published recently by Marta Hanson,[16] who pleads for the importance of the medical material in Manchu. However it is not yet possible to assess the extent to and the ways in which this material might change our view of medicine, let alone of science in general, in Qing China. A census of medical texts has yielded a mere 29 titles,[17] while my attempt at listing mathematical works has so far revealed the existence of no more than four, for all of which Chinese versions are also extant. Given that Manchu collections around the world are in great part catalogued, the neglect of their scientific components may not after all have resulted in as distorted a view of the historiography of science in late imperial China as has been the case for history. That is certainly the case if one conceives history of science merely as the assessment of what knowledge was available at a certain time in a certain place. But if one aims at integrating the history of science into political and cultural history, these admittedly few texts should be taken seriously as evidence of an imperial policy in relation to learning. Moreover, it will be argued below that their very existence should lead us to reconsider another important issue, that of contacts between China and Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.

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[14] (Crossley and Rawski 1993, 68–73).

[15] (Crossley 1999, 190–1).

[16] (Hanson 2005) includes a bibliography of earlier studies.

[17] (Walravens 1996, 359).

Western Learning (xixue 西學) *and the Dynastic Transition*

At the end of the sixteenth century, that is, in terms of Chinese chronology, in the late Ming period, some Jesuits entered China, and established a mission. In their evangelising enterprise, they used natural philosophy and the mathematical sciences as they were then taught in Jesuit colleges in Europe as a means to relate to scholarly elites; this knowledge came to be known in China as "Western learning". Thus in 1607 Matteo Ricci (1552–1610), who is regarded as the founder of the Jesuit mission of China, translated the first six books of Euclid's *Elements* into Chinese in collaboration with Xu Guangqi 徐光啟 (1562–1633), a high official who had converted to Christianity.[18]

In 1629, some Jesuits started working on a calendar reform under the supervision of Xu Guangqi; he had also contributed to an effort by a group of Christian officials to implement Western artillery in the Ming army.[19] The calendar had always been of utmost symbolical and political importance in China; issued in the emperor's name, it ensured that human activity followed the cycles of the cosmos. Discrepancies between the former and the latter would therefore cast doubt upon a dynasty's legitimacy. Thus Xu's calendar reform was but one element in the response to the dynastic crisis that would lead to the downfall of the Ming.

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[18] On this translation see (Engelfriet 1998).

[19] On the calendar reform see (Hashimoto 1988). On the whole Xu's efforts were more successful in astronomy than in military technology (Huang 2001).

The Qing adopted the calendar that resulted from Xu's reform as soon as they took Beijing in 1644, and the Jesuits found a niche in the civil service.[20] The calendar they calculated every year thereafter was promulgated in three different languages: Chinese, Manchu and Mongol.[21] In 1664, however, Jesuits astronomers and their Chinese Christian collaborators were impeached and jailed following accusations of miscalculation and heterodoxy, in what is known as the Calendar Case; five of the collaborators were executed, while missionaries were either expelled or kept under house arrest. One of the first steps taken by the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1662–1722) in his assumption of personal rule in 1669 was to reverse this verdict and to reinstate the Jesuits as imperial astronomers; thereafter their skills were also used in other fields, such as cartography and military technology.[22] It remained an issue, however, whether foreign rulers could ground their legitimacy on a calendar calculated by other foreigners.[23]

Although it is not yet visible in popularisation literature, the historiography of Christianity in China and that of Western learning have undergone parallel renewals in the past two decades. Whereas materials in European languages once were the main and sometimes the sole sources used by European and American historians for writing this history, it is now acknowledged that one needs to combine this material with sources in Chinese—and in Manchu—in order to retrieve a fuller picture of the complex enterprise of the importation of a foreign religion into China.[24] Historians of Christianity in China have by and large given up two assumptions concerning the circulation of religion that were both inherited from Eurocentric worldviews: first, that due to its universal value and truth, the Christian religion spreads "naturally", unless obstacles are raised against its circulation by the Devil or by local superstitions; secondly, that it is desirable that the Christian religion should spread without changing, for the salvation of the heathen, and therefore in their interest, which missionaries understand better than they do themselves.

Similarly, a number of historians of science who work on Western learning in China have given up expecting that science should be the same in various times and places and lamenting the limitations of the transmission of science from early modern Europe to China, and analysing the history of Western learning in China in terms of misunderstanding or "imperfect transmission". This phrase, taken from the part of *Science and civilisation in China*'s section on astronomy devoted to "The time of the Jesuits", suggests that there is a message of truth that should not be altered by circulation, and neatly summarizes the historiography that has dominated in the past 50 years. In his discussion, Joseph Needham is, as always, nuanced in his analysis. However a single sentence has very often been quoted as summarising his conclusions: "Urania's feet were bound".[25] Scholars have striven to pinpoint the culprits for this regrettable fettering; all have been accused: the Jesuits, who personify religion's enmity to science,[26] "the Chinese", who are just too different from "us",[27] and the Manchu rulers, who are just Barbarians.[28] An alternative viewpoint has been developed in the last two decades, according to which the circulation in China of the knowledge imported by the Jesuits should be accounted for without any assumption that one form of science is superior to all others, but rather in terms of how knowledge is constructed in the very process of circulation.[29] This viewpoint yet has to make its way into mainstream historiography.

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[20] (Standaert 2001, 689–710 and 711–37).

[21] (Smith 1991, 75; Golvers 1993, 63).

[22] (Standaert 2001, 760–3, 772).

[23] (Chu 1997).

[24] (Gernet 1982) pioneered this change, showing Chinese scholars' viewpoint on Christianity; (Standaert 2001) is representative of the new historiography.

As suggested above, the sciences played a major role in the continued existence of the mission through the dynastic transition; this continuity has dominated the historiography. Narratives of the mission based solely on missionaries' reports often failed to take into account the major changes brought about in Western learning by the dynastic change. However it is now well established that the reception of this learning among the Chinese elites, as well as the Jesuits' status, changed radically with the advent of the Qing. In the late Ming, Western learning was mainly taken up by converts, or by scholars who had personal relations with one or more Jesuits. In early and mid-Qing, on the other hand, Western learning was no longer accepted or rejected as a whole: debates on the respective merits of Chinese learning and Western learning focused on technical details. Moreover hostility towards the missionaries and their religion was often combined with strong interest in the mathematics and astronomy they had written about in Chinese. The links between this hostility and the Jesuits' prompt switch of allegiance to the Manchus remain to be assessed. The China Jesuits, having worked on a calendar that was to contribute to reforms aimed at strengthening the Ming, instantly offered the result of this work to the invaders, thus giving them the indispensable legitimacy that an accurate calendar traditionally conferred on rulers.[30] After the reinstatement of the Jesuits as imperial astronomers in 1669, criticising Western astronomy could thus entail an implicit questioning of the legitimacy of the Qing. The gradual reconciliation of Chinese elites to Manchu rule, however, did not put an end to the debates and controversies that opposed Western learning and Chinese learning in the sciences: by then the religion preached by the Jesuits aroused but little interest among the elite.

With the advent of the Qing, Western learning thus moved closer to the centre of power and further away from literati elites. The fact that Kangxi, the second emperor of the Qing dynasty to rule China, undertook to study this learning further changed its status. It is at this juncture that taking Manchu sources into account matters.

Science as Imperial Scholarship during the Kangxi Reign (1662–1722)

In what follows, the stakes underlying the use of the Manchu language as a vehicle for imperial science during the Kangxi reign will be discussed, taking into account sources in Chinese and European languages, as well as in Manchu. That the court was the main and possibly the sole place of production of scientific literature in Manchu at the time explains this narrowing of the focus. The Kangxi reign is of particular interest for this question, for two reasons. Firstly, after the final establishment of central control over the Chinese territory, and the quelling of the Three Feudatories rebellion (1674–1681),[31] a lengthy period of stability ensued, during which the emperor had the leisure to pursue a systematic cultural policy. Secondly, his personal interest in the sciences meant that unprecedented emphasis was put on them throughout his reign.

Imperial patronage of learning in the Chinese language was an important aspect of the policy of reconciliation of the Chinese literati elites to the Manchu rule. It entailed the recruitment of some of these literati in the service of the dynasty for the production of new editions of texts of classical learning, or of new texts. The best known example of this is the founding, in 1679, of the Ming History Office (*Mingshiguan* 明史館), where the compilation of the official history of the previous dynasty was undertaken, following the Chinese tradition that a new dynasty should act as the historiographer of its predecessor. A special examination had been organised to staff this Office,[32] which continued to exist until the official *Ming History* (*Mingshi* 明史) was completed in 1739, long after Kangxi's death, under the reign of his grandson. In other cases Kangxi was directly involved in the production of imperial scholarship. Thus in 1671, that is, two years after the beginning of his personal rule, he recruited a number of Daily Tutors (*rijiangguan* 日講官) among Hanlin 翰林 academicians, those scholars who had ranked best at the previous Metropolitan examination, by which high officials were recruited:[33] while still quite junior, they later pursued careers at the highest level. With these Tutors the emperor studied the Classics, which were regarded as the founding texts of Chinese civilisation, and formed the core of the curriculum of imperial examinations; in the process lecture notes were produced, carefully revised by tutors and student, to be printed as imperial publications. Between 1678 and 1749, such "Explanations of the meaning of [...] during daily tutoring" (*Rijiang*...*jieyi* 日講...解義) were published for the Four Books as well as the Five Classics.[34]

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[25] (Needham 1959, 450).

[26] This is closest to Needham's assessment: "The Jesuits were the prisoners of their limited motivation".

[27] (Wong 1963).

[28] (Xi Zezong 2000).

[29] See e.g. (Chu 1997, Jami 2002).

[30] (Jami 2005a, 203–4).

[31] (Spence 2002, 136–47).

Kangxi's study of the sciences followed the same pattern as that of the Classics: he was tutored in them, and some of the tutoring resulted in imperial publications. As for the *Ming History*, a special office was created in 1713 for the compilation of these publications: the Office of Mathematics (*Suanxue guan* 算學館).[35] In the case of the sciences, however, neither the tutors nor the corpus of knowledge they taught were Chinese; the Jesuits tutored the emperor in Western learning. Nonetheless, like classical scholarship, Western learning can be regarded a legacy of the Ming dynasty that the Manchu rulers promptly took up. It was a feature peculiar to Kangxi that he had such long-lasting interest in it. According to him, he had resolved to study it after becoming aware of the general ignorance of astronomy among high officials at the time when the verdict of the Calendar Case had been reversed.[36]

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[32] (Wilhelm 1951).

[33] The examination system is one of the many Ming institutions that the Qing took up at the very beginning of the dynasty.

[34] (Zhao 1977, 2483, 4221, 4226, 4236, 4244, 4248).

[35] (Jami 1994a, 238–241).

[36] (Jami 2002, 31).

This is the story of Kangxi's study as it has been told from sources in Chinese and in European languages.[37] Like the whole story of Western learning in China, it is bipolar: China and the West. In fact some of the Jesuit tutors of the emperor spoke both Chinese and Manchu. Similarly, Daily Tutors had all studied Manchu after passing the Palace examination. Imperial study, like administration, was bilingual. This implied that there should be translations of the Chinese classics into Manchu; these had first been undertaken under the reign of Hong Taiji, before the Manchus took Beijing.[38] In the field of Western learning, on the other hand, texts were produced in either Chinese or Manchu, and some of them were translated from one language into the other. This reflects the emperor's perception of Western learning as a repository from which he drew both techniques for statecraft, over which he might keep a monopoly, and material for scholarship, which he might share with Chinese literati. He used the Jesuits not only as technical (*shu* 術) experts in his service, but also as providers of information that could pertain to the category of learning (*xue* 學), the value held paramount by his Chinese scholar-officials, who were confident that they had a monopoly over it.

The use of the Manchu language implied a restricted availability of information. On the other hand, the use of Chinese made possible not only circulation among all literati, but also a claim to the status of learning for the sciences; such a claim could never be made for writings in Manchu, since classical Chinese remained the sole vehicle of knowledge universally acknowledged among literati. In what follows, I propose to show the implications of imperial choices regarding the languages in which texts of Western knowledge were available. For this purpose texts pertaining to natural philosophy and to the mathematical sciences in the Jesuits' classification of knowledge will be considered. But let us first briefly discuss the study of Chinese and of Manchu by the Jesuits who tutored the emperor.

Learning the Ruler's Language

The Jesuits who entered China as missionaries all studied the spoken language of the elite; at the end of the Ming, that was Southern Mandarin.[39] They also learnt classical Chinese, and acquainted themselves with the

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[37] See e.g. (Kessler 1976, 137–54).

[38] (Crossley and Rawski 1993, 91–2).

[39] On this language see (Coblin 1997).

Classics.[40] This did not drastically change with the dynastic transition, as the vast majority of missionaries worked in the provinces. Only some of the very few who were in the service of the rulers learnt Manchu; some of them only communicated with Kangxi in Chinese.

The emperor's first tutor in the sciences was Ferdinand Verbiest (1623–1688), whom he had appointed Administrator of the Calendar (*zhili lifa* 治理曆法) after the reversal of the verdict in the Calendar Case. Verbiest recounted how he started studying Manchu in 1675:[41]

> When the Emperor heard from me that the books of Euclid made up the prime elements of the whole mathematical science, he immediately wanted the first six books of Euclid, which had once been translated into Chinese by Father M. Ricci, to be explained to him. [...] Although he knew Chinese very well, [...] he nevertheless wanted the Chinese Euclid to be translated into Manchu, to gain some further help from this. Since the dignitaries generally use the Manchu language, and since it is frequently used in almost all the Ministries, he also sent me, in his exceptional favour, an instructor, one of his home servants, to teach me the Manchu language [...].[42]

The translation of Euclid seems to have hardly circulated, and to be no longer extant. As Verbiest points out, at the time, Kangxi was fluent in Chinese; having the *Elements of geometry* translated into Manchu was part of his policy of systematic creation of a body of written literature in his native language.[43] It is unlikely that at the time anyone in the imperial entourage or among Bannermen might actually have needed this translation in order to study geometry, as by that time Manchu scholars mastered literary Chinese. While Verbiest was fully aware that speaking Manchu would be a great help to him as a civil servant, Kangxi's order that the Jesuit should study Manchu also formed part of the imperial construction of this language.

Ten years later, three other Jesuits worked with Verbiest as astronomers and court savants: Claudio Filippo Grimaldi (1638–1712), Tomé Pereira (1646–1708), and Antoine Thomas (1644–1709). Of these only Grimaldi knew Manchu well enough to translate both scientific and religious books into that language.[44] Thomas and Pereira, on the other hand, both tutored the emperor in Chinese—Thomas in mathematics, Pereira in music.

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[40] (Brockey 2002, 313–74).

[41] This is the date given by (Golvers 1993, 266 n. 102).

[42] (Golvers 1993, 99).

[43] (Crossley and Rawski 1993, 91–5).

[44] (Golvers 1993, 267 n. 102).

This is probably the reason why it was Grimaldi who was appointed as Verbiest's successor as Administrator of the Calendar upon the latter's death in 1688.

Shortly after Verbiest's death, five French Jesuits appointed as correspondents of the Paris Academy of Sciences arrived in Beijing. They had been sent by King Louis XIV as "his Mathematicians".[45] The Jesuit mission of China had hitherto been under the sole patronage of Portugal, who in 1494 had been granted a monopoly over missions in Asia by the Pope.[46] The French were received as competitors by most of their confreres who were already working in China; the latter gave priority to their allegiance to their Portuguese patron, on whom they were financially dependent, over their loyalty to the Society of Jesus as a whole. These included not only Pereira, himself a Portuguese, and the superior of the Beijing house since Verbiest's death, but also the Visitor of the Society for China and Japan, Francesco Saviero Filippucci (1632–1692), who forbade the study of Manchu to the five Frenchmen.[47] Nonetheless, Jean-François Gerbillon (1654–1707) and Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730), the two among them who were appointed by Kangxi in his service, did learn that language at his request. Gerbillon recounted a dialogue he had with the emperor in January 1690:

> I always spoke to him in Tartar, but I would not undertake to give mathematical explanations: I apologised to His Majesty that I did not know either the Chinese or the Tartar language well enough to speak to him relevantly, especially regarding the sciences, not knowing the appropriate Chinese or Tartar terms: but I told him that when we would have learnt Tartar well, F. Bouvet and I would be able to give him lessons in mathematics or in philosophy very clearly and neatly, because the Tartar language by far surpasses the Chinese language, in that the latter has no conjugations, no declensions, no particles to link discourses, whereas in the former they are very common. The emperor seemed pleased with this speech, and turning to those around him: this is true, he told them, and this defect makes the Chinese language much more difficult than the Tartar one.[48]

Missionaries who studied both languages all agreed that Manchu was far easier, especially due to the difficulty of memorising Chinese characters.[49] It is very common, even nowadays, for those who confront the difficulties of classical Chinese to ascribe these difficulties to its supposed grammatical shortcomings. This being said, the assessment of Manchu in terms of its similarities with European languages clearly delighted the emperor. His language was deemed more appropriate than Chinese for the purpose of expressing Western learning: here was at least one field in which he did not have to defer to his scholar-officials. Following this conversation, he appointed some teachers to help Gerbillon and Bouvet make progress in his language, as he had done with Verbiest. The first result of this intensive study was a short treatise on digestion, composed at the beginning of 1690 with the help of their teachers, which the emperor himself corrected.[50]

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[45] (Landry-Deron 2001).

[46] (Standaert 2001, 286–7).

[47] (Landry-Deron 1995, 1:50, 54).

[48] (Landry-Deron 1995, 2:11–2).

[49] (Golvers 1993, 267 n. 102).

Natural Philosophy and Medicine: Restricting Access to Heterodox Writings

As with Verbiest, then, the two French Jesuits' study of Manchu was part of Kangxi's policy of constituting a corpus of Western learning in Manchu. After digestion, they dealt with a number of other medical topics in similar short texts, all illustrated. This was part of their larger project to teach philosophy to the emperor, as a step towards converting him.[51] The latter, on his side, insisted that they should show their writings to no one else than him.[52] This secrecy was not limited to medical topics, but extra caution was shown on subjects related to what pertained to natural philosophy at the time in Europe. This probably resulted from an earlier experience: in 1683, Verbiest had presented him a treatise in Chinese entitled *Qiongli xue* 窮理學 ("Study of the fathoming of principles"), asking that it be printed and promulgated.[53] He hoped to substitute the Jesuit version of scholastic education for the Chinese Classics: *qiongli* 窮理 was the term that he borrowed from Neo-confucian philosophers, as his predecessors had done, to render the Latin *philosophia*. The *Qiongli xue* was a compilation of Aristotelian texts written in Chinese by Verbiest's predecessors of the late Ming period, from which he had deleted all references to the Christian religion. Kangxi discussed the treatise with some Hanlin academicians: its title was a claim that it pertained to scholarship. There was a consensus in assessing the *Qiongli xue*. According to the emperor, "the contents of this book [were] rebellious, erroneous and obtuse." His officials argued,

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[50] (Landry-Deron 1995, 2:36).
[51] (Jami 2005b, 218–20).
[52] (Landry-Deron 1995, 2:34–5).
[53] (Dudink and Standaert 1999; Golvers 1999).

more specifically, that "all [Verbiest said] about knowledge and memory pertaining to the brain and so on indeed [strayed] away from principles".[54] In their view, knowledge and memory pertained to the *xin* 心 ("heart" in the abstract sense, sometimes translated as "mind and heart"), which was certainly *not* located in the head. In short, competent as he might be in technical matters (*shu* 術), Verbiest had no understanding of the principles (*li* 理) that underlay genuine, orthodox learning (*xue* 學).

This experience probably explains why Kangxi insisted that the Jesuits should keep their medical writings secret. Indeed the emperor endorsed the condemnation of Verbiest's *Qiongli xue* as heterodox; this was duly recorded in Chinese by imperial diarists. Nonetheless he kept an active interest in Western medicine—which the Jesuits regarded as a part of philosophy—using the Manchu language for this purpose.[55] Beside the material produced by Gerbillon and Bouvet, which appears to be no longer extant, a work on Western pharmacopoeia written for Kangxi is still kept in Beijing at the Palace Museum Library.[56]

The work best known today among those commissioned by Kangxi on European medicine is a treatise on anatomy in Manchu composed by Dominique Parrenin (1665–1741), a French Jesuit who worked at court in the late years of the reign.[57] According to him, Kangxi's original plan was to have the work eventually translated into Chinese, on the grounds of its usefulness; but at the same time the emperor was concerned that the illustrations might shock:

> [...] The public must draw great advantage from this book, as it must contribute to save, or at least to lengthen, life. It is not a book to be shown to young men: thus, the illustrations must only be seen by those who will share the work with you.[58]

Following the emperor's commission, Parrenin worked for five years to produce a Manchu treatise.[59] In its title, *Dergici toktobuha Ge ti ciowan lu bithe* ("Complete record of the body, Imperially commissioned"), one can discern a transcription from Chinese (*Geti quanlu* 格體全錄).[60] Parrenin was assisted by "three Mandarins of the most skilled, two writers whose hand was excellent, two painters very capable of drawing figures, line drawers, designers etc."[61] This points to a general contrast in Western learning. In the late Ming many of the Jesuits' works were jointly signed with one or more Chinese scholars, without whom they could of course not have been produced. During the Kangxi reign some Manchus—and also possibly some Chinese—who worked in the Imperial Household Department (*Neiwufu* 內務府) had obviously significant competence in the sciences, and contributed to the texts discussed here. However their existence is only mentioned in passing if at all in Jesuit sources, and these texts are not signed; neither do other materials in Chinese or in Manchu known and studied so far tell us more about them. On the whole, those who contributed to writing Western learning in Manchu are more anonymous than those who contributed to it in Chinese.

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[54] Quoted in (Dudink and Standaert 1999, 17).
[55] (Dong 2004, 69–102).
[56] (Li 1999).
[57] (Walravens 1996, 368).
[58] (*LEC* XVII, 350).
[59] (Walravens 1996).
[60] (Hanson 2005, 145); *bithe* means "book".

Once the Anatomy was completed, the emperor decided that it was not to be translated into Chinese, and that there should be only three copies of the text, to be kept in different imperial libraries.[62] This decision not to circulate an imperially commissioned work is probably related both to the allusions to the "invisible soul" and to the "Lord who created the things" found in it,[63] and to the earlier assessment of Verbiest's *Qiongli xue*. Here two features of Kangxi's attitude as a patron of scholarship seem to converge: his abiding by Chinese orthodoxy and his policy of controlling, and sometimes monopolizing, Western learning. In both these respects the Manchu language was a valuable tool.

Mathematical Sciences for the Emperor and for the Empire

The subjects that Kangxi studied most systematically with the Jesuits were also those in which Western learning had the greatest impact in China. As mentioned above, he first turned to astronomy and to geometry. He was interested more broadly in mathematics, in which he received further tutoring in the 1690s and the 1710s. He was also tutored in the practice of the harpsichord, as well as in harmonics, a topic essential to ritual, and related to astronomy in traditional Chinese classifications.[64] There was thus a convergence between the scholastic *quadrivium* (i.e. arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy) on which Jesuit education in the mathematical sciences had been constructed, and the cluster of topics on which the court Jesuits wrote most extensively for the emperor.

In 1690 and 1691, sessions of tutoring in Western learning took place almost every day.[65] Beside the two French Jesuits who taught in Manchu, Gerbillon and Bouvet, two other tutors taught in Chinese: Thomas and Pereira. The latter often served as an interpreter for Thomas, whom some sources describe as not being totally fluent even in Chinese, but who, on the other hand, had specialised in the mathematical sciences years before leaving Europe.[66] The emperor's intention seems to have been that all the lecture notes should be available both in Chinese and in Manchu; they were designed to be printed and circulated. This seems to be an example of his plan to create a scholarly literature in Manchu in parallel with Chinese. A number of manuscripts of these lecture notes are still extant, mostly in Chinese, a few in Manchu.

The most famous of these is certainly a treatise of Euclidian geometry based on a French textbook, I.G. Pardies' *Elemens de geometrie*.[67] Gerbillon and Bouvet substituted it for the Clavius edition of Euclid's *Elements*, on which the Ricci-Xu translation of 1607 and the Manchu translation undertaken by Verbiest were based.[68] The two Frenchmen completed their Manchu treatise in 1690, and its Chinese translation the following year.[69] Both the 1607 and the 1691 Chinese treatises were entitled *Jihe yuanben* 幾何原本: this reflects the fact that in Europe "Elements of geometry" had come to refer to a genre, that of geometry textbooks, rather than to Euclid's work in particular. Again the Manchu title was a phonetic transcription of the Chinese one: *Gi ho yuwan ben bithe*. When working on the Manchu version, the two Jesuits received the help of a translator who had previously worked with Verbiest on the Manchu version of the 1607 *Jihe yuanben*.[70] Like Parrenin's collaborators for the Anatomy, his name remains unknown to us. The work he had previously done with Verbiest, however, meant that a Manchu terminology for geometry was already available to Gerbillon and Bouvet. One feature of the manuscript of their Manchu geometry kept at the Palace Museum Library in Beijing

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[61] (Walravens 1996, 365).
[62] (Jami 2002, 43).
[63] (Walravens 1996, 370).
[64] (Jami 2008).
[65] (Landry-Deron 1995).
[66] (Bosmans 1924–6).
[67] (Pardies 1671; see Jami 1996).
[68] (Jami 2005b, 217–21).
[69] On the various manuscripts kept in China today, see (Liu 1991); another copy of the Manchu text is kept in St Petersburg; (Pang and Stary 2000).
[70] (Landry-Deron 1995, 2:48).

is revealing of the fact that the terminology used in the text was constructed by derivation from Chinese. The Chinese character(s) equivalent to Manchu geometrical terms like point, angle, parallel were added to the left of the corresponding Manchu term (the Manchu script is vertical, and columns are laid out from left to right).[71] Chinese characters seem to be added whenever the corresponding Manchu term occurs, so that one could say that in this particular manuscript the mathematical terms consist of Manchu terms and their Chinese equivalents. Some of the Manchu terms were phonetic transcriptions of their Chinese equivalents; this was the case for the names of points in geometric figures; for those, phonetic transcription of the Chinese heavenly stems and earthly branches (*tiangan dizhi* 天干地支) were used. These are two sequences of characters that combined into the sequence of sixty terms commonly used for numbering the days and the years in the calendar. The ten stems and twelve branches were used in Manchu, under names different from the phonetic transcription of their Chinese names; the use of this phonetic transcription to denote points suggests that the Manchu geometric terminology was conceived entirely in parallel with the Chinese one rather than consistently with other usages of the Manchu language. No other geometrical work in Manchu seems to have been written at the time: although the new imperial textbook existed in Manchu before it did in Chinese and was based on a French source, geometry in Manchu seems to have hardly existed independently from this subject in the Chinese language.

Antoine Thomas was the most prolific author of mathematical lecture notes. He was in charge of teaching arithmetic, and later algebra, which, as mentioned above, he did in Chinese. Several Chinese copies of his treatises have been preserved,[72] whereas only one draft Manchu version of his arithmetic treatise is extant.[73] Tome Pereira had earlier written a treatise on harmonics, also in Chinese.[74] When Kangxi asked Gerbillon and Bouvet to translate it into Manchu, they declined to do so, protesting of their ignorance of the subject. The two Frenchmen were thus repaying their Portuguese confrere in kind for the obstacles he kept raising for the French mission.[75] Pereira's treatise was nevertheless translated, although it is not known by whom.[76] This anecdote suggests that the imperial effort to create a corpus of Western learning in Manchu relied on rather limited human means.

Recently, one of the mathematical manuscripts of lecture notes in Manchu has been the subject of a detailed study.[77] This is a short treatise entitled in Chinese *Suanfa yuanben* 算法原本 ("Elements of calculation"), in Manchu *Suwan fa yuwan ben bithe*. It draws on some parts of books VII and VIII of Euclid's *Elements of geometry*.[78] In writing what is the first and only textual study of any of the Manchu material discussed in this article, Junsei Watanabe had no knowledge of what the manuscript was, or of the existence of its Chinese counterpart. Interestingly, this is the one treatise for which no positive external evidence allows to ascertain authorship. Determining whether the treatise was first composed in Chinese or in Manchu would help clarify whether it should be ascribed to Thomas or to Gerbillon and Bouvet.

Let us give an example of what such a systematic comparative study of the two versions might yield. The term used to render "to measure" in the Chinese manuscript is *dujin* 度盡, literally "to measure and exhaust"; the term was not found in earlier texts of Western learning. In the Manchu manuscript there are three successive renderings for the same term, which Watanabe translates as "to measure exactly", "to measure exhaustively", and "to measure and exhaust". Of these three terms, the last one is the closest match with the Chinese *dujin*. This would suggest that the text might have been translated from Chinese into Manchu, which would be consistent with the hypothesis that Antoine Thomas, rather than the French Jesuits, was its author.[79] This being said, the issue of priority between these two versions does not appear to be crucial for our purpose here. What is known of the context in which they were produced points to a desire on the emperor's part to have works on mathematics written in both languages. It may be that these texts were produced simultaneously, or revised jointly, as was the case for some administrative documents.

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[71] It is the case in the Manchu manuscript kept at the Palace Museum Library in Beijing (Ms 13716–13718), which is a draft with corrections on pasted pieces of paper, for both text and figures, and a few ones between columns.

[72] (Han and Jami 2003); (Jami and Han 2003); (Jami 2007).

[73] (BnF Mandchou 191).

[74] On the successive manuscript versions of this treatise, see (Wang 2002).

[75] (Jami 1995).

[76] (Landry-Deron 1995, 2:90. Wang Bing 2002, 70).

[77] (Watanabe 2005).

[78] (Jami 2007, 256).

[79] Watanabe, comparing the text to a later adaptation of the *Suanfa yuanben* published as part of the *Shuli jingyun* (1723), concludes that the latter was derived from the former; (Watanabe 2005, 189–190). Indeed both the Chinese and Manchu versions of the manuscript *Suanfa yuanben* predate the printed one. On the other hand, on the basis of its contents, I have argued that Thomas was more likely than the French Jesuits to have composed the *Suanfa yuanben* (Jami 2007, 468).

After the creation of the Office of mathematics in 1713, the Chinese versions of the manuscripts discussed above were used as a basis for the compilation of the *Essence of numbers and their principles imperially composed* (*Yuzhi shuli jingyun* 御製數理精蘊, 1723). This work proposed a definition of mathematics as a synthesis of all sources relevant to the field then available, that is, both Western learning and Chinese mathematical works. It was compiled by a team of scholars, including mostly Chinese, but also some Bannermen, without the collaboration of any Jesuit: imperial science was thus dissociated from the missionaries while it absorbed Western learning.[80] Two other treatises were compiled at the same Office; together with the *Essence of numbers and their principles*, they formed the *Origins of harmonics and calendrical astronomy, imperially composed* (*Yuzhi lüli yuanyuan* 御製律曆淵源). The treatise on astronomy, the *Thorough investigation of calendrical astronomy imperially composed* (*Yuzhi lixiang kaocheng* 御製曆象考成), does not seem to have resulted from tutoring by the Jesuits; it reflected, rather, an attempt at astronomical reform.[81] On the other hand, the third work, a treatise on harmonics, entitled *Exact meaning of pitch-pipes imperially composed* (*Yuzhi lülü zhengyi* 御製律呂正義), included a rewriting of Pereira's work in Chinese, in a separate and final chapter, following four chapters devoted to traditional Chinese harmonics. Thus, in this last subject, Jesuit tutoring resulted in an imperial publication as well.

Unlike some of its counterparts in classical learning produced under imperial patronage during the Kangxi reign, the *Origins of harmonics and calendrical astronomy* was never published in Manchu, nor is there evidence that there was any plan that the Office of Mathematics should work in that language. Thus, apart from a few manuscripts kept in imperial libraries, or sent to Europe by Jesuit missionaries, there remained no trace of the fact that the construction of imperial mathematics had started as a bilingual project. This can be interpreted as a failure due to the lack of competent staff, or as a consequence of changing relations between the emperor and Chinese literati. In any case it is also one among several examples of how the Manchu rulers in general and Kangxi in particular strove to project an image of themselves as Confucian emperors, promoting scholarship in the Chinese tradition. That only this particular facet of their multiform rulership is visible through Chinese sources is a measure of their success.

Do Manchu Sources Matter After All?

What do we learn from the admittedly very few sources discussed above? First, that more "Western learning" found its way into China than is visible from sources in Chinese alone. Secondly, that the imperial appropriation of this learning both stimulated the production of new texts and limited their circulation: the Manchu language was instrumental in this double process. The ways in which it functioned as a filter in the circulation of knowledge deserves further analysis.

If one adhered to the idea that science should and does circulate "naturally" unless there are obstacles, then it would follow from this that "the Manchus" in general and Kangxi in particular were just as guilty as the Jesuits for the "binding of Urania's feet." Here paradoxically, overoptimistic universalism and the implicit moral judgment that it contains converge with a representation of the Manchus as "Barbarians" who prevented civilised China from partaking in universal science. The complexity revealed by bringing together all the sources available, however, reminds us that history of science—like all history—is about human agents, without whom science simply does not exist. Only by moving beyond the assessment of achievements and limitations and the rhetoric of praise and blame can we deepen our historical understanding.

Is my conclusion, then, simply that the Manchus were not Chinese, and that this shaped the sciences as it did all aspects of politics, society and culture in the Qing Empire? What else can be drawn from this study than a confirmation of what historians have shown in more general terms? First, it shows, I believe, how the sciences were thus shaped. Secondly, by retrieving an obscured path of circulation of knowledge, it further urges us to do away with the long-lived bipolar historiography, in which "China" and "the West" forever stand face to face as two homogenous and immutable entities.

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[80] (Jami 1994b, 204–205).

[81] (Hashimoto 1970).

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LEGAL PLURALISM IN THE QING EMPIRE: MANCHU LEGISLATION FOR THE MONGOLS

Dorothea Heuschert

Studies of the law of late imperial China usually pay more attention to the inner provinces of the multi-ethnic Manchu Qing empire than to the outer regions. Qing law-making was not confined, however, to the Han population. Not only were the Mongols the only non-Han ethnic group for whom a special statute-book was compiled, but the first Manchu[1] laws for the Mongols date from the early 1630s, before the Qing dynasty was proclaimed and while the Manchu conquest of Beijing in 1644 was still a long way off. Qing legislation for the Mongols thus spans almost three hundred years, longer than for any other Qing subjects.

Mongolian law changed completely during the Qing dynasty. It is reasonable to assume that previously law among the Mongols varied widely with time, place, and circumstance, and that it was not uniformly administered on the basis of written texts.[2] Over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, the Qing gradually formalized Mongolian law with the result that, by the late eighteenth century, Mongolian courts were basing their judgements on codes drafted by central government officials in the Chinese capital. As the local judicial authorities were integrated into a hierarchical system, the discretion of Mongolian courts was increasingly restricted; by the end of the Qianlong period, all cases involving punishment more severe than whipping had to be confirmed by higher authority.

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[1] The name 'Manchu' is documented only since the early 1630s.

[2] Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) is supposed to have laid down a series of laws on matters of governance, military administration etc., the so-called *jasagh*, which has not been preserved. As different as opinions about Chinggis Khan's legislation may be, it is generally agreed that the *jasagh* (if it existed) was promulgated only orally, the circle of people allowed to see it being limited to senior officials and members of the ruling house. See David Morgan, 'The "Great Yāsā of Chingiz Khān" and Mongol Law in the Īlkhānate', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, xlix (1986), 169–70. See also Igor de Rachewiltz, who argues for the existence of the *jasagh* as a written corpus of laws: 'Some Reflections on Činggis Qan's J̌asay', *East Asian History*, vi (1993), 102–4.

The changes to Mongolian law during the Qing dynasty were conditioned by the particular historical circumstances. There were many cultural affinities between the two peoples and, for the Mongols, who had submitted to the Manchus before the Manchus became emperors of China, the first Manchu laws did not constitute a break with tradition. However, after the establishment of their dynasty in Beijing, the Qing themselves rejected most of their own legal culture: the first edition of the Qing code, published in 1646, was, by and large, a copy of the Ming code.[3] For the Mongols, therefore, their incorporation into the Qing state not only restricted the legislative and judicial powers of their native rulers, but also imported elements of Chinese legal culture. The definition of crime, the nature of punishment, and the form of procedure were increasingly modelled on the Chinese system. The law in Inner and Outer Mongolia corresponded by the nineteenth century to that in the inner provinces of the Qing empire.

The Qing emperors ruled a legally pluralistic empire, that is, one with two different legal systems.[4] Legal pluralism in the juristic sense is best known in the context of European colonial expansion: the coexistence of more than one normative ordering within the same territory has been said to be typical of colonial settings.[5] The effects of Qing rule on Mongolian law show that the comparison with colonialism is not far-fetched. Mongolian law as enacted by the Qing became a construct which, despite incorporating some traditional elements, introduced the Mongols to a foreign legal culture.

The comparison should not be taken too far; the way the Manchus established control over the Mongols differed from a colonial encounter. As immediate neighbours, Manchu and Mongolian tribes had maintained diplomatic relations long before the Manchus' rise to power. Moreover, most of the Mongolian tribes submitted to the Manchus voluntarily. By 1636, the Manchus had assured themselves of the loyalty of the southern

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[3] See Derk Bodde and Clarence Morris, *Law in Imperial China: Exemplified by 190 Ch'ing Dynasty Cases (Translated from the Hsing-an hui-lan) with Historical, Social, and Judicial Commentaries* (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), p. 60.

[4] According to John Griffiths, legal pluralism in a 'juristic' sense refers to a situation in which 'the sovereign . . . commands . . . different bodies of law for different groups in the population . . . defined in terms of features such as ethnicity, religion, nationality or geography': 'What is Legal Pluralism?', *Journal of Legal Pluralism*, xxiv (1986), 5. Griffiths distinguishes this definition from legal pluralism as 'the omnipresent, normal situation in human society': p. 39.

[5] Sally Engle Merry, 'Law and Colonialism', *Law and Society Review*, xxv (1991), 890. This review essay concentrates on British colonialism in Africa.

Mongolian tribes whose territory, by and large, makes up today's Inner Mongolia.[6] The Khalkha Mongols submitted to the Qing in 1691 and, like the southern Mongols, were not conquered but sought the Manchu emperor's protection from the incessant attacks of the western Mongolian confederation of the Zunghars. The Zunghars themselves were finally defeated by the Qing in 1759. Unlike the Inner and Outer Mongols, however, they had long resisted the Qing and were only subdued after a series of military campaigns.

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The peace treaties the Manchus made with the Mongols in the 1620s strengthened them in their challenge to Ming China, and turned the Mongols into valuable allies in the conquest of Chinese territory. However, while the early Manchu-Mongolian treaties were made between more or less equal partners, within a few years the balance of power shifted in favour of the Manchus. By the early 1630s, the Manchu khan, Hung Taiji, not only demanded of his Mongolian allies loyalty and military support for his ongoing campaigns, but also tried to exert an influence over the tribes' internal affairs.[7] His efforts are documented in a series of laws laid down in 1631 at a meeting with the noblemen of several southern Mongolian tribes.[8] The legislation, the first of Manchu laws for the Mongols, was not imposed by a sovereign: it was preceded by a statement of the time and place at which the two parties had met in order to 'negotiate law', and was, in form and content, consistent with the autochthonous Mongolian legal texts of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.[9] As the names and titles of the Mongolian noblemen are mentioned among those taking part, evidently they still had a say in the formulation of law. The legislation was the result of bilateral negotiation.

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[6] The tribe of the Chahar was an exception; they did not submit voluntarily and were defeated by the Manchus in 1634 after several campaigns.

[7] The Manchus had been making laws for the Mongols participating in their campaigns as early as 1628. See *J[iu] M[an]z[hou] D[ang]* (Taipei, 1969), vi, fos. 2843–5. These rules and regualtions, however, did not imply an interference in the internal affairs of the Mongols.

[8] *JMZD*, vii, fos. 3417–18, 3420–3, 3425–7.

[9] Texts on birch-bark, edited by Pèrlèè, 'Chalchyn šinè oldson caaz-érchémžijn dursgalt bičig', *Monumenta Historica Instituti Historiae Academiae Scientiarum Reipublicae Populi Mongolici*, vi (Ulan Bator, 1973). The legal texts do not make up a unified whole; rather, they constitute compilations of a series of laws drafted separately over several decades by different groups. There is no evidence that the legal rules were distributed or brought into play when judging criminal cases.

The early Manchu laws for the Mongols include rules reminiscent of both traditional Mongolian legal texts[10] and Manchu military law, that is, stipulations designed to ensure the loyalty and the discipline of the Mongolian troops. Although we do not know whether the laws were enforced, the fact that the Manchus made several (more or less similar) laws for the same Mongolian tribes on separate occasions makes it reasonable to assume that it took many attempts before their rules and regulations were known to and enforced on the Mongols.[11]

The Manchus, in order to make the Mongols comply with their new order, made use of traditional forms of Mongolian law-making. However, despite the fact that the Manchus had participated in the drafting of the rules and regulations, they were not bound by them: Manchu laws imposed restrictions only on Mongols. Thus, in contrast to the autochthonous Mongolian legal texts, the lawgivers were no longer also recipients of the law.[12] Apparently, Mongolian noblemen were soon eliminated from decision-making, for laws negotiated bilaterally are recorded only for 1631 and 1632.[13]

Manchu and Mongol equality in law-making, albeit brief, only pertains to the southern Mongolian tribes. In 1692, the year after the Khalkha Mongols formally submitted to the Qing, a corpus of laws was distributed among the Khalkha noblemen.[14] Although these rules and regulations have not survived, they most likely corresponded to the provisions of the Mongolian statute-book, a corpus of laws purportedly distributed among the southern Mongolian noblemen as early as 1643.[15] The earliest extant edition of the statute-book dates from the Kangxi period.[16]

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[10] For the correspondence of the 1631 Manchu laws to the texts on birch-bark, see Michael Weiers, 'Mandschu-Mongolische Strafgesetze aus dem Jahre 1631 und deren Stellung in der Gesetzgebung der Mongolen', *Zentralasiatische Studien*, xiii (1979), 160–2.

[11] For the question of the legal force of seventeenth-century Mongolian legal texts, see Dorothea Heuschert, *Die Gesetzgebung der Qing für die Mongolen im 17. Jahrhundert anhand des Mongolischen Gesetzbuches aus der Kangxi-Zeit (1662–1722)* (Weisbaden, 1998), pp. 88–9.

[12] See Heuschert, *Gesetzgebung*, pp. 79–81.

[13] For the 1632 laws, see *JMZD*, vii. fos. 3937–40. For the process of lawgiving, the Shilu are not a reliable source: from the earliest time, Manchu law-making for the Mongols is always portrayed as a promulgation of imperial law. The Shilu passages are listed in Zhang Jinfan and Guo Chengkang, *Qing ruguan qian guojia falü zhidu ski* (Shenyang, 1988), pp. 36–8.

[14] See *Qingdai bianzheng tongkao*, ed. Chen Bingguang et al. (Nanjing, 1934), p. 366.

[15] See *Da Qing lichao shilu*, Shengzu, juan 24 (Tokyo, 1937–8), fo. 1r/v.

[16] Woodprint, 152 articles in Mongolian language, preserved in the National Library at Ulan Bator. The exact date of publishing cannot be determined. The few dated articles

The regulations not only dealt with the administration of justice; they were also designed to ensure the military support of the Mongols, to establish an administrative hierarchy, and to define the duties and privileges of noblemen. In the early Qianlong period, the statute-book underwent a major revision: it was divided into twelve chapters and compiled in three languages—Mongolian, Manchu, and Chinese.[17] In contrast to earlier Mongolian legislation, the regulations of the statute-book were made known and enforced; records of legal cases from the late eighteenth century prove that copies of the statute-book were available in the offices of the administrative units (banners), and that it was used to judge legal cases.

There is no evidence that, before Qing rule, justice among the Mongols was dispensed according to written laws. The distribution and enforcement of the Mongolian statute-book thus tried to put an end to the legal differences among the Mongols. Although, during the Qing dynasty, local differences in the administration of justice undoubtedly continued to exist, the regulations of the statute-book, with the exception of a few articles laid down for particular tribes, were binding on all Mongols under the authority of the Manchus.

However, while the Mongols of Inner and Outer Mongolia were treated as one group, an exception was made in the case of the Zunghars, at least up to the early nineteenth century. As the Qing had suffered heavy losses in the Zunghar wars, the Qianlong emperor's revenge was cruel. A large proportion of the Zunghar population is said to have been killed, others fled into Russian territory, and the few who remained were sent to the north-eastern province of Heilongjiang or were settled in the Ili region.[18] For them, and for several other western Mongolian tribes who had recently come under the control of the Qing, a regulation was added in 1786 to the Mongolian statute-book which stipulated that, for the next twenty years, they would be punished more severely than other Mongols

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originate from the years 1666, 1667, 1671, 1675, 1686, 1689, 1690, and 1694. The regulations drafted in the 1630s were adopted by the successive editions of the statute-book.

[17] In this article, I refer to the (Mongolian-language) Kangxi edition and an undated reprint of the Jiaqing (1796–1820) edition (in Chinese): *Menggu lüli* (Mongolian statutes and sub-statutes), 12 juan, Beijing (Guoxue wenku 32). While the Qing code consists of *lü* (statutes) and *li* (sub-statutes functioning as supplements to the *lü*), for the rules of the Mongolian statute-book this distinction cannot be drawn.

[18] Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period* (Washington, 1943; repr. Taipei, 1991), i, ii.

for stealing cattle.[19] The harsh punishment shows that not all Mongolian tribes under Qing rule received the same treatment: legal status depended on how tribes were brought under Qing rule.

In the Shunzhi period, an agency called the Lifan Yuan was given the responsibility for drafting laws for the Mongols. Set up as early as 1638, it had emerged from a 'Mongolian office' set up probably two years earlier. Not much is known about its functioning in the years following its foundation: an order of the Manchu emperor that Mongolian noblemen should no longer send their memorials directly to him, but instead to the Lifan Yuan, is, unfortunately, not dated.[20] However, the fact that the Lifan Yuan was responsible for Mongolian affairs meant an enormous loss of power to Mongolian noblemen. In the early 1630s, their subordination to the Manchus was guaranteed by a personal bond with the emperor. Now, they had lost their direct access to the throne. Lifan Yuan officials drafted regulations for the Mongols, submitted them to the emperor in the form of a memorial, and transmitted them to the Mongolian noblemen only after they had received imperial approval.[21]

As the Lifan Yuan was particularly concerned with Inner Asian affairs, a large number of its officials were Mongols. There is no evidence that it co-operated in the seventeenth century with the board of punishments,[22] a Chinese institution, in the handling of Mongolian legal matters; however, numerous regulations dating from the early 1760s were formulated by officials of the Lifan Yuan, the grand council,[23] and the board of punishments.[24] In the mid-Qing period, the emperor often assigned the discussion of particular issues to groups of officials selected from both inner- and outer-court institutions.[25] The fact that the Qianlong emperor

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[19] *Menggu lüli*, pp. 53–4. It is not clear when this regulation was abolished. See Shimada Masao, *Shinchō Mōkorei no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1982), p. 487 and Xue Yunsheng, *Duli cunyi* (Beijing, 1905; repr. Taipei, 1970), iii. 681. Up to now, no records of legal cases involving Zunghars or other western Mongols have come to light.

[20] Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), p. 4v.

[21] For an example, see *Bayantala meng shi ziliao*, ed. Gō Minoru (Zhangjiakou, 1942), i. 6.

[22] The board of punishments was one of the six ministries in imperial China and was responsible for the revision of the penal code, the enforcement and direction of punishments, and the examination of decisions of provincial judges (especially in the case of capital punishment). It also had jurisdiction over cases occurring in the metropolitan circuit.

[23] In the second half of the eighteenth century, this organization interposed between the emperor and the central government agencies in the capital.

[24] For the earliest regulations that go back to deliberations of officials not or not exclusively of the Lifan Yuan, see *Menggu lüli*, pp. 49–51, 57, 92, 101–2, 104–5.

[25] See Beatrice S. Bartlett, *Monarchs and Ministers: The Grand Council in Mid-Ch'ing China, 1723–1820* (Berkeley, 1991), pp. 262–4, 275–8.

assigned the discussion of laws for the Mongols to groups of specialists from various agencies was typical rather than extraordinary.

Nonetheless, the involvement of the board of punishments diminished the distinction between Chinese and Mongolian legislation. The board's participation in drafting Mongolian law also diminished the importance of the Lifan Yuan, no longer the only office charged with the handling of Mongolian legal affairs.

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The changing composition of the group of officials responsible for making laws for the Mongols led to the incorporation of elements of Chinese law into Mongolian law. Laws drafted in the seventeenth century took account of the peculiarities of traditional Mongolian legal practice; fines, for example, had to be paid in cattle and many regulations provided for the compensation of victims. However, the Mongols were gradually introduced to new procedures, punishments, and definitions of crime modelled on Qing law in China: the regulations drafted in the late eighteenth century no longer stipulate punishment in numbers of cattle, nor do they provide for compensation.

Transfer of elements of Chinese law started as early as the Kangxi period, when new tests determining the seriousness of a crime were embodied in Mongol legislation: the relationship between the criminal and the victim, criminal intent, and the type of weapon used in a homicide. Although one has no grounds for assuming that these circumstances were not considered to be important among the Mongols of the pre-Qing period, autochthonous Mongolian legal texts do not mention them, whereas in China they were contained in the penal code.[26] In the Qianlong period, borrowings from Qing law in China became even more obvious. The Qianlong edition of the Mongolian statute-book, for example, differentiates between *mousha* and *gusha*, premeditated and unpremeditated homicide, a difference ignored in Mongolian legal texts.[27]

The Mongolian penal system also borrowed from the Chinese. While capital punishment is usually referred to in autochthonous Mongolian legal texts simply by the term *alay-a* ('Let's kill him'), Shunzhi demanded as early as 1658 that the form of capital punishment should be specified:[28]

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[26] M.J. Meijer, 'The Autumn assizes in Ch'ing law', *T'oung Pao*, lxx (1984), 1–2.

[27] *Menggu lüli*, p. 65. For the conception of *gusha* and *mousha* in Qing law, see Geoffrey MacCormack, *Traditional Chinese Penal Law* (Edinburgh, 1990), pp. 189–90.

[28] *Qingchao wenxian tongkao* (Shanghai, 1936), ii. 6602.

henceforth, regulations for the Mongols specified decapitation and strangulation, the forms of capital punishment specified in China as early as the code of the Sui dynasty. In the Qianlong edition of the Mongolian statute-book, provision was also made for Mongols to be sent to work at postal stations in the inner provinces or to be exiled to malarial regions,[29] forms of punishment non-existent among the Mongols of the pre-Qing period. Similar procedural changes were introduced: from the eighteenth century, serious cases had to be reviewed at different levels and capital punishment required the sanction of the emperor.

The values embedded in the legislation for the Mongols were also modelled on Qing law. The embodiment of virtues in the penal code is often described as one of the pre-eminent features of imperial Chinese law; for example, according to the Qing code, a sentence of death or long-term servitude could be commuted if the criminal was the only son of aged and infirm parents.[30] Under the Qing, this virtue of filial piety was incorporated in 1805 into Mongol legislation by an appendix to the Mongolian statute-book. Criminal sons of aged or infirm parents were allowed to remain at home to care for them.[31]

By the second half of the Qing era, Qing legal statutes were being applied to the Mongols without modification. When the Jiaqing emperor in 1817 ordered that cases for which the Mongolian statute-book provided no regulations should be judged according to the regulations of the board of punishments,[32] he legitimized existing practice. Archival records from the National Library of Mongolia at Ulan Bator show that, as early as 1789, the regulations of the board of punishments were being consulted in cases involving Mongols.[33]

As more and more elements of Chinese law were incorporated into the legislation for the Mongols, the drafting of special Mongolian laws seemed no longer justified.[34] After 1817, no further amendments were made to the Mongolian statute-book; instead, parts of the Qing code which corresponded to the regulations of the board of punishments were translated into Mongolian and used as a supplement. Nonetheless, the Mongolian statute-book did not cease to be used; until the end of the Qing era, Mongolian authorities were supposed to consult it first.

Given the growing similarity between the legislation for the Mongols and the Chinese, and the fact that the regulations of the board of punishments were applied in Mongolia, the unification of law within the empire may seem to have been an objective of Qing policy. The blurring of Mongol and Chinese law does not seem to have been intentional, however; it stemmed from the wish to clarify and formalize Mongolian law.[35] When the Shunzhi emperor decided in 1658 that the death penalties for Mongols should be specified, he did not order the introduction of Chinese forms of punishment. The decision to adopt them was taken by the officials charged with the drafting: as they had no other point of reference, they were likely to adopt the principles of the Chinese penal system. Although in no other case is it possible to reconstruct the circumstances that led to the increased borrowing of Chinese law, it should probably be attributed to collaboration among the officials of the board of punishments.

Moreover, if the Qing had been trying to standardize law throughout the empire, they might have preferred to abolish the Mongolian statute-book. The fact that it remained in force and that, as a result, Mongols until the end of the Qing era received different legal treatment from the Chinese, indicates that the Qing emperors had not intended to impose Chinese law on the Mongols.

* * *

The coexistence of the Qing code with the Mongolian statute-book made it necessary to determine which law took precedence. Although cases that originated in the Mongolian territories and concerned only Mongols obviously had to be judged on the basis of the Mongolian statute-book (unless it failed to contain an appropriate regulation), the operative law could not always be determined unanimously by those who administered justice in the Mongolian territories.

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[29] See, e.g., *Menggu lüli*, pp. 51–3.

[30] See Bodde, *Law in Imperial China*, pp. 39–43.

[31] *Menggu lüli*, p. 119.

[32] See *Qingdai bianzheng tongkao*, p. 378. The Qing code consists of an introductory division followed by six parts which, in name and title, corresponded to the six boards.

[33] Charles Bowden, 'A Case of Murder in Eighteenth-Century Mongolia', *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies*, xxxii (1969), 86 and 'A Juridical Document from Nineteenth-Century Mongolia', *Zentralasiatische Studien*, iii (1969), 247 n. 35.

[34] As early as 1690, the Kangxi emperor had decided that Mongols who, in the act if stealing cattle, had killed a person should be judged on the basis of the regulations of the board of punishments. See Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), fos. 112v–113r. This decision, however, seems to have been an isolated case. The Qianlong edition of the Mongolian statute-book contains a regulation for this crime (dated 1763). See *Menggu lüli*, pp. 50–1.

[35] Concerning the efforts of the Qing emperors to formalize elements of Manchu culture, see Pamela K. Crossley, '*Manzhou yuanliu kao* and the Formalization of the Manchu Heritage', *Journal of Asian Studies*, xlvi (1987), 779–81.

When the Qing dynasty took power, it ruled that the provisions of the Mongolian statute-book should be applied to criminals 'outside the Great Wall', regardless of the ethnicity of the victim.[36] Following the influx of Chinese farmers and traders into Inner and Outer Mongolia, however, the Qing authorities were confronted in the eighteenth century with a growing number of legal disputes that involved both Chinese and Mongols. The principle of ethnicity was not found appropriate in all cases. In a memorial submitted to the emperor in 1749, the Lifan Yuan argued that it was not practicable to impose dissimilar punishments on Chinese settlers in Mongolia and their Mongolian neighbours.

For example, among pastoral nomads, cattle-theft, though a crime easily committed, usually had disastrous results for the victim's family. Accordingly—and consistent with the rules of most other sources of Mongolian law—the Mongolian statute-book stipulated capital punishment for the offence. The regulations of the board of punishments, however, stipulated only beating with bamboo. The Lifan Yuan complained that, in order to evade capital punishment, guilty Mongols would bribe Chinese settlers to confess; or the Chinese would ask Mongols to steal cattle on their behalf, and, if the theft was revealed, would confess to the crime. To resolve these problems, the Lifan Yuan suggested that Chinese who stole from Mongols should be judged on the basis of the Mongolian statute-book, and Chinese who stole from Chinese be punished according to the regulations of the board of punishments.[37] Punishment should be determined by the ethnicity of the criminal.

In an attempt to impose greater uniformity, an article added to the Mongolian statute-book in 1761 stipulated that territoriality took precedence over ethnicity: Mongols who committed a crime in China would be judged according to the regulations of the board of punishments, and Chinese who committed a crime in the Mongolian territories according to the Mongolian statute-book. The principle may not have been generally applied[38]—we do not know in how many cases Chinese were judged on the basis of the Mongolian statute-book—because the administration of justice in the Mongolian territories continued to be based on ethnicity. Chinese farmers and traders living in the Mongolian territories were not placed under the jurisdiction of the Mongolian rulers but of Chinese officials who, after 1722, were stationed throughout Mongolia.[39]

Further evidence of the reluctance of the Qing state to give territoriality precedence over ethnicity is provided by the large number of regulations drafted after 1761 that contravene the principle. Territoriality was contentious because many of the regulations of the Mongolian statute-book provided compensation for the victim. In minor cases, victims were compensated with a specified number of cattle; in more serious cases, the family and belongings of the offender (who himself was sentenced to death) were given to the victim's family. As the regulations of the board of punishments did not provide for this form of compensation, regulations were introduced to prevent Chinese residents of the Mongolian territories from giving or receiving compensation.[40]

However, to ensure that Mongolian victims living in Chinese territory would receive compensation, a regulation drafted in 1849 stipulated that if a Mongol had been plundered in the Chinese territory of Rehe (Chengde), which bordered Mongolia and had a large number of Mongolian inhabitants, the case should be judged on the basis of the Mongolian statute-book. If the victims were both Mongolian and Chinese, the ethnicity of the one suffering the greater loss was to determine the operative law.[41] Thus, the regulation not only contradicted the principle of territoriality, but it also shows us that, in certain cases, the operative law was determined by the ethnicity of the offender rather than the victim.

It is unclear, however, whether Chinese or Mongols received preferential treatment within the Qing empire. The laws made for the Mongols during the consolidation of Qing rule in the seventeenth century are too different to warrant comparison with Qing law in China. Noblemen, for example, received preferential treatment, being exempt from all forms of corporal punishment. In later years, there is some evidence for the preferential treatment of Chinese. Some of the regulations drafted for the

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[36] Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), fos. 20v–21r.

[37] *Da Qing lichao shilu*, Gaozong Shilu, juan 342, Qianlong 14th year, 6th month, *jichou*.

[38] *Menggu lüli*, pp. 104–5.

[39] See David M. Farquhar, 'The Ch'ing Administration of Mongolia up to the Nineteenth Century' (Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard, 1960), p. 165. In cases that involved both Mongols and Chinese, the officials were supported to co-operate with the respective *jaṣagh*.

[40] For example, an undated article of the *Menggu lüli* (p. 106) stipulates that the family and the belongings of a Mongol who had stolen from a Chinese should not be given to the victim, as would have been the case had the victim been a Mongol. In accordance with the 1749 memorial of the Lifan Yuan, a regulation of 1836 exempts disputes among Chinese living in the Mongolian territories from a judgement on the basis of the Mongolian statute-book. See Shimada, *Shinchō*, p. 102.

[41] See Shimada, *Shinchō*, p. 94.

Mongols in the eighteenth century stipulate more severe punishment than the corresponding regulation of the board of punishments. Moreover, whereas most of the regulations drafted after 1761, which contradict the principle of territoriality, were intended to exempt Chinese from a punishment based on Mongolian law, there is no indication that Qing authorities hesitated to apply to Mongols, who had committed a crime in China, the regulations of the board of punishments. Nevertheless, as the 1849 regulation shows, the Qing did try to protect Mongolian interests and did not put Chinese beyond punishment based on the Mongolian statute-book.

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During the conquest, the Mongolian noblemen, as allies of the Manchus, were entrusted with the leadership of military units, a status denoted after the mid-1630s by the term *jasagh* (ruling). In the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the role took on the features of an office, giving it control of both the military and the civil administration.[42] One of the duties that went along with the office was the dispensation of justice.

Owing to the lack of source material, it is not possible to say whether the installation of a *jasagh* was, in the beginning, a formal acknowledgement of existing custom or the creation of a new position. However, there can be no doubt that, under Qing rule, the authority of native rulers was of a different kind. The Manchus tended to recognize native Mongolian authorities, but, at the same time, to circumscribe the scope of each ruler's power. In the pre-Qing period, judicial power shifted with political power. The Manchus, however, when incorporating the southern Mongolian tribes into their evolving state, took steps to define areas of and limits to jurisdiction. They allocated grazing lands to the various Mongolian tribes and, by a ruling of 1632, stipulated a fine for noblemen who exceeded their legal jurisdiction.[43]

Before their submission to the Qing, the Mongolian tribes functioned as separate political entities. For the Manchus, an effective way to control these small principalities was to force them to co-operate with one another.[44] In the late 1670s, the Kangxi emperor ordered that groups of two, three, four, or five noblemen should be formed to dispense justice jointly over their tribes.[45] Although the order, which is included in the Kangxi edition of the Mongolian statute-book, does not state the kinds of cases the noblemen were to decide together, another regulation required them to act jointly in cases involving capital punishment: if a nobleman pronounced a death sentence without consulting the noblemen of the neighbouring tribes, he was himself to be punished for murder.[46] Moreover, the noblemen were supposed to share among the group the fines each of them had collected.[47]

The judicial powers of individual noblemen were further reduced by the introduction of the Chinese system of reviewing legal cases at various administrative levels. The Mongolian statute-book stipulates that banner-regents could only consider cases where the punishment was no more severe than whipping.[48] Capital cases had to be referred to the Lifan Yuan; except for its involvement, the procedure of Mongolian cases involving capital punishment was analogous to the handling of capital cases originating in the inner provinces of the Qing empire.[49] By the end of the eighteenth century, Mongolian noblemen could make decisions only in minor cases; their provisional rulings in more serious cases had to be confirmed at higher levels.

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[42] The position of *jasagh* became hereditary among the southern Mongols in the Shunzhi period, and, about one hundred years alter, also among the Khalkha. See Farquhar, 'Ch'ing Administration', p. 118. The successor still had to obtain imperial approval which, however, was usually given.

[43] *JMZD*, vii. fo. 3938.

[44] This should lead us to question the common opinion according to which divide-and-rule was the guiding principle of Manchu policy towards the Mongols: see, e.g., Franz Michael, *The Origin of Manchu Rule in China* (Baltimore, 1942), p. 97 and Sabine Dabringhaus, *Das Qing-Imperium als Vision und Wirklichkeit. Tibet in Laufbahn und Schriften des Song Yun (1752–1835)* (Stuttgart, 1994), pp. 34–6. The Manchus were not facing the Mongols as a political unity, but were confronted with a multitude of independent rulers who had to be prevented from high-handed actions.

[45] Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), fos. 48r–51r. For a dating of this article into the second half of the 1670s, see Heuschert, *Gesetzgebun*, p. 151 n. 196. The groups of ruling noblemen can be seen as precursors of the leagues, which were formed in the Yongzheng period.

[46] Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), pp. 32v–33v. There is no indication of the presence of a representative of the central government at those meetings. This suggests that the meetings held by the neighbouring *jasagh* to decide criminal cases were not identical to the assemblies convened by the Qing every three years. For these asssemblies, see Farquhar, 'Ch'ing Administration', pp. 118–19.

[47] Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), fos. 48r–51r. Fines not given as compensation but collected by the authorities could be imposed for the unauthorized crossing of borders, illegal trading, and neglect of duties by frontier guards.

[48] *Menggu lüli*, p. 105 and Shimada, *Shinchō*, pp. 861–3.

[49] Officials of the judicial department of the Lifan Yuan, together with representatives of the three high courts (board of punishments, court of revision, and censorate), had to review the case and draft a memorial, in which the emperor was informed about the facts and his approval of the proposed sentence was requested. For the procedure of cases originating from the inner provinces, see Meijer, 'Autumn Assizes', pp. 1–17 and Bodde, *Law in Imperial China*, pp. 113–22.

* * *

Qing rule over the Mongols was compared with British colonial rule by Luo Yingrong as early as 1947.[50] But comparisons have not been made of the two colonial legal systems. Although the British administration of justice under a system of indirect rule was once assumed to have led to the revival of 'native courts' enforcing 'customary law', recent anthropological research has shown that the 'customary law' claiming continuity with a pre-colonial past was, in fact, a creation of the colonial system under which a fluid and shifting set of rules and procedures was transformed into a fixed and formal code. According to Sally Engle Merry, 'one of the major insights produced by work on law in colonial situations is that the customary law implemented in "native courts" was not a relic of a timeless pre-colonial past but instead an historical construct of the colonial period.'[51] The same is true of the 'native courts' themselves. As Martin Chanock shows for Malawi, they had 'to choose between accepting a certain ineffectiveness or becoming stricter and more formal in an effort to impose and defend their status'.[52]

Parallels may be drawn with Qing rule over the Mongols. The Mongolian statute-book is a different kind of document from indigenous Mongolian legal texts; it uses a new legal terminology and the articles it contains are arranged thematically by chapter. Unlike earlier Mongolian legislators, the Manchus systematically distributed their written laws, and their efforts at enforcement were not without success. Legal records from the end of the eighteenth century show that once a criminal case entered the official channels,[53] it was reviewed at several levels and judged on the basis of the statute-book. Moreover, Qing law not only introduced the Mongols to more standardized and bureaucratic forms of organization, but also imported the foreign legal culture of China.

During the Qing era, the position of the judicial authorities also changed completely: areas of jurisdiction were defined, the dispensation of justice by native authorities was more closely regulated, and political structures became more rigid. The regulation of 1651 that forbade the population to bypass their *jasagh* and turn directly to the Lifan Yuan[54] shows that, immediately after the establishment of the Qing administration, the position of the *jasagh* needed to be backed up by the government. Once Qing rule had been consolidated and the emperor had delegated judicial and executive powers to the *jasagh*, his position became unassailable. One is reminded of the Indian princes who made subsidiary alliances with the British imperial government. Protected against both foreign enemies and domestic rivals, they paid highly for the privilege: the more readily they co-operated, the more they were asked to pay.[55]

Although the Qing buttressed the native Mongolian authorities, they limited their freedom to decide criminal cases. As in the case of the 'native courts' created under British indirect rule,[56] the punishment awarded by the Mongolian noblemen was restricted. Thus, both the British and the Manchus adopted a policy of simultaneously legitimizing and restricting native authorities. There were, however, differences; in Africa, litigants were not confined to the native courts but could appeal to British' courts.[57] Mongolian litigants, however, had no choice but (at least for a first hearing) to bring their cases before their *jasagh*, who would try the case on the basis of the Mongolian statute-book. And while the decisions of African native courts could be revised and even annulled by British courts, the *jasagh* had to answer to the higher authorities, that is, to the next administrative unit up from the banner, the league, and ultimately to the Lifan Yuan. Thus, the *jasagh* was not answerable to the authorities of an alien imperial legal system, but held a recognized position in the official hierarchy of Qing administration in Mongolia.

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[50] 'Zhong e meng de jiechu yu Qingdai de lifan zhengce', *Lishi zhengzhi xuebao*, i (1947), 27.

[51] Merry, 'Law and Colonialism', p. 897.

[52] Martin Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Order: The Colonial Experience in Malawi and Zambia* (Cambridge, 1985), p. 118.

[53] There is evidence, however, that not all cases got into the official channels of Qing bureaucracy: in 1781, a sentence was mitigated on the grounds that cases like this were usually not judged according to Qing law, but were decided 'silently and secretly'. See Dorothea Heuschert, 'Die Entscheidung über schwierige Rechtsfälle bei den Mongolen des 16.–19. Jahrhunderts. Zum Beweismittel des *siqaya(n)*', *Zentralasiatische Studien*, xxiv (1996), 62.

[54] Mongolian statute-book (Kangxi), fos. 67v–68r and *Da Qing Huidian*, 1690 ed., juan 145, fos. 2v–3r.

[55] For a general account of relations with the Indian states, see Michael H. Fisher, *Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System* (New York, 1991); for the price of loyalty, see Bharati Ray, *Hyderabad and British Paramountcy, 1858–83* (Delhi, 1988).

[56] Chanock, *Law, Custom, and Social Order*, p. 113.

[57] H.F. Morris, 'English Law in East Africa: A Hardy Plant in an Alien Soil', *Indirect Rule and the Search for Justice: Essays in East African Legal History*, ed. H.F. Morris and J.S. Read (Oxford, 1972), pp. 75–6.

In common with Western colonialism, Qing rule over the Mongols combined the establishment of a new political order with the import of elements of a foreign culture. As the Qing did not gain control over the Mongols as the result of a military conquest, however, and as most groups of Mongols had submitted to the Manchu emperor of their own volition, the Qing emperors did not need to justify the exercise of sovereign powers over the Mongols as part of a 'civilizing mission'.

The transfer of Chinese law to the Mongols increased during the course of the Qing era. At first, the Manchus made use of traditional Mongolian law-making practice. As the practice was irreconcilable with Qing emperorship, the responsibility for drafting rules and regulations was transferred to central government agencies. The officials charged with the formulation of Mongolian law were placed in a dilemma. As far as legal terminology and the specification of crime, procedure, and punishment were concerned, they had to meet standards which had not existed in Mongolian law. When they modelled regulations on Chinese counterparts, the transformation of Mongolian law was bound to reflect the changes taking place at the imperial court.

By the nineteenth century, the legislation for the Mongols had become so blurred by the influence of Chinese law that the Qing emperors no longer saw the need to enact separate penal statutes for the Mongols. Nonetheless, the Mongolian statute-book remained in force until the end of the Qing era; in Khalkha Mongolia until 1921, that is, after the Qing dynasty had ceased to exist. After three hundred years of Manchu rule, however, the Mongols were no longer able by the end of the Qing era to draw on their own legal tradition. Even after Mongolian independence, the administrative system set up by the Qing served as the guarantor of social stability.

■ Source: Hostetler, Laura, 'Contending cartographic claims? The Qing empire in Manchu, Chinese, and European maps', in James R. Akerman (ed.), *The imperial map: Cartography and the mastery of empire*, University of Chicago Press, 2009, pp. 93–132 and 321–326 (footnotes).

CONTENDING CARTOGRAPHIC CLAIMS? THE QING EMPIRE IN MANCHU, CHINESE, AND EUROPEAN MAPS

Laura Hostetler

When we hear the word *imperialism*, most of us think first of various forms of Western imperialism, past or current. Yet the Qing empire (1636–1911) was one of the most successful examples of imperialism in the early modern period. The Qing dynasty was founded by Jürchen peoples from northeast Asia, later known as Manchus, who conquered China in 1644 after the collapse of the Ming dynasty (1368–1644). In the following years the Qing also defeated or made alliances with neighboring powers to encompass Mongolia and Xinjiang, as well as their homeland of Manchuria, to form a vast multicultural empire. Moreover, the Qing exercised considerable influence in Tibet, annexed Taiwan, and brought under its firm control areas of southwest China that had been only nominally part of the Ming. Thus, even after its conquest of China in 1644, the Qing continued to expand its territorial reach, successfully doubling the size of the empire between approximately 1660 and 1760. This chapter explores various ways in which Qing imperial expansion was mapped. While the maps it examines on one level record contending cartographic claims, as a corpus they worked together to reify the claims of Qing empire both at home and abroad, eventually lending their influence to the shape of modern China today.

The Qing empire was a vital and integral part of the early modern world.[1] Early modernity, as I use the term, is characterized by participation in global processes that affected many parts of the world during the period dating roughly 1500–1800. In the economic realm these changes can be summarized as moves toward increased monetization of the economy, a greater role for the exchange of nonessential commodities, and an increase in the level of international trade. In scholarship, observation of the natural world became important. The study of geography included both cartography and ethnography. Travel writing also became a significant literary genre.[2] The late Ming and Qing additionally produced important books on botany.[3] Textual studies explored new ways of examining and understanding the past.[4] In the political realm we see a growing self-awareness among individual monarchs vis-à-vis their counterparts in other parts of the world.[5] This included a heightened awareness of their roles as patrons of both arts and sciences. For our purposes here, imperial patronage of cartography is most relevant.

Cartography played an important role in the creation and extension of the empire. The early Qing emperors took the initiative in sponsoring the most cutting-edge scientific survey and mapping technology available, and simultaneously continued to sponsor and promote indigenous mapping traditions. Both types of cartography were essential components of their imperial strategy. In 1708 the Kangxi emperor (r. 1662–1722) commissioned European Jesuit missionaries in his employ to assist in making surveys of the Qing empire.[6] The results of these surveys were recorded in a variety of maps produced both in the Qing capital and abroad (fig. 3.1). Later in this chapter we will take a close look at four of these maps, three of which were produced in Qing China and one in France. These different renderings, all of which represented the Qing empire and were based on the same surveys, vary significantly in their appearance. Yet each was appropriate to its own context; the maps were designed for different audiences and served different purposes. We will explore what their distinct individual qualities can tell us, but also consider their collective significance. Each in its own way both reflected and contributed to imperial success. Together as a group they assisted in recording and communicating more precise knowledge of Qing territory, enabling tighter control over it. They also communicated territorial claims to rival early modern powers abroad, while at the same time projecting an image of an expanded "China" to an elite Chinese readership. This new image of China would become an essential component in the creation of national identity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

At the same time, other maps, not connected with these surveys but stemming from indigenous cartographic traditions, also conveyed the new shape and scope of the empire to Qing subjects domestically (fig. 3.2).[7] These maps enjoyed broader exposure than the survey maps, and they were designed for different purposes. The scaled survey maps emphasized precision in identifying the location of any given point (plotted according to latitude and longitude) in relation to other given points (including international boundaries). As such these renderings had superior military and strategic applications. The imperial maps made according to longstanding indigenous mapping conventions, by contrast, emphasized the



Figure 3.1. Map of Guizhou Province, in the 1721 Kangxi atlas, *Huangyu quan lan tu*. Maps c.11.d.15. © British Library Board. All Rights Reserved.

relationship of the viewer to the whole. Especially for an ethnic Han Chinese, a map of the Qing that included the far west, the northeast, and Taiwan communicated a different image of, and message about, the empire to which he belonged than a comparable Ming map, which would not have laid claim to the same amount of territory. The expanded map of the Qing encompassed a vision of empire that was not only geographically extended, but culturally and ethnically diverse.

To date, these two different styles of mapping used in the Qing have been seen as separate and distinct—one as Western and scientific, the other as traditional and Chinese.[8] As we shall see, scholars have tended to show an interest in either one type or the other, viewing them as largely



Figure 3.2. Map of Qing empire, "Da Qing wannian yitong dili quantu" (Complete Map of the Unified and Eternal Great Qing), 1767. Rés. Ge A 1096, Cartes et Plans. By permission of Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris.

unrelated and mutually uninformed. In the pages that follow I discuss separately the early modern, indigenous, and hybrid maps (those combining aspects of both types of cartographic practice). I argue strongly, however, that Qing success in extending and perpetuating its vast empire during the early modern period depended on the ability *both* to communicate its claims internationally in the emergent lingua franca of the scaled map *and* to communicate those claims at home in the indigenous map language that the majority of educated Chinese understood and respected. Hybrid maps also had an important role. The common legacy of all these Qing maps, which as we shall see sometimes encompassed contending cartographic claims, is their contribution to the shape and vision of the modern Chinese nation.

The ways in which we have come to think of China as a geopolitical entity have been influenced not only by maps but also by modern notions of what constitutes the nation. When we think of China today, we think of a modern nation-state with fixed territorial boundaries—some of which are, admittedly, under dispute.[9] China's historical continuity, however, is as a civilization, not a territorial entity. The notion of "China" as a fixed territorial space is a relatively recent development. Over the centuries, the shape and size of the lands that various dynasties controlled shrank and grew like an amoeba. Nor did the limits of territorial control always correspond to territorial claims made by the center.[10] Thus, although in picturing the extent of Qing expansion it has become "natural" to think of the territory of "China" as doubling between 1660 and 1760, this conceptualization is both misleading and anachronistic. It is a product of the logic of nationalism that has pervaded thinking about sovereignty during the last century or more. *China*'s size did not double; the extent of the *empire* claiming legitimacy to rule the Chinese people through the "Mandate of Heaven" did. The assertion that China's territory doubled has nonetheless been naturalized by the fact that most of the territory governed by the Qing is now part of the People's Republic of China. For the history of "China" is construed as something long predating the People's Republic of China, founded in 1949, or even the Republic of China, founded in 1912.[11]

In examining when and how assumptions about China's territoriality became more fixed, it is also instructive to take a closer look at the way we speak of China. The English word *China* and its various European equivalents (*la Chine, China, Cina,* and so on) have long served to describe the civilization and political entities associated with "the Chinese" (as opposed to a particular dynasty or period). In China, however, before the advent of modern Chinese nationalism there was no single term that reflected the English usage of *China*.[12] In the few instances where I have come across the term in primary documents of the Qing period, it is used in a comparative context in which other emergent nations such as France (Faguo) are also being discussed. By the early twentieth century *Zhongguo* took on an equivalency with the Chinese nation, and now the term is used in modern Chinese in much the same way as the English word *China*, bringing with it the same conceptual problems. The labels *Zhongguo* and *China* imply a continuity and association with the modern nation-state not reflected in the indigenous terms for the various ruling houses of China during the early modern period.[13] They are often used to describe both the modern nation-state *and* earlier dynastic periods, thus muddying concepts as basic as what constituted a geopolitical entity before the modern era. The casual use of either of these terms to refer to dynastic periods in Chinese history fails to reflect historical indigenous ways of conceiving imperial sovereignty and territoriality. In fact, such usage glosses over the very possibility that indigenous conceptions differed from our own and that they did indeed change over time, thus minimizing the political rupture that ensued with the end of the dynastic system.

The modern nation-state benefits from this appearance of continuity. Its legitimacy, what allows it to make claims on its citizens, derives from dual foundations grounded in both time and place. On the one hand is a long (cultural) history that serves as the basis for a common bond or sense of belonging among the people, and an icon of the nation that the state is to protect. This history also provides young nations with an authority that can only be derived from association with the past, or the continuity that comes with "tradition."[14] On the other hand, national sovereignty requires territorial integrity.[15] Sometimes the imperatives of the nation even work to conflate the necessity of a history to which it can attach itself and the need for territorial integrity. A telling example is seen in the Chinese translation of the *Cambridge History of China*. The maps included in the volume for the Ming dynasty cover significantly more territory than those in the original English-language edition.[16] Here we see the territorial requirements of present-day China being projected back in time.

The Qing in Early Modern Maps

In order to demonstrate how early modern cartography contributed to and recorded Qing expansion, and communicated its claims internationally—subsequently creating borders that are still largely recognized today—we need to examine Qing cartography and its legacy from three different angles. Only such a multidimensional approach can make visible what would otherwise be obscured. To be more specific, I will (1) revisit the circumstances of the Kangxi surveys; (2) describe four different maps based on these surveys but having different audiences and serving different purposes; and (3) reexamine the historiography of cartography in China as it relates to the Kangxi surveys, to the reception and use of technologies introduced from Europe, and to indigenous mapping practices. Combining different perspectives not only provides a fuller (more three-dimensional) picture, but allows us to see where overlapping gaps left by earlier accounts have left holes in a web of interpretations that silently reinforced each other. The approach I have described will allow us to uncover how international cooperation during the surveys; the various competing versions of maps produced from those surveys; and the historiographical narratives of cartography in China have actually served to obscure the fundamental success of Qing mapping, its early modern character, and its role in paving the way for the advent of the modern nation-state.

I have referred to the mapping of the empire as both an early modern and a Qing enterprise, as it certainly was, and one in which Europeans participated. It is important to be clear, however, that well before the founding of the Qing—and even before the arrival of Jesuit missionaries in China—Chinese scholars were involved in the study of geography and the natural world.[17] This was not a case of the foreigners sparking a geographic interest among Chinese scholars, but a convergence of interests.[18] When Jesuits arrived in China beginning in the late sixteenth century, Chinese literati immediately expressed interest in exchanging geographic knowledge with them.[19] Nor was the interest in geographic learning limited to private individuals. The Ming court published Matteo Ricci's world map in Chinese. Furthermore, from the founding of the Qing dynasty, its rulers recognized the importance of obtaining information about the territories and populations that they were to govern. Just two years after the conquest, Dorgon, the Qing regent, ordered a cadastral survey of the empire.[20] Gazetteers also included elaborate regional maps. Later, in the eighteenth century, even as the Qing court expressed interest in cartographic techniques introduced by Europeans, indigenous cartography continued to enjoy an important position.

In light of this ongoing imperial interest in geography and the natural world, it should not surprise us that when a group of Jesuits was sent to China by Louis XIV in 1685 with the joint purposes of propagating the faith and making observations for the world map being plotted in the Paris observatory,[21] the Kangxi emperor recognized their usefulness to his own aspirations for having better maps. Between 1708 and 1718 detailed surveys of the Qing empire, commissioned by the Kangxi emperor, were carried out with European Jesuit participation.[22] The resulting maps, which appeared in a number of editions, are known in Chinese as the *Huangyu quan lan tu* (Imperially Commissioned Maps of All Surveyed).[23] These maps have long been known in English as the Kangxi Jesuit Atlas.[24] In China in the 1760s, the maps were updated with additional survey work under the Qianlong emperor, but in Europe the geographic information provided by the surveys made under the Kangxi emperor was not surpassed for over one hundred years.

THE SURVEYS • Before looking more closely at the maps themselves, we need first to consider the surveys from which they were produced. The surveys embodied international cooperation born of a convergence of scientific, religious, and imperial interests. A number of the Jesuits involved were sent to China by Louis XIV with the express understanding that they would collect observational data for the French Academy of Sciences.[25] The support and full backing of the Qing emperor were, of course, vital. The Europeans who were involved had first to gain the trust of the emperor through a series of smaller surveying and mapping projects before the Kangxi emperor commissioned the full surveys. These earlier maps consisted of a map of Peking and its environs (1707), portions of the Great Wall (1708), and finally the entire province of Beizhili, which contained the capital (completed in 1710). Following the successful completion of these projects, several different teams of Jesuit surveyors were sent to different parts of the empire to complete the work.[26] Ted Foss, who has contributed substantially to our knowledge of the surveys, has stated that

> without the help of native functionaries trained in Western cartographic method as well as the use of Chinese explorations and traditional Chinese cartography, the Jesuits could not have completed their survey. They collected and studied indigenous works and gathered information from local officials as they traveled.[27]

We know, in other words, that the surveys of China were a collaborative project. But unanswered questions remain. How many Manchus and/or Chinese (and which?) generally accompanied the Jesuits on their surveys? What were their roles? Did they participate in making and recording observations?[28] What kind of information did they supply in terms of existing maps, routes to be taken, negotiations with local officials? These are not questions that the European surveyors addressed in their letters home. Nor have I been able to find a full Chinese account that addresses all of these questions. However, governors of individual provinces did use the system of Secret Palace Memorials to report to the emperor on the presence and progress of the survey teams working in areas under their jurisdiction. These memorials also quote portions of the commissioning edict and bear the written responses of the emperor to the reports.[29]

These various memorials indicate that the teams of surveyors were quite small, consisting of one to three Jesuits and an additional imperial official—usually, if not always, a Manchu.[30] The foreign surveyors were not sent off by themselves, but with the full backing and logistical support of the imperial government. Instructions were sent to provincial governors through the Board of War; also involved was an overseer from the Wuyingdian, or Hall of Military Glory, where the imperial presses were located.[31]

The primary imperial concerns were for efficiency and secrecy. Governors were ordered to allow the surveyors to proceed directly to the next province when the task carried out in their own jurisdiction was completed. The surveys for each province were to be forwarded to the capital as soon as they were completed, but quietly. Instructions specified that a member of the governor (or governor-general's) household (*jia ren*) was to be sent. The rescript to one memorial explicitly states, "Do *not* send an important official; a mandarin of rank from the palace would not be suitable. If you send an important official anyone at all could ascertain clearly [what is being sent]."[32] The implication was that the information in the surveys was top secret, kept perhaps even from most of the officials at court.

As described by Matteo Ripa, the fact that the surveys were being undertaken could hardly have been kept a secret:

> The expense attending this undertaking was immense, for the whole of the vast empire of China, Tartary, and nearly thirty tributary principalities and kingdoms, including Corea, were to be surveyed [using both long chains and mathematical instruments]. This operation required the services of numerous individuals, superintended by many mandarins, and lasted fourteen years.[33]

The surveyors and their equipment could not have avoided notice, but it was crucial that the information they collected be kept out of the wrong hands.

The emperor's instructions may have met more than one imperial goal, in that the procedures to be followed ensured timely, confidential delivery of information to the court without requiring the surveyors to make time-consuming frequent return trips to the capital. But his directives also required the surveyors to hand over on a regular basis the information they had gathered. Possibly designed as a safeguard against theft, this practice also would have prevented the surveyors themselves from accumulating too much information. Moreover, Europeans were not allowed to visit sensitive border regions in the north, or Tibet and Korea.[34]

It is possible that these maps were further refined under the succeeding Yongzheng emperor's reign (r. 1723–35). The catalogue of the Beijing Number One Historical Archives lists maps dating from the Yongzheng reign period that have titles similar to those in the *Huangyu quan lan tu*.[35] Since they are not currently available for viewing, however, we can only speculate on this point. If similar maps were made and updated under Yongzheng, ironically the secrecy with which they were surrounded was so successful that he has not been credited with this accomplishment.[36]

THE MAPS • Let us now take a close look at the four maps. Beginning in 1717, the survey maps were produced in a bewildering array of editions and in a variety of media, including woodblock prints, copperplate engravings, and manuscript.[37] My goal here is not to give an exhaustive list of the various map versions, but rather to illustrate how different editions were designed for different audiences and used for different purposes. Although all are products of early modern survey technology, they differ in significant ways. Each of the four maps I will describe communicates a different aspect of the Qing imperial enterprise, each with its own purposes and for a specific audience. Three of the maps were made in China, one in Europe. Two were designed for relatively broad circulation, two for much more restricted use.

The first Qing map is a large scroll version dating from 1719. It was engraved in China by Matteo Ripa. According to the secular priest's memoirs,

> The Emperor had long desired to have someone in his service who could engrave the geographical map . . . His Majesty was highly pleased to hear that, although I had not practiced the art of engraving, I was ready to attempt it, and he immediately ordered that I should begin to engrave.[38]

After practicing on landscapes, including the now famous Thirty-six Views of Jehol, he set to work on the map.[39]



Figure 3.3. Matteo Ripa, 1719 survey map showing indications of latitude, longitude, and prime meridian. K.Top.116:15, Topographical Collection of King George III. © British Library Board. All Rights Reserved.

Ripa's completed rendering consists of three exceptionally large scrolls of irregular size, which when rolled out fit together to represent the extent of the Qing empire.[40] They are made to scale and bear indications of latitude and longitude (fig. 3.3). Perhaps most interestingly, the nomenclature appears in both Chinese and Manchu (fig. 3.4). (Some place-names and notes are also penned in Italian.) This is not simply a bilingual (or trilingual) map. Rather, place-names within the bounds of what had been the Ming dynasty are marked in Chinese, the further expanse of the Qing in Manchu. Liaodong, for example, is marked in Manchu (and Italian), as is the area north of the Great Wall. Place-names within the Shandong Peninsula are, by contrast, marked in Chinese. Thus the map highlights the fact that China remained culturally distinct from, yet part of, a larger empire. It may also reflect the fact that Ripa was probably working from raw data, and no one had yet taken the time or pains to transliterate non-Chinese place-names into Chinese characters.

The extent and limits of the Qing empire are well documented on the map. Provincial boundaries are shown by dotted lines, most of which are overlaid with a colored wash that was probably added in Europe. In the southwest, bordered blank spaces show where frontier areas were not under the direct control of the Qing. An explanation in Italian confirms that these areas were under the dominion of the Miao. The frontier



Figure 3.4. Matteo Ripa, 1719 survey map: detail showing Manchu and Chinese language markings in southwestern frontier area. Manchu is written in a phonetic script (left-hand side of map), Chinese in characters (right-hand side of map). K.Top. 116:15b, Topographical Collection of King George III. © British Library Board. All Rights Reserved.

province of Yunnan exemplifies important characteristics of the whole map. The province's southern borders are clearly delineated. Its northern and northwestern borders are also shown by dotted lines, partially filled in with yellow ink. Beyond the province's borders to the north and west, all writing is in Manchu. Place-names in Sichuan, lying to the north of Yunnan, are labeled in Chinese, but again, script beyond the Wulong River appears in Manchu. Names of countries beyond the borders of the Qing to the southwest are not indicated. The South China Sea, located off the southeastern provinces, is also unlabeled.[41] The extent of Yunnan itself is delimited, but areas beyond its control are variously depicted: some clearly marked, some unmarked, some labeled in Chinese, others in Manchu script.

The copy of this map that I consulted is housed in the British Library's Topographical Collection of King George III under the title "A Map of China and the Surrounding Lands Based on the Jesuit Survey of 1708–1716." I have not been able to trace how it came into the collection, but we do know that a copy of one of Ripa's copperplate editions "was sent to Louis XV of France in appreciation for his support of the mission."[42] (Although the project was initiated during the reign of Louis XIV, the crown passed to Louis XV before the project was completed.) Furthermore Ripa, on his departure from China in 1723, brought one or possibly more copies back to Europe, hoping that through them and other gifts he might receive patronage for establishing the Chinese College in Naples, where he planned to train missionaries for the China field. The Instituto Universitario Orientale di Napoli (its successor institution) still houses a copy.[43] The international distribution of these survey maps, both as official gifts and unofficially, communicated geographic information about Qing realms to Europe, at once enhancing Europe's knowledge of Asia and staking Qing claims to the mapped areas. At the same time, their cartographic precision in showing the limits as well as the extent of Qing territory reflects certain strategic realities that are deemphasized in European versions of the maps, as discussed below. None of the other maps we will consider reproduce the Manchu labeling of the Qing that on this map so distinctly outlines the difference between China proper and the far reaches of the Qing.

The second map we will consider closely is a 1721 atlas version of the survey map (see fig. 3.1). The "Kangxi Map Atlas" housed in the British Library is bound in Western style with a red leather cover. The work, which measures approximately 24 inches by 16 inches (61 × 41 cm), can be opened like a book to view individual provinces or other regions of the empire separately. Each of the maps, printed on rice paper, appears to have been glued into this convenient format for ease of use—more convenient than the large scrolls, which require an enormous amount of space to unroll, although admittedly also less conducive to facilitating any kind of planning that would have required coordination across provincial boundaries. In the copy I consulted, a romanized index that lists the contents in alphabetical order had been added at the front. Altogether the atlas contains thirty-two maps, each of which is clearly marked by indications of latitude and longitude.

Sixteen of the thirty-two maps are of individual provinces. These maps are designated by the name of the province, for example Yunnan, Zhili, Shandong, and so on, and the suffix *quan tu*, which translates as "a complete map of." Thus the provincial maps are presented as "complete." Provincial boundaries are indicated by dotted lines. In frontier provinces in the southwest, the dynasty was not actually in control of all the territory officially belonging to that province. Two large portions of what was officially Guizhou were in fact controlled by ethnically non-Chinese groups living in the region. Known as *Miao jiang*, or "Miao territory," these areas to the south of Guizhou on its border with Guangxi are clearly indicated on the Guizhou map as not actually under imperial control (fig 3.1). The blank spots on this map are not labeled, but from the map of neighboring Guangxi one can see indications of which parts of Guangxi bordered on Guizhou and which on "Wild Miao territory."

The other sixteen pages of the atlas are not styled "complete maps," but simply "maps," *tu*. These maps tend not to show boundaries, or depict only incomplete ones that fade out toward the farther reaches of the empire. The map of Jehol, for example, shows the Great Wall toward the west and indicates a border with Korea, but to the north we see a gradual fade-out of geographic features, and no indication of borders. Many but not all of the other maps in the second half of the atlas are organized around major rivers such as, but not limited to, various portions of the Yellow and Amur rivers. Mapping rivers, or rather naming maps according to major rivers, seems to have been a way to depict territory while getting around the problem of *whose* territory. This somewhat eclectic organization of the atlas highlights questions of how territory is conceived of and named. The varying treatment of regions (bounded or not, named according to administrative status, or named by significant geographic features) marks an interesting historical moment where we can witness the negotiation of imperial boundaries, but also an early point in the transition from empire to nation-state. For instance, Korea is included in the atlas, but labeled clearly as "the *country* of Korea" (*chaoxian guo*).

The most significant difference between the 1719 and 1721 maps, beyond the latter's atlas format, is that the place-names, both within China proper and beyond, are recorded only in Chinese characters on the 1721 version. Even places within Manchuria are not marked in Manchu. This map may originally have been designed for Chinese who might have had limited facility with Manchu language, or as a reference for standardizing Manchu place-names in Chinese.[44] What is significant from our vantage point in time is that from looking at it one might form the impression not that China had been colonized by the Manchus, but that outlying lands had become part of China.

This is no small or inconsequential difference. Whatever the original reason for the linguistic choices, later repercussions would be significant. Sinicization theory, for example, argues that Chinese civilization has uniquely absorbed outside conquerors and transformed them into Chinese. Proponents argue that this can be seen in linguistic, cultural, and political realms. The resonance with the interests of Chinese nationalism is, I think, obvious and need not be belabored here. Although sinicization theory has been challenged in recent years, it still has strong advocates.[45] My point is that labeling the far reaches of the Qing empire in Chinese allowed for a gradual shift in perspective that led to the possibility that these areas could eventually be considered part of China.[46]

The third set of maps we will consider is Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville's *Atlas de la Chine*, published in Paris in 1737. D'Anville's *Atlas* was not the only European version of these maps. Various editions of the maps it contains were widely distributed throughout Europe, most notably in the four-volume *Description... de la Chine...* by Jean Baptiste Du Halde which appeared in French, English, German, and Russian editions beginning in 1735 (fig. 3.5).[47] D'Anville's *Atlas* contains forty-two maps, ten more than the 1721 atlas described above. Of these, four are composite maps of larger regions, fifteen are maps of individual provinces within China proper, thirteen are of regions within Tartary, ten are of regions within Tibet, and one is not based on the Qing surveys at all, but on later explorations from another source.

Overall the European atlas gives more attention to the international context of the Qing empire by showing it in relation to neighboring parts of the globe. This required a synthesis of additional sources besides the Kangxi surveys. The atlas also reveals an extensive interest in central Asia and Tibet. According to the preface, d'Anville began with the very maps that the Jesuits working in China had sent to Du Halde, who had in turn presented them to the French king. Before they were engraved, d'Anville edited them and drew up the "general maps" that are included in his atlas. These maps, which did not appear in the Chinese versions, include one that encompassed China, Tartary, and Tibet, another depicting China, a third Tartary, and a fourth Tibet. When d'Anville was finished with the Qing survey maps, they were then conserved in the royal library.

The general maps of China, Tartary, and Tibet and a general map of the provinces of China appear on the first two pages respectively, creating for Europe an image of China formed from, but in some ways greater than, the sum of its parts. It may seem somewhat ironic that no comparable composite maps are included in the 1719 and 1721 Kangxi maps discussed above, as these maps make the most direct claim to the shape and extent of China proper and of the Qing empire. In China, however, the survey maps did not need to perform this function; other imperial maps that were made in the indigenous tradition and were strategically less sensitive served this purpose.

The preface of d'Anville's *Atlas* tells us that in the case of the map of Tartary, d'Anville took information from the individual maps sent from China, and also from the memoirs of Père Gerbillon. In the case of Tibet, he used the individual Qing maps as a base, but along the borders with India he added additional information that had been gathered "from the other side." Delhi, Agra, and several other important landmarks in India appear on the map. Furthermore, to fill out the atlas he added maps of Japan and lands farther south. The final map shows the territory traversed by a "Captain Beerings" (i.e., Vitus Bering) from Tobolsk to Kamtschatka. The inclusion of this last map situates d'Anville's atlas within the context of ongoing exploration of Russian Asia, implying an up-to-the-minute quality in terms of the data, and also making an implicit claim that the editors were responsible for the sum of the information included, rather than reliant on a single outside source.

Looking at the atlas, the viewer immediately senses other points of departure from the Qing maps as well—the kind of differences to which we have been trained to assign great weight. To our eyes the engraving is more sophisticated, the romanized place-names more intelligible. The etching of the mountains has a more finished quality. The cartouches, while not central to the geographic information the maps convey, lend a certain authority to the maps. Their ornate design, lettering, and visual imagery are designed to impress an audience interested in the maps for more than the pragmatic purpose of precisely plotting place-names on paper, recording administrative boundaries, and charting the courses of rivers. Some provinces rate more ornate cartouches than others. That for Guangdong, the province through which maritime trade with Europe passed, is especially elaborate. It includes a representation of a European, probably a merchant. The additional polish of the d'Anville atlas is not simply a function of its European manufacture. The presentation is more self-conscious and finished because it was meant to reach a broader


CARTE LA PLUS GENERALE
ET QUI COMPREND
LA CHINE
LA TARTARIE CHINOISE
ET LE THIBET
DRESSEE SUR LES CARTES PARTICULIERES
DES RR. PP. JESUITES
ECHELLE

Figure 3.5. General map of China, Tartary, and Tibet, in J.B. Bourguignon d'Anvill, *Atla*
la Chine (1737). Courtesy of The Newberry Library, Chicago.

audience, one that would have valued its appearance (in addition to the information it contained) and been willing to pay a good price for it.

But are the maps in the d'Anville atlas in fact more accurate than the 1721 Chinese-language volume of comparable size, as its polished presentation would aim to persuade? Because it features mapping conventions with which we are more familiar, we might like to think so, but that is not the case. To give one example, we have seen that the 1721 atlas map of Guizhou Province clearly indicates lands not under the control of the imperial government. These lands, which were controlled by various Miao peoples, were intentionally left blank in the atlas. (One wonders if they were not able to be surveyed.) The d'Anville atlas, by contrast, gives a different impression. Text on the general map of China states that the area is inhabited by Wild Miao (*seng miao*), but the limits of imperial control are not as readily apparent as on the Chinese editions (fig. 3.6). Although the provincial map does indicate boundaries between the province and the Wild Miao territory by way of dotted lines, the interior of these areas is filled in, portrayed as if it had been surveyed, unlike on the Qing maps. Thus the d'Anville map tends to give the impression that all of the province was surveyed and under Qing control. While the mapping conventions the atlas uses may make it appear to place a higher value on accuracy than the Chinese survey maps, in fact, at least on this one point, the map misrepresents the Qing as having greater territorial control than it actually had. Accurate or not, this and similar European versions of the Kangxi surveys, and the authority they conveyed, helped to shape Europe's picture of what it called China for centuries to come.

The fourth and final map based on the Kangxi surveys that we will consider is a much smaller Chinese-language edition entitled *A Complete Map of China Divided by Prefecture* (Fenfu Zhongguo quan tu; fig. 3.7). This atlas measures only about 11 inches by 6 inches (27 × 15 cm). According to the catalogue in the British Library, this volume dates from 1721. A note penciled inside reads, "These maps appear to have been made from the earliest surveys of the Jesuits and agree with the map in Du Halde's History." Small as the volume is, and having been printed by woodblock, the overall level of detail and accuracy is not nearly that of the larger Chinese atlas edition of 1721. Furthermore, no indications of latitude or longitude are printed.[48] Altogether it contains only twenty-six maps. Although less detailed in some ways than the survey maps we have already considered, the atlas is more detailed in others. For example, areas beyond provincial boundaries are clearly labeled with the name of the adjoining prefecture or district from the neighboring province.



Figure 3.6. Guizhou Province, in J.B. Bourguignon d'Anville, *Atlas de la Chine* (1737). Courtesy of The Newberry Library, Chicago.

The writing on the maps is entirely in Chinese. Less precise, and less expensive to produce, this atlas consequently would have enjoyed wider circulation than the larger 1721 edition. Looking at it outside the larger context of the other editions, one might form the impression that scale was not particularly important to Chinese maps; but given what we know about the imperial concern for secrecy, it is more likely that only such simplified renderings would be allowed to circulate. (This same principle applies today closer to home, when satellite imagery is made available to the public only in versions altered to be less distinct.) Even so, we can plainly see the correspondence with the larger 1721 atlas in the shape of Guizhou Province, part of which remained under the control of the Wild



Figure 3.7. Wula, in *Fenfu Zhongguo quan tu* (A Complete Map of China Divided by Prefecture), 1721. OIOC 15271.a.20. © British Library Board. All Rights Reserved.

Miao when the surveys were taken. Furthermore, even in its "dumbed-down" version, such an atlas would have had carried important messages. The organization would have urged its viewers, who would have been more familiar with provincial gazetteers than a national map, to regard their province as part of a larger country, made up of many like units. According to the title, the atlas depicts China (Zhongguo). Yet, judging by the content of the atlas, "China's" reach extends significantly beyond the fifteen provinces that constituted Ming China, or *neidi* (China proper). Furthermore, the use of Zhongguo in its title portends a new way of viewing the country—as one among many (Faguo [France], Deguo [Germany], and so on). It also conveys the message that Qing China occupied one part of a globe shared by other emergent nations—a statement made more implicitly in the other versions of the map through indications of longitude and latitude, quiet reminders of realms beyond China (on the ever-shrinking globe).

To summarize, all four of these maps of the Qing empire stem from the same surveys. The first, dating from 1719, was made in China, where it was engraved by Matteo Ripa. Consisting of three large scrolls, it requires considerable space to view. The map was made to scale and bears indications of latitude and longitude. Place-names within the bounds of what had been the Ming dynasty are marked in Chinese, the further expanse of the Qing in Manchu. As such, the map highlighted the fact that China remained culturally distinct from, yet part of, a larger empire. The second map, a 1721 atlas version of this same map, is also drawn to scale, with indications of latitude and longitude, but is labeled only in Chinese. From looking at it, one might form the impression *not* that China had been colonized by the Manchus, but that outlying lands had become part of China. The third version is Jean Baptiste Bourguignon d'Anville's *Atlas de la Chine* (1737). Along with earlier versions appearing in Jean Baptiste Du Halde's *Description . . . de la Chine . . .*, it created the authoritative picture of China in Europe.[49] This atlas gives greater attention than its Qing counterparts to situating China, Tartary, and Tibet in the larger global context. The final work considered is a much smaller Chinese-language edition, also from 1721. Although clearly deriving from the same Kangxi surveys, this map is devoid of indications of latitude and longitude, nor would it appear to be drawn as strictly to scale.[50] Less detailed, and less expensive to produce, it consequently could enjoy wider circulation.

Although the four maps all differ from one another in various ways—the first pointing to the Manchu nature of the dynasty, the second to the Qing as Chinese, the third demonstrating European understandings of China, Tartary, and Tibet—it would be easy to see three of them—those made explicitly to scale and with direct European involvement—as constituting one category, and the smaller, more popular "Chinese" atlas as another. One might even be tempted to use the latter as an example of disregard for the fundamentals of scientific mapping practices. We are predisposed to making this distinction by the deeply entrenched categories by which we tend to divide the world and objects within it: the West versus East (here China), and scientific versus traditional. Instead of following these categories of analysis, I challenge their unqualified usefulness for all situations. *All* of these maps, which are based on the same surveys, represent competing claims, or at least differing views of Qing territory, not simply a single European (or scientific) versus a Chinese (or traditional) view. Second, and perhaps even more significantly, as I argue further below, ascribing too much importance to differences between Western and Chinese, or scaled and nonscaled maps has served to divert our attention from the development of an even more fundamental shared vision of Qing empire. Each of these four maps, as well as later reeditions, indigenous Chinese maps of the Qing empire, and what we might call hybrid maps—those combining indigenous cartographic traditions and early modern practices—contributed to the creation, both domestically and internationally, of a new territorial conception of the Qing empire, one that would eventually play a substantial role in shaping the geobody of the Chinese nation.

Historiography Reconsidered

Because the Kangxi surveys and resulting maps employed European personnel and technology introduced from Europe, much debate has centered around whether and where they fit into the Chinese mapping tradition. My argument is contingent on understanding these maps as an important strand of Qing cartography, not simply as Western maps of China. For this reason it is necessary to introduce the contours of the historiography of cartography in China. Upon close examination we can see how its conceptual frameworks, which have pitted "Chinese" against "Western" and "scientific" against "traditional," have shaped the kinds of questions we have asked of Qing maps. These categorical dichotomies in our thinking obscure fundamental similarities and continuities between different types of Qing maps. These categories of differentiation are by no means unique to the history of cartography, but have for years pervaded other scholarly disciplines as well, making them seem all the more natural or intuitive to us.

Broadly speaking, the historiography of cartography in China has been dominated by a debate—both sides of which, in their own way, attempt to defend the integrity of Chinese mapping as measured against mapping technology practiced in (and introduced from) the "West." On the one hand, Joseph Needham, author of the well-known multivolume work *Science and Civilization in China*, and those sympathetic to his point of view, argue that cartography in China was in no way inferior to that in "the West."[51] To justify their claims, these scholars have taken pains to demonstrate Chinese use of advanced scientific techniques, both in ancient times and in the adoption of early modern techniques introduced during the Qing through Jesuit missionaries from Europe. We can see an example of an early technologically advanced map in the famous "Yu ji tu" (Map of the Tracks of Yu), a rubbing from a Chinese stele dating from 1136. Given this historical precedent, the scaled maps deriving from the Kangxi surveys are for Needham not an unprecedented aberration in the practice of mapping in China. They constitute rather a natural trajectory from within Chinese cartographic practice, which has its own scientific roots demonstrated by a tradition of precision in measurement and representation.

The other side of the debate is well represented by Cordell Yee, best known for his contributions to *The History of Cartography* series.[52] Yee argues that by focusing primarily, if not exclusively, on "scientific" aspects of cartography in China, Needham and others have overlooked the vast corpus of what he calls "traditional Chinese maps" that do not fit this model. Yee defines traditional Chinese maps as tending to be pictorial, not to scale, and including fairly extensive textual descriptions necessary to the interpretation of the map.[53] Sometimes the text occurs directly on the map; more often it appears on separate pages. In such renderings, the text supplements the graphics, often giving precise distances between points indicated on the map.

Both approaches make valid points, but from different perspectives. But each also brings with it a set of conceptual limitations. If Needham's "China had science, too" approach tends to leave a large corpus of traditional materials out of consideration, Yee's approach conversely tends to exclude the very possibility of scientific maps—those using technology introduced from Europe—as Chinese maps. Furthermore, both approaches, while contributing important elements to our understanding of mapping in China, leave another important area of potential inquiry untouched: namely, how *various* kinds of Qing cartography have contributed fundamentally to shaping our notion of what constitutes "China" today. In order to recognize the dual effectiveness of early modern scientific and indigenous cartographies in Qing China, we need to see them as two parts of the entirety of Chinese cartography, not as antithetical to each other. Scientific cartography and indigenous Chinese cartography each worked in tandem, ultimately helping to produce a picture of a unified Qing empire. As Jim Millward has phrased it, "Whether the technology employed in the Kangxi and Qianlong surveys was 'Western' or 'Chinese' is in a sense the wrong question, since Jesuits were a major force behind the growth of interest in map-making in Europe, as well as cartographic advisers to the Qing."[54] Both scientific cartography and traditional maps played important roles in the creation of the Qing empire and in perpetuating its territorial legacy, as did hybrid maps, discussed below.

Part of the attraction of maps, and the study of cartography itself, is the range of artistry, technical skill, and science that they embody. In recent years the study of cartography has attracted the attention of scholars in a variety of disciplines. Conversely, scholarship generated outside this history of cartography can also help us ask important questions about maps. In order to elucidate my argument, I draw from work in both the history of science and art history. It is no coincidence that these two disciplines, which constitute two ends of a spectrum onto which the qualities of any map could be plotted—science at one end and art at the other—have proved fruitful for framing my interpretation of Qing maps and their role in the construction of empire.

A view from the history of science can help us to explore assumptions that often surround the nature of cartography, especially when considered in comparative context. In *Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line*, Thomas Gieryn uses an extended metaphor of cultural cartography to discuss science.[55] He notes that when people grapple with questions like "'What is science?' or 'Who is a scientist?' the answers they come up with often address the odd-sounding query, '*Where* is science?'"[56] His point is that in our cultural maps of science we must locate it somewhere. A map found in *An Atlas of Fantasy* locates "Mount Science" "just above the town of Reason in the State of Knowledge, which is adjacent to the States of Fine Prospect and Improvement, across the Sea of Temperance from the State of Plenty, all this on the other side of the Demarcation Mountains from the towns of Darkness, Crazyville, and Prejudice, and the islands of Deaf, Blind, and Folly."[57] In discussions that involve cross-cultural comparisons with the "non-West," science is usually located in "the West."

Gieryn's discussion of science, how it is constituted and its authority determined, negotiated, and extended, can be useful to historians of cartography as well as historians of science. *Science* is a slippery term, meaning different things to different people and at different times. Its one consistent quality seems to be the authority our culture ascribes to it. With that authority comes the inevitable competition between different groups, individuals, and political centers to interpret or define, and to monopolize, what constitutes science. For science is our culture's way of striving for and defining truth. For this reason, constant debate surrounds what constitutes "real science." Yet, in Gieryn's words, "Epistemic authority exists only to the extent that it is claimed by some people (typically in the name of science) but denied to others."[58] The crucial question is, whose truth will prevail?

This kind of boundary work, so characteristic of science, also surrounds the history of cartography. For maps, like science—*as* Science—are representations of, or means to perpetuate, certain truths—as well as implicit claims to the authority to act on those truths. The tendency to evaluate cartographic representation in China according to Western scientific criteria (Needham) and conversely, the urge to resist categorization of Chinese cartography according to apparently external standards (Yee) are a kind of boundary work. At stake is which view of Chinese maps is the "real" one. The debate has shaped the historiography on cartography in China profoundly. It has also allowed some to dismiss the Chinese maps based on the Kangxi surveys as a passing but superficial phase in the history of cartography in dynastic China, whose epistemology never really caught on.[59]

From the beginning, the historiography of the Kangxi surveys and their products has tended to regard them as Western inspired. Already in the early eighteenth century Jean Baptiste Du Halde and Antoine Gaubil credited Jesuit missionaries with instilling in the Kangxi emperor the desire to have his empire mapped.[60] Later, scholars of the history of cartography would continue to interpret these maps through their own cultural lenses. The scaled versions of the surveys would eventually be categorized as scientific or Western, and the more widely disseminated, nonscaled versions used as evidence by some of China's lack of interest in, or lack of aptitude for, the precision required for scientific inquiry. Thus the Kangxi atlas has been generally understood as a product of Western influence. (As noted above, it is usually called the Kangxi *Jesuit* Atlas.)

My aim here is not to refute this argument, which I have already done elsewhere.[61] Rather, I want to introduce several new, but related, insights: in representing the Kangxi atlas as European, or at least European inspired, another much more powerful narrative has been obscured: the historiography of the Kangxi surveys and resulting maps actually worked to *strengthen* the imperial claims of the Qing maps internationally, and later to project them into the future as the shape of modern China. For, ironically, it is just this classification of the Kangxi surveys and their products as Western, distinguishing them from traditional and Chinese maps, that legitimates their claims in the Western world. Why should those in Europe doubt or question these Qing claims when they are understood as products of European science—the ultimate (internal) validation? European countries even reproduced these Qing imperial claims on their own maps.

Although Gieryn's view of the history of science is in some ways profoundly postmodern, we need not throw up our hands and abandon hope of finding a useful measure of evaluation. At the heart of his argument is the premise that what constitutes science, although not a constant, is determined by context and can be evaluated by its usefulness within a given setting. What constitutes good science, he claims, is determined not by a fixed or rigid set of practices or principles that can be objectively described, but by its ability to persuade a given audience of its claims to authority and utility in a given context. The same is true of cartography. What constitutes a good map is its relevance and usefulness for the purpose at hand.

Viewed in this light we can understand why each of the four maps I have described, though stemming from the same data, represents or emphasizes different aspects of the Qing empire. Without exploring the contexts in which each was used, we cannot legitimately judge that some were better or even more accurate than others. (This is also true of the indigenous and hybrid maps discussed later in this chapter.) Each was designed for a specific purpose and for different viewers, yet we can see how collectively what they represented dovetailed with the emergent needs of the nation-state, with its demands for territorial integrity and complex claims to rootedness in the histories of specific regions.

Recent work in the history of art can also help us gain perspective on the study of maps, especially in a comparative context. Craig Clunas's *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China* is a work at the intersection of Chinese history and visual culture.[62] In the introduction, Clunas discusses the perpetuation of an assumed, or constructed, difference between Chinese and Western painting that has been fundamental to the discipline of art history.[63] Both within the canon of Chinese art and in Western historiography of Chinese art, Chinese art has been constructed fairly narrowly to include (or at least privilege) only certain types of painting: mainly those prized by a small but elite circle of Ming literati who valued amateur, more expressionist art over professional painting that demanded higher fidelity to representational accuracy. This distinction, while indeed rooted in indigenous art criticism and theory, has taken on a degree of importance that significantly distorts our view of the scope of painting in China and exaggerates the difference of painting in China and Europe.

To simplify a bit, the problem with this categorization is that art that tends toward the representational has tended to be written off as unimportant by Chinese collectors and as "not Chinese" in European and American art historical circles. The views of a small elite in China, whose artistic preferences favored only a small portion of the variety of kinds of painting produced in China, in turn influenced foreign students of Chinese art history, both through their writing and through the nature of their collections. Their taste also influenced the kinds of pieces that in more recent times became part of museum collections in China, which subsequently reflect only a relatively small slice of the variety of paintings made in China during the early modern period. Similarly, the standards of Western scientific cartography have tended to discredit indigenous or traditional mapping genres as inferior or at least "other."[64]

These two glimpses of how art and science can be, and have been, understood—in terms of categories of place, and of intrinsic qualities whose status is constantly negotiated—help us to understand what is at stake in the debates on the history of cartography in China. According to Clunas, Ming literati had an influence on determining what their successors in China and later Western art historians considered as Chinese art that was both out of proportion to their numbers and not representative of the actual scope of painting in China. The effect is not unlike the distortion born of using Western scientific standards to determine what constitutes cartography worthy of note in China, although the particular circumstances are, of course, quite different. In the situation Clunas describes, the measure of value was ascribed by an indigenous elite group—amateur literati artists. The material left out, or seen as of lesser importance, was other, lower-status types of painting (that, ironically, occasionally embody qualities usually ascribed to Western painting, such as greater representational fidelity to the object depicted). The result has been a longstanding acceptance of "difference" more constructed than actual between Chinese and Western painting; Western painting itself being reciprocally constructed through the same process. It is time to ask ourselves to what extent this may also be true of our understanding of cartography.

The binary division between Chinese and Western or scientific and traditional assumes that a given map, or painting, must belong *either* to one category *or* to its implied other. Under this paradigm it is not possible to conceive of a map that could be both Chinese and scientific (or modern). For this reason the validity of maps that incorporate aspects of both indigenous Chinese and early modern European mapping practices has been called into serious question, their value dismissed. This intellectual framework has also made it possible to state that "most of the changes the Jesuits introduced were of a relatively short duration"[65]—the fact that most maps in China today are drawn to scale and have little to distinguish them stylistically from maps made in Europe or the United States (or most anywhere) notwithstanding. Because maps made in premodern China have been conceived of as either scientific *or* traditional, Western *or* Chinese, it has not been possible conceptually to see how these two different genres might coexist, both of them being accepted and understood, or to trace a path from traditional Chinese maps to contemporary Chinese maps that would account for Western influence—at least not prior to the Opium War. Having critiqued the existing paradigms through which we have understood the history of cartography—and indeed what constituted cartography—in China, in the next section I explore a new way of looking at the multifaceted products of Qing cartography. I propose an approach that takes into account the diversity of mapping practices within the Qing. Thus I turn to indigenous Chinese maps produced well into the Qing, and to examples of the pervasiveness of what I will call "hybrid" cartography, that is, maps that combined elements drawn both from the Kangxi survey maps that have been described as Western and from indigenous cartographic practices.

THE LANGUAGES OF QING MAPPING • Clunas helps us to understand how deeply entrenched are the categories of Chinese and Western in evaluating visual arts. But can the approach he suggests for moving beyond these binary categories prove useful in helping us look more inclusively at maps? I would suggest that it can be. While writing this chapter I came to understand that I had to be careful not to allow my work to fall into the East-West divide, even if under another name. Had I confined my inquiry only to the survey maps (although I do not see them simply as Western, but rather as early modern) and ignored indigenous cartography, I would, in practice, have been crediting the validity of the categories that I have been critiquing, implicitly placing myself in the Needham school. For a critic could argue, with some justification, that the four maps I have discussed in detail all utilize Western mapping practices—whether successfully or not. Naturally, the critic might add that they *look* early modern (whether or not the technology behind them was really understood) because they *are* products of Western technology and, to a large extent, of European personnel. The enormous wealth of indigenous Chinese cartography would have been left out of the picture, reifying the division between scientific and traditional, if not that of Chinese and Western.

The study of cartography in comparative context is also complicated by the fact that after circa 1840, when China was defeated by Britain in the Opium War, cartography in China gradually gave way to a monoculture in mapping. That Chinese mapping practices have shifted to look more like our own is not to the credit of the superiority of the West—after all, Western cartographic practices have changed over time as well—but a reflection that we have come to share outlooks produced by the common experience of modernity, including the primacy of the nation-state as a political unit and science as an arbiter of truth. However, because indigenous cartographic practices were gradually replaced by models derived from Europe, it is deceptively easy to discount the importance and effectiveness that they enjoyed well into the high Qing. Maps privileging accurate measurement had not been absent prior to the nineteenth century, but numerically they had been in the minority, largely confined to the court and accessible only to small numbers of people in sensitive positions. However, it is crucial that the question of when (individuals in) the Qing understood scientific mapping not be conflated with the question of when other models fell out of use. To conclude that the Chinese did not really understand scientific mapping because they did not immediately adopt its exclusive use would be a fallacy. Such a judgment could only stem from our own perspective, where a relative monoculture in mapping is the norm and where we privilege scientific maps over those that we deem less precise.

The work of Emma Teng shows how what she calls "imagined geographies" were crucial to the creation of an indigenous Chinese conception of what constituted the Qing empire.[66] She also challenges any assumptions we might have about the unchanging nature of traditional Chinese maps (those modern science has now rejected). During the Ming dynasty a conception of China as bounded by natural geographic features including the South China Sea prevailed. Gradually, however, Qing maps came to include territory that was once considered beyond the seas (*haiwai*). In this way, new indigenous maps of China including Taiwan (or at least its northwest coastal area) helped to change the way people thought about the extent of China and its territorial limits. Viewed in terms of an implicit comparison to a modern, or Western map, these indigenous maps may not appear to have changed much stylistically. But, whereas Ming and Qing maps may be similar in general format, the content when viewed carefully is unmistakably different. The general maps found in the Ming and Qing gazetteers of the empire, for example, differ significantly. While neither map attempts an actual scaled portrayal of the empire, the Ming map is quite schematic. The Yellow and Yangzi rivers stand out markedly. Each province is labeled, as are the cities of Nanjing and Beijing. To the east, Korea, Japan, and Ryukyu are identified. Taiwan was, of course, not claimed as part of the empire during the Ming, nor does it even appear on this map. To the west, identified in the same way as foreign countries to the east, we see Hami, the Western Regions, and Western Barbarians. The map from the Qing gazetteer, by contrast, while no more accurate in terms of the coastline, represents expanded territory, and the inclusion of many more place-names, particularly in what had been peripheral areas of the empire, or areas completely beyond the scope of the Ming. Taiwan is represented and clearly labeled.

Comparison of the 1579 Ming dynasty *Guang yu tu* with a 1743 world map shows a similar expansion of territory expressed within a traditional Chinese mapping idiom. In the latter, a great deal of area beyond the Great Wall is shown. The southeastern quadrant of the map clearly shows "Taiwan Prefecture." Unlike the other islands surrounding it that were not under Qing jurisdiction, Taiwan prefecture is represented by a square shape, as are the other major prefectures within China (Taiwan did not become a province until the 1880s). Thus the map claims Taiwan as part of the Qing empire through the style of the map language as well as by its very appearance on the map. The 1767 "Complete Map of the Unified and Eternal Great Qing" (fig. 3.2) was made to impress a certain constituency. Measuring approximately 1.3 by 2.35 meters, it had an imperial purpose—to awe those who viewed it with the grandeur of the Qing. The title highlighted that the Qing was unified, and would last for as long as anyone could imagine (literally ten thousand years). The purpose of this map could not have been served appropriately by the updated survey maps commissioned during the same reign period. They were in a foreign style, one that did not attest to Qing (Manchu) patronage of Chinese traditions; and furthermore the precise strategic information they contained was much too sensitive to permit exposure to a broad audience.

The process of representing the new scope of what constituted the empire was not limited to maps of Qing territory, but included literature of exploration and ethnographic inquiry into the practices of the peoples inhabiting frontier territory. The Qing also engaged in ethnographic mapping of its minority populations in works such as the *Huang Qing zhigong tu* (Qing Imperial Illustrations of Tributary Peoples) and in Miao albums.[67] The *Illustrations of Tributary Peoples* was a compendium that illustrated 301 peoples from all over the world, most of which were from within the frontier regions of the Qing empire. Each segment showed a man and woman in traditional dress, and included ethnographic text describing that people's dress, customs, relationship to the Qing, and any local products of note. Miao albums depicted culturally non-Chinese peoples from the southern and southwestern provinces. Illustrations centered on identifying cultural practices, whether belief systems, courtship rituals, or means of livelihood. The textual descriptions always noted the administrative jurisdiction within which they lived, as well as describing distinctive customs and their relationship to central authority. Sometimes records of ethnographic inquiry were combined in the same volume with maps of frontier regions.[68]

Mapping was not only indigenous and pictorial or strictly to-scale and classified during the Qing. Hybrid maps, combining elements of survey maps and indigenous Chinese map characteristics, were not uncommon. Maps based on the Kangxi survey maps (and possibly supplementary surveys as well) were produced and circulated widely in established Chinese genres, including collectanea and official dynastic records. The *Gujin tushu jicheng* (Collection of Books and Illustrations, Old and New) includes maps not only of each province, but also of each prefecture of China.[69] Commissioned by the Kangxi emperor, the work, consisting of 1,628 volumes, was unprecedented in scope. The maps it contains are truly hybrid in nature, incorporating elements from both indigenous Chinese mapping practices and survey technology. They do not appear to be formally scaled, but even a casual comparison with the Kangxi survey maps reveals their origin. The titles of the individual provincial maps indicate that they also depict areas bordering on those provinces (for example, "Guizhou jiang yu tu" [fig. 3.8]). As in the smaller 1721 map of China discussed above, the areas on which different portions of Guizhou (and other provinces) border are clearly labeled. These consist of counties, districts, prefectures, and other formal units of administration under the jurisdiction of neighboring provinces. Maps of each individual prefecture within the province are also reproduced in the encyclopedia. As in the provincial maps, administrative regions bordering on each prefecture are clearly labeled. Thus here we have an example of aspects of the survey maps being incorporated into other Chinese sources during the reign of the Kangxi emperor. Although the most detailed survey maps were too sensitive to circulate, it benefited the court to disseminate knowledge of their existence and aspects of their content among broader circles.

The *Da Qing hui dian tu*, commonly translated as either "Illustrated Records of the Qing" or "Illustrated Collected Statutes of the Qing," published much later in the dynasty, also contains extensive maps of the empire.[70] These include both a large foldout insert map of the entire empire (measuring 45 ½ inches [116 cm] tall and 72 inches [183 cm] wide), and individual maps of each province and each prefecture in the country—as well as outlying areas. The maps appear to be based on actual surveys using the kinds of mapping technology introduced by the Jesuit missionaries; they are not simply copies of the Kangxi atlas. However, the large foldout map (fig. 3.9) and the smaller maps contained within the



Figure 3.8. Guizhou Province, in *Gujin tushu jicheng* (Collection of Books and Illustrations, Old and New) (Shanshai: Tu shu ji Cheng yin shu ju, Guangxu 10 [1884]).

individual fascicles of the work use two different systems of projection. The map of the empire clearly indicates latitude and longitude. The provincial and prefectural maps (fig. 3.10), on the other hand, do not bear indications of latitude and longitude, but rather appear on grids, each square of which represents 100 *li* (approximately 50 km [31 miles]).[71] Because of the use of this type of grid rather than a projection based on latitude and longitude, these maps are considered hybrid maps, maps that use both indigenous Chinese technologies and those introduced from Europe.

Yee sees the maps in the *Collected Statutes of the Qing* as evidence that Chinese cartographers did not in fact fully understand the premises behind Western cartography. He interprets the fact that a grid was used—and in some cases used together with indications of latitude and longitude—as evidence that the Chinese compilers did not understand the theory behind a Western-style scaled map. My interpretation differs.

Clearly the foldout map showing the full empire uses a projection requiring an understanding of latitude and longitude. But that does not mean that it was the only valid, or even best, way of depicting territory. The smaller provincial and prefectural maps are on grids, not because the concept of latitude and longitude was not understood, but because it was not particularly useful in this context. For an area no larger than a province or prefecture, a projection that showed an absolute measure of distance (even if distorted) would have been more useful. In principle, and in practice, this is not unlike our own state road maps, where the scale indicates how many miles or kilometers are represented by an inch. My road atlas, for example, does not indicate latitude and longitude on state maps, only on those of larger regions. State and city maps also indicate scale, which could be represented as well by a grid. In other words, we, too, use a grid of *x* many kilometers to the centimeter, only the grid is invisible.

My point is that we constantly mix our mapping technologies and metaphors depending on context. The fact that the Qing did so does not indicate a lack of understanding of what would eventually become the standard mode for representing territory. On the contrary, it shows the ability to adapt mapping languages to different contexts and purposes. Furthermore, that maps of individual prefectures of this enormous empire were reproduced in this compendium tells me that precise mapping was vital to the administration of the Qing dynasty. In fact, precision may have been becoming more important ever time: the maps in the *Da Qing hui dian tu* appear to be based on more recent surveys than those in the *Gujin tushu jicheng*.

Conclusion

Maps are not a straightforward representation of territorial realities. They are products of specific historical moments that encode and reflect a great deal of information about the contexts in which they were produced. Furthermore, once on paper they perpetuate that vision, projecting it into the future and sometimes into the past, as seen in the altered maps appearing in the Chinese translation of the *Cambridge History of China*. In this chapter, I have explored one facet of how China's current shape came to be established and generally accepted. I showed that this process unfolded during the Qing dynasty (1636–1911), and that to be fully understood, China's geopolitical transformation from empire into a modern nation-state cannot be examined in isolation, but must be seen as part and product



Figure 3.9. Detail of map of the Qing empire, in *Da Qing hui dian tu* (Illustrated Record the Qing) (Beijing: Hui dian guan, 1899).



Figure 3.10. Map of Guiyang prefecture, in *Da Qing hui dian tu* (Illustrated Records of the Qing) (Beijing: Hui dian guan, 1899).

of larger global historical processes being played out in various parts of the world during the early modern period. In order to understand Qing concepts of empire and the complexity of the processes being played out during this period, we need to consider maps based *both* on indigenous *and* on imported technologies. Whereas the Qing maps we have considered most closely in this chapter were products of the Kangxi surveys, and did have a unique role in the shaping of modern China internationally, indigenous and hybrid maps, as well as ethnographic and literary representations of the Qing empire, also contributed in their own way to defining the Qing imperium and in turn to current understandings and images of what constitutes China today. Both scaled maps associated with technology derived from Europe and indigenous Chinese maps not drawn to scale contributed to this process. Other, less strictly cartographic ways of thinking about space and place, as well as cultural heritage (and eventually nationality), also played a role.

From historical research into other aspects of Qing history, we know that the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors were masters of images. Their legitimacy and authority were created and sustained through successfully cultivating a broad range of cultural constituencies. They collected and displayed cultural artifacts from many parts of the world. Their various summer palaces included Chinese gardens, European-style palaces, and a replica of the Potala Palace, the residence of the Dalai Lama.[72] They patronized the compilation of dictionaries in various languages, and collections of works of literature and history in Chinese and Manchu. From the point of view of an imperial center with the talents of the world's best artisans at its command, why not take advantage of a multiplicity of mapping languages and cartographic technologies as well? Any notion that traditional Chinese cartography would or should have been abandoned as soon as Western-style cartography was introduced, and understood, is simply a product of a narrow and presentistic, if not Eurocentric, vision.

We have seen how longstanding assumptions about differences between China and the West have shaped the interpretation of the history of cartography in China. In illuminating how our culture thinks of science, Gieryn's metaphor of cultural cartography has been useful in making sense of the contours of the existing historiography. He observes that in our cultural cartographies, or conceptual maps, science must be located somewhere, plotted, as it were, in space—and, I would add, in time. Writ large, this place has become the early modern and modern West. For this reason historians of cartography in China have had difficulty reconciling apparently conflicting styles of cartography practiced simultaneously under the Qing. Clunas, on the other hand, has challenged the validity of this Chinese-versus-Western binary that profoundly shaped the field of art history. His approach to art encourages alternative ways of looking at cartography as well.

In order to understand cartography as practiced during the Qing we need to be able to understand the contexts in which a variety of mapping genres was used, and the needs and purposes that these maps were designed to fill. The rulers of the Qing sponsored a variety of imperial mapping technologies to serve a range of goals, all of which related to empire building. On the one hand the Qing empire functioned in an increasingly internationalized early modern world where empires could no longer view themselves in isolation from one another, but borrowed technologies, shared certain kinds of information, and engaged in learning about one another. In establishing a position in this context, the Qing needed to record and communicate its territorial reach according to the emerging international language of the scaled map. On the other hand, domestically, as a foreign dynasty, the Qing needed to cultivate its legitimacy as patron of longstanding scholarship within China. In this context the only reasonable way of representing Qing territorial achievements, thus conveying to the people a new sense of what China would be, was through the established mapping idiom. Whereas the technology employed and the militarily sensitive information contained in the Kangxi survey maps were accessible only to a privileged few within China, they circulated abroad to extend Qing claims internationally. Simultaneously, other maps of the Qing based on indigenous Chinese methods, and the hybrid maps that were widely disseminated also iterated a similar message of the unity of an enlarged and culturally diverse empire. Perhaps at base these maps were not so different from each other as has been presumed.

But differences do not occur only across different mapping traditions. Even the four maps based on the Kangxi surveys discussed here reveal significant discrepancies. Each was appropriate to its own context; the maps were designed for different audiences, and served different purposes. The information they contain, as well as their uses and interpretations, shows historical contingency and process in the staking and negotiating of contending imperial cartographic claims over the course of three centuries. In different ways claims of Manchus, Chinese, and Europeans were all represented. Whose claims were most effective? The Manchus successfully employed cutting-edge cartographic technology to map their expanding empire and successfully transmitted these claims abroad to other world powers, where they were perpetuated for centuries—well beyond the life of the Qing dynasty. Imperial claims were also made and circulated in well-established Chinese genres of mapping. The emergent Chinese nation, in whose language most of the maps circulated, at least in Asia, benefited from this linguistic appropriation of territory—whether on the survey maps or those made in the indigenous style; representation of frontier lands in Chinese could only support later nationalistic claims—not only to parts of China that were culturally Chinese, but to all the areas of the Qing expanse marked (in Chinese names) on the Qing maps. How about claims made by Europe? The original surveys undertaken through cooperation between Manchu and European personnel and the findings later disseminated in European editions show that Qing cartographic claims were accepted and perpetuated by (at least some) European countries. The power of Qing cartographic claims still extends its influence abroad. Although Europeans and people in other parts of the West may be most sensitive to the calls for political autonomy made by peoples living in territories once represented as part of the Qing empire but now controlled by the modern Chinese nation-state—namely Tibet and Xinjiang—we are all still constrained to some degree by the boundaries inherited from the Qing cartographic legacy.

As we have seen, even maps stemming from the same Kangxi surveys manifest significant differences. Nonetheless, as part of a larger set, each in its own way contributed to the transformation from Qing empire to Chinese nation. First of all, part of the raison d'être of a map is to extend territorial claims into the future. Maps are not simply a reflection (however willful) of present circumstances, but represent an interest in the perpetuation of those claims. Second, the sheer volume of maps representing the same thing, even if in different ways, tends to reify the existence of that entity in our minds. The four survey maps introduced above, while different in significant ways, all represented the Qing empire (or large portions of it). While individual maps served different purposes and audiences—whether speakers of Manchu or Chinese, those privy to classified information, or Chinese provincial leaders encouraged to see their locality as part of a larger empire—the corpus as a whole did not question the extent or existence of the Qing but rather served to claim it.

Seen together, not only do these maps reflect claims that in some ways compete with one another, but more important, each map individually added strength to the fundamental claim "this is Qing territory," again projecting it into the future. The fact that the French map of the Qing, the Qing survey maps (whether Chinese or Chinese/Manchu), and indigenous and hybrid imperial maps all agreed on this point makes the claim even stronger internationally. The international agreement between France (or Europe for that matter) and the Qing on what constituted the Qing empire cartographically would also have served to obscure or weaken any dissenting views (or in this case, any competing cartographies of this same territory or parts thereof). Three versions of the Kangxi atlases include Tibet, a fact that the Dalai Lama might not have appreciated. (Although the French title makes clear that the map is of the Qing empire *and* Tibet, still the proximity of Tibet as shown with various other parts of the Qing empire has overtones that cannot and could not have been overlooked.[73])

The historiography of Qing maps is an integral part of the multidimensional success story of the Qing empire. Through the use of various types of mapping practices, the Qing were able to set forth a new vision of an integrated dynasty for their Chinese constituency in a map language that was understood and respected; to deploy the latest early modern technology to more precisely map the empire; and to stake out territorial claims internationally. These maps were made, according the preface to the revised Qianlong edition of the survey maps, so that they "might descend to all ages as evidence of the truth."[74] On balance, they have done a remarkable job of creating and perpetuating that truth.

Notes

1. Craig Clunas, *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Andre Gunder Frank, *Reorient: Global Economy in the Asian Age* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1998); Jonathan Hay, *Shitao: Painting and Modernity in Early Qing China* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001); Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001); Laura Hostetler, "Qing Connections to the Early Modern World: Ethnography and Cartography in Eighteenth-Century China," *Modern Asian Studies* 34, no. 3 (2000): 623–62; Peter Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement; Chinese, Russian, and Mongolian Empires in Early Modern Central Eurasia," *International History Review* 20, no. 2 (June 1998): 263–86; Kenneth Pomeranz, *The Great Divergence: Europe, China, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000); Sanjay Subrahmanyam, "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia," *Modern Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1997): 735–62; Lynn A. Struve, ed., *The Qing Formation in World-Historical Time* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004); and Roy Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).

2. Timothy Brook, "Guides for Vexed Travellers: Route Books in the Ming and Qing," *Ch'ing-shih wen-ti* 4, no. 5 (1980): 32–76; Timothy Brook, *Geographical Sources of Ming-Qing History* (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1988); Mark C. Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies," *Journal of Asian Studies* 59, no. 3 (August 2000): 603–46; Benjamin Elman, "Geographical Research in the Ming-Ch'ing Period," *Monumenta Serica* 35 (1981–83): 1–18; Hostetler, "Qing Connections to the Early Modern World"; James A. Millward, " 'Coming onto the Map': 'Western Regions' Geography and Cartographic Nomenclature in the Making of Chinese Empire in Xinjiang," *Late Imperial China* 20, no. 2 (December 1999): 61–98; Richard J. Smith, "Mapping China's World: Cultural Cartography in Late Imperial Times," in *Landscape, Culture and Power in Chinese Society*, ed. Yeh Wen-hsin (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California, Center for East Asian Studies, 1998); Richard E. Strassberg, *Inscribed Landscapes: Travel Writing from Imperial China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1994); and Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

3. Kenneth Hammond, "Wang Shizhen and Li Shizhen: Archaism and Scientific Thought in Sixteenth-Century China," and Georges Métailié, "The Botany of Cheng Yaotian (1725–?1814): Multiple Perspectives on Plants" (papers presented at the Age of Antiquaries in Europe and China Conference, The Bard Graduate Center, New York, March 25–27, 2004).

4. See for example Benjamin A. Elman, *From Philosophy to Philology: Intellectual and Social Aspects of Change in Late Imperial China*, Harvard East Asian Monographs, 110 (Cambridge, MA: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1984); Benjamin A. Elman, *Classicism, Politics, and Kinship: The Chang-chou School of New Text Confucianism in Late Imperial China* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990); Bruce Rusk, "The Rogue Classicist: Feng Fang (1493–1566) and His Forgeries" (Ph.D. diss., University of California at Los Angeles, 2004); and Bruce Rusk, "Old Scripts New Actors: Ming Philology Before the Jesuits" (paper prepared for Global Science and Comparative History "Jesuits, Science, and Philology in China and Europe, 1550–1850," Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, December 6–7, 2002).

5. See for example Laura Hostetler, "Mirror for the Monarch: A Literary Portrait of China in Eighteenth-Century France," *Asia Major* 19, nos. 1–2 (2007): 349–76.

6. Matteo Ripa, who engraved the maps, was not a member of the Society of Jesus.

7. For an introduction to indigenous Chinese cartography, with emphasis on the Qing period, see Cao Wanru et al., eds., *Zhongguo gudai ditu ji* [A Collection of Ancient Chinese Maps], vol. 3, *Qing dai* [The Qing Dynasty] (Peking: Wenwu chubanshe, 1997); Cordell Yee, "A Cartography of Introspection: Chinese Maps as Other Than European," *Asian Art* (Fall 1992): 28–37; Cordell Yee, "Reinterpreting Traditional Chinese Geographical Maps," in *The History of Cartography*, vol. 2, bk. 2, *Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies*, ed. J.B. Harley and David Woodward, 35–70 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), and "Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization," 170–202 in the same volume; and Richard J. Smith, *Chinese Maps: Images of "All Under Heaven"* (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996), and "Mapping China's World."

8. Martin W. Lewis and Kären Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Metageography* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1997), show how the notion of what the "West" includes has gradually grown over time to expand from Western Europe to all of Europe, North and South America, Australia, North Africa, Russia, and even Japan. In a similar (if not precisely contiguous) way, the authority of science as arbiter of truth has gained tremendous ground. The "Western," which has become equated with "science," remains oppositionally defined by (premodern) China—which represents the quintessential "East" and "tradition."

9. Including who controls, or should control, Taiwan, and whether or not it should be independent. Similar issues affect Xinjiang and Tibet, but in these cases, unlike in Taiwan's, the de-facto control is currently in the hands of the PRC. In each case the borders are less at issue than the control of the territory.

10. For maps of the territorial extent of the Tang (618–906), Northern Song (960–1126), and Southern Song (1127–1278), see Harley and Woodward, eds., *The History of Cartography*, vol. 2, bk. 2, *Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies.*

11. For an extended discussion of this aporia, see Prasenjit Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation: Questioning Narratives of Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995).

12. For this reason some historians of the Qing are attempting to eschew the use of "China" altogether.

13. More common were *wo guo*, "our dynasty"; *da Ming*, "the great Ming"; *da Qing*, "the great Qing"; or, more seldom, *zhongguo*, which is now translated as "China," but derives from an ancient term used to denote the "central states" during the Warring States Period prior to the establishment of the Qin dynasty in the third century BC—an event sometimes described as the "unification of China."

14. For the seminal work on the relationship between "tradition" and the nation, see Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, eds., *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

15. For more on these complexities, see Thongchai Winichakul, *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1994); and Duara, *Rescuing History from the Nation.*

16. See Geoff Wade, "The Southern Chinese Borders in History," in *Where China Meets Southeast Asia: Social and Cultural Change in the Border Regions*, ed. Grant Evans, Christopher Hutton, and Kuah Khun Eng, 28–50 (New York: St. Martin's Press; Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2001).

17. Elman, "Geographical Research in the Ming-Ch'ing Period," 1–18.

18. This was certainly the finding of the History of Science Workshop "Global Science and Comparative History: Jesuits, Science, and Philology in China and Europe, 1550–1850," held at Princeton University, Princeton, NJ, December 6, 2002. On Qing imperial understanding for the need for precise cartography per se, see Millward, " 'Coming onto the Map,' " 72; and Perdue, "Boundaries, Maps, and Movement."

19. There is a copious literature, for example, on Matteo Ricci's world map in Chinese. See Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 52n2.

20. Ibid., 70–71.

21. Laura Hostetler, "Global or Local? Exploring Connections between Chinese and European Geographical Knowledge during the Early Modern Period," *East Asian Science, Technology and Medicine* 26 (2007): 117. See also Isabelle Landry-Deron, "Les Mathématiciens envoyés en Chine par Louis XIV en 1685," *Arch. Hist., Exact Sci.* 55 (2001): 423–63; and Florence C. Hsia, "French Jesuits and the Mission to China: Science, Religion, History" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1999), especially chap. 1.

22. Not all of the Jesuits were from France.

23. *Surveyed* as in "seen"; the term *lan* is not a technical one. This is my translation. An alternate translation is "Imperial Map of Territory Showing a Full View." See Theodore N. Foss, "A Western Interpretation of China: Jesuit Cartography," in *East Meets West: The Jesuits in China, 1582–1773*, ed. Charles E. Ronan, SJ., and Bonnie B.C. Oh (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1988).

24. In my own work I have chosen to call it the Kangxi Atlas.

25. Jean Baptiste Du Halde, *Description... de la Chine* (The Hague, 1736), 117; Lloyd A. Brown, *The Story of Maps* (New York: Dover Publications, 1979), 219. For the relationship of the French Jesuits to the French Academy of Science, see Hsia, "French Jesuits and the Mission to China," especially chap. 1.

26. For additional detail see Foss, "A Western Interpretation of China."

27. Ibid., 229.

28. In the case of Tibet and Korea, no Jesuits were allowed to make on-site observations, so others must have been doing the technical work.

29. *Kangxi chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian*, 8 vols. (Beijing: Dang'an chubanshe, 1985). For Zhejiang see 5:288–90; for Jiangxi see 5:328, 433; for Sichuan see 5:674–76; for Yunnan see 6:310–13 ; for Guizhou see 6:605–6.

30. The ethnicity of these officials needs to be verified through further research.

31. *Kangxi chao hanwen zhupi zouzhe huibian*, 5:674.

32. Ibid., 6:630.

33. Matteo Ripa, *Memoirs of Father Ripa during Thirteen Years' Residence at the Court of Peking in the Service of the Emperor of China*, trans. Fortunato Prandi (London, 1855; reprint, China, 1939), 66.

34. See Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 78–79.

35. Millward, " 'Coming onto the Map,' " 71n18.

36. The memoirs of Antoine Gaubil attest to ongoing interest at the court in regard to the topography of the Sino-Russian frontier area, and also to the secrecy that surrounded these matters Jesuits were the object of much suspicion during the Yongzheng emperor's reign. Antoine Gaubil, S.J., *Correspondance de Pékin, 1722–1759* (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1970).

37. These included a 1717 xylographic (or woodblock) printing, revised and corrected in a 1719 manuscript version. Also in 1719 a copperplate engraving was made by Matteo Ripa, a secular priest sent to China by the Propaganda Fide in Rome, who had accepted a position at the Qing imperial court as a painter. This was followed up in 1721 by another xylographic edition—the one on which Jean Baptiste Du Halde would base the maps of China that form a crucial part of his *Description... de la Chine*. As we shall see below, less elaborate (and less detailed) editions were also produced for broader consumption. In addition, maps based on these surveys were included in important Qing compendia, including the *Da Qing hui dian* (Collected records of the Qing Dynasty). The *Da Qing hui dian* edition includes both a large foldout map (measuring 45.5 inches [116 cm] tall and 72 inches [183 cm] wide) that includes indications of longitude and latitude, and maps of each individual prefecture within China laid out on a square grid.

38. Ripa, *Memoirs*, 66.

39. A copy of the Thirty-six Views is housed in the Bibliothèque nationale de France. See Nathalie Monnet, *Chine: l'Empire du trait; Calligraphies et dessins du* v^{e} *au* xix^{e} *siècle* (Paris: Bibliothèque nationale de France, 2004), 194–95.

40. The three scrolls, K. Top. 116.15, 15a, and 15b, measure 79 inches (201 cm) tall and 118 inches (300 cm) long; 60 ⅝ inches (154 cm) tall and 109 ½ inches (278 cm) long; and 38 inches (97 cm) tall and 93 ½ inches (238 cm) long respectively.

41. This careful indication of the limits of Qing control is quite different from what appears in the revised 1775 edition of these survey maps commissioned by the Qianlong emperor. In the later map boundaries between provinces are indicated, but areas where the southwestern provinces meet up with foreign countries simply fade out into blank space, seemingly leaving open the possibility of future expansion. Yet, unlike in the earlier Kangxi edition, names of countries beyond the Qing empire are indicated.

42. Foss, "A Western Interpretation of China," 234.

43. See A. Tamburello, "Per un recupero conoscitivo e patrimoniale delle opere, doni e lasciti di Matteo Ripa e del Collegio dei Cinesi," in *La Missione Cattolica in Cina Tra i Secoli XVIII–XIX: Matteo Ripa e il Collegio Dei Cinesi*, ed. Michele Fatica and Francesco D'Arelli, 39–60, Instituto Universitario Orientale Collana "Matteo Ripa" 16 (Naples: Instituto Universitario Orientale Collana "Matteo Ripa," 1999).

44. The Qianlong emperor sponsored a major dictionary project to this end.

45. For the main contours in the debate between what I will call the new Qing history and proponents of sinicization theory, see Evelyn S. Rawski, "Presidential Address: Reenvisioning the Qing; The Significance of the Qing Period in Chinese History," *Journal of Asian Studies* 55, no. 4 (November 1996): 829–50; and Ho Ping-ti, "In Defense of Sinicization: A Rebuttal of Evelyn Rawski's 'Reenvisioning the Qing,' " *Journal of Asian Studies* 57, no. 1 (February 1998): 123–55.

46. James Millward (" 'Coming onto the Map' ") has shown in regard to Xinjiang that linguistic choices pertaining to place-names have great political significance, particularly in their power to evoke associations with the imperial past.

47. For the professional relationship between Du Halde and d'Anville and Du Halde's choice of d'Anville to engrave the maps for his *Description*, see "Du Halde et D'Anville (Cartes de la Chine)," *Recueil de Mémoires orientaux par les Professeurs de l'École des Langues orientales*, 5 Tom., 5e série (Paris, 1905), 389–400.

48. Although indications of latitude and longitude do not appear in the engraving, they are penciled in on many of the pages in the copy of this atlas housed in the British Library (OIOC 15271.a.20), which demonstrates both the origins of the atlas in the Kangxi surveys and the relative accuracy of the maps.

49. On Du Halde's work, see Theodore N. Foss, "A Jesuit Encyclopedia for China: A Guide to Jean-Baptiste Du Halde's *Description . . . de la Chine* (1735)" (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1979); Isabelle Landry, *Le Preuve par la China: La "Description" de J.-B. Du Halde, 1735* (Paris: Editions de l'École des hautes études en sciences sociales, 2002). I do not mean to claim here that the d'Anville and Du Halde maps were identical; my point is rather that maps made in Europe based on the Kangxi surveys enjoyed wide circulation.

50. As noted above, the copy in the British Library bears penciled markings of latitude and longitude on some pages. This would seem to indicate that the atlas was indeed made to scale, although the scale is not indicated on the maps.

51. See especially Joseph Needham, "Geography and Cartography," in *Science and Civilisation in China* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1959), 3:497–590.

52. Woodward and Harley, eds., *The History of Cartography*, vol. 2, bk. 2, *Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies*.

53. Yee argues this most pointedly in his essay "Traditional Chinese Cartography and the Myth of Westernization."

54. Millward, "'Coming onto the Map,'" 89.

55. Thomas F. Gieryn, *Cultural Boundaries of Science: Credibility on the Line* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). See especially the preface and the introduction.

56. Ibid., 6.

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid., 14.

59. See for example Smith, *Chinese Maps*, 42.

60. Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 71; Foss, "A Western Interpretation of China," 222–23. Du Halde, *Description . . . de la Chine*, xxxvi.

61. I have argued elsewhere that the Kangxi emperor who sponsored the projects recognized their utility and saw the need for the most up-to-date scientific practices in mapping his empire—no matter their origin. See also Joanna Waley-Cohen, "China and Western Technology in the Late Eighteenth Century," *American Historical Review* 98, no. 5 (1993): 1525–44, for Qing imperial recognition of the utility of Western science and technology. For more on this problematic, and suggestions on a more productive way to conceptualize the history of cartography in China and Europe, see Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, 6–25.

62. Clunas, *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China*.

63. Ibid., 11.

64. To make his point, and to open up possibilities for different ways of viewing art, Clunas suggests a number of marked similarities between painting in China and Europe that, given the early modern period that he studies, are not at all coincidental. These include a painting's nature as a commodity that could be bought and sold or otherwise exchanged, its transportability, and the importance of the artist's identity to the value of the painting. While the specifics are not identical for maps and for paintings, like Clunas, who seeks to break free from "the necessity for explanations of the difference between 'art' and 'Chinese art,' 'history' and 'Chinese history'" (ibid., 11), I find that it is not always useful to categorize a map as either Chinese or Western—or scientific or traditional for that matter. Indeed, doing so may obscure other important qualities, such as a shared early modernity. (For a possible alternative to the categorization of "Chinese" and "Western" maps, see the introduction to Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*, esp. 21–25.) Drawing such parallels between the cultural products of different traditions could be taken too far, as Clunas is well aware. I, too, wish to exercise caution in my portrayal of similarities and differences in mapping practices in China and Europe. After all, different scholarly traditions and technological practices *do* contribute to different ways of understanding and representing the world. However, my aim is to demonstrate that too much focus on differences between "Chinese" and "Western" or "traditional" and "scientific" can obscure other important qualities of mapping—specifically imperial mapping—that deserve our attention.

65. Smith, *Chinese Maps*, 42.

66. Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geographies*. For a study of similar processes of self-definition in Tokugawa Japan, see Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period (1603–1868)* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2003).

67. Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise*.

68. "Dian yi tu shuo," Fu-ssu Nien Library, Institute of History and Philology, Academia Sinica. Although the specific examples I discuss here date from the eighteenth century, ethnographic depictions were also made significantly earlier. See Clunas, *Pictures and Visuality in Early Modern China*, 35.

69. The maps are found in the *zhi fang dian* section.

70. *Qin ding Da Qing hui dian*, 494 vols. (Beijing: Hui dian guan, 1899).

71. From 1704, by order of the Kangxi emperor, the measure of one Chinese *li* was altered so that 200 *li* would be equal to one degree of latitude, or 100 km (62 miles), thus bringing the system of measurement used in China into conformity with an international standard.

72. On the Qianlong emperor, see Pamela Kyle Crossley, *A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in the Transformations of Qing Imperial Ideology* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1999). On palace architecture and gardens, see Philippe Forêt, *Mapping Chengde: The Qing Landscape Enterprise* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000); and Young-Tsu Wong, *Paradise Lost: The Imperial Garden Yuanming Yuan* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001).

73. The Chinese title of the work, *Huangyu quanlan tu*, does not mention Tibet specifically.

74. Translation from R.K. Douglas, MS copy in the British Library, stored with the *Qing Qianlong neifu yu tu*.

■ Source: Di Cosmo, Nicola, 'A Manchu fragment on the medical treatment given by the Italian Jesuit Giovanni Giuseppe Da Costa to Yin-ssŭ, eighth son of K'ang-hsi', in Klaus Sagaster & Helmut Eimer (eds), *Religious and lay symbolism in the Altaic world and other papers: Proceedings of the 27th meeting of the Permanent International Altaistic Conference*, Walberberg, Federal Republic of Germany, June 12th to 17th, 1984, Otto Harrassowitz, 1989, pp. 100–108.

A MANCHU FRAGMENT ON THE MEDICAL TREATMENT GIVEN BY THE ITALIAN JESUIT GIOVANNI GIUSEPPE DA COSTA TO YIN-SSŬ, EIGHTH SON OF K'ANG-HSI

Nicola Di Cosmo

Some years ago a fragment written in the Manchu language was found at the Curia Generalizia dei Frati Minori (General's Court of the Grey Friars), in Rome. The author was Brother Giovanni Giuseppe Da Costa, an Italian Jesuit who lived in China from 1715 to 1747.

As is well known, the Society of Jesus' missionary activity in China dates back to 1552 and, until its official abolition in 1773, it not only distinguished itself by evangelic preaching and propagation of the Christian doctrine but also by the diffusion of scientific knowledge and by the translation of a number of mathematical, physical and astronomical treatises.

Especially during the first period of the Jesuits' activity in China, which Pfister places between 1580 and 1672,[1] the number of books written by them on scientific subjects is equal to that on religious topics, and maybe even greater. The many significant works of renowned Jesuits like Matteo Ricci, Adam Schall or Ferdinand Verbiest are examples of this tendency.

In the second period, which runs approximately from 1672 to 1736 (that is, the end of the reign of Yung-cheng 雍正), the Jesuit community in China was engaged in the sharp dispute which had arisen on the much debated question of the Chinese rites with the Holy See. This fierce discussion led to the proliferation of a large amount of booklets, tracts and various works, and eventually was concluded definitely on July 11, 1742 with the bull *Ex quo singulari* issued by Pope Benedictus XIV, which represented a final and absolute condemnation of all the Chinese rites, and, therefore, of the missionaries' attempts to find a mutual understanding between Christianity and Confucianism. At this stage the arts and sciences continued to be cultivated and religion, notwithstanding the various forms of persecution adopted by Yung-cheng, a fervent Buddhist, fearful of the Jesuits' power, spread all over the empire.

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[1] Cf. Louis Pfister, *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les Jesuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine. 1552–1773*, Chang-hai, Imprimerie de la Mission Catholique, 1932, 2 voll., Repr. by Chinese Materials Center, San Francisco, 1976, p. XXIII.

The third period, which runs from the beginning of the reign of Ch'ien-lung 乾隆 (1737) to the replacement of the Jesuits by the Lazarists in the Peking mission in 1785, was marked by the brief *Dominus ac Redemptor*, with which Pope Clement XIV abolished the Society, ordering the secularization of the Jesuit clergy. In China uncertainties and disagreements inside the mission itself complicated the situation, but the missionary community succeeded in preserving itself almost unchanged for the next ten years. This was due to two main factors. The Jesuits were appreciated and were held in high esteem at Ch'ien-lung's court as long as they possessed scientific and technical western knowledge, and, so, as cultural intermediaries between two worlds otherwise almost totally devoid of contacts. Furthermore, financed by France, they rendered important diplomatic services to that country, playing to a certain degree the role of a French embassy in China.[2]

Therefore, after the doctrinal and political split between the Jesuits and the Holy See, neither Ch'ien-lung nor Louis XVI had any interest in dissolving the Jesuit mission in China, mostly because its evangelic task was considered concluded. Paradoxically enough, after 1775 the imperial court favoured again the Jesuits.

Brother Giovanni Giuseppe Da Costa was one of the group of missionaries who dedicated themselves to the diffusion of the sciences and, with his chemical, surgical and pharmaceutical knowledge practised medicine not only at the emperor's court, but also among the poorer strata of the population, curing, as Pfister says, "Christians and infidels without distinction."[3]

As to his place of birth, we have two different versions. According to Dehergne[4] he was born in Mallensis (the ancient name for Maglie, a small town near Lecce, in the Kingdom of Naples), Pfister, on the other hand, says he was born in Calabria.[5] He entered the novitiate in 1700, when he was already an expert pharmacist and surgeon. On August 15, 1710 he took his vows as temporal coadjutor. He arrived in Peking in 1715 and assumed

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[2] Cf. *Lettres édifiantes et curieuses de Chine par des missionaires Jésuites. 1702–1776. Chronologie, introduction et notes par Isabelle et Jean-Louis Vissiere*, Garnier-Flammarion, Paris, 1979, p. 25.

[3] Cf. Pfister, op. cit., p. 640.

[4] Cf. Joseph Dehergne, *Répertoire des Ecrits de Chine de 1552 a 1800*, Roma, Institutum Historicum S.I., 1973, p. 64.

[5] Cf. Pfister, op. cit., p. 639.

the Chinese name of Lo Huai-chung 羅懷忠. He opened a dispensary in the capital and carried on his activity as physician and missionary for the next 32 years.

The fragment I would like to present is preserved at the General's Court of the Grey Friars, catalogued *sectio A, Num. 982*. It was divided into three parts, and, unfortunately, damaged by wood-worms, which have rendered it illegible in a few spots. From the final sentence *"inu wesimbuhe babi"* we can deduce that it was a copy of a report to the emperor. The 'patient' is called *jakūci age*, so that he could be the eighth son of K'ang-hsi 康熙, namely Yin-ssŭ 胤禩 (1681–1726).[6] The fragment, even if it specifies the day and the month, does not give any indication of the year, which in any event must be placed between the date of arrival of Da Costa in China (1715) and the death of Yin-ssŭ (1726).

Text:

> [p. 1] jorgon biyai juwan uyun de jakūci age lo hūwai jung be hūlame gamafi henduhengge: mini ere juwe bethe te nimeme hamirakū. dobori amu inu baharakū. si sendejebufi dasareo seme tuwabuha manggi: lo hūwai jung ni henduhengge te age baita de yabumbi. sendejebufi yaburakū oci. angga johibuci kemuni ombi: te jing baita de yabumbikai. talude ubai angga johire. gūwa baci geli ehe horon senggi tan wasime niyara aibime oci. aika giranggi sube de isinaci. holhobuha ba amba: te taka ere juwe angga be sindafi. gūwa bai ehe horon senggi tan be eyebuci kemuni yebe: aika hon nimeci niyaki senggi be šolo šolo de. edun akū halukan-i babe baifi siraci. nimerengge [p. 2] ainci yebe ombi: age šolo baha manggi. heni feliyerakū yaburakū erinde jai dasaki: ne niyanse sindame basihiri g'ang latubu: sangga-i [.....] faha gese. uba daci [.....] babe dahame. aibici šumin serebumbi: jai hashū ergi bethe ne udu ambula aibime nimecibe heni acinggiyaci ojorakū. ishun aniya niyangniyeri erin aici hashū ergi bethe johiha amala. geli urunakū niyaki tucimbi: te damu los ma ni [....] dasa: juwe bethe-i [....] udu hūwanggiyarakū bicibe. dorgi horon labdukan amba. bi ǰe ho de sucungga tuwaha de. uthai inenggi baibumbi seme [p. 3] age de inu alaha. inu wesimbuhe babi:
>
> The 19th day of the 12th month, the Eighth Lord sent for Lo Hūwai-jung (Lo Huai-chung) and told him: "Now, these feet of mine hurt unbearably and at night I cannot sleep. Now that they are already open, are you able to heal them?" After having examined them, Lo Hūwai-jung said: "Sir, you are now very busy. Even if you did not treat them after they became ulcerated, it is still possible to heal the wounds. I will take care of the matter now. The local ulcers could be curable but the evil and poisonous pus of the blood from different sources made them swell because of the putrefaction; if the

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[6] Cf. Arthur W. Hummel, *Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, 1644–1912*, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1943–1944, 2 vols., pp. 926–927.

pus should reach the bones and the muscles, then the part concerned will become larger. Now, if after having temporarily dressed these two wounds I remove the evil and poisonous pus of the blood from another part, you will soon get better. If, because of the pus of the blood you should suffer too much, you will have to find a place which is warm and windless to spend some time resting: the pain will probably calm down. Sir, you will be able to recover if after having taken a period of rest; for a certain amount of time you will preserve absolute immobility. Now apply a dose[7] of *basihiri g'ang* and rub it in. [....] Afterwards if your left foot, being swollen, should hurt too much, you must not move it at all. Next year, in spring, when your left foot is healed, certainly the pus will come out completely. Now, furthermore, you can treat them with *los ma ni* [...]. Even if [the pus] of the two feet is not harmful any more, inside there will still be some poison. Next time, when I shall visit you in Jehol I will need the daylight."

This has been transmitted to the Lord and also reported to the Emperor.

In the course of the translation I met with some difficulties that unfortunately I was not able to resolve. In particular, mainly because of the very small amount of information we have on Manchu medicine,[8] it has been impossible for me to find the origin and meaning of the two words *basihiri g'ang* and *los ma ni*. These seem to be the only pharmaceutical words contained in the fragment.

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[7] *Niyanse*, from the Chinese word *nien-tzu* or *nieh-tzu* 捻子 which means a small quantity or something twisted or rolled with the fingers.

[8] Manchu books on medical subjects are extremely rare. Cf. M. Weiers, "Fragment einer Anweisung zur Moxibustion oder Akupunktur in mandschurischer Sprache", in *Heilen und Schenken. Festschrift für Günther Klinge zum 70. Geburtstag*, Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, 1980, pp. 139–144.



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

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

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

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

(3)

■ Source: Walravens, Hartmut, 'Medical knowledge of the Manchus and the Manchu Anatomy', in *Études mongoles et sibériennes*, 27 (1996), pp. 359–374.

MEDICAL KNOWLEDGE OF THE MANCHUS AND THE MANCHU ANATOMY

Hartmut Walravens*

That the Manchus had an original medical system of their own may justly be doubted. They were probably on the same level as other nomadic peoples of their neighbourhood, and that would mean a strong orientation towards natural drugs and shamanistic practices. Manchu medical books are almost exclusively translations from the Chinese—lamaistic medicine did not play any major role.

A superficial survey of Manchu medical literature reveals twenty-nine titles of which five represent general works, four deal with the pulse, four with smallpox, one with acupuncture, one with midwifery, one with pediatrics, one with macrobiotics, and three with horse medicine. The largest group is concerned with pharmacology. Only a few of these books were actually printed;[1] this proves that the rapid process of sinization made it unnecessary to publish any more medical texts in Manchu translation. Manuscripts would do for occasional use in areas where the Chinese language was not generally accepted.

Some knowledge of Chinese medicine was passed on to Europe through the filter of a Manchu translation, e.g. *Boo can da śeng bithe.* This Manchu title is given as the frontispiece of *Zwey chinesische Abhandlungen über die Geburtshülfe* which the interpreter Anton Vladykin[2] had translated from a Manchu manuscript[3] into Russian; the German translation was made by Joseph Rehmann,[4] who published the booklet in 1810.[5]

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* Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, Preussischer Kulturbesitz.

[1] E.g. *Shou-shih pao-yüan* and *Yen-shou ko-yen.*

[2] Cf. H. Walravens, Anton Vladykin. Eine Bibliographie des russischen Mandjuristen und Sinologen, *Uralaltaische Jahrbücher*, NF 2 (1982): 291–8.

[3] Institute of Oriental Studies, Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg. Cf. M.P. Volkova, *Opisanie man'čžurskix ksilografov Instituta vostokovedenija AN SSSR*, vyp. I (Moskva, Nauka, 1988): # 109.

[4] Cf. H. Walravens, Zum Werk des Arztes und Ostasienforschers Joseph Rehmann, *Sudhoffs Archiv*, 67 (1983): 94–106.

[5] Besides this St. Petersburg edition (VI, 36 p.), there are also an edition Riga, 1812, and a Polish translation Wilno/Warszawa, 1811.

Rehmann, physician to the czar, and also member of the 1805–06 Golovkin embassy to China,[6] was instrumental in bringing Jennerian vaccination to Siberia and Mongolia.[7] He as well as the young Julius Klaproth (1783–1835), another member of the Golovkin embassy, reported on the efforts of Alexander Pearson and George Thomas Staunton to fight smallpox in China.[8]

While other fields of Manchu literature have received some attention in recent years, Manchu medical books have been completely neglected. Nevertheless, both the selection and translation of these texts deserve further investigation and would illustrate the reception of Chinese traditional medicine by the Manchus.

An obstacle to the serious study of Manchu medical texts lies in the fact that the major collection is in St. Petersburg; for a long time it was not easy, at least for foreign researchers, to get access to this material.

The few Manchu medical books not going back to Chinese but to European sources are:

- a treatise by Father Ferdinand Verbiest on a poison-attracting stone, *Hi du ši wehe-i turgun be fetehe baitalara be tucibuhe bithe*,
- *Si yang-ni okto bithe*, a treatise on European medical remedies, from the K'ang-hsi period, and
- the famous *Manchu anatomy* which has received considerable attention.[9] The beginnings of its compilation go back to the Jesuit father Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730)[10] who did some translations for the K'ang-hsi emperor:[11]

> Mais parce que les Chinois, avec toute la belle reputation qu'ils ont, d'avoir depuis longtemps de tres-habiles Medecins, n'ont à present qu'une connoissance tres-confuse de l'Anatomie; il fallut d'abord composer un Traité fort ample, pour donner une idée de toutes les parties du corps en général, puis de chacune en particulier; & faisant voir la liaison & l'enchaînement reciproque qu'elles ont entr'elles; en faire comprendre toute l'Economie. [...] Dès que l'Empereur eût vû les douze & quinze premieres Propositions, avec toutes leurs figures en taille-douce, accompagnées de leurs explications, que nous luy presentâmes, au retour d'un voyage de Tartarie, il en parut tellement satisfait, que pour faire voir l'estime qu'il en faisoit, il ordonna au premier de ses Peintres, qui excelle sur tout pour la délicatesse du pinceau, de tout quitter pour travailler à ces figures. Néanmoins comme cette Science demande plus d'application, que la santé de l'Empereur permettoit d'y en apporter alors; il nous fit interrompre ce travail pour quelque temps, afin de contenter sa curiosité sur les principales maladies [...] En deux ou trois mois de temps nous composâmes 18 ou 20 petits Traitez sur autant de maladies differentes, selon l'ordre que l'Empereur nous prescrivoit.

Father Bouvet explains how pleased the emperor was and that he made the Jesuits also prepare material on pharmacology. The famous edict of tolerance was, so the author claims, accorded as a reward for these medical endeavours. The translation activities must have taken place before 1693 when Bouvet left Peking on a mission to Europe. The edict of tolerance by the K'ang-hsi emperor bears the date of 1692, so this is the date *ante quem*.

Father Bouvet's work was taken up again by Dominique Parrenin (1665–1741),[12] another Jesuit who arrived in China in 1698 and prepared a volume on human anatomy at the command of the K'ang-hsi emperor:

> Er hatte längst vorhero wahrgenommen, daß in China so wol die Leibals Wund-Artzney sehr unvollkommen seye, und solcher Mangel haubtsächlich von dem herrühre, daß in disem Reich die Anatomie gäntzlich abgienge. Deßwegen ertheilte er mir Befehl, einen vollständigen Begriff solcher Wissenschafft auszusuchen, und denselben in die Mantscheukische oder Ost-Tartarische Sprach zu übertragen. Er selbst machte den Entwurff des Wercks, als er mir geboten erstlichen den Inhalt desselben aufzusetzen,

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[6] Wadysaw Kotwicz, *Die russische Gesandtschaftreise nach China 1805. Zu Leben und Werk des Grafen Jan Potocki. Nebst Ergänzungen aus russischen und chinesischen Quellen hrsg.* (Berlin, Bell, 1991): 119 p. 4° (Han-pao tung-Ya shu-chi mu-lu, 44).

[7] Bericht über die Einpflanzung der Kuhpocken in Sibirien in den Jahren 1805 und 1806. An den Minister des Innern. Geschrieben in Irkutzk am Ende des Jahres 1806, *Sammlung auserlesener Abhandlungen und merkwürdiger Nachrichten russischer Ärzte und Naturforscher*, hrsg. von J. Rehmann, 1 (St. Petersburg/Moskwa/Riga/Leipzig, 1812): 200–24.

[8] Nachricht von einem chinesischen Buche über die Kuhpocken, *Russische Sammlung für Naturwissenschaft und Heilkunst*, hrsg. von A. Crichton, J. Rehmann und K. F. Burdach, 1 (Riga/Leipzig, Hartmann, 1816): 94–97; Julius Klaproth, Sir George Staunton's chinesische Abhandlung über die Kuhpocken, *Archiv für asiatische Litteratur, Geschichte und Sprachenkunde*, 1 (1810): 111–13.

[9] *Anatomie mandchoue*, facsimilé du manuscrit n° II du fonds oriental de la Bibliothèque royale de Copenhague, texte trad. par Vilhelm Thomsen, éd. par V. Madsen (Copenhague, 1928): 15 p., 90 pl.; A. Clod-Hansen, Die manschuische Übersetzung von Bartholin's Anatomie, *Skandinavisches Archiv für Physiologie*, 18 (1906): 321–2.

[10] L. Pfister, *Notices biographiques et bibliographiques sur les jésuites de l'ancienne mission de Chine* (Chang-hai, Mission catholique, 1932–34): # 171.

[11] Joachim Bouvet, *Histoire de l'empereur de la Chine* (La Haye, Meyndert Uytwerf, 1699): 101ff.

[12] Pfister, op. cit. # 233.

> das Buch aber in gewisse Lehr- und Haubt-Stuck ordentlich abzutheilen. Er thate noch mehr, als er über sich genommen, so offt ich zehen Bläter wurde verfertiget haben, solche zu übersehen, und in der Tartarischen Sprach, um mehrerer Zierde und Deutlichkeit willen, zu verbesseren, welches er auch von Anfang biß zum End einer so mühesamen Arbeit unverdrossen in das Werck gestellet, und, was dessen Ausführung betrifft, alle Anstalten vorgekehrt zugleich aber allen Hinternussen vorgebogen hat.

Parrenin sent a copy of it to the French Academy in 1723; it is now preserved in the Muséum national d'histoire naturelle in Paris. This work was probably looked upon as a precious curiosity, and does not seem to have had any major impact either in China or in Europe. The original was not published, probably for the reason that it would have revolutionized Chinese medicine. Father Parrenin wrote:

> Der Kayser ware Anfangs gesonnen, dises Werck samt andern von mir übertragenen Büchern in die Sinische Sprach zu übersetzen und durch den Druck kund zu machen. Doch in Erwegung, daß ein so edles Kunst-Stuck, wie er redete, die Vor-Ehr wol verdiene nur von hohen Personen berührt zu werden, hat er seinen Schluß geändert und befohlen, dasselbe drey mal rein abzuschreiben, das erste und zierlichste Exemplar behielte er für sein geheime Bibliotheck; das andere vermachte er in die Hof-Bibliotheck dern Gelehrten mit Erlaubnus solches alldort zu lesen, doch mit Verbott, es abzuschreiben oder von der Stell hinweg zu tragen; das dritte schickte er in die Tartarey auf obbenantes Lust-Schloß Ge-ho. Dieses vierte Exemplar verehre ich nebst denen zwo Beylagen Euerer Höchstansehnlichen Gesellschaft.[13]

Erhard Rosner comments:

> Nous avons ici un cas remarquable prouvant que K'ang-hsi, érudit pourtant, a volontairement empêché la diffusion de nouvelles découvertes importantes, alors qu'il était considéré par ses contemporains comme étant un promoteur de la science occidentale. Nous laisserons ici en suspens la question de savoir jusqu'à quel point la peur a joué un rôle pour lui, la peur que le monde culturel chinois et sa cosmologie pourraient être ébranlés.[14]

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[13] J. Stöcklein, *Der Neue Welt-Bott*, letter # 288. The letter is traditionally dated May 1st, 1723 but the original in the Institut de France proves that it is actually of May 15th, 1723.

[14] Erhard Rosner, Le développement de la terminologie médicale moderne en Chine, *Actes du VI^e colloque international de sinologie, Chantilly, 1983* (Taipei/Paris/Hong Kong, Institut Ricci, 1991): 276.



[Anatomie Mandchoue] Ms. 2009 du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle (Paris), fasc. 4, pl. 122.

At any rate the work, which was based on Pierre Dionys' anatomy[15] while the majority of the plates was modeled after Caspar Bartholinus' *Anatomia nova*,[16] took five years to accomplish, in spite of the fact that "trois Mandarins des plus habiles, deux écrivains dont la main étoit excellente, deux Peintres capables de tracer les figures, des tireurs de lignes, des cartonniers etc." were at Parrenin's disposal. Parrenin says himself:

"Was den Text betriff, hab ich schier durchgehend mich an das schöne Werck des Herrn Dionis gehalten, doch die Figuren belangend des Herrn Caspar Bartholini seine nacharten lassen; weil dise letztere nicht allein grösser und deutlicher, sondern auch schöner und feiner, als des ersteren seynd." Regarding the long time of compilation he points out:

> Wann aber diese Bücher, wie obstehet, erst nach fünff Jahren seynd fertig worden, kommt solches meistens von dem her, daß der Kayser ewig herum reiset, und ich die achtzehen letste Jahr seines Lebens ihn aller Orten, wo er hinzuge, hab begleiten müssen; massen er jährlich sich kaum über zwey Wochen zu Peking pflegte aufzuhalten. Zudem hat er zwischen jetztgemeldeter Haubt-Statt und dem Ort, wo die grosse Jagt in der Tartarey angestellt wurde, über zwantzig Lust-Häusser bauen lassen, und in derer einem, so Geho genant wirt, alle Jahr biß drey Monat verweilet, um hiedurch die grosse Sommer-Hitz zu vermeiden. Doch hab ich allda, weil so wol meine Gehülffen als der Bücher-Vorrath mitgeführt worden, meine Arbeit auf eben die Weise, als befände ich mich zu Peking, fortgesetzt.[17]

The time of the compilation of the *Anatomy* cannot be exactly determined. As Father Parrenin only arrived in China in 1698 and probably needed a while to acquire a sufficient command of the language,[18] the most probable time would perhaps be after 1710. As the emperor died in 1722 and read and corrected every page, one would assume that the

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[15] Supposedly Pierre Dionys, *Anatomie de l'homme suivant la circulation du sang et les dernières découvertes*, 4ᵉ éd. (Paris, Laurent d'Houry, 1706); cf. also Yvonne Grover, La correspondance scientifique du père Dominique Parrenin, *Actes du IIᵉ colloque international de sinologie, Chantilly, 1977* (Paris, Cathasia, 1980): 85. The Jesuit Library in Peking only conserved a copy of another work by Dionys († 1718): cf. *Catalogue of the Pei-t'ang Library* (Peking, Pei-t'ang Press, 1949): 243: *Cours d'operations de chirurgie, demonstrées au Jardin Royal*, 4th ed. (Paris, Laurent d'Houry, 1749), XXXII: 923 p.

[16] Pei-t'ang 947: Bartholinus, Thomas, 1616–80, *Anatome quartum renovata: non tantum ex institutionibus b. m. Parentis, Caspari Bartholini, sed etiam omnium cum Veterum, tum Recentiorum Observationibus: ad circulationem Harveianam, & Vasa Lymphatica directis. Cum iconibus novis et indicibus.* Lugduni, Sumpt. Joan. Ant. Huguetan, & Soc. (1677): 806 p., 15 pl. "Missionis Sinensis PP. Gallorum Soctis Jesu, 1698, Pekin."

[17] Stöcklein, op. cit.

[18] Johnssons' assumption, that the probable time would be 1698–1703, does not seem realistic.



[Anatomie Mandchoue] Ms. 2009 du Muséum national d'histoire naturelle (Paris), fasc. 1, pl. 109–110.

work was probably finished by 1720. Also, a kind of sequel to the *Manchu Anatomy*, a work on poisons and remedies, *Baicaha ba be tucibume gisurehengge*, is preceded by the imperial command to Parrenin, dated the 28th day of the first month of the year K'ang-hsi 54, i.e. 1715. This would indicate that Parrenin worked on the *Anatomy* from 1710 to 1715, and then received the order to proceed with this additional treatise. This work as well as the above-mentioned compilation of European remedies may have accompanied the copy of the *Anatomy* that Parrenin sent to the Paris Academy in 1723.

There is also the question of the relation between Bouvet's medical treatises and Parrenin's *Anatomy*. It is difficult to answer this question, as Bouvet's material does not seem to be extant. At any rate, the plates seem to be new, as the copy of Bartholinus' work used for the compilation entered the Jesuit library in Peking only in 1698. As for the text, Parrenin states that he mainly translated from Dionys; the wording makes it quite clear that he did so from the original, not from already translated material. So it seems justified to assume that most of Parrenin's work was new; this would not mean that Parrenin did not use Bouvet's papers at all. It is also not quite clear from Bouvet's report if he translated into Chinese or Manchu, or both. While he gave basic information on how the human body worked, he emphasized his eighteen to twenty treatises on different illnesses.

The *Manchu Anatomy* made its first real appearance on the scene in Europe in 1928, when the Carlsberg Foundation published a facsimile of a ninety-leaf fascicle that the Royal Library had acquired and which showed anatomical plates, apparently those forming part of Parrenin's *Manchu Anatomy*. These illustrations are very nicely done, and many carry explanations in Manchu.

This work was justly admired, and several scholarly treatises tracked down the originals as published by Dionys and Bartholinus.[19] But apparently the existence of the bulky descriptive anatomy of which this fascicle was only a fragment fell into oblivion. Nobody has so far tackled the text itself, and even a recent publication from Taiwan contents itself with reproducing the Copenhagen fragment.[20]

So far, nine copies, fragments, or blueprints are known, some under the title of *Dergici toktobuha Ge ti ciowan lu bithe*, "Complete record of the whole body, by imperial command." This might hint at an originally Chinese title. Parrenin's letter of May 15th, 1723, makes it clear, however, that the translation was done from French into Manchu, and that the emperor was against a translation of the Manchu text into Chinese. At any rate, a still possible Chinese version has not yet come to light.



Beginning of the text kept at the Tōyō Bunko (Tōkyō), under the reference 100656.

There are two copies at the St. Petersburg University Library, one at the Institut Vostokovedenija (St. Petersburg Academy of Sciences) first mentioned in 1843 by Father Avvakum Čestnoj, the well-known Copenhagen fragment, a copy at the Bibliothèque nationale (Paris) formerly owned by Paul Pelliot and entitled *Wargi namu oktosilame niyalma beye giranggi sudala nirugan-i gisun* ("Illustrated account of the bones and vessels of the human body, according to European physicians"), the copy sent to the Academy by Father Parrenin, another copy in the Tōyō Bunko as well as a blueprint, and another blueprint at the Library of the Minorities Institute in Peking. In former times copies were also known to exist at the Russian Legation in Peking (the collection was destroyed by fire) and in the possession of the physician Dr. Dudgeon in Peking.

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[19] Especially John W.S. Johnsson, *L'anatomie mandchoue et les figures de Th. Bartholin. Étude d'iconographie comparée* (København, A.F. Høst, 1928): 42 p. [Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskab. Biologiske meddelelser, 7]. He proved that of the 175 designs 118 were modeled after Bartholinus.

[20] The latest publication on the subject is disappointing: John B. de C.M. Saunders, Francis R. Lee, *The Manchu Anatomy and its Historical Origin. With Annotations and Translations* (Taipei, Li Ming Cultural Enterprise, 1981): 180 p. It is an English reworking of the Copenhagen edition. No attempt is made to deal with the text of the *Anatomy*. The Manchu captions are said to be "in the Tungus language"!

An interesting addition is the above-mentioned manuscript at the St. Petersburg University Library which contains Father Parrenin's answers to the emperor's questions regarding poisons and remedies. It was edited by Ivanovskij in his *Man'čžurskaja Xrestomatija* (vol. I, St. Petersburg, 1893).

The Copenhagen National Museum owns a Mongolian anatomy which may be related to the Manchu anatomy, as the title would suggest: *Ge ti ciowan lu bičig* (around 1930).

A comparison of the plates of the Copenhagen fragment with the work itself leads to some interesting results: the Bibliothèque nationale copy contains 135 illustrations, a number of which is also represented in the Copenhagen copy which comprises 90 pages but a smaller number of illustrations with explanations; 29 plates of the latter are without any captions, and they do not show up in the Bibliothèque nationale copy. So one may assume that they were studies, or preliminary versions, which for one reason or another were not included in the final work. This is corroborated by the fact that the legends are written in two different hands, one of which is in a running style. This reminds one of a sentence in Parrenin's letter to the academicians:

> C'est icy Mrs qu'il faudroit vous rendre conte des ordres de ce prince et de la maniere que je les ai executé, je nai pu le faire dans un cayer separé et de papier plus fort que celuy des tomes tartares dont la délicatesse ne scauroit soffrir sans être endommagée tous les mauvais traitements et les fréquentes visites des curieux, ce cayer pourra passer de main en main parmis vous autres Mrs; pendant que le corps de l'ouvrage servira d'ornement a vôtre Bibliotheque et de marque certaine que j'ai du moins voulu vous faire plaisir [...].

So it seems probable that either the Copenhagen fragment or a similar production was meant to be an object of demonstration.

The book itself is a description of the whole body, not only the bones but including muscles and blood vessels. The Jesuit approach was, of course, not purely medical. They would not deal with the body without mentioning the soul, and they pointed out the role of the creator:

> To examine the visible body is easy, to recognize the invisible soul is difficult, and therefore we will discuss the visible body first and the invisible soul later on. To get to know all the bases of the visible body and the invisible soul, one has to become thoroughly acquainted with the fathomless wonderful virtue of the Lord who created the things, one has to practice reason, love and respect and easily understand the eternal existence of the soul.[21]

Not the least feature of the book is the introduction of a new medical vocabulary. Traditional words are mixed with newly coined expressions. Muscle is *yali farsi*, "a piece of flesh," an artery is *senggi selgiyere sudala*. However they did not enter the dictionaries as the work was never published.

What is so remarkable about the *Manchu Anatomy* that it deserves further study?

- It is an outstanding example of early knowledge transfer in the medical field.
- The translation and compilation were done under the emperor's personal supervision which gives it a very high rating.
- While part of the plates have been studied, the bulky text, still unstudied, gives a precise idea of the way European scholarship was adapted to the Manchu language and Chinese medical theory.
- It contributes to Manchu lexicography as the book contains new technical terms.
- It gives a new dimension to the Jesuits' scholarly activity at the Chinese court and has to be seen in the context of missionary history.

Appendix
Survey of the Extant Copies of the Anatomy

1. *Dergici toktobuha* [...]
12 fascicles. 25,6 × 17,7 cm
Dergici toktobuha Ge ti ciowan lu bithe.
[Chinese title: *Ko-t'i ch'üan-lu*]
"Complete description of all bones."

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[21] *Ge ti ciowan lu bithe*, first paragraph.

Manuscript, Manchu. Paper without lines. 1 vol., 12 fascicles. Fasc. 1: 55 fol.; 2: 65 fol.; 3: 47 fol.; 4: 43 fol.; 5: 41 fol.; 6: 46 fol.; 7: 56 fol.; 8: 57 fol.; 9: 68 fol.; 10: 61 fol.; 11: 62 fol.; 12: 61 fol. 7 lines/page.
At the beginning of fasc. 1 table of contents. The work consists of two parts: *dergi* (4 debt.) and *fejergi* (4 debt.).
University Library, St. Petersburg: O 2340, Xyl. 1642.

2. *Dergici toktobuha* [. . .]
Pek. Mission. 12 fascicles. 26 × 17 (20,5) cm
Title the same as # 1.
Without *t'ao.* Fasc. 1: 61 fol.; 2: 72 fol.; 3: 52 fol.; 4: 46 fol.; 5: 48 fol.; 6: 55 fol.; 7: 64 fol.; 8: 67 fol.; 9: 68 fol.; 10: 71 fol.; 11: 69 fol.; 12: 72 fol. 7 lines/page, Chinese pagination.
Russian interlinear translations are added to the table of contents. University Library, St. Petersburg: 306.Md 222; dbl Xyl 1642.
This is apparently the copy referred to by Bretschneider as being in the possession of the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission in Peking.

3. Asiatic Museum: Az Dep. 445 656 fol.
Copy described by M.P. Volkova, *Opisanie man'čžurskix rukopisej Instituta narodov Azii AN SSSR* (Moskva, 1965): # 212.
Avvakum, *Katalog knigam, rukopisjam i kartam na kitajskom, man'čžurskom, mongol'skom, tibetskom i sanskritskom jazykax, naxodjaščimsja v biblioteke Aziatskogo departamenta* (St. Petersburg, Eduard Prac, 1843–44): # 445.
Mandjurische Bücher in Rußland: Drei Bestandskataloge (Hamburg, 1986): 15, # 445 [50]; 108, # 212.
Institut Vostokovedenija, Academy of Sciences, St. Petersburg.

4. "Treatise on anatomy by P. Joachim Bouvet (1656–1730) and P. Dominique Parrenin (1665–1741) after Thomas Bartholin (Lyon, 1677), Manchu translation 1723."[22]
40 fol., 90 pl., 31,5 × 24 cm
Acquired in Peking in 1901, from the collection of the Keng-yin-t'ang of a certain Doctor Po.

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[22] This description as given by Gimm is, of course, misleading: Bouvet's participation in the existing work may justly be doubted, and the text is based mainly on Dionys; the translation cannot be dated 1723.

Walter Fuchs, Martin Gimm, Die manjurische Sammlung der Königlichen Bibliothek zu Kopenhagen, *Aetas Manjurica*, 2 (1991), # 97. Cf. also *Gads danske Magazin* (1906–07): 531; *Politiken*, 15 (mai 1907); P. Huard, A propos de l'anatomie de Thomas Bartolin, *Presse médicale*, n° 34 (7 juin 1947).
Mitteilungen zur Geschichte der Medizin und Naturwissenschaften, 6 (1907), 448 (after *Kölnische Zeitung*)
Royal Library, Copenhagen: MS no. II, Fonds oriental (fragm.)
Hand 1: standard style
Hand 2: running style: pl. 23, 24, 33, 34, 39, 40
P. 11 contains only the text to pl. 10, thus there are 89 pl., or rather illustrations altogether.

5. Acquired from the bookseller Maisonneuve.
Title: *Wargi namu oktosilame niyalma beye giranggi sudala nirugan-i gisun*
135 pl., 16 fasc.: 299 + 288 fol. Many corrections.
H. Cordier, *Bibliotheca sinica*, 3672–73.
J.M. Puyraimond, *Catalogue du fonds manchou* (Paris, 1979): # 289.
This copy seems to have belonged to Paul Pelliot. Cf. *TP* 26 (1929): 404.
Bibliothèque nationale, Paris: FM 191.

6. Paris, Muséum national d'histoire naturelle, MS 2009 8 fasc.
Sent by Parrenin to the Royal Academy; fine copy.

7. *Dergici toktobuha* [. . .]
Tōkyō, Tōyō Bunko 100656
Poppe/Hurvitz/Okada: Catalogue of the Manchu-Mongol section of the Tōyō Bunko. Tōkyō, Tōyō Bunko; Seattle, Univ. of Wash. Pr. 1964, # 478: 8 + 4 fasc.
Apparently without plates.

8. *Dergici toktobuha* [. . .]
Tōkyō, Tōyō Bunko 112812 (blueprint, 6 fasc.) Poppe/Hurvitz/Okada 479.

9. *Hesei toktobuha Ge ti ciowan lu bithe.*
Peking, Chung-yang min-tsu-hsüeh-yüan t'u-shu-kuan. 6 fasc. Blueprint.

10. *Baicaha ba be tucibume gisurehengge.*
"Explanations of issues asked."
Manuscript, Manchu. Paper without lines. 1 fasc. without *t'ao.* 46 fol. 7 lines/page. 27 × 16.

Corrections in red ink at the beginning of the text.

According to Pfister, 513, translation of part 9 of the work: Pierre Dionys, *L'anatomie de l'homme* (on poisons and drugs), transl. by Dominique Parrenin.

At the beginning there is an imperial order to Ba Du-ming (Parrenin) to compile this text; dates 28.I. *Elhe taifin* 54 (1715).

[Edition:] A.O. Ivanovskij, *Man'čžurskaja Xrestomatija, 1* (Spb, 1893): 56–83.

University Library, St. Petersburg: Md 61; Xyl 394.

Beginning: *Elhe taifin-i susai duici aniya. aniya biyai orin jakôn de. ba du ming de Hese wasimbuhangge. niyalma jeke omiha jaka oci. elhei singgefi teni fusihôn wasimbi. arki nure omime uthai dere fularambi. hahai elhe-i isinarangge ai tuttu uttu hôdun. niyalma ehe okto omiha de. nergin de uthai aici fudara aici wasire. aici bucere de isinambi. goidafi bucerengge goidarangge inu bi: nimeku be dasara de sain uheri seme be ereme okto omibuci. yebe ele sain ojorongge elhe manda bime. umai tusa ojorakôngge akôngge inu bi. ere turgun adarame. Si yang-i bithede baici sehe: Ba du ming-ni gingguleme Wesimburengge.*

The imperial questions and Parrenin's answers to them follow.

PART SIX

LATE QING AND THE CHINESE REPUBLIC

■ Source: Bawden, Charles R. , 'Some documents concerning the complement of Manchu garrison companies at Chapu in the mid-19th century', in *Zentralasiatische Studien*, XVIII (1985), pp. 12–34.

SOME DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE COMPLEMENT OF MANCHU GARRISON COMPANIES AT CHAPU IN THE MID-19TH CENTURY

C.R. Bawden

Among the Manchu books and manuscripts in London listed in the *Union Catalogue*[1] are six booklets described by the compilers in the following terms: 'Register of lists of commanders and soldiers of various banners, as well as lists of soldiers lost through sickness, written partly in Manchu only, and partly in Manchu and Chinese, of about Tao Kuang 21–22 (1841–1842). These booklets comprise 11, 12, 7, 5, 6 and 14 folios respectively.' The dates are significant. As will be shown below, the units concerned were stationed at Chapu. Chapu was captured by a British force on 18 May 1842, and though the provenance of these booklets is unrecorded, it may be assumed that they were taken at that time.

The booklets relate to four different companies, *niru, tso-ling* 佐領.

They fall into two types: ideally a pair of booklets, one of each type, should exist for each company. The bilingual booklets, which consist of a Manchu text reading from left to right, and a Chinese text reading from right to left, meeting in the middle of the booklet, are nominal rolls of the under-officers, troops and what may be called auxiliaries, of the companies concerned, while the monolingual booklets, written in Manchu only, appear to be returns of changes in the complement of the company concerned during the year under review. If they are indeed returns, it is not stated to what person or office such returns were to be made. The first two booklets in the collection, numbered OR 13039, 1 and 2, are nominal rolls for the company commanded by Mujingge, and are dated the second month of Tao Kuang 22 and 21 respectively. The year to which the rolls relate is not defined, except in so far as is implied by the date appended to the documents. OR 13040 and OR 13041 are returns of changes in the complement of the companies commanded by Cingling and Ding respectively, for the year Tao Kuang 21, and are dated the second month of Tao Kuang 22. OR 13042, 1 and 2, is the most informative item, as its two booklets consist of the return of changes in the complement of the company commanded by Lungfu for the year Tao Kuang 21, and the nominal roll of the same company. Both documents are dated the second month of Tao Kuang 22. The changes specified in the return are reflected in the names given in the nominal roll, indicating, as might be expected, that the matter shows the state of affairs at the end of the year preceding that of its date.

These documents are valuable for two reasons. Although the national organisation of the armies of China at mid-century was studied by T.F. Wade,[2] they provide information not given by Wade about the constitution of a typical Manchu garrison unit at the time of the first Opium War, showing the numbers of troops of different categories and ranks in such a company, and the way vacancies occurred and were filled. Secondly, the lists of some 230 Manchu names in both their Manchu and Chinese forms, and of a further number in Manchu only, provide conveniently assembled material for a study of the Manchu personal name. It is the former of these two lines of enquiry which will be pursued here.

All but one of the booklets bear cover titles, written on labels, as follows:

OR 13039, 1:
Hashū ergi kūwaran i kubuhe lamun i manju gūsai Mujingge [*nirui*][3] *cooha ursei gebu ton i getuken cese*
('Clear register of the names and numbers of the personnel of the Mujingge company of the Bordered Blue Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp.')

左營鑲藍旗滿洲穆精額佐領下兵丁花名數目清冊

OR 13039, 2 has no cover titles, but the fact that half of the impression of a seal is left on each cover indicates that title labels, which like those on the other booklets would have borne the rest of the seal impression, have dropped off and become lost.

OR 13040:
Hashū ergi kūwaran i gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cing[4] *ni kamciha nirui duin hacin ton i getuken cese*
('Clear four-part register of the numbers in the company concurrently commanded[5] by Cing[ling) of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp.')

OR 13041:
Ici ergi kūwaran i gulu šanyan i manju gūsai Ding ni kamciha nirui duin hacin i getuken cese

('Clear four-part register of the company concurrently commanded by Ding of the Plain White Manchu Banner and the Right-hand Camp.')

OR 13042, 1:
Hashū ergi kūwaran i kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui cooha ursei duin hacin i getuken cese
('Clear four-part register of the personnel of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp.')

左營鑲紅旗滿洲龍福佐領下兵丁等清冊

OR 13042, 2:
Hashū ergi kūwaran i kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui cooha ursei duin hacin i getuken cese[6]
('Clear four-part register of the personnel of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp.')

The booklets bear the impression of seals in certain standard positions, as follows:

OR 13039, 1:
Front and back covers;[7] end of each text over the date. (Four impressions.)

OR 13039, 2:
As OR 13039, 1.

OR 13040:
Front cover; over the join in alternate openings; end of the text over the date. (Seven impressions.)

OR 13041:
Front cover; end of text over the date. (Two impressions.)

OR 13042, 1:
Front cover; over the join of four openings; end of text over the date. (Six impressions.)

OR 13042, 2:
Front and back covers; over the join of nine openings; end of each text over the date. (Thirteen impressions.)

Nearly all the seals are for the most part illegible, but the two complete impressions in OR 13039, 2 can be read, to some extent with certainty, for the rest speculatively, as follows:

To the left, two lines of Manchu, reading:

> *Ja pu hashū ergi kūwaran i kubuhe lamun i*
> *manju gūsai nirui janggin i temgetu*
> ('Seal of the commander of the company of the Bordered Blue Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp at Chapu.')

To the right, two lines of Chinese, reading:

> *Cha p'u tso ying hsiang lan ch'i* 乍浦左營鑲藍去旗
> *man chou tso ling chih t'u chi* 滿洲佐領之圖記
> ('Seal of the Manchu company (or company-commander) of the Bordered Blue Banner and the Left-hand Camp at Chapu.')

By an unfortunate coincidence, the words corresponding in each of the two texts to 'Left-hand Camp', that is *hashū ergi kūwaran* and *tso ying*, 左營 are the least legible, and their reconstruction is not guaranteed.

The cover titles thus show that the companies concerned were identified in three ways: by the name of their commander; by their banner affiliation; and by their allotment to one or other of a left-hand and right-hand camp.

That the proper name in the title is indeed that of the commander, *janggin*, is confirmed by a Manchu document in the possession of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, which has a shorter formulation of the banner designation. This document, on a single piece of paper measuring approximately 25.5 by 12 cm., appears to be an acknowledgement of the transfer of a sum of money. It reads as follows:

> *Bekitu nirui*
> *Jalan i da Dehingga i gocika yafahan uksin Gišeng*
> *jakūn biyade bahara menggun emu yan sunja jiha*
> *erebe nirui janggin Bekitu funde bošokū Kingde . . . bošokū Boode akdula*
>
> I translate as follows:
> 'Infantry soldier Gišeng of Bekitu's company, attending on Colonel Dehingga. Received for the eighth month in silver, one and five tenths taels. This is attested by Company Commander Bekitu, Lieutenant Kingde and Sergeant Boode.

Commentary:

1. I am not sure of the purpose and destination of this isolated document, nor of the way the money mentioned may have passed, and quote it solely for the limited purpose of showing how a company could be identified by the name of its commander.
2. Between the words *Kingde* and *bošokū* there occurs what seems to be either a single word written in a cursive hand, or some other mark (shown here by three dots), which I cannot read, and ignore for the moment.
3. The document bears the impression of a seal, which is at present indecipherable.
4. The word *gocika*, translated here as 'attending on', presents difficulty. Norman's definition is 'pertaining to the imperial bodyguard', which seems inappropriate. *Gocika* may be, in spite of the peculiarity of representing the Manchu syllable *ci* by a Chinese character read *shih*, the original of a word naturalised into Chinese as *ko shih ka* (*ha*), 戈什哈, which appears in a running hand in three places in OR 13039, 2. It is entered there against two names, and occurs also as part of some notes jotted down at the end of the text, in the phrase:

   > *ta jen ko shih ka erh ming*, 大人戈什哈二名 'attending on the commander two men.' For *ko shih ka* as a Chinese word, see *Tz'u Hai.* where it is explained as being a Manchu word meaning 'guard': 滿語護衛之義 It should be noted, though, that the standard equivalent for *gocika* is *ch'in* 親 (*Wu-t'i ch'ing-wen-chien*, 856, in the phrase *gocika bayara, ch'in chün* 親軍): also *ch'in sui* 親隨 *by* way of Mongol *sidar* (in *Mongyol kitad manǰu üsüg-ün san ke.*)

For the moment I must leave the precise meaning of *gocika* open.[8]

No problem is presented by the question of banner affiliation. It should be noted, though, that the garrison at Chapu contained companies which belonged to both the Left Wing (i.e. the Plain White Banner) and the Right Wing (i.e. the Bordered Blue, Plain Yellow and Bordered Red Banners) of the Manchu forces at large. The Wing-affiliation of the banners to which the companies concerned belonged is not mentioned in any of the cover titles, but does occur in other contexts. Thus in OR 13040, 4v, we read:

> *tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui*,
> 'of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu: Banner and the Wing concerned.'

A similar formula occurs in OR 13042, 1, 4v:

> *tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai cingling ni kamciha nirui*

The text-heading of OR 13042, 2 designates the company as:

> *Jebele galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu niru*, where the words *jebele galai*, 'of the right wing' have the Chinese equivalent *yu i*, 右翼.

Thirdly, the terms Left-hand and Right-hand Camp refer to the internal organisation of the Chapu garrison. We know from an article by G.T. Lay, based on a captured Chinese description, that this garrison was divided into two camps during the Yung Cheng period,[9] and it is undoubtedly this division which is reflected in the present designation of the companies.

We may take the nominal roll OR 13042, 2 as the norm of its type, consisting of a list of the names of under-officers, troops and auxiliaries classified according to their ranks. There is a small amount of additional text.

In the Manchu version the booklet opens in the following way:

> *Jebele galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui bošokū be araha gabsihiyan i juwan i da Sesengge gūsin uyun se.*

The Chinese equivalent is:

> 右翼鑲紅旗滿洲龍福佐領下領催委署前鋒校色森額年三十九歲

We may translate, provisionally and incompletely, as:

> *Bošokū be araha gabsihiyan i juwan i da* of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Right Wing, Sesengge, age 39.

Commentary:

Sesengge is evidently the senior under-officer in the company, the only one of his rank. The names of officers, notably that of the *janggin* Lungfu, under whom there will have been one or more lieutenants, *funde bošokū*, do not not figure in the roll, which is thus seen to be limited to other ranks.

I cannot at the moment offer a satisfactory analysis of the title of Sesennge's rank, that is, *bošokū be araha gabsihiyan i juwan i da.* In general, the titles of ranks given in these documents do not correspond completely with those given in other lists known to me, that is, to lists given by Wade and by Brunnert and Hagelstrom.[10] Individual items may correspond, but there is no systematic correspondence, for which reason it seems advisable to do no more than offer nominal equivalents. I adopt here the translation Sergeant-major.

All subsequent entries follow a similar pattern to that of Sesengge's. The rank is given as a heading, followed by the names of all those holding that rank, with their ages, and, in a few cases, supplementary annotations, as follows:

1. *Coohai šusai* 武生員 attached to a name indicates that the individual was a military licentiate.
2. *Bithei šusai* 文生員 indicates that the individual was a literary licentiate.
3. *Te* (followed by a name) *seme halaha* 今改名 'now called . . . ' indicates a change of name.
4. *Oron be aliyara bihesi* (found in OR 13039 1) 候補筆帖式 may be translated 'secretary awaiting a vacancy.'

No exact basis for the order of entries within each rank is apparent.

The remaining ranks are as follows:

bošokū 領催	translated here as 'sergeant.'
poo i bošokū (from OR 13039) 砲領催	'gunnery sergeant'
araha gabsihiyan 委署前鋒	'appointed vanguardman' The significance of the term *araha* is not apparent, except that in the returns men promoted *gabsihiyan* are said to be 'appointed', *araha*, as distinct from lower ranks, who are said to be 'taken on', *gaiha.*
uksin 兵	'soldier'[11]
*poo uksin*11 砲手兵	'gunner'
šuruci cooha 水手兵	'boatman'
hūwašabure cooha 養育兵	'boy soldier' (Wade translates as élève.)
beri faksi 弓匠	'bow smith'
sirdan 箭匠	'arrow smith'
sele faksi 鉄匠	'blacksmith'
caliyan jetere sula 食餉閑散	'drawing pay, unenlisted'

The total number of soldiers is then given in the following formulation, which suggests that those ranking below *poo uksin* were not considered full soldiers in the same sense as those of that rank and above:

> *Ereci wesihun ere nirude cooha uheri ton uyunju ilan ci tulgiyen*
> 此佐領下兵數共九十四名外
> *šuruci cooha ilan hūwašabure cooha nadan beri faksi emke sirdan faksi emke sele faksi emke caliyan jetere sula juwe.*
>
> Furthermore, apart from the grand total of 93 troops in this company: boatmen, three; boy soldiers, six; bow smith, one; arrow smith, one; blacksmith, one; drawing pay, unenlisted, two.

Last of all comes the date: *Doro eldengge orin juweci aniya juwe biyai*, '. . . day of the second month of Tao Kuang 22.' 道光二十二年二月 日.

The four-part returns of changes in the complement of a company are drawn up according to the following scheme:

The document is identified in a standard, though slightly variable, formula, in which the following four heads are indicated:

1. *Fe kadalaha*, 'old command': the numbers of men in each rank;
2. *Ice bargiyaha*, 'new additions': details of additions to, and movements within, the company during the year;
3. *Sume tucibuhe*, 'removals': details of losses by promotion to officer rank outside the company, by demotion and discharge, and through death;
4. *Yargiyan bisire* (*ton*), 'true complement': the numbers of men in each rank, categorised as in 1 above. In the present documents, these two sets of statistics coincide. It may be assumed that they refer to numbers at the beginning and end of the year respectively, though this is not stated explicitly.

Inspection of the returns suggests that each company normally kept up to a definite numerical strength in its various ranks, and that this goal was achieved partly by enlisting young men from the two categories of *sula manju* and *sidan manju*, which I translate as 'unenlisted Manchu' and 'juvenile Manchu' respectively, partly by transfer from one company to another.[12] Reliable conclusions cannot be drawn from the small amount of evidence available to us, but it would seem that transfers were made within small groups of companies which were regular partners, regardless of the banner- and wing-affiliation. Thus the Lungfu company had as its exchange partners the Mujingge company, both of them belonging to the Bordererd Blue Banner, and the Cingling company, which belonged to the Plain Yellow Banner. Both banners belonged to the Left Wing. The Ding company of the Plain White Banner, hence belonging to the Left Wing, exchanged with the Lergiyengga company, which belonged to the Bordered White Banner of the Right Wing, and the Minghing company of the Plain Blue Banner of the Left Wing.

As OR 13042, 1 relates directly to the nominal roll in OR 13042, 2, I shall translate it here, taking it as typical of a return. Exchanges with the Cingling company recorded in it can be checked against the return for that company, which will also be translated. The return for the Ding company presents special problems which may result from internal imperfections, but are more probably to be ascribed to my own lack of experience with documents of this type, and as there is no other document against which it can be checked, I propose not to edit it for the time being.

Text and translation of OR 13042, 1 are as follows:

1r. *Hashū ergi kūwaran i kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui doro eldengge i orin emuci aniya aniya biyaci deribume jorgon biyade isibume ere emu aniyai dolo fe kadalaha ice bargiyaha sume tucibuhe yargiyan bisire ton be amala arahabi*

I record the old command, the new additions, the removals, and the true complement for this one year from the first month to the last month of the year Tao Kuang 21, of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp.

Fe kadalaha
Bošokū be araha gabsihiyan i juwan i da emke bošokū duin poo i bošokū emke araha gabsihiyan juwan emu uksin nadanju juwe poo i uksin duin šuruci cooha ilan beri sele sirdan faksi ilan hūwašabure cooha nadan caliyan jetere sula juwe
1v. *uheri ton emu tanggū jakūn*

Old command:
Sergeant-major, one; sergeants, four; gunnery sergeant, one; appointed vanguardmen, eleven; soldiers, seventy-two; gunnery soldiers, four; boatmen, three; bow smith, blacksmith, arrow smith, three; boy soldiers, seven; drawing pay, unenlisted, two.
Grand total: one hundred and eight.

Ice bargiyaha
Lungfu nirui sula manju Guwangtai juwan jakūn se ineku aniya aniya biyai ice ilan de tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling ni kamciha nirui Z'unai i oronde caliyan jetere sula gaiha

New Additions:
I. Unenlisted Manchu Guwangtei of the Lungfu company, age 18, taken on on the third day of the first month of this year as drawing pay, unenlisted, in the vacancy left by Z'unai of the compancy concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

1. Commentary:
Referring to the return for the Cingling company, 2r, we find that it was on the 23rd of the first month, not the third, that Z'unai was promoted, within that company, from drawing pay, unenlisted to boy soldier, thus leaving a vacancy in the former rank which was transferred to the Lungfu company. This must be the vacancy filled by

Guwangtai. As it seems hardly possible that a vacancy could be filled in anticipation of its occurrence, we may assume some mistake in the datings of these movements. Z'unai's promotion in the return for the Cingling company occurs in the second of two series of changes each dated to the 23rd of the first month, so that it seems *prima facie* slightly more probable that the mistake, if any, was made in the return for the Lungfu company, and that *ice ilan* should read *orin ilan.*

2. In this return, the company is referred to thoughout by its title, *Lungfu niru.* The Cingling company uses the formula *tesu nirui*, 'of the company concerned', while the Ding company uses no reference at all.

3. Guwangtai is not listed in the nominal roll under the rank of drawing pay, unenlisted. As will appear below, he was promoted to the rank of boatman in the intercalary third month, and to soldier in the fourth month, and he is listed in his final rank.

II. *Lungfu nirui šuruci cooha Bolgonggo orin nadan se ineku aniya anagan i ilan biyai orin juwe de Gešun i wesike oronde uksin gaiha*
caliyan jetere sula Guwangtai juwan jakūn se ineku inenggi Bolgonggo i
2r. *oronde šuruci cooha gaiha*
sula manju Fusengge juwan nadan se ineku inenggi Guwangtai i oronde caliyan jetere sula gaiha

Boatman Bolgonggo of the Lungfu company, age 27, taken on on the 22nd day of the intercalary third month of this year as soldier, in the vacancy left by the promotion of Gešun.

Drawing pay, unenlisted Guwangtai, age 18, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Bolgonggo.
Unenlisted Manchu Fusengge, age 17, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Guwangtai.

Commentary:
As is recorded below, Gešun was promoted *funde bošokū*, lieutenant, and transferred to the Mujingge company on the same day, though he does not figure in that rank in the nominal roll of the latter company. The vacancy caused by his promotion gave rise to a series of changes, and was finally made good by the enlistment of a recruit.

III. *Lungfu nirui šuruci cooha Siratu juwan jakūn se ineku aniya duin biyai ice nadan de Šuwangju i oronde uksin gaiha*
caliyan jetere sula Anjin juwan jakūn se ineku inenggi Siratu i oronde šuruci cooha gaiha. Erei caliyan jetere sula i oronde tesu galai kubuhe lamun i manju gūsai Mujingge nirui ice bargiyaha cesede dosimbuha

Boatman Siratu of the Lungfu company, age 18, taken on on the seventh day of the fourth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Šuwangju. Drawing pay, unenlisted Anjin, age 18, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Siratu. His vacancy of drawing pay, unenlisted entered on the New Additions of the Mujinge company of the Bordered Blue Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

Commentary:
The translation of the sentence from *erei* to *dosimbuha*, concerning the transfer of the vacancy to another company, is difficult to jastify. What appears to have happened is that the vacancy caused by the promotion of Anjin to boatman, rather than being filled in the Lungfu company, was allotted to the Mujingge company, which was then entitled to take on one man in the rank of drawing pay, unenlisted. However, *oronde* cannot be the grammatical object of *dosimbuha*, Ch. 令進, Mo. *oroyulumui*, as is implied in my translation. Possible explanations, apart from the probability that I have failed to understand the text properly, are i) that *dosimbuha* has an implied object, and that the meaning is something like: 'entry made in the New Additions … in the vacancy of drawing pay, unenlisted'; ii) that the writer in the Lungfu company, who wrote *oronde* correctly so many times, mistakenly wrote it in this context too in place of *oron be.* I suggest this possibility only because we find *oron be* in a similar passage in OR 13040. When Z'unai, drawing pay, unenlisted of the Cingling company, was promoted to boy soldier, his vacancy was transferred to the Lungfu company, and the transaction was recorded as follows: *tesu nirui caliyan jetere sula Z'unai i oron be tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gusai Lungfu nirui ice bargiyaha ton be dosimbuha.* The suffix of the accusative is used here with both *oron* and *ton.*

IV. *Lungfu nirui uksin Jabšana orin nadan se ineku aniya duin biyai*
2v. *ice uyun de tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling ni kamciha nirui Kuini i oronde gabsihiyan araha*

Soldier Jabšana of the Lungfu company, age 27, appointed vanguardman on the ninth day of the fourth month of this year in the vacancy left by Kuini of the company concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

Commentary:
As the return of the Cingling company records, Kuini was demoted, on the ninth day of the fourth month, on account of dizziness and incapacity at archery, but was retained as soldier, 6r: *tesu nirui araha gabsihiyan Kuini uju liyaliyahūn*[13] *niyamniyara muterakū turgunde ineku aniya duin biyai ice uyun de araha gabsihiyan ci nakabufi, an i uksin bibuhe.*
The same return also records that his vacancy was transferred to the Lungfu company: *Kuini i oron be tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui ice bargiyaha ton be dosimbuha.*
This transaction would appear to have added one to the Lungfu company's complement of sergeants; the position would have been restored in the fifth month when Ijishūn, appointed vanguardman of the Lungfu company, was demoted to soldier, and replaced, in the Cingling company, by the promotion of Guiking. See below, 5r.

V. *Lungfu nirui šuruci cooha J'ide orin se ineku aniya sunja biyai juwan juwe de Targabun i oronde uksin gaiha*
beri faksi Deciowan orin se ineku inenggi J'ide i oronde šuruci cooha gaiha
caliyan jetere sula Giying juwan ninggun se ineku inenggi Deciowan i oronde beri faksi gaiha
sula manju Jalingga tofohon se ineku inenggi Giying ni oronde caliyan
3r. *jetere sula gaiha*

Boatman J'ide of the Lungfu company, age 20, taken on on the twelfth day of the fifth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Targabun. Bow smith Deciowan, age 20, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by J'ide. Drawing pay, unenlisted Giying, age 16, taken on on the same day as bow smith in the vacancy left by Deciowan. Unenlisted Manchu Jalingga, age 15, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Giying.

Commentary:
Targabun was discharged on the same day for indiscipline: *an be tuwakiyarakū turgunde… uksin ci nakabuha.* His name does not figure in the nominal roll, showing that he was completely discharged, not demoted as was Kuini, though the same verb, *nakabumbi,* was used in the case of the latter also. See above, commentary to IV.

VI. *Lungfu nirui šuruci cooha Guwangtai juwan jakūn se ineku aniya duin biyai juwan juwe de Cunciowan i oronde uksin gaiha*
caliyan jetere sula Fusengge juwan nadan se ineku inenggi Guwangtai i oronde šuruci cooha gaiha
sula manju Liyangui tofohon se ineku inenggi Fusengge i oronde caliyan jetere sula gaiha

Boatman Guwangtai of the Lungfu company, age 18, taken on on the twelfth day of the fourth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Cunciowan. Drawing pay, unenlisted Fusengge, age 17, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Guwangtai. Unenlisted Manchu Liyangui, age 15, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Fusengge.

Commentary:
1. The vacancy had been caused by the discharge of Cunciowan on the same day for indiscipline.
2. Liyangui was later promoted to bow smith, and appears in the nominal roll in that rank.

VII. *Lungfu nirui araha gabsihiyan J'ihing orin ninggun se ineku aniya ninggun biyai orin emu de tesu galai kubuhe lamun i manju gūsai Mujingge nirui* 3v. *Šunggiyen i oronde bošokū gaiha*
uksin Keksetu orin sunja se ineku inenggi J'ihing ni oronde gabsihiyan araha

Appointed vaguardman J'ihing of the Lungfu company, age 26, taken on on the 21st day of the sixth month of this year as sergeant in the vacancy left by Šunggiye of the Mujingge company of the Bordered Blue Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned. Soldier Keksetu, age 25, appointed vanguardman on the same day in the vacancy left by J'ihing.

Commentary:
Šungiiye is listed in the nominal roll of the Mujingge company for Tao Kuang 21 as *bošoku*, or sergeant. It is not clear what happened to the vacancy in the rank of soldier left by Keksetu's appointment as vanguardman. (In the nominal roll of the Mujingge company for Tao Kuang 22, Šungiiye is seen to have attained the rank of sergeant-major.)

VIII. *Lungfu nirui šuruci cooha Anjin juwan jakūn se ineku aniya jakūn biyai orin sunja de Šuilin i oronde uksin gaiha*
beri faksi Giying juwan ninggun se ineku inenggi Anjin i oronde šuruci cooha gaiha
caliyan jetere sula Liyangui tofohon se ineku inenggi Giying ni oronde beri faksi gaiha. Erei caliyan jetere sula i oronde tesu galai
4r. *gulu suwayan i manju gusai Cingling ni kamciha nirui ice bargiyaha cesede dosimbuha*

Boatman Anjin of the Lungfu company, age 18, taken on the 25th day of the eighth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Šuilin. Bow smith Giying, age 16, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Anjin. Drawing pay, unenlisted Liyangui, age 15, taken on on the same day as bow smith in the vacancy left by Giying. His vacancy of drawing pay, unenlisted entered on the New Additions of the company concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

Commentary:
1. The vacancy was caused by the death on the same day of Šuilin.
2. The remarks made under III above apply here too. In the return for the Cingling company for the same day we find the entry: *tesu nirui sidan manju Funi juwan ninggun se ineku aniya jakūn biyai orin sunja de tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui Liyangui i oronde caliyan jetere sula de gaiha*, 'Juvenile Manchu Funi of the company concerned taken on on the 25th day of the eighth month of this year as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Liyangui of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.'

IX. *Lungfu nirui sidan manju Z'unšeo juwan ilan se ineku aniya uyun biyai orin emu de Taksimbuu i oronde hūwašabure cooha gaiha.*

Juvenile Manchu Z'unšeo of the Lungfu company, age 13, taken on on the 21st day of the ninth month of this year as boy soldier in the vacancy left by Taksimbuu.

Commentary:
Taksimbuu had died on the same day.

X. *Tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling nirui šuruci cooha Ferguwecun orin se ineku aniya juwan biyai orin uyun de Lungfu nirui Minggan i oronde uksin gaiha*
Sidan manju Z'umboo juwan duin se ineku inenggi tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling ni kamciha nirui Narhūntu i oronde
4v. *caliyan jetere sula gaiha*

Boatman Ferguwecun of the Cingling company of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned, age 20, taken on on the 29th day of the tenth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Minggan of the Lungfu company.
Juvenile Manchu Z'umboo, age 14, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Narhūntu of the company concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

Commentary:
1. Minggan had been discharged for indiscipline on the same day.
2. These entries are puzzling in two respects, firstly in that Ferguwecun's transfer is recorded in the return of the Cingling company under an earlier date, secondly in that the vacancy left by Narhūntu is unexplained. The return for the Cingling company records these movements as follows; 4v: *tesu nirui šuruci cooha Ferguwecun orin se ineku aniya uyun biyai orin emu de tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui Minggan i oronde uksin de gaiha te Ferguwecun be kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui ice bargiyaha ton be dosimbuha: tesu nirui caliyan jetere sula Narhūntu juwan uyun se ineku inenggi Ferguwecun i oronde šuruci ci cooha de gaiha: tesu nirui caliyan jetere sula Narhūntu i oron*

be tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui ice bargiyaha ton be dosimbuha:

(Note: *ci* after *šuruci* appears to be an intrusion.) 'Boatman Ferguwecun of the company concerned, age 20, taken on on the 21st day of the ninth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Minggan of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned. This Ferguwecun entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner. Drawing pay, unenlisted Narhūntu of the company concerned, age 19, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Ferguwecun. Vacancy left by drawing pay, unenlisted Narhūntu of the company concerned entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.' It is this vacancy which was filled by Z'umboo.

XI. *Tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling ni kamciha nirui šuruci cooha Narhūntu juwan uyun se ineku aniya jorgon biyai juwan duin de Lungfu nirui Niyancangga i oronde uksin gaiha.*

Boatman Narhūntu of the company concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned, age 19, taken on on the 14th day of the last month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Niyancangga of the Lungfu company.

Commentary:
The return for the Cingling company, 5v, confirms this transfer. Narhūntu's place in the Cingling company was filled by a boy soldier named Z'unai of the same company.[14]
Sume tucibuhe
Removals:
Bošokū Gešun ineku aniya anagan i ilan biyai orin juwe de tesu galai kubuhe lamun i manju gūsai Mujingge nirui funde bošokū tebume sindaha erei bošokū i oronde Mujingge nirui ice bargiyaha cesede dosimbuha

Sergeant Gešun promoted Lieutenant in the Mujingge company of the Bordered Blue Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned on the 22nd day of the intercalary third month of this year. His vacancy of sergeant entered on the New Additions of the Mujingge company.

Commentary:
This transaction cannot be checked in the nominal rolls of the Mujingge company.

Uksin Šuwangju ineku aniya duin biyai ice nadan de nimeme
5r. *akū oho*

Soldier Šuwangju died of illness on the seventh day of the fourth month of this year.

Araha gabsihiyan Ijishūn ineku aniya sunja biyai ice ilan de alban lali akū gabsihiyan ci nakabufi uksin de bibuhe erei gabsihiyan i oronde tesu galai gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling ni kamciha nirui ice bargiyaha cesede dosimbuha

Appointed vanguardman Ijishūn demoted from vanguardman on account of unfitness for duty on the third day of the fifth month of this year. Retained as soldier. His vacancy of vanguardman entered on the New Additions of the company concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

Commentary:
The return for the Cingling company, 3r, confirms this arrangement: *tesu nirui uksin Guiking orin duin se ineku aniya sunja biyai ice ilan de tesu galai kubuhe fulgiyan i manju gūsai Lungfu nirui Ijishūn i oronde gabsihiyan araha*, 'Soldier Guiking of the company concerned appointed vanguardman on the third day of the fifth month of this year in the vacancy left by Ijishūn of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.' Ijishūn's name appears low on the list of soldiers in the nominal roll of the Lungfu company.
Uksin Targabun an be tuwakiyarakū turgunde ineku aniya sunja biyai juwan juwe de uksin ci nakabuha

Soldier Targabun discharged from (rank of) soldier on the twelfth day of the fifth month of this year on account of indiscipline.

Uksin Cunciowan an be tuwakiyarakū turgunde ineku aniya duin biyai juwan juwe de uksin ci nakabuha

Soldier Cunciowan discharged from (rank of) soldier on the twelfth day of the fourth month of this year on account of indiscipline.

5v. *Uksin Šuilin ineku aniya jakūn biyai orin sunja de nimeme akū oho*

Soldier Šuilin died of illness on the 25th day of the eighth month of this year.

Hūwašabure cooha Taksimbuu ineku aniya uyun biyai orin emu de nimeme akū oho

Boy soldier Taksimbuu died of illness on the 21st day of the ninth month of this year.

Uksin Minggan an be tuwakiyarakū turgunde ineku aniya juwan biyai orin uyun de uksin ci nakabuha

Soldier Minggan discharged from (rank of) soldier on the 29th day of the tenth month of this year on account of indiscipline.

Uksin Niyancangga ineku aniya jorgon biyai juwan duin de nimeme akū oho

Soldier Niyancangga died of illness on the 14th day of the last month of this year.

Yargiyan bisire

Bošoku araha gabsihiyan i juwan i da emke bošoku duin poo i bošoku
6r. *emke araha gabsihiyan juwan emu uksin nadanju juwe poo i uksin*
duin šuruci cooha ilan huwašabure cooha nadan beri sele sirdan faksi
ilan caliyan jetere sula juwe
uheri emu tanggu jakun

True complement: Sergeant-major, one; sergeants, four; gunnery sergeant, one; appointed vanguardmen, eleven; soldiers, seventy-two; gunnery soldiers, four; boatmen, three; boy soldiers, seven; bow smith, blacksmith, arrowsmith, three; drawing pay, unenlisted, two.

Grand total: 108.

6v. *doro eldengge orin juweci aniya juwe biyai*
... day of the second month of Tao Kuang 22.

OR 13040, the return for the Cingling company, which was been quoted from above, will now be presented in translation. The original text will be cited only where it contrasts significantly with that of OR 13042. The document begins as follows:

r. *Hashū ergi kūwaran i gulu suwayan i manju gūsai Cingling ni kanciha nirui doro eldengge i orin emuci aniya aniya biyai ice ci deribume ineku aniya jorgon biyai gūsin de isibume ere emu aniyai dolo cooha ursei fe kadalaha ice bargiyaha sume tucibuhe yargiyan bisire ton be getuken cese weilefi alibuha baicame tuwafi yabubureo*

Having drawn up a clear register I present the old command, the new additions, the removals, and the true complement for this one year from the first day of the first month to the 30th day of the last month of the year Tao Kuang 21 of the personnel of the company concurrently commanded by Cingling of the Plain Yellow Manchu Banner and the Left-hand Camp. Please examine and forward.

Old command:
Sergeant-major, one; sergeants, five; appointed vanguardmen, twelve; soldiers, seventy-five; boatmen, three; smiths, three; boy soldiers, seven; drawing pay, unenlisted, six.

1v. New additions:
1. Boatman Yuwanhing of the company concerned, age 18, taken on on the 23rd day of the first month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Šaogan, Bow smith Andangga of the company concerned, age 24, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Yuwanhing. Drawing pay, unenlisted Ferguwecun of the company concerned, age 20, taken on on the same day as smith in the vacancy left by Andangga. Unenlisted Manchu Mailamboo of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted, in the vacancy left by Ferguwecun.

II. 2r. Boatman Ishūnan of the company concerned, age 20, taken on on the 23rd day of the first month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Šifu. Boy soldier Sainan of the company concerned, age 18, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Ishūnan. Drawing pay, unenlisted Z'unai of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as soldier in the place left vacant by Sainan. Vacancy left by drawing pay, unenlisted Z'unai of the company concerned entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

III. Drawing pay, unenlisted Higui of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the ninth day of the intercalary third month of this year as smith in the
2v. vacancy left by Dorongga. Unenlisted Manchu Kinggui of the company concerned, age 18, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Higui.

IV. Boatman Sainan of the company concerned, age 18, taken on on the 26th day of the fourth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by K'anglingga. Blacksmith Guwansio of the company concerned, age 19, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Sainan. Drawing pay, unenlisted Šuwanggui of the company concerned, age 20,
3r. taken on on the same day as smith in the vacancy left by Guwansio. Unenlisted Manchu Narhūmbu of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Guwansio.

V. Soldier Guiking of the company concerned, age 24, appointed vanguardman on the third day of the fifth month of this year in the vacancy left by Ijishūn of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

VI. Unenlisted Manchu Horonggo of the company concerned, age 15, taken on on the 16th day of the eighth month of this year as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Mailamboo.

VII. Boatman Guwansio of the company concerned, age 19, taken on on the 21st day of the eighth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Lugui.
3v. Bow smith Ferguwecun of the company concerned, age 20, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Guwansio. Boy soldier Liyande of the company concerned, age 17, taken on on the same day as smith in the vacancy left by Ferguwecun. Drawing pay, unenlisted Narhūmbu of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as boy soldier in the vacancy left by Liyande. Unenlisted Manchu Cengming of the company concerned, age 15, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Narhūmbu.

VIII. Juvenile Manchu Funi of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on
4r. the 25th day of the eighth month of this year as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Liyangui of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

IX. Boatman Andangga of the company concerned, age 24, taken on on the 17th day of the ninth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Ciyanglun. Blacksmith Šuwanggui of the company concerned, age 20, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Andangga. Boy soldier Šolongga of the company concerned, age 18, taken on on the same day as smith in the vacancy left by Šuwanggui. Unenlisted Manchu Wesingge of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as boy soldier in the vacancy left by Šolongga.

X. 4v. Boatman Ferguwecun of the company concerned, age 20, taken on on the 21st day of the ninth month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Minggan of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned. This Ferguwecun entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner. Drawing pay, unenlisted Narhūntu of the company concerned, age 19, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Ferguwecun. Vacancy left by drawing pay, unenlisted Narhūntu of the company concerned entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

XI. Boatman Jakunju of the company concerned, age 17, taken on on the 14th day of the last month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Dingciyang.

5r. Bow smith Liyande of the company concerned, age 17, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Jakūnju. Drawing pay, unenlisted Kingkui of the company concerned, age 18, taken on on the same day as smith in the vacancy left by Liyande. Unenlisted Manchu Šemping of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Kingkui.

XII. Boatman Narhuntu of the company concerned, age 19, taken on on the 14th day of the last month of this year as soldier in the vacancy left by Niyancangga of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

5v. This Narhūntu entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner. Boy soldier Z'unai of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as boatman in the vacancy left by Narhūntu. Drawing pay, unenlisted Cengming of the company concerned, age 15, taken on on the same day as boy soldier in the vacancy left by Z'unai. Unenlisted Manchu Tofohonggo of the company concerned, age 16, taken on on the same day as drawing pay, unenlisted in the vacancy left by Cengming.

Removals:

6r. Soldier Šaogan of the company concerned died of illness on the 23rd day of the first month of this year.

Soldier Šifu of the company concerned died of illness on the 23rd day of the first month of this year.

Arrow smith Dorongga of the company concerned: shall he be discharged from (rank of) smith on the ninth day of the intercalary third month of this year on account of unfitness for duty?[15]

Appointed vanguardman Kuini of the company concerned demoted from appointed vanguardman on the ninth day of the fourth month of this year on account of dizziness and incapacity at archery. Retained as ordinary soldier. Vacancy left by Kuini entered on the New Additions of the Lungfu company of the Bordered Red Manchu Banner of the Wing concerned.

Soldier K'anglingga of the company concerned died of illness on the 26th day of the fourth month of this year.

6v. Drawing pay, unenlisted Mailamboo of the company concerned died of illness on the 16th day of the eighth month of this year.

Soldier Lugui of the company concerned died of illness on the 21st day of the eighth month of this year.

Soldier Ciyanglun of the company concerned died of illness on the 17th day of the ninth month of this year.

Soldier Dingciyang of the company concerned died of illness on the 14th day of the last month of this year.

True complement: Sergeant-major, one; sergeants, five; appointed vanguardmen, twelve; soldiers, seventy-five; boatmen, three; smiths, three; boy soldiers, seven; drawing pay, unenlisted, five.

Grand total: one hundred and one.

. . . day of the second month of Tao Kuang 22.

All the documents in the set are clean copies, with the minor exception of OR 13040, which has two Chinese characters inserted in a running hand in the top margin of 5r, and the major exception of OR 13039, 2, which has several insertions, in both the Manchu and Chinese sections, including what appears to be a seven-character couplet in Chinese. Most of these insertions are in Chinese, the remainder, of course, being in Manchu. Five lines at the end of the booklet, that is, on a page preceding 1r of the Chinese text, appear to be a memorandum of the distribution of the troops, and are entirely in Chinese, except for the three Manchu words *janggin, bošokū* and *gabsihiyan.* I am not confident enough of the purport of these annotations to offer a translation. Nor can one draw any definite conclusions from this mixture of scripts and languages, except to say that both Manchu and Chinese were evidently in use in the compilation of army records in mid-century. The insertions themselves appear to have been written with equal fluency, and with no awkwardness in transition from one script to the other, by the same hand, though one gains the impression that the writer may have been more at home in the Chinese language than the Manchu language.[16]

Notes

1. W. Simon and Howard G.H. Nelson: *Manchu books in London: a union catalogue*, London: British Museum Publications Ltd. for the British Library, 1977.
2. T.F. Wade: 'The Army of the Chinese Empire: its two great divisions, the Bannermen or National Guard, and the Green Standard or Provincial Troops: their organisation, location, pay, condition, etc.', *The Chinese Repository*, XX, Canton, 1851, 250–280, 300–340, 363–422.
3. The label is torn and missing at this point.
4. *Sic*, thought in the text the name is given as Cingling. This suggests that the name Ding may also be an abbreviation.
5. *kamciha*. The translation is provisional and rests on the entry for *kamcimbi* in Norman, *A concise Manchu-English lexicon*, 171, which includes the meanings 'to serve concurrently, to act at the same time.'
6. *ursei* appears to have been miswritten and corrected. The words *duin hacin i getuken* are inappropriate here, as they belong properly, to the title of a return, not that of a nominal roll, and in the original they have been ringed round in ink, apparently to indicate the error.
7. Viewing the booklets as in Manchu, not Chinese, format.
8. Wade, 272, describes a category of 'henchmen', his translation of a term *sui-kiá*, which he does not define further, who were attached to certain officers, I have no evidence to connect these 'henchmen' with the term *gocika*.
9. G. Tradescant Lay: 'A brief account of the Mantchou Tartars at Chápú', *The Chinese Repository*, XI, Canton, 1842, 425–434. Lay was interpreter to Sir Henry Pottinger's special mission at the time of the capture of Chapu. For a brief account of his life see A.C. Hyde Lay: *Four generations in China, Japan and Korea*, Edinburgh and London, 1952, Chapter 1.
10. H.S. Brunnert and V.V. Hagelstrom: *Present day political organization of China*. Shanghai, 1912.
11. In OR 13039, 2, also *poo i uksin*.
12. In OR 13041 the expression *sidan manju* is qualified on two occasions by the words *celeku de amcabuha*. I cannot trace this expression in reference books available to me, but from the fact that in *Manǰu mongyol toli bičig*, Ulaanbaatar, 1968, *celeku* has the Mongolian equivalent *tögelegür* (= modern Mongol *töölüür*), I associate it with such phrases as *töölüürt brox*, given in Tsevel's dictionary with the explanation *eriin nasand xürex*, 'to reach man's estate', and *er töölüür*, given in G. Norovsambuu: *Mongolyn arxivalban xereg, tüünii bichgiin xev*, Ulaanbaatar, 1975, 72, with the explanation *tsereg eriin bürtgel*, 'list of army men.' However, these phrases are not exact correspondences, and are also drawn from Mongolian, not Manchu, contexts, and can only suggest that *celeku de amcabuha* may mean something like 'having reached man's estate.'
13. Cf. Norman, 293, *uju liyeliyembi*, 'to be dizzy.'
14. OR 13041 offers one further significant addition to the vocabulary used in the returns, where it lists, 2v, a soldier discharged at the age of 77. The text runs: *alibufi uksin ci nakabuha sula ciowalin*, 'Ciowalin, unenlisted, discharged from (rank of) soldier, on request.' The translation 'on request' for *alibufi* is tentative. The same formula, *alibufi uksin ci gaiha*, is used later, 4v, where Ciowalin's death from illness is reported. Though he is referred to as *sula*, both passages record that he had been taken on as blacksmith after his discharge as soldier.
15. The question form, *nakabureo*, would seem to be anomalous.
16. For a detailed discussion of the theme touched on here, see Ch.H. Ch'en: 'The decline of the Manchu language in China during the Ch'ing period (1633–1911)', in W. Heissig (ed.), *Altaica Collecta*, Wiesbaden, Otto Harrassowitz, 1976, 137–154.

■ Source: Min, Tu-ki, 'The Manchu-Han relations in the day of 1898 reform movement; a revisionist view', in *Symposium on the history of the Republic of China, Taipei: Compilation Committee of Symposium on the History of the Republic of China*, 1981, v.1, pp. 434–441.

THE MANCHU-HAN RELATIONS IN THE DAYS OF 1898 REFORM MOVEMENT; A REVISIONIST VIEW

Min Tu-ki

Abstract

K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao who fled to Japan after the setback of 1898 Reform Movement assumed the antagonism between the Manchus and the Hans a factor which led to the failure of the Movement. This alleged antagonism was rarely touched upon, despite the possibility of being a clue to go into the origin of anti-Manchu revolutionary movement of later days.

Liang elaborated the close connection between the Manchu high officials and the Empress Dowager to deter the Reform Movement which was supposed to go eventually against the interests of the Manchus. No Han Chinese conservatives were, in this respect, taken into account in describing what he perceived the causes of the 1898 failure. He simply eqated the Manchus with the conservatives. The famous saying he attributed to K'ang I was introduced as the evidence of the ethnic antagonism; K'ang I once told his friend "The reform is favourable to the Hans only and harmful to the interests of the Manchus. We the Manchus would rather give friends (i.e. foreigners) our estate (i.e. China) than share with our slaves (i.e. the Hans)". It seems this saying Liang spread was responsible much for intensifying the anti-Manchu sentiment of the Hans in later days. Did anyone ever questioned the authenticity of it? To make it doubtful, Liang quoted the saying differently in the other part of his description of the failure of the Movement.

Not only K'ang and Liang but also some Han Chinese contemporaries sympathetic to the Reform stated views similar to that of K'ang and Liang. Some contemporary Manchu officials, too, betrayed a sort of ethnic antagonism, as they emphasize the impartiality to both ethnic elements. It should be noted, however, that some enlightened Manchu officials responded affirmatively to the appeal of the Reformists in 1898. Not a few Manchus, memorializing to the throne on various aspects of reform, went with the current of the time in the days of the Reform Movement.

K'ang and Liang also emphasized the years old conflict between the Emperor and the Empress Dowager in addition to the ethnic antagonism. According to Liang, the Manchu high officials who initiated the coup d'etat were connected closely with the inside conflict among the Manchus. It is quite plausible, then, that the inside conflict might account for the setback much more than the one between the two ethnic elements, if any. Another difficulty in explaining the

failure with the ethnic antagonism is that the Hans also played vital roles in attacking and undermining the Reform Movement.

One may argue that the antagonism between the Manchus and the Hans should be construed as the antagonism between the high officials of both ethnic elements. But, it is difficult to identify the Hans only with the Han high officials and Manchus with the Manchu high officials. It is much more difficult to identify the small number of the Han Reformists with the Hans for the antagonism. The segregation of the Hans from the Manchus in some respect does not always account for provocation of anti-Manchu activities, which happen to be when some other social stimili and political conditions are reinforced. May it be true that the segregation between the Manchus and the Hans existed in the days of the Hundred Days Reform Movement, it seems to me that the segregation itself did not result in the Manchu-Han antagonism which Liang claimed the main factors for the setback of the Reform Movement. What did, then, the contemporaries take the antagonism one of the major causes of the setback? I think that the possible answer can be found in the dual system itself which comprised double ethnic elements in a polity. Although the dual system itself does not necessarily mean any segregation from social and political point of view, one can tend to look after some kind of easy excuse, a scape goat, which one can attribute one's dissatisfaction or failure whatsoever. The constituents of the dual system may not be influential, but the system itself is liable to exert some influences in a given circumstance. In the day of the Reform Movement, one of the task the Reformist had to tackle was to eradicate the dual system by peaceful means. As the Reformists were unsuccessful in doing so, the revolutionary movement found their goal to attain, breaking completely up the source of the dual system.

Paper

I

Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, who fled to Tokyo after the setback of the Hundred Days Reform, sent a letter to Japanese Premierokuma Shigenobu six days after he arrived in Tokyo. He described in the letter what he thought to be the true story of the coup d'etat of 1898. As the causes of the setback he enumerated four points; (1) the conflict between the Empress Dowager and the Emperor, (2) the antagonism between the reformists and the conservatives, (3) the antagonism between the Manchus and the Hans, (4) the rivalry of Russia and Great Britain in China. The three points were, save the third point, discussed so far by many scholars, while the third point was rarely touched upon, despite the possibility of being a clue to go into the origin of anti-Manchu revolutionary movement of later days.

On the Manchu-Han antagonism Liang elaborated the close connection between the Manchu high officials and the Empress Dowager to deter the reform movement which was supposed to go eventually against the interest of the Manchus. No *Han* Chinese conservatives were, *in this respect*, taken into account in describing what he perceived the causes of the 1898 failure. Mentioning the antagonism between the reformists and the consevatives with vagueness, he had the readers virtually convinced that only the Hans were acceptable for the reformist cause, which is not true. It is understandable that Liang had to simplify and exaggerate when he appealed to the Japanese Premier for sympathy towards the reformist's cause. Shortly after, he repeated the same story in "The Account of the Coup D'État of 1898" (Wu-hsü Cheng-pien-chih) and published the letter to Japanese Premier with slight modification in a Japanese magazine. In a chapter on the general cause of the coup in "The Account" he attributed the setback of the reform movement only to both the conflict between the Empress Dowager and the Emperor, and between the reactionary activities of the conservatives and the progressive effort of the reformists. Although he did not state the ethnic antagonism explicitly as in the letter to Okuma, he eqated the Manchus with the conservatives introducing the "evidence" of the antagonism. He claimed that the Manchus attacked the reform policy because of their interests supposed. The "evidence" he introduced is the famous saying attributed to Kang I, a Manchu Grand Secretary, who later became famous for his militant attitude during the days of the Boxer Rebellion. Kang I once told his friend: "The reform is favourable to the Hans only and harmful to (the interests of) the Manchus. We would rather give friends (i.e. foreigners) our estate (i.e. China) than share with our slaves (the Hans)." It seems that this saying Liang spread was responsible much for intensifying the anti-Manchu sentiment of the Hans in later days. In fact, many writers, including Ch'en T'ien-hua, an editorial writer of Su-pao of Shanghai, and even a writer of 1911 proclamation of the independent Hupei quoted the saying to be a firm evidence how the Manchus were hostile to the Hans, appealing to the Hans for action. But did anyone ever question the authenticity of it? Did Liang show any reliable sources of it? Liang confessed only that everybody in Peking knew it. Furthermore to make it more doubtful, Liang quoted the saying differently in the other part of "The Account"; Russians (who kept close relations with the Manchus according to Liang) told the Manchus that the reform was against the interest of the Manchus.

Not so explicitly as Liang did, K'ang Yu-wei too assumed in his "Chronological Autobiography" the antagonism between the two ethnic interests as a factor which led to the failure of the 1898 Reform Movement. He recollected that he urged the Emperor to move the capital to Shanghai because Peking had so many Manchus (who were against the reform).

Like Liang, he stated that members of the Imperial Household asked Tzu-hsi to restore the hsün-cheng (instructive government), and Li Shan (a Mongol Bannerman) and other Manchu Bannermen suggested to Jung Lu, the governor-general of influential Chihli province, to depose Kwang-hsü Emperor which meant the discontinuity of the reform movement. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao also maintained in "The Account" that the military build up of the Manchu court was aimed at suppressing the Hans instead of defending China from Foreign aggression. The infamous attack by Wen T'i, a Manchu censor, of K'ang Yu-wei's alleged conspiracy for his "upholding China (Chung Kuo) instead of supporting the Ch'ing" was applauded by many Manchus from the heart. Describing those who were punished owing to their engagement in the reform movement, Liang had a grudge against some Manchus who were treated leniently unlike most of the Hans.

II

I have discussed above how Liang and K'ang who suffered most severely from the setback saw the so-called Manchu-Han antagonism. Was it, then, only Liang and K'ang who had resented the Manchus? How were the reactions of the contemporaries with Liang and K'ang? Such bitter feelings, if any, could not be made public inside China. Only in the diary of some scholars sympathetic to the reform I happened to find the following statement written by P'i Hsi-jui of Hunan about the setback of the reform movement in the capital.

> The rehabilitation of the hsun-cheng by the Mistress of Ch'ang-hsin palace (Tzu-hsi) resulted from her own desire of wealth and authority, ignoring the fate of our country. The Manchus are within easy access of the Mistress... Our yearning for restoration ended with a empty dream... As the hatred of the Manchus against the Hans are demonstrated, it is easy to imagine how Western foreigners would hate us once they come to China to become the lord of China. We are to become the sixth or seventh grade servants.

In another entry of his diary he mentioned the Manchu censor Wen T'i who attacked K'ang Yu-wei of his Kung-tze Kaichih Kao (A study of Confucious as a Reformer): "how can such a Manchu (like Wen T'i) has something to say about the idea like Confucious as a Reformer." Yeh Chang-chi'i, also a contemporary scholar with K'ang and Liang repeated to point out four causes of the failure of the 1898 reform movement, as Liang mentioned. Fei Hsing-chien, a contemporary with the reformists, recollected in 1926 that Manchu high officials especially, bore resentment against the reform. Another contemporary writer, Chao P'ing-lin, explained that most of the Bannermen had been afraid of losing their official and financial privilege due to the ongoing reform. In his English book published in 1900 Lim Boon Keng (Wen Ching), once an ardent supporter of K'ang and Liang in Singapore, mentioned the alleged saying of Kang I in order to attack the Manchu court, and took the Wang Chao affair as a grave momentum of the Manchu-Han antagonism. I have drawn above some examples of contemporary Han Chinese views. How did the Manchus, then, responded to the failure of the reform movement? A Junior Vice President of Li-fan Yuan (Boad of Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs) memorialized to the throne right after the coup as follows:

> Rumors now spreading widely are implying that the court is willing to alienate the Hans from the Manchus due to the fact that all of six executed officials were Han Chinese. From the founding our dynasty is impartial to both ethnic elements. Therefore no one allowed to doubt the impartiality in the disposition of the (six) rebels. (But in order to provide with counter weight to the harmful rumor) it is advisable to single out some loyal and unyielding Han officials to honor with award.

This memorial betrays clearly the fact that many Hans in the capital perceived the coup d'etat in terms of Manchu-Han antagonism. It also attests that the Manchu themselves, too, took similar views on the setback of the reform movement in spite of pronounced impartiality. One more example of a Manchu view on the ethnic antagonism comes from a Manchu Hanlin Reader, I Ku, who attacked vehemently a Manchu governor who memorialized to change some conventional administrative procedures in the stormy days right after the coup d'etat. I Ku insisted on the dismissal of the governor because *being a Manchu Bannerman* he advocated the reform of the established institution (as K'ang and Liang did). He also complained about the treatment on two prominent Manchus who sided with the reformists, Tuan Fang and Kuo-fu T'ung-wu, insisting that the two be punished more severely (so that the court demonstrates the impartiality).

III

Now, let us turn to how was the situation of the Manchu-Han relations in the days of the reform movement. Liang recorded that K'ang Yu-wei, the prime driver of the movement, once advised the throne to treat Manchus and Hans with equality. The idea was also revealed in K'ang's "Treatise on the Reform in Japan" (Je-pen Pien-cheng-chih) submitted to the Emperor in the fifth Month through six month. There was another reformist Chang Yuan-chi who advocated the idea explicitly in his memorial submitted in the seventh month. Chang proposed some concrete measures of taking away the regulations to have segregated ethnically, which allows all Manchus to choose their own occupations besides the military duties and to marry the Hans.

An edict issued on 29th day of the seventh month, which was based on a memorial of Yuan Ch'ang, ordered Grand Secretariat to provide a measure to improve the livelihood of the Bannermen. Although Yuan did not specify how to dissegregate, it is safe to consider that his idea would eventually lead to the abolishment of the segregation.

IV

How the Manchus responded to the reform movement, while the Hans were trying to abolish the segregation? Did they categorically oppose the reform measures from their ethnic sentiment? Shou Fu, a Bachelor of the Hanlin Academy and a member of Royal Household (Tsung-sih), was a Manchu responded affirmatively to the appeal of the reformists. He organized a society entitled "Acknowledge-Shame Society" (Chihch'ih Hui) with active support from K'ang Yu-wei. His essay published in Shih-wu Pao, the reformist journal, "an Appeal to the Bannermen", urged his fellow men to realize the crisis the Ch'ing faced. It is noteworthy that his crisis consciousness came from two directions: the one was the foreign aggression, and the other the advocacy of People's right. He took part in the reform movement so as to offset any radical movement of advocating the people's right which prevailed among some reformists of the Day. Kuo-fu-t'ung-wu, another Manchu high officials, participated in K'ang Yu-wei's Pao-kuo Hui. He went even further to advocate the establishment of parliament immediately both in capital and provinces (It is well known that even K'ang hesitated to endorse the immediate establishment of parliament). He was promoted to the Vice President of Board of Rites after the conservatives of the Board were ousted in connection with Wang Chao affair. Not a few Manchus, memorializing to the throne on various aspects of reform, went with the current of the time. One can easily find a considerable number of Manchu names in the "Source Materials on the Reform Movement of 1898 in Palace Archives" (Wu-hsu Pien-fa Tang-an Shih-liao). Out of 231 memorials besides those Grand Secretaries' which dealt only with the ordered topics, 42 were submitted by the Manchus. Some Manchus memorialized how to reform the administration of the Banner system, which was raken as a part of the overall reform plan.

Leaving over the question of what brought on the setback of the reform movement, let us first examine who Liang claimed to be the initiator of the coup d'etat. According to Liang, Jung Lu was the prime initiator with the support of Huait'apu, the ousted president of Board of Rites, and Li-shan, a Mongol Bannerman. Kang I was named the behind-the-scene man of the coup. Their attitudes were connected closely, Liang asserted, with the conflict between the Emperor and the Empress Dowager. Of the four points previously mentioned, the conflict between mother and the adopted son was emphasized as the prime factor for the setback of the reform movement. Liang claimed that the reform movement was damaged more on the conflict than the antagonism between the Manchus and the Hans, or between the reformists and the conservatives. Chapter two of his "Account" was spared exclusively in describing the story of the conspiracy to depose Kwang-hsu Emperor. In another chapter he also described the sublime virtue of Kwang-hsu Emperor in an effort to outweigh the Empress Dowager who was abused in foul language. It is quite plausible in this context that the inside conflict among the Manchus might account for the setback of the reform movement more than the one between the two ethnic elements.

Another difficulty in explaining the failure with the Manchu-Han antagonism is that the Hans also played vital roles in attacking and undermining the reform movement. As we all know, it was a Han censor, a well known protege of Li Hung-chang, Yang Ch'ung-i who set afire. In fact, Yang recommended Li Hung-chang, in his memorial to accuse the reformists, that Jung Lu be relieved the Governor-General of Chih-li province to the duty of protecting the Empress Dowager and the Emperor. Needless to say, many Hans memorialized to accuse the reformists around the coup. In addition, as discussed above, considerable number of the Manchus took part in the reform movement. In sum, a more convincing explanation is needed for us to accept Liang's claim.

Does the reform policy really harmed the interests of the Manchus? I am ready to admit that some Manchu (or Mongol) high officials would undergo troubles for their exclusive privileges provided the reform eventually led to the constitutional government, which would understandably allow equal opportunities regardless of the ethnic differences. However, it is possible to expect the improvement of the maladministration of the Banner affairs, and of the misery of the illiterate and poor Manchus. Furthermore, if the reform succeeded in saving Ch'ing China from the Powers' melon-cutting, the Manchus would not lose the resort of reliance and protection, the Ch'ing court.

One may argue, however, that "the Manchus" for the Manchu-Han antagonism should imply *exclusively* some Manchu high officials close to the court (as it was in the last days of Ch'ing rule) beyond the rank and file of the Banner system. The antagonism between the Manchus and the Hans, therefore, should be construed as the antagonism between the high officials of both ethnic elements. It is hard to identify "the Hans" for the Manchu-Han antagonism only with the Han high officials. As I discussed above, not a few Han high officials such as Hsü Ying-kuei and Li Hung-chang sided with the Manchus against the reform movement. Chang Chi-t'ung, a moderate conservative put the meaning of the Empress Dowager's presence, in 1900, as follows:

> In order to preserve China (Chung Kuo), it is imperative to protect and save the Empress Dowager from the danger without. If it failed, China would no longer be able to exist.

Thus, the Empress Dowager's presence, symbol of the privileged Manchus was at the same time regarded by the Han high officials the symbol of the established order, the Ch'ing dynasty in which they enjoyed privileges as high officials. Is it possible, then, to identify the small number of the Han reformists with the Hans for the antagonism? It is much more difficult to agree with this view. How can one identify only the small number of the reformists with the Hans excluding the conservative high officials of the Hans?

The segregation of the Hans from the Manchus in some respect does not always account for provocation of anti-Manchu activities, which happen to be when some other social stimuli or political conditions are reinforced. T'an Ssu-t'ung, for example, who harboured anti-Manchu feelings to some extent, preferred to join the Manchu court in the hope of reforming the established institution. A significant reform theoretician as well as a leader of the reform movement, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, also once expressed some kind of strong anti-Manchu feelings when he taught at an academy in Changsha, Hunan. Even Sun Yat-sen who fought fiercely against the Manchu dynasty, once sought after a way to *reform* some aspects of the established order with the help of Cheng Tsao-ju, a high official of the Ch'ing. He sent a letter to Li Hung-chang with the intention of reforming China in the same year he embarked in strong anti-Manchu revolutionary movement. Chang Ping-lin, a formidable ideologue of the anti-Manchu revolutionary cause, also sent a letter to Li Hung-chang just before joining the revolutionary movement. Thus, one could harbour conflicting ideas (goals) at the same time, and choose it on the basis of the social stimuli or political conditions. In short, may it be true that the segregation between the Manchus and the Hans existed in the days of the Hundred Days Reform, it seems to me that the segregation itself did not result in the Manchu-Han antagonism which Liang claimed one of the main factors for the setback of the reform movement in 1898.

V

What did, then, the contemporaries take the antagonism one of the major causes of the failure? I think that the possible answer can be found in the dual system itself which comprised double ethnic elements in a polity. Although the dual system per se does not necessarily mean any segregation or antagonism from social or political viewpoint, one tends to look after some kind of easy excuse, a scapegoat, to which one can attribute their dissatisfaction or failure whatsoever. The constituents of the dual system may not be influential, but the system itself is liable to exert some kinds of influences in a given circumstance. Those who dissatisfied at the reform movement would see the reform in terms of the dual system. In that case the dual system often accounts for some difficulties in carrying out the reform. In the days of 1898 reform movement, one of the most urgent task the reformists had to tackle was to eradicate the dual system by peaceful means, that is, to get rid of the segregation between the two ethnic elements. Liang realized it clearly when he said in 1900 the identification of the Ch'ing with China (Chung Kuo) was the urgent task. As the reformists were unsuccessful in doing so, the revolutionaries found their goal to attain, breaking completely up the source of the dual system.

■ Source: Zarrow, Peter, 'Historical Trauma. Anti-Manchuism and Memories of Atrocity in Late Qing China', in *History & Memory*, Vol. 16, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 2004), Indiana University Press, pp. 67–107.

HISTORICAL TRAUMA
ANTI-MANCHUISM AND MEMORIES OF ATROCITY IN LATE QING CHINA

Peter Zarrow

In April 1644 the reigning emperor of Ming-dynasty China committed suicide as massive rebel armies invaded Beijing. By the end of that year the Qing dynasty (1644–1912), led by Manchus, had defeated the rebel armies and remnant Ming forces in and near the capital and had seated a new emperor on the throne in the Forbidden City. They had taken control of northern China and were well on their way to imposing their authority in the south as well. The Qing, like the earlier Yuan (Mongol) dynasty of the thirteenth century, was a conquest dynasty, achieving power through invasion from the north. In the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, Manchu tribal leaders had put together, through conquest and alliance, an ever larger and more efficient military machine that also included Mongols, Koreans and Han Chinese (in what we now call southern Manchuria). The collapse of the Ming, the spread of violence across much of China in the early seventeenth century and the final attacks of the Qing forces caused great suffering. Whole cities were razed when their residents did not submit; men were killed, women raped and children enslaved. Men were ordered to shave their pates and grow queues in the Manchu style, and some committed suicide rather than do so. This historical trauma was recorded extensively by literate Chinese.[1]

However, the Qing conquest overall was accepted by the Chinese landholding gentry. Historians generally agree that in spite of widespread Ming loyalism and resentment against the new "barbarian" overlords, the Qing ability and willingness to maintain the basic socioeconomic order led the "gentry" class to cooperate. Tellingly, family heads who refused to accept service under the Qing encouraged or acquiesced as their sons and nephews participated in the revised examination system and pursued careers in Qing officialdom. Rulers like the great Kangxi emperor (r. 1661–1722) understood the need to appeal to this critical social elite.

In the Confucian tradition, populations could be categorized according to standards similar in some ways to modern racial thinking. Certainly, the distinction between the "civilized" (Chinese) and the "barbarous" (foreigners) was central. At one extreme, it was held that barbarians were innately animal-like and could never become civilized. However, the mainstream view essentially held that this distinction was not immutable: barbarians could become civilized ("transformed"—*jiaohua, xianghua*) and indeed were even expected to do so. Also, rulership was legitimized by the "Mandate of Heaven," which was bestowed on the basis of virtue, not racial purity. Anyone, theoretically, could claim the Mandate and an orthodox place in the succession of emperors. The Qing dynasty's claims to legitimacy were virtually unquestioned through the eighteenth century, but that authority began to fray in the nineteenth. As the Qing government suffered a series of defeats and humiliations at the hands of the British, French, Americans, Germans and other Western powers, and in 1895 at the hands of the long-despised Japanese, and as domestic reforms were stymied by conservatives, calls for radical change increasingly were heard.

The scions of the old gentry elite were then being educated in modern schools located in east-coast cities and abroad, where they learned modern racial thinking, that is, the mainstream Western view that humanity was divided among several major, essentially immutable breeding populations. Generally these were referred to in five, color-coded categories: Whites, Yellows, Browns, Blacks and Reds. This order also represented a hierarchy of intelligence and morality that justified rule by Whites—temporary and tutorial rule in some views, permanent rule over uneducable peoples in other views. The present essay cannot pursue this subject. Suffice it to say that Chinese thinkers at the turn of the twentieth century accepted some of the basic premises of racial thinking, tending to equate the intelligence of Whites and Yellows and sometimes predicting a racial war between them for world supremacy.[2]

Chinese thinkers also understood that the five major racial groups were subdivided into smaller groups or sub-races that constituted, in effect, races themselves. That is, as Whites were distinct from Blacks, so Latins were distinct from Teutons, though both belonged to the overarching White race. Asian sub-races were variously delineated. This essay focuses on how the distinction between Han Chinese and Manchus was made and what it meant to young radicals. As frustration with Qing conservatism grew, especially after the failure of the 1898 reform movement, anti-Qing feeling took on a racial cast, and the failures of the entire government were increasingly blamed on Manchu racial inferiority. Anti-Manchuism fed into the currents leading to the Revolution of 1911, which overthrew the dynasty.

This essay argues that anti-Manchuism, while shaped by the traditional distinction between civilization and barbarism and by modern racial thinking, also represented a traumatized historical memory. Chinese radicals condemned the Manchus for their incorrigibly "bestial" nature, which was proved by their past and current crimes. They relived the conquest of the seventeenth century, experiencing the old trauma vicariously. Repeated references to the bloody events of the conquest of course were designed to arouse popular anger, but they were not merely instrumental or cynical: they were themselves signs of uncontrolled anger and hurt, incessant picking at old wounds and an inability to forget. My goal in this essay is to supplement the existing political and intellectual accounts of late Qing revolutionaries with an account that takes the emotionality of their rhetoric seriously. The point is not that such rhetoric was "illogical" or historically unsound but that it displays the logic of the unconscious as much as conscious discursive structures. One way to analyze it is through psychoanalytical concepts such as trauma, memory, scapegoating and acting-out. Ultimately, this should help us understand what committed people to revolution, as well as to specific decisions—such as to commit suicide or assassinations or to join armed uprisings.

Trauma, Memory and History

Anti-Manchuism has remained something of a puzzle to historians, Chinese and foreign. Why did such a seemingly irrational view become so widespread? What were the origins of racial hatred? How deeply was it felt? Why did it disappear relatively quickly after the revolution?[3] Was it not merely superficial propaganda, virtually without meaning? Many scholars have averted their eyes from the ugliness of anti-Manchuism, focusing instead on revolutionary ideology and activities. Yet if we examine the dynamics or inner logic of anti-Manchuism, we can see how it was rooted in the assumptions of the day, the stresses facing activists, and the burdens of historical memory.

The emotional history of the 1911 Revolution has yet to be written; this essay intends to make a small start. Thus far anti-Manchuism has been studied through the lens of ideology as one aspect of the 1911 Revolution. This is not the place to review this large literature, but we can note that a doyen of late-Qing nationalism studies, Jin Chongji, discounts the importance of anti-Manchuism. He recently has argued that narrow anti-Manchuism did not represent mainstream thought.[4] In this view, Sun Yat-sen emphasized a more inclusive notion of Chinese nationalism after the founding of the National Alliance (Tongmenghui) in 1905. Insisting on the equality of the various Chinese nationalities, Sun combined nationalism with the notions of democracy and people's livelihood. A similar note is sounded by Tao Xu, who emphasizes that, like Sun, the anti-Qing intellectual Zhang Binglin aimed his wrath at the Manchu *overlords*, not ordinary Manchus, so that after 1905 revolutionary propaganda minimally reflected sentiments of "racial revenge."[5] The problem with this assertion is that, while particular intellectual leaders may have modified their views after 1905, a general kind of anti-Manchuism, based on a notion of racial taintedness, nonetheless remained ubiquitous in revolutionary publications. Even Sun and Zhang did not always distinguish between Manchus as rulers and Manchus as ordinary people, and their followers seldom made the distinction.

Zhang Kaiyuan, who also has published extensively on anti-Manchuism, tends to grant it a role in mobilizing public opinion in favor of revolution.[6] He argues that a more rationalistic nationalism appealed to educated social elements, while a more emotional nationalism appealed to the masses. This is not convincing, if only because (as we will see below) clearly emotional elements were mixed with political and philosophical approaches in many highly literate pleas for nationalism. Zhang Kaiyuan himself recognizes that, in practice, rational and emotional appeals were mixed. This seems to be what allowed anti-Manchuism to play its ultimately positive role (in Zhang's judgment) in the creation of modern Chinese nationalism and—because of its emphasis on bottom-up change (revolution)—in the creation of modern Chinese democracy as well.

A Taiwanese scholar, Zhu Hongyuan, has noted that the *Minbao* (People's journal), the organ of the National Alliance, essentially made two points: that Manchus and Hans had different origins and that the Manchus had not assimilated.[7] Similarly, Japanese scholars have emphasized that the notion of "racial revolution" (*zhongzu geming*) was developed by young revolutionaries in their journalistic writings.[8] Anti-Manchuism was a form of resistance, in this view.[9] Much scholarship has thus discussed the issues in terms of a debate between revolutionaries, who were anti-Manchu and pro-republican, and reformers, who favored a civic rather than an ethnic definition of citizenship and supported constitutional monarchism.[10] The English literature also has tended to treat anti-Manchuism as an irrational but effective political program: vitriolic, racist, emotional and dangerous, but still useful in the development of nationalist ideas.[11]

Many scholars have emphasized the common positions shared by revolutionaries and reformers, who seem to have been divided almost solely by the question of anti-Manchuism. These scholars, too, picture a fairly rational discourse about political change and institutions, race and ethnicity, nationalism and citizenship, and similar topics.[12] Two recent monographs deal more directly with anti-Manchuism. Edward Rhoads describes anti-Manchuism as a powerful ideology in its own right and a major component of revolutionary thinking in the late Qing (carrying consequences well into the Republic).[13] Rhoads argues that after the turn of the century, Qing leaders began to recognize the need to "equalize" Hans and Manchus—to abandon the special privileges that Manchus possessed in law and custom. Yet they failed to pursue reform with sufficient vigor. Thus, in Rhoads's judgment, Han charges against the Manchus were justified. The Manchus imposed their customs (such as the queue); preserved a separate, privileged status for themselves as court aristocrats and as "banner people" (*qiren*); they discriminated against the Han Chinese while maintaining a military occupation, and, in sum, they were willing to sacrifice Chinese interests in order to retain power. Correspondingly, Rebecca Karl traces a turn, beginning about 1907, in the intelligentsia's understanding of nationalism, one which moved from a kind of multi-ethnic anti-imperialism to a more narrowly conceived ethnic nationalism.[14] The Manchus were then excluded from "the people" (*minzu*) on the grounds they were colonizers like the Americans in the Philippines, the British in South Africa, and so on. This, too, was essentially an ideological move.

Yet it seems to me that ideology does not provide a complete explanation of what was clearly an emotion with many irrational elements. Anti-Manchuism was expressed in extravagant, passionate language, not the reasoned logic of ideological argument (which, if not always reasonable, at least uses logical forms). It made claims that were indeed logically absurd and literally ridiculous. One reason for this was the revival of traumatic memories of the Qing conquest of the seventeenth century. As this putative history was reimagined in the late Qing, the graphic details of massacres and rapes functioned to bring the seventeenth century into the present, making past history seem like personal memory (as these details confirmed the charges against the Manchus). In psychoanalytical terms, the revolutionaries, and to a degree other educated Chinese, experienced the old trauma through secondary witnessing, or a process of transference that could probably only occur with a degree of traumatization. This created virtually new identities that depended directly on what was felt as personal memory (albeit through secondary witnessing) and allowed scapegoating of the impure overlord race.

The kind of secondary trauma that certain young men and women felt in the late Qing was no doubt partially existential—that is, inherent to the lives of the period. Angry and irrational writings also displayed a sense of loss. This was perhaps, at root, a mythical loss of the perfect China. Since the rejection of the Manchus was generally related to a wider rejection of the Chinese past, this loss could not be articulated. That is, revolutionaries knew perfectly well that there had never been a perfect China: they sought to move forward, not turn back. Yet the political logic of anti-Manchuism, as well as its psychology, placed the Manchus in the role of destroyers. Late Qing radicals were convinced that the Han Chinese had suffered deep wounds and ongoing injury. There was a noticeable reluctance to consider the "Chinese" roots of weakness either vis-à-vis the West or vis-à-vis the Manchus.

Intellectually, the fundamental recategorization of populations in racial-ethnic terms was essential to a deliberate effort to experience trauma in the late Qing. Though the actual perpetrators of the traumatic crimes of the seventeenth century had almost invariably been Hans, in the new ethnic terminology this was erased through a double process of transference (first, contemporary Hans identifying with their supposed ancestors and, second, contemporary Manchus being identified with the entire crisis of the seventeenth century). As we will see below, the notions of an "ancestral nation" (*zuguo*) and definition of the Han people as a descent group were integral to this formative period of Chinese nationalism. That China was being humiliated by the Western powers, there was no doubt. Of greater emotional impact in the last decade of Qing rule, however, was the historical humiliation of the numerically and culturally dominant Han at the hands of "barbarian" Manchus. Now, the "loss of the nation" (*wangguo*) over two centuries before marked a loss of the self, or at least a loss of the self as a source of legitimacy. Such a loss was bound to be traumatic.

"Trauma" today may well be an overused concept.[15] One could argue that late Qing radicals could not have been traumatized in any medical sense because "trauma" is something that happens to individuals who are wounded in some way: so wounded as to be incapable of understanding their experience. If so, then the Qing conquest in the seventeenth century may have traumatized individual Chinese at the time, but it could not have traumatized anyone in the twentieth century.[16] Psychological definitions of trauma, however, emphasize its subjective nature—what one person finds traumatic another person might take in stride. Late Qing radicals were not literally "rendered helpless by overwhelming force," as in one definition of trauma,[17] but they did think back to Manchu atrocities with a sense of vulnerability as well as horror and anger; they subjectively experienced the "Manchu conquest" as traumatic, and these experiences, in effect, were encoded as memory. Granted, this was closer to "collective memory" than to individual recollections, but again, the subjective experience was highly personal.[18] The crimes of the seventeenth century were perceived, at least, as crimes against people's own families.

If we accept the occurrence of some kind of traumatization, it was certainly an indirect or secondary experience of trauma. While it is important to maintain the distinction between the trauma that an individual directly undergoes and secondary trauma, there seems general agreement that trauma is itself *to a degree* conveyed when it is described or recounted in some way. Watching *Shoah* or reading Primo Levi does not give one access to what Holocaust victims suffered—they themselves may not have had full "access" to their experiences. But it seems common for a witness to accounts of trauma to experience some kind of trauma on some level and even become "co-owner of the traumatic event" as he "partially experiences trauma in himself."[19] A "transmission" of the experience of trauma can take place.[20] And this happens not in response to the will of the witness but, to a degree, involuntarily, as numerous studies show.[21] Indeed, one study indicates that therapists are especially vulnerable to internalizing the distress of trauma victims whom they are treating, sometimes developing symptoms like those of their patients.[22] And a number of studies indicate that "clinical manifestations of trauma" may occur upon exposure to horrifying images.[23]

Writing of historians studying the Holocaust, Dominick LaCapra notes:

> Transference is inevitable to the extent that an issue is not dead, provokes an emotional and evaluative response, and entails the meeting of history with memory. When confronting live issues, one becomes affectively implicated and tends to repeat in oneself at some level the processes active in what one tries to understand. With respect to traumatic events, and certainly with respect to the extremely traumatic limit-event, one must, I think, undergo at least muted trauma and allow that trauma (or unsettlement) to affect one's approach to problems.[24]

But if a degree of traumatization is both inevitable and desirable, LaCapra also notes that it raises difficult demands. The historian, he posits, must avoid over-identifying with the victims (which gives him an unearned subject-position as resister), he must avoid kitsch or harmonizing narratives, and he must appreciate the complexities facing victims, collaborators, resisters, and other conceivably variable positions. At the same time, to reject feelings of empathy would seem to greatly wrong the victims as well as oneself.[25]

Clearly, one does not have the right to appropriate the experiences of others. Dori Laub has suggested that witnesses to trauma must preserve an independent perspective: while partially becoming a participant in trauma, they must remain not only a witness to that trauma but also to themselves.[26] LaCapra basically says much the same thing. Borrowing from Freud, he contrasts mourning as an essentially healthy process of "working through" to melancholia, a compulsive and narcissistic inability to let go of the past, an endlessly repetitive "acting-out" (although he grants that melancholia, to a degree or temporarily, may be appropriate under certain circumstances). Above all, secondary witnesses should avoid getting trapped in acting-out, which will prevent critical judgment, ethically responsible behavior, and political commitment.[27]

As for the role of memory in trauma, studies have raised many questions. For instance, do victims "forget" what happened to them but act out their problems either immediately or much later through nightmares, hallucinations, paranoia, and such?[28] Here, it is important to note that as a medical or psychiatric phenomenon, "trauma" has been largely understood as a collection of pathological symptoms that occur *after* the traumatic experience itself (of wartime fear and pain, childhood sexual abuse, railroad accidents, or other extreme "stressors").[29] The incessant return of youthful revolutionaries in the late Qing to the horrors of the seventeenth century resembles delayed acting-out. At the least it suggests a traumatic failure, if a willful one, to come to terms with the seventeenth century as they had themselves imagined it in racial terms. They desired to bear witness to the past, to become secondary witnesses as it were.

This phenomenon was not unique to late Qing China. There are some parallels to contemporary Serbian "memories" of fifteenth-century Ottoman atrocities, for example. More broadly speaking, it is often the case that some people wish to understand "what happened" by experiencing some of the trauma at a distance—for instance, willing secondary witnesses in the next generation, who wish to understand their parents. The children of Holocaust victims played a pivotal role in getting their parents to talk, that is, in the production of memory.[30] The next generation is able to situate the traumatic events in a larger historical framework, thus both preserving them and de-traumatizing them. Yet something remains of the original trauma that cannot be integrated into historical narrative or collective memory. It is possible that family and group memories are thus preserved through generations in the forms of tales, everyday practices, and rituals. Interestingly, family traditions of anti-Manchuism are hinted at in biographies of the revolutionaries Sun Yat-sen, Zhang Binglin and Liu Shipei, and even the reformist Liang Qichao.

Memory: Trauma and Anger

In May 1645 Qing forces conquered the wealthy city of Yangzhou. Since the authorities there had refused to surrender, Qing commanders authorized their troops to loot and kill at will for five days.

> Several dozen people were herded like cattle or goats. Any who lagged were flogged or killed outright. The women were bound together at their necks with a heavy rope—strung to one another like pearls. Stumbling with each step, they were covered with mud. Babies lay everywhere on the ground. The organs of those trampled like turf under horses' hooves or people's feet were smeared in the dirt, and the crying of those still alive filled the whole outdoors. . . . It goes without saying that there were droves of orphaned children and widowed women, crying in hundred-voice choruses, their lamentations verily shaking the earth. By afternoon the stacks of corpses had grown mountainous, but the killing and pillaging just grew more intense. . . . [A soldier] had already taken a young woman, her daughter, and little boy captive. When the boy cried to his mother for something to eat, the soldier grew angry and bashed in the child's skull with one blow. Then he carried the mother and daughter away. . . . Several soldiers had captured four or five women, the older two of whom were crying dolefully while two of the younger ones were smiling, laughing, and enjoying themselves. . . . Then the two other younger women were sullied while the two older ones wailed and begged to be spared. The three younger ones shamelessly thought nothing of it when about a dozen men took turns raping them before handing them over to the two soldiers who'd run up later. By that time one of the younger women couldn't even get up to walk.[31]

The above passages are from an eyewitness account of a Chinese survivor, Wang Xiuchu, who describes his efforts to survive and keep his family alive by hiding from the soldiers and, when caught, by bribing them. His pictures of death are horrifying, as is his description of rape. That he witnessed the rape of women he knew to be of good families seems to link the fall of the city to the collapse of propriety itself. His *Yangzhou shiri ji* (Account of ten days in Yangzhou) was understandably suppressed by the Qing government, but it is not particularly anti-Manchu. It makes clear that the Qing soldiers included Chinese and that the pillagers of Yangzhou included local bandits. Indeed, Wang describes how Manchu officers imposed (very limited) discipline on particular occasions and finally brought the entire massacre to a halt.

Records such as the *Yangzhou shiri ji* and the similar *Jiading tucheng jilue* (Account of the Jiading massacres) circulated "underground" during most of the Qing period, to be rediscovered and first enter print in the second quarter of the nineteenth century.[32] It was not until the last quarter of the century, however, as China began to face aggression from Japan as well as the Western powers, culminating in the humiliation of defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95, that these writings (and others of their kind) came to be reprinted in large, multiple editions, under highly charged interpretive conditions.[33] By the late 1890s, both the Yangzhou and the Jiading accounts were being disseminated widely by the Revive China Society (Xingzhonghui) under Sun Yat-sen in Hong Kong, by Liang Qichao and the reformers in Hunan Province, and subsequently by others in many other places.[34] To make such accounts and other descriptions of the Qing conquest support a moving nationalist manifesto required that they be read in a new way. They were read through traumatized memory.[35] The perpetrators all became a foreigner race and the victims all became Han Chinese, including later generations. Late Qing readers of the *Yangzhou Account* experienced not merely empathy with Wang Xiuchu but a transferential relationship imagined in terms of the rape and murder of an entire nation—*my ancestors, my nation, my "self."* The emotionality of the readers' responses marks the contemporary—living—nature of the events. The trauma of the Yangzhou massacre was inscribed on the minds of late Qing readers already "traumatized" by foreign invasion and cultural threats. Young Han radicals demanded revenge against the Manchus who had so weakened the Chinese. Their traumatization, even if self-inflicted, was felt no less than a trauma directly inflicted. Their memories, even if in a sense willfully false (i.e. not belonging to them personally), were real as secondary memories. By "secondary" memory I mean that memories of traumatic experience on the part of the actual survivors, whether transmitted orally or in writing, are absorbed transferentially by others who come later *as their own* traumatizing memories. This was specifically encouraged by a sense of identity with the "ancestors," the meaning of which slid from lineage to nation. The result was that some late Qing Chinese relived the trauma of the Manchu invasion and conquest. In a sense, the trauma was out of control, constantly repeating itself in the minds of the (self-conceived?) victims and expressed in a variety of tropes.

In their own writings, the revolutionaries of the late Qing used tropes of recovery (of a nation lost to the Manchus), revenge, enslavement, insult, humiliation and shame.[36] They referred frequently to the "ten days of Yangzhou" and the "massacres of Jiading." They called contemporary Manchus Tartar caitiffs, slaves, beasts, barbarians, and of course an "alien race" (*yizhong*).

An influential pamphlet, *Gemingjun* (Revolutionary army), was widely reprinted in the years leading up to the 1911 Revolution. It had been published by Zou Rong in 1903 when he was just eighteen.[37] Essentially he argued that the Manchus were foreigners, that as foreigners they had no right to rule China, that they were in any case an inferior race who could not rule well, that they nonetheless persisted in oppressing the Chinese and that, therefore, the Chinese needed to rise up and overthrow them and their government. This argument rested on premises that were already widely accepted, but Zou was among the first to put them together so plainly and make the case for revolution. What made the pamphlet popular at the time, however, was Zou's sweeping language and his emotional condemnation of all Manchus, as Manchus—referring, for instance, to "the furry and horned Manchu race" and "the wolfish ambitions of this inferior race of nomads, the brigand Manchus."[38]

To put it in circular terms: the Manchus were foreigners because they were not Chinese. For Zou, as for many at the time, the Han people were literally descended from the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi), a founder of Chinese civilization in the third millennium BC, according to ancient myth. Other peoples were not so descended.[39] Other peoples were "other" precisely because they lacked this shared descent. Zou's essay was obsessed with the history of the Manchus and of the Chinese under them. His preface was dated "the 260th year after the fall of the [Ming] state of the great Han race."[40] And he brought the memory of that fall alive. Zou described his encounter with the seventeenth-century conquest as follows:

> When I read the *Account of Ten Days in Yangzhou* and the *Account of the Jiading Massacres*, I began weeping before I finished reading them. I speak out to proclaim to my fellow-countrymen: Were not the ten days at Yangzhou and the three massacres at Jiading typical of the slaughter of Hans that the Manchus perpetrated in every single district? These two books are

> merely one or two cases treated very briefly. But at that time, when troops let loose with burning and plundering, when strict orders were issued to shave heads, wherever the cavalry of the Manchu scoundrels reached there was murder and pillage. What really took place must have amounted to ten times more than these two cases. For these two incidents, which are known to everyone, there were a hundred thousand Yangzhous and Jiadings. When I recall (*yi*) them, I am in anguish. . . . When the Manchu scoundrels entered China, were not those butchered by them the great-great-grandfathers of your great-great-grandfathers? . . . Were not those raped by the Manchu scoundrels the wives, daughters, or sisters of the great-great-grandfathers of your great-great-grandfathers? . . . The *Book of Rites* says, "A filial son cannot live under the same sky with the murderer of his father and elder uncles." Even a child understands this.[41]

Here we see both historical reasoning and memory work. Zou's easy extrapolation to thousands of Yangzhous and Jiadings suggests a certain critical distance, but his weeping describes his own traumatization. The ancestral connection turns Zou (and his audience) into secondary witnesses of the earlier massacres. We can see here both identification with people defined as victims by the crime committed against them and with people defined more ambiguously by the humiliations and shame they endured—humiliations seen now as lasting 260 years. For Zou, the transferential relationship is completed by the appeal to filial piety, which demands immediate revenge no matter how distant the crime. In the new political context, revenge demanded revolution, which was Zou's most immediate goal. I will return to revenge. The point I want to emphasize here is the interrelatedness of several of Zou's tropes. He insisted that China was a conquered, "lost" nation, and he condemned his fellow Hans for their willingness to be "slaves of the barbarian slaves."[42] Zou's anger thus shifts in an unstable fashion between Hans (i.e. the self), who lack patriotism and racial feelings and have a slavish character, and Manchus (i.e. the alien), whose crimes are inscribed in his memory.[43] The tropes of slavery, recovery of the lost country and revenge all reflected the same memory; they were a code for historical wrongs committed against the self. Combined with the racial invective of bestiality, they branded the Manchus as impure—a threat to the in-group that could only be dealt with by complete expulsion or extermination.

These tropes were not unique to Zou Rong, although his pamphlet and the ensuing government case against its publisher garnered much publicity.[44] Many of these tropes are found in Tan Sitong's 1897 work *Renxue* (On benevolence), which undoubtedly influenced Zou. Tan developed the same case against the Manchus for their historical crimes, based on the premise that they were an alien, usurping race. While referring to the *Account of Ten Days in Yangzhou* and the *Account of the Jiading Massacres*, Tan writes with a certain critical distance that suggests he has not absorbed the "slaughter and pillage" of the seventeenth century in terms of his own secondary witnessing.[45] Nonetheless, later revolutionaries used many of Tan's tropes to great rhetorical effect precisely by combining them with racializing memory work. For several years, Yangzhou and Jiading remained central to the formation of a new identity. After horrendous descriptions of the death and suffering, one author estimated the number of dead: 800,000 directly put to the knife and piled up in Yangzhou, not counting those who drowned themselves in wells and rivers, burned themselves to death in their own homes, or were enslaved.[46] So, too, in Jiading, while in Jiangyin, which also had refused to surrender, over the course of 81 days the Manchus killed over 97,000 people in the city and another 75,000 in the surrounding areas—only 53 escaped. In such passages, numbers serve not to distance the reader but in their apparent precision to highlight the extent of the suffering. The author then drives the lesson home: "Let us reflect (*si*) that although those who were murdered and raped were not ourselves, they were truly our ancestors."[47]

The role of Sun Yat-sen in the creation of anti-Manchuism was clearly important. Sun used a rhetoric of racial invective, playing on the themes of barbarism and slavery.[48] Sun's vocabulary featured degrading epithets (such as barbarians, slaves, caitiffs, thieves, inferior race, and so forth), as well as calls for "taking Han revenge" (*xing Han fuchou*) and "restoration" (*guangfu*).[49] "*Think back to* when we lost the nation," he told an audience in 1906. "*Our ancestors* were not willing to submit to the Manchus. Close your eyes and *recall* the history of our ancestors' blood flowing in rivers and their corpses lying everywhere."[50] The Hans had never accepted the Manchus as their overlords, in Sun's reading of history; they had failed to overthrow them (until now) due only to lack of unity.

For Sun, the Manchu conquest meant that the Han had become "slaves"—subject to and exploited by a people whose "great cruelty" was symbolized by the massacres of Yangzhou and Jiading.[51] Indeed, the Hans now were doubly slaves—slaves of the Manchus who were slaves of the imperialist Powers—and thus faced imminent extinction. Although Sun sometimes distinguished between the Qing rulers and the Manchu people, he generally claimed that the Manchus as a whole were the utter enemies of the Han.

In Sun's reading of history, the Manchus had "entered the pass" to subjugate China only with the assistance of traitorous Hans.[52] They were essentially primitive, barbarous nomads who attracted other barbarian tribes with their myths.[53] The Chinese thought them so ineffectual, they were left alone along the borders. The evil Nurgaci (unifier of the Manchu tribes), however, eventually became pretender to the throne of China. His successor, Hong Taiji (who declared the Qing dynasty in 1636), consolidated control over Liaodong. As the Ming continued to suffer internal depredations and bandits took over Beijing, Hong Taiji's de facto successor Dorgon (uncle and regent to the young Shunzhi emperor) invaded under the pretext of helping the Ming. Everywhere, they brought cruel slaughter: in Yangzhou and Jiading, as well as in Jiangyin, Jiaxing, Jinhua, Guangzhou, and other places. The Manchus' crimes did not stop with the conquest but continued—and are continuing—throughout Qing rule: systematic thievery, exploitation and oppression, as well as individual immorality. And not a few Hans became corrupted by them. The Manchu-Qing's greatest crime, in Sun's view—judging by how often he repeated the point—lay in making the Han people ignorant. Sun was referring to censorship, restrictions on political activities and closing the country to outside influence. More broadly, however, Sun was accusing the Manchus as a race of deliberately trying to impede political progress.

Sun also was referring to enforced forgetting, since the Manchus understood that the less the Hans knew of their own past, the easier they would be to rule. In a speech given in the United States in 1904 Sun explained: "The Manchus' object was to stamp out the patriotic spirit of the Chinese, so that in the course of time they might forget that they were subject to a foreign rule."[54] He here compared the Manchu conquest to the barbarians' overrunning of the Roman Empire. The fundamental point, though, was that there was no Chinese government, only an illegitimate Manchu one. In sum, Sun remembered history as events modified with adjectives—particularly adjectives like "immoral" and "thievish." His basic views are summarized in this 1903 statement:

> Since the Qing court consists of a foreign race ruling China, the gap between the government and the people has become especially deep. During the invasion they slaughtered whole towns, and hunting down victims regularly took ten days. Since ancient times, never had the Han people suffered such great savagery. Loyalists hid in the wilds and retained their hatred, so the notion of revenge has never faded. . . . The Manchu court's killing in order to intimidate the Hans has continued without abatement.[55]

Again, this view rested on the notion of Han descent from the Yellow Emperor, which premise allowed Sun to regard the Hans as a distinct people, with some 4,000 years of history, and the Manchus as primitive barbarians from beyond the pale.

Trauma: Anger and Dehumanization

Over the course of the following decade, treatment of the conquest as a traumatizing experience can be found in much of the student press. Zou Rong's essay was repeatedly cited in writings that combined attacks on the institutions of kingship and "slavery" with calls for revenge against the Manchus, who, it was charged, wielded power unjustly as well as incompetently, who were thieves (having stolen China), and who were subhuman beasts, "as depraved as dogs and sheep, like hungry wolves."[56] One student wrote that he understood the history of his ancestors (that is, the Han Chinese people) and remembered (*ji*) their shame—it was imprinted on his brain and would never be forgotten.[57] The barbarian Mongols had killed nineteen million Chinese, but the slaughters by the Manchu beasts were far worse. The percentage of the populace that was supposed to have died at Yangzhou and Jiading was extrapolated to apply to every county. The unprecedented cruelties included cannibalism in Shanxi Province and the sale of human heads in Henan. "Whenever I think of these things, my blood boils and I want to exterminate this bastard race and eat them for breakfast."[58]

Many readers of the Yangzhou *Account* reported being deeply moved by the massacres, which elicited "irrepressible gnashing of teeth and shouts of anger," in the standard phrase.[59] To remember the conquest, with its crafty barbarians and traitorous Ming officials, was an agony. Yet it was also an act of empathetic understanding: "The old people were killed and the young ones enslaved. The cruelties of the ten days in Yangzhou and the three massacres of Jiading were utterly inhuman. Even today, thinking back on it, I tremble with fear. We can only imagine how awful it must have been at the time!"[60] Memory could also take concrete physical form. A leading revolutionary from central China, Yang Dusheng, remembered this saying about men who wished to be buried in Ming clothing: "When alive, they surrendered [to the Qing], but in death they never surrendered." Yang also suggested that at least in Hunan the "evil custom of footbinding"—not formally permitted among Manchu women—was taken as a sign that "while men surrendered [to the Qing], women never surrendered." Thus footbinding became a kind of "memorial of grief and trauma" that prevented the Hunanese from ever forgetting the shame of their slavery.[61]

Writing in 1906, a certain Gong Chuntai claimed that the Manchu barbarians were simply following their evil nature when they slaughtered over two million Han compatriots in conquering China.[62] This was their first great crime. Gong goes on to accuse them of destroying Chinese culture, exploiting the Chinese people, and other heinous acts down to the present day. In other words, their historical crimes were part of a continuous, living stream of criminal behavior. It was the later, ongoing crimes that made the original crimes unforgivable, requiring revenge. They provoked in the last years of the Qing a traumatized rhetoric that made use of both traditional colloquialisms and new metaphors. In another student newspaper of the same year one reads:

> Ever since they entered the pass [to China proper], the barbarian Manchus have never practiced virtue but always followed their ultimate strategy. They have relied on brute force to suppress the popular will. As for the evils of their methods and the perils of their policies—even if you had a thousand hands and a thousand fingers on each hand, you could never finish counting them; even if you had a thousand mouths and a thousand tongues in each mouth, you could never finish naming them.[63]

The Manchus' cruelty and bestiality continued to be emphasized in a series of "manifestos" (*xi*) published in 1907 in a special edition of the *People's Journal* called "Heaven's Revenge" (*Tiantao*). The lead article emphasized their ongoing cruelty and immorality, directly exhorting its readers:

> You also need to remember (*nian*) that when the barbarians entered the pass, they assaulted your fathers and grandfathers, whose dismembered heads and guts were scattered abroad, whose houses were destroyed, whose ancestral temples were obliterated, and whose tombs were opened, and that your deceased mothers, along with all your mothers and all your aunts, were defiled.[64]

The issue featured manifestos against Manchu crimes in the provinces of Sichuan, Jiangsu, Henan, Anhui, Zhili, Shandong, Guangdong and Yunnan. In each case, the origin of the crimes was traced to the seventeenth-century murder and rape of ancestors. The descriptions of Shandong and other places emphasized that the land and people had not recovered, even centuries later.

Other devices for framing memory included fiction. A "literary sketch" published in 1903 in a student journal titled *Jiangsu* described an "old man" in a teahouse telling his auditors of the evils of the alien Manchus.[65]

To begin with, he says, they tricked the Hans by hiring conscienceless traitors to teach that they were of the same race as the Manchus so people would forget who their ancestors' enemies were. The old man emphasized that in fact the victims of slaughter were Han, the perpetrators Manchu; the exploited were Han, the exploiters Manchu. The Manchus were barbarians—hunters without religion or government who lived like the animals they hunted. The implied logic here was that the Manchus held themselves aloof from the Hans, creating a kind of apartheid, and thus it was no surprise that today the Manchus were willing to give the country away to the Western powers. Loyalty to the emperor, the old man said, may be a virtue in some quarters, but now it represented loyalty to our ancestral enemy. "They killed Chinese beyond counting. This enmity can never be forgotten." As for the massacre at Yangzhou:

> All the inhabitants, including those who had fled from outlying districts, at least two or three millions, were slain without exception. Everyone saw how the Tartars cold-bloodedly slaughtered people and set fires. Although these actions were witnessed, in an instant the witnesses were turned into ghosts who could not tell the living the truth of what had happened. Still, a few were lucky enough to escape with their lives either by hiding in coffins or in the piles of corpses. The cries of the dying were all they heard from morning to night without cease. Some had their heads cut off; some their arms and legs; some were severed at the waist; some had their heads sliced open; some were split into two from head to foot; some were able to flee even with their wounds; some were stomped to death by Manchu soldiers as they lay writhing on the ground; and some were speared by Manchu soldiers when they tried to hide in trees.[66]

The city was filled with cries for help, but in the streets were only piled-up corpses, and the river filled with blood.

The fictionality of this account largely consisted of its framing, which also highlights its memory work. The old man told his teahouse interlocutors that as a child he had found an "Account of Unendurable Witnessing" (*Buren jian lu*) in his family library, much to his father's distress. His father burned the incriminating volume, but the man remembered its accounts of slaughters across China. The author, he said, was a Han who had surrendered to the Manchu scoundrels. If this was the case, an interlocutor asked, then why would such a man write an account of Manchu crimes? The old man explained that the author had surrendered only to live to expose the truth for later generations. The old man indirectly raised the issue of the account's reliability by emphasizing the detailed nature of the account and the author's evident sincerity. The question of how we know it to be true, however, is not directly answered. From the point of view of the reader of *Jiangsu*, the Manchu depredations are a story (the "Account") in a story (the old man's words) in a story (the literary sketch). Yet these layers of framing do not seem to lessen the immediacy of the witnessing or convey a sense of make-believe; rather, they naturalize the process of secondary witnessing by drawing the reader into the seventeenth century through the contemporary, if fictional, teahouse. Though the story includes sounds and odors, it is sights that have the most traumatizing effects, and the theme of witnessing is thereby foregrounded.

Traditional story-telling could also convey memory. In the "Dream of Yangzhou" again we find a story within a story, highlighting the problem of remembering by moving back and forth between the present (1903) and the fall of Yangzhou in 1645.[67] A long-dead spirit recalls the cruelties that people—without regard to birth or station—suffered then. "Whenever I remember (*nian*) the Tartars' conquest and the sufferings of the people, I cannot think, cannot talk, cannot stop trembling." Yet over the centuries everyone has forgotten the ancient slaughter. The spirit's point is that at present Yangzhou's scholars are trying to think of ways to help resist Russian encroachments on Manchuria, but rather than trying to fight for the (Manchu) emperor, they should remember that it was Manchus who killed their ancestors. Back then, blood was everywhere; neither old nor young were spared. Now, the Manchu destruction of Yangzhou cannot be forgotten. Then, the Manchus slaughtered at will, tied up women and children, trampled infants under their horses' hooves, raped nuns in front of their servants and killed beautiful women in their chambers. The spirit emphasizes his sense of humiliation, recalling how Manchu soldiers claimed that Korean women had resisted them to the death but that Chinese women had not shown such virtue. What the "Dream of Yangzhou" lacks in coherence, it makes up for in traumatic intensity.

The "memories" of Manchu invasion and occupation also underwent a dual process of distancing and deepening in the youthful revolutionary Chen Tianhua's novel *Shizi hou* (Lion's roar). The novel begins with an allegorized version of the defeat of the Chinese, thus breaking, to a degree, the strong identification found in witnessing. Yet this allegory allows Chen to heighten mythical "truths" as literal narratives cannot. We learn that the large and magnificent Original Kingdom (*Hundunguo*) had been conquered by neighboring barbarian tribes.[68] Ninety percent of the population had been killed and the country occupied for more than 200 years. Then, even fiercer countries arrived to take bites out of the Original Kingdom, kill more of its inhabitants and steal its products. The men of the Original Kingdom could not find wives, and the population was dwindling down to extinction. The conquering nations neglected education, so the Original People became barbaric and ran wild. They were used as cannon fodder and coolies, and they disappeared within 300 years.

This allegory is followed by a brief description of the Manchu conquest that is matter-of-fact in tone—until Chen approaches the topic of Yangzhou.[69] At this point, Chen describes the Qing's armies—Han troops in front—leaving not even a chicken or dog in their wake. Whether or not people shaved their heads, all were caught in the Manchus' nets. Chen provides a long excerpt from the *Account of Ten Days in Yangzhou*, claiming that Yangzhou and Jiading were typical cases of Manchu cruelty. And he cites a memory passed down by the older generation—that decades after the conquest, lands where the Manchus passed through were still not being farmed.

Throughout this material, the fear of forgetting and the need to remember remained another important trope. Liu Shipei (a Yangzhou native) demanded that Yangzhou be remembered. His reasons ranged from the initial slaughter of innocents and the ruthless pursuit of revenues to the literary persecutions of the eighteenth-century Qianlong emperor and his immoral treatment of women on his southern tours.[70] Also, a letter to the journal *Jiangsu*, published under the heading "Records of What We Dare Not Forget," emphasized the importance of remembering the Ming martyrs. An example given was that of a man, Yang Tingshu of Suzhou, who had refused to surrender to the Manchus, hiding out for four years. When captured, he had insisted on losing his head to the executioner rather than lose his hair in adopting the Manchu queue. Before he was killed, he managed to inscribe a poem on his gown with his own blood to "rouse the spirit of the Chinese people." The letter-writer's point was that by not forgetting this man—his poem in blood, his suffering and his patriotism—the Han people would "remember" their identity.[71]

This approach to historical memory might be called anachronistic, since it reads Ming loyalists as Han nationalists, like the interpretation of footbinding as anti-Manchuism cited above. But the point here is that such memories were inevitably associated with pain. "As for the pain of losing the nation [i.e. the Qing conquest], even today we are still full of grief when we recall it."[72] In yet another formulation: "Thoughts of the loss of the nation [however painful] are constantly in our hearts."[73] The fear of forgetting—and by implication the need for acts of will to remember—was captured in the last testament of the revolutionary assassin and martyr Wu Yue. Recalling the slaughter of ancestors and the rape of ancestors' wives and sisters, as well as the current failure of the Manchus to protect China from foreign onslaught (indeed, their active cooperation with foreign enemies), Wu asked, "These brigands, these enemies: how can we live with them for more than 260 years and forget about their crimes? If we forget, we are forgetting the enemies who killed our compatriots' ancestors, forgetting the enemies who raped the wives and sisters of our compatriots' ancestors. . . ."[74]

Memory and Revenge

We have seen above how frequently writers used the trope of revenge. It was an essential component of traumatized memory as well as a kind of allusion to the tradition of righteous vengeance.[75] Calls for Han revenge against Manchus were ubiquitous in the last years of the Qing. A 1907 "indictment" (*zuizhuang*) against the Manchus began with the conquest, that is, the "age of butchery" (*tulu shidai*).[76] In this account, the killing began with Nurgaci and his band of dogs and sheep; they started by murdering the poor and continued with the rich. The Qing dynasty's classification of populations placed Manchus first, Mongols second, Han bannermen third, and the ordinary Han Chinese last.[77] The conquest left the country devastated, with "countless souls crushed under the hooves of the Suolun horses."[78] This indictment stressed that the accounts of Yangzhou and Jiading recalled to mind the ancestors twisting under Manchu knives, and it concluded with a demand posed as a question: "How should we compatriots take revenge?"

But where did the motif of revenge come from? Why was it so central to the discourse of racial difference, traumatic historical memory and oppression? The scholarly nationalist and fervent revolutionary Zhang Binglin emphasized the use of historical memory to produce a sense of national identity. Although he did not dwell specifically on the trauma of the seventeenth century, he did carefully define the tropes of "revenge" (*fuchou*) and "restoration" (*guangfu*), and one might say that his sense of living in an enemy-occupied land was traumatizing. I do not want to trivialize trauma by finding it everywhere. Still, Zhang's incessant anti-Manchu comments in the early years of the twentieth century suggest some of the uncontrolled repetitiousness of trauma. Here we might distinguish between two types of memory: in Ruth Leys's formulation, " 'traumatic memory,' which merely and unconsciously *repeats* the past, and 'narrative memory,' which *narrates the past as past.*"[79] In other words, traumatization in some sense rests on the present, narrating self's observation of the previous, narrated self. Moving this into the realm of collective memory, we can see that Zhang makes an *argument* based essentially on two premises: first, that the Manchu group has perpetrated racial crimes on the Han group, and second, that those crimes persist to the present day. This argument in turn rests on a historical *narrative* that traces the groups back to ancient times and recalls the events that joined the crime—victim relationship. Finally, Zhang takes on an *ethical stand*: that this demands revenge. Revenge is the ethically logical and necessary conclusion to which traumatized racial memory leads. Without it, Zhang's memory work would collapse (as indeed it tended to do after 1912).

Zhang moved from reform to revolution during the years 1900 and 1901.[80] In a statement for a planned meeting in Tokyo in 1902 to commemorate the 242nd anniversary of the "loss" of China (canceled by the Japanese authorities), Zhang claimed a quasi-racial, clan continuity for the Chinese that had lasted over 4,000 years.[81] For this, he cited both ancient myths, such as the Yellow Emperor, as well as his own historical work on Han clans. In Zhang's view, the Manchu invasion of the seventeenth century nearly wiped out the Chinese and led to the last 242 years of illegitimate occupation. Zhang frankly reveled in the past but also noted the pain of remembrance (*sigu zhi tong*). In this spirit, he invoked the martyrs of resistance to the Manchu invasions:

> We shall gather together in tears to observe the fall of China. May our Yunnan Chinese remember Li Dingguo! May our Fujian Chinese remember Zheng Chenggong! May our Zhejiang Chinese remember Zhang Cangshui! May our Guangxi Chinese remember Qu Shisi! May our Hubei Chinese remember He Tengjiao! And may our Liao [South Manchurian] Chinese remember Li Chengliang![82]

Heroic martyrs were symbols of national unity, marked also by Zhang's simultaneous appeal to administrative geography. And Zhang's invocation of martyrs also performed a kind of memory work: raising in the background the issues of crime and revenge.

In his open letter to Kang Youwei (who, along with Liang Qichao, was a leader of the antirevolutionary reformers), published in mid-1903, Zhang condemned the Manchus for their abuse of the ancestral lands (*zhuangnue zuguo*) and their treatment of Hans as their enemies.[83] Condemning Kang's thesis that Hans and Manchus were essentially the same people, Zhang argued in detail that the Manchus had failed to assimilate to Han ways: they absolutely were alien conquerors. And this is why revenge against the Manchus was justified. Kang had suggested that just as present-day Chinese were descended from different warring kingdoms (two millennia previously), so Manchus and Hans could seek a higher political unity. Zhang, however, objected that Kang's historical examples involved, first, men of the same race, and second, wars that had been conducted in the names of individual leaders, not entire groups. The troops who had carried out their orders had not acted out of hate two thousand years ago, but the Manchus had all agreed on slaughtering the Han race. Finally, Zhang added, even if present-day Chinese were a homogenization of once-distinct peoples, the Manchus were still a well-defined group (i.e. one that refused to assimilate).

Zhang criticized both Qing rule and Manchu favoritism: Manchus were privileged in the bureaucracy; taxes harmed the populace; censorship and executions crippled intellectuals. "Today five million Manchus rule over 400 million-plus Hans only through rotten traditions that make them stupid and keep them ignorant. As soon as the Hans wake up, the Manchus will be unable to rest peacefully within the Great Wall." Manchus were "as stupid as deer and pigs," and the emperor, the "little clown," was the "public enemy of the Han race." Zhang's anti-Manchuism was based on a racial reading of history but it also rested on his strong sense of moral righteousness.[84]

In another essay, Zhang linked revenge to the execution of justice.[85] As a son has a right to avenge a father wrongly killed, so the Hans have the right to avenge their ancestors. If the Manchus suddenly gave up their illegitimate powers, they would have the right to their lives, or so Zhang implied. But since they had raped and killed the Han nation *and* still clung to power, justice could only be achieved by killing them. This was not a matter of killing innocent later generations but active participants in a great and ongoing crime.

It may be objected that Zhang is confusing two separate issues here: one the moral question of revenge and justice; the other, the political necessity of revolution. Scholars often remark on Zhang's early turn to exclusive nationalism, the Zhang family tradition of anti-Manchuism and the scholarly arguments that he used to support it. The roots (and philosophical implications) of Zhang's thought are beyond the scope of this article, but his particular reading of classical and historical texts in terms of repeated barbarian blows against Chinese civilization is significant.[86] Much about Zhang's thinking remains controversial, including the roots of his nationalism and the degree to which he should be considered racially "anti-Manchu," rather than politically "anti-Qing." But it is clear that his thought was permeated with historical awareness. His social and political analyses intertwined with his readings of the Confucian classics and canonical histories. In addition to his study of ancient tribal names, designed to show the primordial distinctions between Han and barbarian, his discussions of the late Ming also emphasized the foreign origins of the Manchus.

The Qing government's destruction of Chinese historical records during the Qianlong emperor's literary inquisition (1772–96) was a crime as great as any, in Zhang's tally.[87] He was motivated to preserve historical memory, but he was also emotionally committed to anti-Manchuism in ways that reveal at least partial traumatization. In a "song" written in 1906, for example, he returned to the slaughter of Hans during the ten days of Yangzhou, as well as to the massacres of Jiading and Guangzhou: Manchu soldiers began by raping and plundering and then moved on to simply exploiting the Hans.[88]

Calls like Zhang's to link memory with revenge were extraordinarily widespread, if seldom as well thought-out. The theme of revenge played a major role in the writings of Zou Rong and Sun Yat-sen, as noted above. Chen Tianhua, too, spoke of the need for revenge—and of its long frustration: the ancestors, unable to take revenge, hoped that a later generation would fight back. So now, "reading the records of the slaughters at Jiading or the ten days at Yangzhou, who does not recoil in furious anger?"[89] Similarly, the student press frequently linked the crimes of the evil race to the need to "take the revenge of nine generations" (*jiushi fuchou*).

The theory of revenge was thus highly emotive. In the formulation of Wang Dong, if a grandfather or father is killed by bandits who also occupy the family home and their descendants have nowhere to turn, then they must "swallow their hatred and cry tears of blood," polishing their knives and waiting for the day when they can kill the bandits and expel their descendants, restore the family home and avenge the ancestors.[90] This was of course as much parable as theory.

It should perhaps also be noted that, while Manchus were often attacked as "Tartar caitiffs," "barbarian sheep," and such, a distinction was sometimes made between the Manchus as a racial group, some members of which were innocent, and the Qing leaders. Sometimes Sun Yat-sen spoke in this way: "We don't hate Manchus; we hate those Manchus who harm Hans," and Manchus who do not fight against the revolution will not be hurt.[91] So too—sometimes—did revolutionaries like Hu Hanmin, Zhang

Binglin, and others less famous. Such calm calculation of distinctions might seem evidence of non-traumatized detachment. However, while political calculations played a role in their apparent moderation, racial trauma had been so thoroughly internalized that it did not always scream its presence.[92] It had been transmuted into cold anger and the remorselessness of revenge. The language of revenge was itself strong enough to reflect a traumatized sensibility.

On a cooler emotional level, for the radical writer Lu Xun, reflecting on his memories of the 1911 Revolution in 1925, the ultimate issue had not been revenge, or the failure of revenge, but rather the failure of memory—the distressing tendency of the Chinese to forget.[93] He noted that the accounts of the massacres at Yangzhou, Jiading, and other places, like the writings of Ming loyalists, were published to revive forgotten hatreds. But this desire for revenge had dissipated with the coming of the revolution. Lu suggested that this was because of both revolutionary optimism and a desire to appear "civilized." Though the Manchu quarters in Nanjing had been destroyed, this had not been due, he thought, to any Han desire for revenge. Rather—or so he had heard—most of the damage had been caused by the Manchus themselves. In any case, "Even if you hung the *Account of Ten Days in Yangzhou* in front of your eyes, you couldn't maintain your anger." After the success of the 1911 Revolution, conditions had regressed with the revival of monarchism and the triumph of Yuan Shikai's dictatorship. Thus, in his day, Lu neither glorified nor denigrated revenge, regarding it as both normal and dangerous. Yet he felt that the anger of the Chinese people was too often misdirected and intermittent.

Conclusion

Were Zou Rong, Zhang Binglin, Lu Xun and other late Qing radicals rewriting history, or were they in some sense reliving the traumatic events of the seventeenth century? Were they commemorating past events, or were they in some sense prey to recurrent and intrusive memories? The truth may lie somewhere in the middle. We cannot know how readers reacted to their writings, but the ubiquity of emotionalized references to Manchu atrocities, and the large number of authors (many now unknown), suggest a degree of trauma. True, if late Qing radicals suffered from trauma, it was relatively controlled and self-inflicted. Yet we cannot say they were merely engaged in historical reconstruction. It is generally agreed that history writing works on certain levels of detachment and objectivity; late Qing radicals were engaged in something closer to memory work.

China is not the only such case. As David Lowenthal says of Ireland,

> Some societies need no re-enactment to reactivate history; the process seems to be ingrained, habitual. Unassuaged injuries and injustices often lead men to conflate remote with recent times and even with the present. Many Irish continue to *experience* the Danish invasions, the devastations of Laud, the Famine of 1847, as almost contemporaneous events.... But the Irish do not "live in the past"; rather, Ireland's history "lives in the present."[94]

The immediate presence of the past—whether reinforced by commemorative rituals or physical landmarks, or engendered entirely by acts of the imagination—requires an identification with the past. A seemingly natural form of such identity was provided by the traditional Chinese emphasis on lineage and ancestors. As Lowenthal also points out, "The enduring import of family bonds often conflates past generations. 'Yes, 1852, that was the year... I fought King Ta'ufa'ahau,' reports a Tongan, but in fact it was his great-great-great-grandfather who had done so. To reactivate vivid memory, as we have seen, requires a renewed sensation in the present."[95] Vivid historical memories can also be virtually created by political leaders using the resources of the state, as in Serbia in the 1990s, but they always rest on group identities.

Anti-Manchuism erupted in 1902–3 and perhaps peaked in the 1905–7 period, remaining strong through the 1911 Revolution. Its effects were profound. Although the exact relationship between anti-Manchu propaganda and the slaughter of Manchu communities in the course of the 1911 Revolution remains elusive, it seems beyond doubt that there was *some* relationship. The language of "revenge" that accompanied that of "extermination" and "expulsion" demonstrates, at the least, how anti-Manchu ideology was used to legitimate the slaughters when they occured.[96] Thus we cannot discuss anti-Manchuism without keeping in mind the horrifying fate that awaited many Manchus, who were turned into refugees if not killed outright. Anti-Manchu violence, including the slaughter of women and children, engulfed Wuchang, Xi'an, Taiyuan, Zhenjiang, Fuzhou and Nanjing.[97] Manchu quarters in these cities were torched. Hunted down over several days, supposed Manchus were identified by their clothing, their accents, their "flat heads," and the unbound feet of Manchu women. On the other hand, in some cities (including Hangzhou, Guangzhou, Chengdu and Yili), the Manchus were merely driven out of their homes and turned into refugees. Since peace terms between the revolutionaries and the government were negotiated before the revolution reached northern China and Manchuria, the lives and properties of ordinary Manchus in these regions were not threatened. A complete assessment would thus treat anti-Manchuism as just one factor determining how violently Manchus were treated.[98]

The weight of scholarly opinion grants that anti-Manchuism had its negative side—encouraging Han chauvinism, short-circuiting rational debate and increasing ethnic tensions generally. But overall it concludes that anti-Manchuism played a positive role in furthering the revolution by moving people beyond traditional prejudice against barbarians and constructing Han identity. Anti-Manchuism is generally treated as one of several radical positions.[99] Indeed, most studies of the 1911 Revolution downplay its violence.

The emotion of anti-Manchuism was itself a violent one, however, emerging in a dialectic of immediate grievances and memories of the seventeenth-century conquest—the original trauma—which that emotion also helped to create. Certainly anti-Manchuism was related in one aspect to fundamental changes in historiography, including the discovery of the nation as the prime historical subject, but my emphasis here is on the role of memory as a personal experience. Eyewitness accounts of the devastation of Yangzhou and other events that occurred during the conquest were absorbed by some late Qing figures as living issues of intense emotional import. They clearly identified themselves with victims of the conquest. They renarrativized this history by reading contemporary symbols back into the original sources. Obviously, it was a racialized "nationalism" that provided the context in which such a renarrativization could take place. Both an ideology of lineage and a biologized social Darwinism were important. The imagining of "ancestors" in the late Qing became a critical part of Han identity, as Hans and Manchus became racially imagined as distinct breeding populations or "races."

The tone of late Qing narratives of the conquest ranged from dry, objectified accounts of a nearly dead issue to complete transference and compulsive repetition of particular events as if they were a fully present reality. It is accounts tending toward the latter pole that concern us here and which, I believe, became mainstream during this period. Critical distance was neither desired nor, for the most part, possible. This was not because revolutionaries were consciously manipulating history but because they had invested themselves in the "ancestors" of the seventeenth century. We may label this a fantasmatic investment based on a mythic sense of good (Han, human) versus evil (Manchu, bestial). In this case, fear of the "other" would have been accentuated by a reality of shared culture. Although recent research has convincingly demolished older views that Manchus were completely assimilated, they were hardly separated from the Hans by large cultural, linguistic, religious or physical differences. This suggests that anger against the Manchus as Manchus, at least in its more extreme forms, was displaced anger of the Han with themselves and displaced desire for what they seemingly lacked. In the absence of a viable nation, desire focused on what had been putatively lost; for the failure to achieve nationhood, a scapegoat was needed.

Memory played a double role here. The Han could be simultaneously blamed for forgetting and awakened to their national destiny through recollection. And memories could be created and incorporated into the self, which resulted in essentializing two different populations or "races," the Han and Manchu. Conceiving themselves as victims—with a considerable element of truth—self-proclaimed Han leaders needed further victims. Chinese anxieties were channeled into a project of redemption through national struggle conceived as "racial revolution" against an overlord race. Fear that the Han race would be exterminated was a major trope of the period. Rhetorically, the Manchus became scapegoats whose extermination in turn would guarantee the survival of a purified Han race. Exterminating Manchus could also be a way of affirming the power of the Hans.[100] The pressures of Western imperialism destabilized China's external and internal "borders," thus allowing race to emerge as a key ordering notion. The very closeness of the Manchus to the Hans marked the latter as an even greater threat to Han purity than the Western intruders. Scapegoating was thus not only a matter of displacing anger at an uncontainable Western imperialism onto a weaker people and government, but also a way of defining the national body.

At the same time, without a more thoroughly biological imaginary, anti-Manchuism could not become a foundational myth of the revolution. For all its limitations, the 1911 Revolution resolved the late Qing identity crisis. Nationhood having been at least preliminarily achieved, purification was no longer on the agenda, and Manchus could be reabsorbed into a multinational nation-state (the "republic of the five races"). The seventeenth-century "crimes" of the Manchus were not forgotten immediately, but they were increasingly distanced.[101]

The late-Qing retraumatization of the seventeenth-century conquest and the creation of new collective memories of it literally represent a "return of the repressed" in the sense that this memory work relied on texts that had been available but had not become culturally and psychologically salient until the 1890s. Traumatized memory then claimed to have a certain story to tell—one of Han victims and resisters, not of "Great Qing" soldiers—that the texts confirmed. On this memory claim the late Qing revolutionaries rested demands for justice and revenge, and circularly, claims for justice legitimated the traumatized memory. Within this new revenge scenario, Zhang Binglin argued that it was just for Hans to kill Manchus but not for Manchus to kill Hans. To conflate vengeance with justice in this way is no doubt a great, potentially criminal, mistake. But to deny the right to vengeance might also be to deny a right to justice. For victims, the failure to take revenge might result in a failure to work through their relationships to the past and claim their own agency.

Zhang Binglin did not, at least, equate the descendants of perpetrators with the perpetrators themselves, but noted that those descendants were still benefiting from the crimes of the past. The 1911 Revolution, then, brought an end to the story. Today, the traumas of the seventeenth century and the early twentieth century alike do not seem as alive to the Chinese people as they once were. Newer traumas, such as the Great Leap Forward, the famines of the early 1960s and the Cultural Revolution of the late 1960s—discussed below by Klaus Mühlhahn—are presenting them with fresh challenges in coming to terms with the past.

Notes

1. For an example, see Lynn A. Struve, "Confucian PTSD: Reading Trauma in a Chinese Youngster's Memoir of 1653," 14–31 above. Translations of other accounts can be found in idem, *Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm: China in Tigers' Jaws* (New Haven, 1993).

2. For example, see Liang Qichao, "Chunqiu Zhongguo yidi bianxu" (Introduction to the distinctions between barbarians during the Chunqiu period), in idem, *Yinbingshi heji* (Collected essays from the ice-drinker's studio) (Beijing, 1993), *Wenji* (Miscellaneous essays), 2: 48–49.

3. Anti-Manchuism did not completely disappear, but it did dissipate rapidly in the 1910s, as the Republic of China officially and frequently invoked the harmony of the "five [Chinese] races." Taking the oath as provisional president on 1 January 1912, Sun Yat-sen invoked the unity of Hans, Manchus, Mongols, Huis and Tibetans as one people. The notion of the "five races" was repeatedly invoked in official speeches on national holidays and in the symbolism of the new state—especially the five-colored flag, but also in national songs. See Henrietta Harrison, *The Making of the Republican Citizen: Political Ceremonies and Symbols in China, 1911–1929* (Oxford, 2000).

4. Jin Chongji, "Xinhai geming he Zhongguo jindai minzu zhuyi" (The 1911 Revolution and modern Chinese nationalism), *Jindai yanjiu*, no. 5 (2001): 1–20.

5. Tao Xu, *Wan-Qing minzu zhuyi sichao* (Nationalist currents in the late Qing) (Beijing, 1995), 211–14.

6. Zhang Kaiyuan, "Xinhai geming shiqi de shehui dongyuan" (Social mobilization during the 1911 revolutionary period), *Shehui kexue yanjiu*, no. 5 (1996): 93–99; "'Pai-Man' pingyi: Dui xinhai geming qianhou minzu zhuyi de zai renshi" (A critique of "expel the Manchus": A reconsideration of nationalism before and after the 1911 Revolution), *Guoshiguan guankan* 16, no. 6 (1994): 125–43. See also Li Liangyu, "Xinhai geming shiqi de pai-Man sixiang (Manchu-expulsion thought during the 1911 revolutionary period), *Nanjing daxue xuebao: Zhexue, renwen, shehui kexue*, no. 2 (1989): 67–77.

7. Zhu Hongyuan, *Tongmenghui de geming lilun: "Minbao" gean yanjiu* (The revolutionary theories of the National Alliance: A case study of the "People's Journal") (Taipei, 1995), 66–68.

8. See, for example, Ono Shinji, "Singai kakumei to kakumei senden" (The 1911 Revolution and revolutionary propaganda), in Onogawa Hidemi and Shimda Kenji, eds., *Xingai kakumei no kenkyū* (Studies on the 1911 Revolution) (Tokyo, 1978), 37–88.

9. Maruyama Masayuki, *Chūgoku kindai no kakumei shisō* (Modern Chinese revolutionary thought) (Tokyo, 1982), 35–36.

10. The outstanding example in English is Michael Gasster, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911* (Seattle, 1969).

11. Ibid., 69–100; Gasster is critical of "racial invective" for inflaming the political atmosphere so that "rational discussion became increasingly difficult" (99). Frank Dikötter, in *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (London, 1992), has stated that anti-Manchuism was a minor strand compared to fears of the "white race" (111–12). This might be true in terms of the overall context of racial thinking in the late Qing, but it is misleading in that anti-Manchuism, coupled with frequent and casual racial invective, became central to revolutionary propaganda (curiously, Dikötter fails to connect the construction of the so-called "Han race" with anti-Manchuism). Pamela Kyle Crossley is alert to personal factors but also emphasizes ideology. See her *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton, 1990), 178–86.

12. Jiang Xin and Li Cunyu, "Zai minzu jiuwang de qizhi xia: minzu zhuyi sichao lun'gang" (Under the banner of national salvation: Outline of nationalist thought), in Gao Ruiquan, ed., *Zhongguo jindai shehui* (Social thought in modern China), (Shanghai, 1996), 375–413, esp. 398–400.

13. Edward Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Political Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle, 2000).

14. Rebecca Karl, *Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the Twentieth Century* (Durham, NC, 2002).

15. Felicia R. Lee, "Is Trauma Being Trivialized?" *New York Times* (web edition), 6 Sept. 2003, section B, p. 9.

16. The use of "trauma" to describe premodern psychological states, especially in intercultural settings, raises the question whether a phenomenon only noticed (or at any rate analyzed as a distinct condition) in the West in the late 19th century existed in other times and places. Given different expectations and attitudes toward suffering in past times and different cultures—say, in Rome's attack on Carthage—conditions that produce trauma today might have been experienced as painful but not traumatizing. On the other hand, it would be wrong to assume that a condition cannot exist before it is identified as such. Only careful definition and empirical work can answer the question. As mentioned above (n. 1), Struve has found a 17th-century case that seems to fit the modern definition of trauma. Another culturally attuned effort to trace traumatic memory in China is Susanne Weigelin-Schwiedrzik's article "Trauma and Memory: The Case of the Great Famine in the People's Republic of China (1959–1961)," *Historiography East & West* 1, no. 1 (2003): 38–67. She raises the possibility that traumas are de-traumatized through the agency of ancestor-worship: to wit, as long as the family line is guaranteed, whatever happens to a given individual is "tolerable" (57–58).

17. Judith Lewis Herman, *Trauma and Recovery* (New York, 1992), 33.

18. Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory,* trans. Francis J. Ditter, Jr., and Vida Yazdi Ditter (New York, 1980).

19. Dori Laub, writing in Shoshana Felman and Dori Laub, *Testimony: Crises of Witnessing in Literature, Psychoanalysis, and History* (New York, 1992), 57–58.

20. Cathy Caruth, "Introduction," in idem, ed., *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, (Baltimore, 1995), 10–11.

21. Richard J. McNally, *Remembering Trauma* (Cambridge, MA, 2003), 82–89.

22. I.L. McCann and L.A. Pearlman, "Vicarious Traumatization: A Framework for Understanding the Psychological Effects of Working with Victims," *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 3, no. 1 (1990): 131–49.

23. This is especially but not uniquely true of children and those with some personal connection to the original trauma. See David B. Pillemer, *Momentous Events, Vivid Memories* (Cambridge, MA, 2000), 37–38.

24. Dominick LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz* (Ithaca, 1998), 40.

25. Ibid., 40–42.

26. Felman and Laub, *Testimony*, 57–58.

27. LaCapra, *History and Memory after Auschwitz*, 40–42, 183–87.

28. A recent monograph (McNally, *Remembering Trauma*) convincingly argues that true forgetting is extremely rare and that "recovered memories" are seldom, if ever, reliable. However, trauma victims certainly suffer from a variety of symptoms and sometimes cannot articulate what happened to them.

29. Hence the recognition in 1980 by the American Psychiatric Association in the third edition of the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (*DSM-III*) of *post*-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), defined through symptoms that emerge after a "stressor" cause. See McNally, *Remembering Trauma*, 8–10.

30. See Weigelin-Schwiedrzik, "Trauma and Memory," 47–48, citing work on Holocaust memories. Art Spiegelman frames an oral history of the Holocaust precisely in this way in his *Maus: A Survivor's Tale*, 2 vols. (New York, 1993); see also Helen Epstein, *Children of the Holocaust: Conversations with Sons and Daughters of Survivors* (New York, 1979).

31. Excerpts from Wang Xiuchu, *Yangzhou shiri ji* (Account of ten days in Yangzhou), in Struve, *Voices from the Ming-Qing Cataclysm*, 36, 40, 43, 46–47.

32. For bibliographical information on the *Jiading tucheng jilue* (original title *Dongtang rizha*) and the *Yangzhou shiri ji*, see Lynn A. Struve, *The Ming-Qing Conflict, 1619–1683: A Historiography and Source Guide*, Association for Asian Studies Monographs, no. 56 (Ann Arbor, 1998), 242–43 and 251, resp.

33. Ibid., 73.

34. Wu Lun Nixia, "Xianggang fan-Qing geming xuanchuan baokan jiqi yu Nanyang de lianxi" (Anti-Qing revolutionary propaganda organs in Hong Kong and their ties to Southeast Asia), *Xianggang Zhongwen daxue Zhongguo wenhua yanjiusuo xuebao* 19 (1988): 418; Ding Wenjiang, ed., *Liang Rengong xiansheng nianpu changbian chugao* (Chronological biography of Liang Qichao, preliminary long draft), 2 vols. (Taipei, 1988), 43.

35. In trying to describe how some early-twentieth-century Chinese read mid-seventeenth century texts, my analysis is indebted, mutatis mutandis, to Dominick LaCapra's accounts of efforts to comprehend the Holocaust. See especially his works *History and Memory after Auschwitz*, 8–42, and *Writing History, Writing Trauma* (Baltimore, 2001), 1–42, 64–85. Trauma and memory have recently become the focus of much attention in the humanities and social sciences: useful discussions can be found in Katharine Hodgkin and Susannah Radstone, eds., *Contested Pasts: The Politics of Memory* (London, 2003); Susannah Radstone, ed., *Memory and Methodology* (Oxford, 2000); Paul Antze and Michael Lambek, eds., *Tense Past: Cultural Essays in Trauma and Memory* (New York, 1996); James W. Pennebaker, Dario Paez and Bernard Rimé, eds., *Collective Memory of Political Events: Social Psychological Perspectives* (Mahwah, NJ, 1997); Cathy Caruth, *Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History* (Baltimore, 1996); idem, ed., *Trauma: Explorations in Memory*, and Ruth Leys, *Trauma: A Genealogy* (Chicago, 2000).

36. The tropes of "slavery" and "lost country" are discussed in a different context by Rebecca E. Karl, " 'Slavery,' Citizenship, and Gender in Late Qing China's Global Context," in idem and Peter Zarrow, eds., *Rethinking the 1898 Reform Period: Political and Cultural Change in Late Qing China* (Cambridge, MA, 2002), 212–44.

37. Zou Rong, *Gemingjun* (Revolutionary army) (Shanghai, 1958), published in English as *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903*, trans. and annot. John Lust (The Hague, 1968). For an overview of the essay, see Abe Kenichi, "Zou Rong de 'Gemingjun' yu Xiyang jindai sichao: Yi 'minyuelun' ji jinhualun wei zhongxin" (Zou Rong's "Revolutionary Army" and modern Western thought in terms of the "social contract" and the theory of evolution), *Jindai Zhongguo* 42, no. 8 (1984): 159–68.

38. Zou Rong, *Gemingjun*, 1/58, 4/65 (double page references are to the Chinese and English editions, respectively). Zou classified the Manchus with other northern barbarians as racially distinct from the Han (*butong zhongzu*), nomadic, and a "goat race" with "beasts' hearts"—18/80; also as an "alien race" (*yizhong*)—34/123.

39. Ibid., 23/101, 24–29/106–10. This approach Frank Dikötter usefully calls "race as lineage" (*Discourse of Race*, 61).

40. Zou Rong, *Gemingjun*, 4/56, 5/64. The view that the Yellow Emperor was the ultimate ancestor of the Hans was being popularized by Liu Shipei and Zhang Binglin among others. See Martin Bernal, "Liu Shih-p'ei and National Essence" in Charlotte Furth, ed., *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China* (Cambridge, MA, 1976), 90–112; Shen Songqiao, "Wo yi woxue jian Xuanyuan: Huangdi shenhua yu wan Qing de guozu jiangou" (I sacrifice to Huang Di with my blood: Huang Di myth and the construction of nationhood in the late Qing), *Taiwan shehui yanjiu jikan* 28, no. 12 (1997): 1–77; and Luo Zhitian, "Baorong ruxue, zhuzi, yu Huangdi de guoxue: Qingji shiren xunqiu minzu rentong xiangzheng de nuli" (National learning that encompassed Confucianism, the various schools, and the Yellow Emperor: Chinese intellectuals' search for a symbol of national identity in the late Qing), *Taida lishi xuebao* 29, no. 6 (2002): 87–105.

41. Zou Rong, *Gemingjun*, 14/75–15/76.

42. Ibid., 5/65.

43. See, inter alia, ibid., 4/65, 35/123.

44. The Qing government tried to bring sedition charges against the Shanghai-based *Subao* in 1903 after it published Zou's *Revolutionary Army* and Zhang Binglin's essay. This turned into a public-relations disaster when several targeted individuals escaped and especially when the British authorities in Shanghai refused to cooperate. Eventually, Zou and Zhang were convicted of the lesser charge of *lèse majesté* and thus turned into martyrs. Zou died in prison, whereas Zhang was released in 1906. On animal imagery similar to that used by Zou, see Huang Xianqiang, "Dongwu huawentu yu Qingmo fanjiao paiwai yundong" (Animalized icons and the anti-Christian movement of the late Qing), *Qinghua xuebao* 28, no. 4 (Dec. 1998): 461–85.

45. Tan Sitong, *Tan Sitong quanji* (The complete works of Tan Sitong) (Beijing, 1990), 2: 342.

46. Suzi (pseud., "Pure Youth"), "Jiangsu geming shu" (Revolutionary declaration of Jiangsu), *Minbao* (*Tiantao*), 1907.4.25, 58–59. Citations in this form, here and below, indicate the corresponding Gregorian year, month (usually lunar), and day of the issue, separated by periods.

47. Ibid., 59.

48. There is, of course, a huge literature on Sun's revolutionary activities. Recent treatments of his anti-Manchuism include: Guo Shiyou, "Sun Zhongshan de fan-Man minzu zhuyi sixiang bielun" (An alternative view of Sun Yat-sen's anti-Manchu nationalism), *Qingshi yanjiu*, 1994.4, 40–49; He Lingxu, "Sun Zhongshan suochangdao de minzu zhuyi jiqi shixing zhengce de yanbian" (The nationalism advocated by Sun Yat-sen and the evolution of his policies), *Jindai Zhongguo*, no. 107 (1995–96): 196–216. More critical is Zhu Hongyuan, "Zailun Sun Zhongshan de minzu zhuyi" (A reappraisal of Sun Yat-sen's nationalism), *Zhongyang yanjiuyuan jindaishi yanjiusuo jikan* 22, no. 6 (1993): 327–57. For a balanced and well-written account of Sun's life, see Marie-Claire Bergère, *Sun Yat-sen* (Stanford, 1998); see esp. 103–36.

49. Guo Shiyou, "Sun Zhongshan de fan-Man minzu zhuyi," 43.

50. Sun Zhongshan (Sun Yat-sen), "Sanmin zhuyi yu Zhongguo minzu zhi qiantu" (The Three People's Principles and the future of the Chinese people), in *Guofu quanji* (The complete works of the father of our country (Taipei, 1989), 3: 18 (emphasis added); published also as Sun Zhongshan, "Zai Dongjing 'Minbao' chuangkan zhounian qingzhu dahui de yanshuo" (Speech at the celebratory meeting on the anniversary of the founding of the "People's Journal" in Tokyo), in *Sun Zhongshan xuanji* (Selected works of Sun Yat-sen) (Beijing, 1986), 81. It was in this speech that Sun denied hating all Manchus and insisted that only those Manchus who harmed Hans—particularly those in the government—would be harmed.

51. Sun Zhongshan, "Yu jiu Zhongguo bi xian tuidao Man-Qing" [1907] (To save China we need to overthrow the Manchu-Qing), in *Guofu quanji*, 3: 15–16.

52. Sun Zhongshan, "Shixing geming jianli gonghe guojia" [1903] (Carry out revolution and establish a republican nation), in ibid., 3: 1.

53. Sun Zhongshan, "Zhongguo guominjun zhengfu tao Manzhou xi" (Summons to the Chinese national military government to suppress the Manchus; 1907), in ibid., 2: 9–10.

54. Sun Zhongshan, "The True Solution of the Chinese Question," in ibid., 10: 89.

55. Sun Zhongshan, "Zhina baoquan fen'ge he lun" (On the preservation or division of China), in ibid., 2: 238, 240.

56. Jin Ma, "Yunnan tao Manzhou xi" (Summons to Yunnan to suppress the Manchus), *Minbao (Tiantao)*, 1907.4.25: 102.

57. Ziransheng (pseud., "Natural student"), "Du yanna liuxuesheng miyu youfen" (Anger upon reading the secret edict on disciplining students abroad), *Subao* 2486 (1903.6.10).

58. Ibid. (no pagination).

59. Zhang Xingyan [Zhang Shizhao], "Sharen zhuyi" (The doctrine of assassination), *Subao* 2498 (1903.6.22): 2. Reprinted in *Subao an jishi* (Records of the "Subao" incident) (Taipei, 1968).

60. Fu Hanzhong zhe (pseud., "He who restores the Han race"), "Xin guoshilue" (A brief new history of the nation), *Jiangsu* 6 (1903.8.1): 54 (1036).

61. Yang Dusheng, "Xin Hunan" (New Hunan), in Zhang Nan and Wang Renzhi, eds., *Xinhai geming qian shinianjian shilun xuanji* (Selected topical writings of the decade preceding the 1911 Revolution) (Beijing, 1960–1978), 1B: 617.

62. Gong Chuntai, "Zhonghua guominjun qiyi xiwen" (Summons to the Chinese national army to rise up), in Wu Yiye, et al., eds., *Yingxiang Zhongguo lishi jincheng de wenxian* (Documents that influenced the development of Chinese history) (Changsha, 1997), 694.

63. Quhun (pseud., "The spirit of Qu Yuan"), "Chou Man hengyi" (Radical hatred of the Manchus), *Dongting po* 1 (1906.9). Reprinted in *Ershi shiji zhi Zhina, Dongting po, Hanzhi hedingben* (Combined volume: "Twentieth-century China," "The waves of Dongting Lake" and "The banner of the Han") (Taipei, 1968), 160.

64. Jun zhengfu (pseud., "Military government" [Zhang Binglin?]), "Tao Maozhou xi" (Summons to suppress the Manchus), *Minbao (Tiantao)* 1907.4.25: 8.

65. Anon., "Xiaoshuo" (Literary sketch), *Jiangsu* 3 (1903, intercalary month 5), part 1, 0543–49 (quote, 0544–45), part 3, 1095–1102.

66. Ibid., 1095, 1100.

67. Anon., "Yangzhou meng" (Dream of Yangzhou), *Hubei xueshengjie* 6 (1903.6; Taipei, 1968): 97–100.

68. Chen Tianhua, *Shizi hou* (Lion's roar) (Taipei, 1984), 1–2. Unlike some revolutionaries, however, Chen never let anti-Manchuism block his view of the main problem: Western imperialism. He remained attracted to the possibility, however unlikely in his own eyes, of Qing reform. See Ernest Young, "Problems of a Late Ch'ing Revolutionary: Ch'en T'ien-hua," in Chün-tu Hsüeh, ed., *Revolutionary Leaders of Modern China* (New York, 1971), 210–47; Satoi Genshichirō, "Chen Tianhua de zhengzhi sixiang" (The political thought of Chen Tianhua), trans. Wu Wenxing, *Jindai Zhongguo* 24 (Aug. 1981): 181–98; 25 (Oct. 1981): 265–76.

69. Chen Tianhua, *Shizi hou*, 18–20.

70. Shenshu (pseud., Liu Shipei), "Yangzhou erbailiushi nian zhi jinian" (Commemoration of 260 years since Yangzhou), in the column "Bugan wang lu" (Records of what we dare not forget), *Jiangsu* 7 (1903.9.1) (Taipei rpt., 1968): 1316–20.

71. "Bugan wang lu," *Jiangsu* 5 (1903.7): 0911–14.

72. Guan Lu (pseud., "Observing Shandong"), "Shandong sheng tao Manzhou xi" (Summons to Shandong Province to suppress the Manchus), *Minbao (Tiantao)* 1907.4.25: 83.

73. Tuisi (pseud., "Tracing recollection"), "Guangdongren duiyu guangfu qiantu zhi zeren" (Responsibilities of the Cantonese toward the task of restoration), *Minbao (Tiantao)* 1907.4.25: 93.

74. Wu Yue, "Wu Yue yishu" (Posthumous writings of Wu Yue), *Minbao (Tiantao)* 1907.4.25: 13–14.

75. The "ideology of revenge" has a long history in China, as elsewhere. See Jen-Der Lee, "Conflicts and Compromise between Legal Authority and Ethical Ideas: From the Perspectives of Revenge in Han Times," *Renwen ji shehui kexue jikan* 1, no. 1 (Nov. 1988): 359–408; Wang Li, *Zhongguo gudai fuchou wenxue* (The literature of revenge in ancient China) (Beijing, 1998). Nor was this entirely a Han tradition—see Li Li, Chu Xingjia, and Liu Changjiang, "Nuerhachi 'xueqin fuchou' sixiang jiqi shijian" (The theory and practice of Nurgaci's theory of 'blood revenge' "), *Shehui kexue jikan*, no. 122 (March 1999): 112–15.

76. Tiesheng (pseud., "Iron student"), "Jinggao wo Hanzu dajunren shu" (A warning letter to the great soldiers of our Han race), in *Xinhai geming qian shinian jian shilun xuanji*, 2B:864–68 (originally published in *Hanzhi* 2 [1907.2]).

77. The Qing military elite was divided first into 8, then into 24 "banners" or major armies, one-third of which were Han units.

78. The Suolun were a Tungusic tribe from present-day Heilungjiang Province who formed an elite cavalry unit in the early Qing. The term "Suolun horses" became a byword for large and sleek military horses.

79. Ruth Leys, *Trauma*, 105 (emphasis in the original), discussing the therapies of some modern psychologists, who encourage patients to narrativize their traumas so that the traumatic (uncontrolled) memories can be incorporated into their life stories. Other views of trauma emphasize not its narrativity, but symptoms ranging from psychogenic amnesia to intrusive recollections such as dreams and flashbacks—cited in McNally, *Remembering Trauma*, 8–10. But the point remains that any attempt to deal with trauma or, more broadly, discuss memories, must involve narrativization.

80. Of the extensive literature on Zhang's anti-Manchuism, most useful are: Kauko Laitinen, *Chinese Nationalism in the Late Qing Dynasty: Zhang Binglin as an Anti-Manchu Propagandist* (London, 1990), 77–126; Young-tsu Wong, *Search for Modern Nationalism: Zhang Binglin and Revolutionary China, 1869–1936* (Hong Kong, 1989), 24–43; Wang Fansen, *Zhang Taiyan de sixiang (1868–1919) jiqi dui ruxue chuantong de chongji* (The thought of Zhang Binglin [1868–1919] and his attacks on the Confucian tradition) (Taipei, 1985), 68–90; Jiang Yihua, *Zhang Binglin pingzhuan* (A critical biography of Zhang Binglin) (Nanjing, 2002), 30–87; Takata Atsushi, *Shō Heirin, Shō Shishū Ro Jin: Shingai no shi to sei to* (Zhang Binglin, Zhang Shizhao, and Lu Xun: Life and death in 1911) (Tokyo, 1974), 38–56; Onogawa Hidemi, "Zhang Binglin de pai-Man sixiang" (Zhang Binglin's anti-Manchuism), *Dalu zazhi 44*, no. 3 (March 1972): 39–60; and Charlotte Furth, "The Sage as Rebel: The Inner World of Chang Ping-lin," in idem, ed., *The Limits of Change*, esp. 128–39.

81. This meeting was to mark the martyrdom of the last Ming emperor, Chongzhen. See Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi* (Notes on the history of the revolution) (Shanghai, 1947), 1: 57–59.

82. As translated in Young-tsu Wong, *Search for Modern Nationalism*, 61; from Feng Ziyou, *Geming yishi*, 1: 58.

83. Zhang Binglin, "Bo Kang Youwei geming shu" (Letter refuting Kang Youwei's views on revolution), in *Zhang Taiyan quanji* (Complete works of Zhang Taiyan) (Shanghai, 1985), 4: 173–84.

84. Ibid., 4: 177.

85. Zhang Binglin, "Pai-Man pingyi," in ibid., 4: 267–69.

86. See Wang Fansen, *Zhang Taiyan de sixiang*, 68–72, 84–90; also "Qingmo de lishi jiyi yu guojia jianguo: Yi Zhang Taiyan weili" (Historical memory and nation-building in the late Qing: The case of Zhang Binglin), *Si yu yan* 34, no. 3 (Sept. 1996): 1–18.

87. Wang Fansen, *Zhang Taiyan de sixiang*, 87–88. The Qianlong emperor (r. 1736–1796) instituted a massive project to catalog all extant writings, not incidently proscribing and destroying anything found offensive, including anti-Manchu expressions, and prosecuting those who wrote, published or possessed such writings.

88. Zhang Binglin, "Zhu Man ge" (Song of punishing the Manchus), in Tang Zhijun, ed., *Zhang Taiyan nianpu changbian* (Chronological biography of Zhang Binglin, long edition) (Beijing, 1979), 1: 222; originally in *Fubao* 5 (1906.8.25).

89. Chen Tianhua, *Shizi hou*, 69.

90. Jisheng (pseud., "Parasite" [Wang Dong]), "Fuchou lun" (On revenge), *Minbao* 10 (1906.12.20): 33–41.

91. Sun Yat-sen, "Ji shieryue erri benbao jiyuan jie" (Record of the celebration of the birth of this journal on the 2nd day of the 12th month), *Minbao* 10 (1906.12.20): 85.

92. In the short term, revolutionaries were replying to critics who charged them with crude racism; looking to the long term, they were considering a future Chinese nation-state that would include Manchus.

93. Lu Xun, "Zayi" (Miscellaneous recollections), in *Lu Xun quanji* (Complete works of Lu Xun) (Beijing, 1956), 1: 317–23.

94. David Lowenthal, *The Past Is a Foreign Country* (Cambridge, 1985), 250 (emphasis added).

95. Ibid., citing Marshall Sahlins, "Other Times, Other Customs: The Anthropology of History," *American Anthropologist* 85, no. 3 (1983): 522–23. Here the strong family identity encompasses, even drowns out, the individual self.

96. Rhoads, *Manchus and Han*, 189–91.

97. The most thorough study is Rhoads, *Manchus and Han*, 187–205. Rhoads calls the slaughter "essentially genocide" (204) but does not attempt to estimate the total number killed or the percentage of Manchus who were killed. Useful background is presented in Mark Elliott, "Bannerman and Townsman: Ethnic Tension in Nineteenth-Century Jiangnan," *Late Imperial China* 11, no. 1 (June 1990): 36–74.

98. As long as the violence that did ensue is acknowledged, it is perfectly legitimate for historians to ask why there was not a complete bloodbath. Unfortunately, there has been a tendency to downplay the military violence and deny or ignore the deliberate murder of civilians.

99. Historians have sometimes noticed the emotional impact of the revolutionary rhetoric. See, for instance, Zhu Hongyuan, "Cong zuguo dao guozu: Qingmo Minchu gemingpai de minzu zhuyi" (From ancestral nation to nationalism: The nationalism of the revolutionaries in the late Qing and early Republic), *Si yu yan* 30, no. 2 (June 1992): 15–16; idem, "Minguo yilai minzu zhuyi de yanhua" (The evolution of nationalism since the Republic), *Zhonghua minguo jianguo bashinian xueshu* (Scholarship [commemorating] the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China) (Taipei, 1991), 1: 133. Zhu is critical of "Han chauvinism" and, like other scholars such as Zhang Kaiyuan, concludes that its main function lay in popularizing revolutionary goals. But historians have not analyzed the inner logic of the emotionality of its rhetoric.

100. This brings to mind Robert Jay Lifton's comments on the My Lai case: "Groups victimize others, they create what I now call 'designated victims,' the Jews in Europe, the Blacks in this country. They are people off whom we live not only economically, as is often the case, but psychologically. That is, we reassert our own vitality and symbolic immortality by denying them their right to live and by identifying them with the death taint, by designating them as victims.... It's deriving one's solution to one's death anxiety from extreme trauma, in this case in an extreme situation by exploiting a group of people and rendering them victims, designated victims for that psychological work." See Cathy Caruth, "An Interview with Robert Jay Lifton," in idem, ed., *Trauma*, 139.

101. Following this logic, *pace* Edward Rhoads, the attacks on Manchu communities in the course of the fighting of 1911–12 represented sporadic genocidal impulses rather than a deep commitment to exterminate the people. Granted, it would have been difficult to organize a more thoroughgoing genocide without stronger political force. But if highly developed technologies and infrastructures are helpful, they are not absolutely necessary to accomplish ethnic cleansing, as the 1915 Turkish genocide of Armenians in Anatolia shows at the beginning of the 20th century and the 1994 Hutu extermination of Tutsis in Rwanda shows at its end. The will to complete the job regardless of other considerations is requisite. See Norman M. Naimark, *Fires of Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe* (Stanford, 2001).

■ Source: Yoshihiro, Ishikawa, 'Anti-Manchu Racism and the Rise of Anthropology in early 20th Century China', in *Sino-Japanese Studies*, 15 (April 2003), pp. 7–26.

ANTI-MANCHU RACISM AND THE RISE OF ANTHROPOLOGY IN EARLY 20TH CENTURY CHINA

Ishikawa Yoshihiro 石川禎浩

First of all, I should explain why I have become interested in this subject. Ever since I began to read writings from the late Qing period, I have been shocked to find so many bizarre and outdated theories being advocated in them. These include: the theory of ether (*yitai xueshuo*, 以太學説) advocated enthusiastically by Tan Sitong 譚嗣同 (1865–98), the famous reformist intellectual executed after the failure of the 1898 Reform Movement; and geographical determinism supported mainly by Liang Qichao 梁啟超 (1873–1929), the brilliant reformist journalist who pioneered almost all the modern academic disciplines in China.[1] The theory of race or racism was just one of many theories popular at that time. Its story is the familiar one of the most popular ideas of one era becoming completely forgotten or denied by later generations.

Little attention, however, has been paid to the dissemination of these popular theories despite their immense and prolonged impact on modern Chinese intellectuals. My guess is that it is paradoxically because these nebulous theories were so popular and widespread at that time that we cannot easily trace their history as fully as we might like. Thus, I have decided to attempt to clarify the history of "raciology" or ethnology in modern China which, on the one hand, played such a great role in the anti-Manchu revolutionary movement, and, on the other hand, opened the way for the rise of anthropology in modern China.

Before taking a closer look at the rise of anthropology in China, a few remarks should be made concerning the term "anthropology." As is often the case with the Western social sciences introduced into China at the beginning of the twentieth century, the definition of "anthropology" at that time was extremely vague. Some works about anthropology were ethnology texts composed mainly of information concerning the human races of the world; some were archeology texts composed of explanations about the origins of mankind; and some were theology texts discussing the problems of Genesis. At the same time, the Chinese equivalents for the term "anthropology" were numerous as well. At least four or five Chinese terms for "anthropology" were used, including *renleixue* 人類學, *minzuxue* 民族學, *minzhongxue* 民種學, *renzhongxue* 人種學, and *zhongzuxue* 種族學. One rather extreme example which I discovered in a Chinese translation entitled *Jinhua lun* 進化論, as in the English "Theory of Evolution," actually had as its original English title none other than *Anthropology*.[2] I will use the term "anthropology" and its Chinese equivalent, *renleixue*, to refer to the entire discourse which sought to explain the whole history of humanity from a racial point of view.

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[1] On Liang Qichao's introduction of geographical determinism, see Ishikawa Yoshihiro, "Liang Qichao and Geographical Studies in Meiji Japan: On Geographical Determinism," in Joshua Fogel, ed., *The Role of Japan in Liang Qichao's Introduction of Modern Western Civilization to China* (Center for Chinese Studies, University of California, Berkeley, forthcoming).

As is well known, anti-Manchu racism played an extremely important role in the revolutionary propaganda of the late Qing period. It stimulated racial consciousness among the Chinese people and accelerated the revolutionary movement. One could argue that the 1911 Revolution owed its stunningly quick success to this anti-Manchu racism. In an important sense, then, one might say that anti-Manchuism was the spirit of that age.

It is true as well that China had a long tradition of anti-Manchuism. But, when we read the anti-Manchu propaganda of late Qing revolutionary intellectuals carefully, we can see clearly that they applied anthropology—the newly-introduced, "scientific" knowledge at that time—rather than simply repeating traditional anti-Manchu tropes. In this Way, the anti-Manchu propaganda of the 1911 period included not only the narrow concept of race, but also many diverse theories of modern anthropology, such as evolutionary thinking. In this essay, I would like to explain, first, how the elements of modern Western anthropology were introduced into China; second, how they affected the critical activities of both revolutionaries and reformers in China; and then, briefly, how the anti-Manchu racism of the 1911 period affected the subsequent development of Chinese anthropology. The first scholar to offer a full treatment to the discourse of race in modern China was Frank Dikötter. Although his book *The Discourse of Race in Modern China*, published in 1992, is certainly a fine piece of work,[3] one topic which remains an unsettled question is the role Japanese writings—the key problem in considering the introduction of Western systems of thought into modern China—played in the field of anthropology. I would like to consider the problem mainly from the perspective of this Japanese influence.

Concerning foreign influences, there was an interesting academic scandal in early 2002 in China. A spirited young professor of anthropology at Peking University, by the name of Wang Mingming 王銘銘, was accused of plagiarizing a book on anthropology written by an American scholar.[4] After his case came to light, Professor Wang was relieved of some of his academic positions, and this led to a heated controversy surrounding the nature of present-day scholarship in China. When I saw that story on the web, I could not, in a sense, help feeling a strange pity for Professor Wang, because, as we shall see in a moment, at the beginning of twentieth century, China's leading figures in the field of anthropology were never labeled plagiarists despite the widespread incidence of plagiarism from Japanese books in their writings. What all of this seems to show is that in China the rise and development of anthropology—an academic discipline of Western origin—has been closely connected with the introduction of foreign theories throughout.

1. *The Introduction of Western Anthropology into East Asia*

Let us start now with the introduction of anthropology into modern China. As was the case with other academic disciplines, one might say that anthropology was, in a sense, not that new a subject in China. Before the modern era, Chinese intellectuals knew that there were a number of different races or tribes outside China. Terms like "Folangji" 佛郎機 and "Hongmaofan" 紅毛番, for example, appeared already in sixteenth and seventeenth century documents as names for Westerners, and later a large number of illustrated ethnographies were made by imperial order to show off how many tributary peoples the Qing empire had. The most famous of them is *the Huang Qing zhigong tu* 皇清職貢圖 (Illustrated ethnography of the peoples in the Qing empire), which was edited on the order of the Qianlong Emperor in 1751. It covered virtually every ethnic group from minority races living on Chinese territory to the white races of the West. This sort of ethnography, however, never developed into the modern discipline of anthropology.

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[2] See "Guangxue hui xinshu guanggao 廣學會新書廣告 (List of the new books published by the Guangxue hui)," *Wangguo Gongbao* 萬國公報 186 (1904).

[3] Frank Dikötter, *The Discourse of Race in Modern China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).

[4] According the *Shehui kexue bao* 社會科學報 (dated January 10, 2002), Wang's *Xiangxiang de yibang* 想象的異邦 (Imagined foreign lands) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1998) is plagiarized from William A. Haviland, *Cultural Anthropology* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1987).

It was in the final decade of the nineteenth century that modern anthropology was introduced into China as part of the "New Knowledge." And as soon as it was introduced, it provided Chinese intellectuals with a fresh tool that helped them to understand the entire world at a single stroke. The early introduction of anthropology and information on the subject of race were closely linked to the proselytizing efforts of Christian missionaries in China. Insofar as I have been able to discover, the first explicitly anthropological publication to appear in Chinese was "Ren fen wulei shuo" 人分五類說 (On the five classifications of mankind) which was printed in the *Gezhi huibian* 格致滙編 (The Chinese Scientific Magazine) in 1892.[5] The *Gezhi huibian* was an illustrated periodical edited by John Fryer (1839–1928), a translator and missionary.[6] "Ren fen wulei shuo" explicated the contemporary Western view of the attributes of humanity's supposed five basic racial divisions. It read in part: "Westerners divide mankind into five races: the Mongolian race, the Caucasian race, the African race, the Malaysian race, and the American Indian race. Their skin color differentiates them into yellow, white, black, brown, and red peoples."

It then went on to give a detailed explanation of the physical features of each race. Early Western anthropology established in the nineteenth century was characterized by its emphasis on the physical classification system, namely physical anthropology. So, it is quite natural that the basic tone of "Ren fen wulei shuo" was dominated by physical anthropology. The fivefold classification of mankind to which the article referred originated with Johann F. Blumenbach (1752–1840), a German anatomist considered to be one of the founders of modern anthropology. The fivefold classification of races was so popular in the West that early East Asian writings on the races of the world, more or less, accepted it as an authorized categorization. The first Japanese book on anthropology, *Jinshu hen*

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[5] *Gezhi huibian* 7.3 (1892).

[6] On for the role of the *Gezhi huibian* in introducing Western natural sciences into China, see Xiong Yuezhi 熊月之, *Xixue dongjian yu wan-Qing shehui* 西學東漸與晚清社會 (The dissemination of Western learning and late Qing society) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1994), esp. chap. 10.

人種篇 (An outline of the human races), published in 1874, for instance, also introduced this fivefold classification, and explained that it had been "devised by a German scholar, by the name of Blumenbach."[7] What is more interesting is that *Jinshu hen* moreover referred to "the method of categorizing human races by the shape of the skull"[8] by which was meant the so-called cranial index, the ratio of the breadth of the skull to its length. This theory had been very popular as one of the most scientific indices of ethnology ever since it was devised by the Swedish anatomist, Anders Retzius (1796–1860) in 1842.

The *Jinshu hen* was published by the Japanese Ministry of Education in a series of reference books for schoolteachers, and was actually an abridged translation from one of the volumes of the Chambers Encyclopedia entitled *Chambers's Information for the People: A Popular Encyclopedia.* It is noteworthy that detailed information about Western ethnology or physical anthropology had already spread to Japan in the earliest years of the Meiji era. The method of categorizing human races by the shape of the skull was introduced in the above-mentioned "Ren fen wulei shuo," too, although not as clearly as in *Jinshu hen.* We can say with fair certainty that "anthropology" at that time meant mainly physical anthropology, characterized by its emphasis on a "scientific" means of categorizing the races of humanity. And we can say with the same certainty that Western anthropology at that time was strongly colored by a theory of racial evolution. That is, almost all the races were arranged according to their degrees of evolution with the white race at the pinnacle. This was true as well of East Asian anthropology which adopted the value system of Western anthropology. The two writings mentioned above, are cases in point. "Ren fen wulei shuo", for example, observed:

> The Mongolian, that is the yellow races, ... do not have a highly-developed ability to tell right from wrong, and they still find it difficult to get rid of convention. ... The Caucasian, that is the white races are, physically speaking, tall, strong, and nimble; mentally speaking, they are people of action, good sense, and decisiveness. ... The Ethiopian, that is the black races, are not only stupid and ignorant but also lacking in insight.

The *Jinshu hen*, on the other hand, after comparing the characteristics of each race, went on to note: "The European races are much superior to other races in every respect."[9] Although this sort of racial stereotype would be denied completely nowadays, it was widely accepted at the time and almost all East Asian intellectuals believed in such a racial hierarchy.

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[7] Akiyama Kōtarō 秋山恒太郎 (trans.), *Jinshu hen* 人種篇 (Tokyo: Monbushō, 1874), vol. 1, pp. 4–5.

[8] *Jinshu hen*, vol. 1, p. 16.

One other thing that is highly important for the emergence of anthropology in modern China is, of course, the influence from Japan. As is well known, we cannot consider the introduction of Western social sciences into modern China apart from Japan's role as a middleman. And, anthropology is no exception. As a matter of fact, the first Chinese translation of a Western book on anthropology, entitled *Renlei xue* 人類學 (Anthropology), was made from a Japanese translation around the year 1903.[10]

The rise of the Japanese anthropology goes back to 1884, when the first academic anthropological society, the *Jinrui gakkai* 人類學會, was established in Tokyo by Tsuboi Shōgorō 坪井正五郎 (1863–1913), Torii Ryūzō 鳥居龍藏 (1870–1953), and others. Torii Ryūzō, especially, exercised a major influence on the rise of anthropology in China. Torii, the most eminent anthropologist in modern Japan, started his career as an East Asian ethnologist working especially on the Siberian and Mongolian races. He carried out fieldwork on several occasions in Manchuria after his first project on the Liaodong peninsula in 1895, and collected all manner of data about the Manchurian peoples, such as physical measurements, folkways, languages, and the like. His early works, such as *Jinshu shi* 人種誌 (Ethnography, 1902), *Jinshugaku* 人種學 (Raceology, 1904), *Minami Manshū chōsa hōkoku* 南満洲調査報告 (A report on an investigation in south Manchuria, 1910), were products of that fieldwork.

In his investigations of the Manchu people, based on his wealth of data from physical measurements, Torii attempted to clarify the origins of the Manchus and their similarity with other Siberian races, that is the so-called Tungus peoples. And this point had a great impact on the development of anti-Manchu racism in early twentieth century China. Chinese translations from Torii's writings in the first decade of the twentieth century alone were numerous.[11] All the Chinese translations were made within a year of their original publication, which shows how closely Chinese intellectuals paid attention to Torii's work. For example, the Chinese translator of "Jinruigakujō yori mitaru *Kō-Shin shokkōzu*" (An anthropological view of the *Huang Qing zhigong tu*) offered a high evaluation of Torii's achievements; he wrote: "Dr. Torii, the Japanese scholar, has toured Mongolia and northern Manchuria for many years, braving so many difficulties and dangers. As a result, some Chinese people suspect him of spying on China." On the racial characteristics of the Manchus, Torii pointed out in 1904: "From the viewpoint of physical features, the Manchus closely resemble the Tungus. We can be fairly certain that the Manchus are one of the subgroups of the Tungus. From the viewpoint of ethnology, they belong, beyond a doubt, among the Tungus race."[12]

In this way, at the very beginning of the twentieth century, the Manchus who had been regarded vaguely as descendants of "Sushen" 肅慎 or the "Jurchens" 如真 for many generations were, for the first time, categorized into the Tungus or Siberian races by the methods of physical anthropology. Later, Chinese revolutionaries came to use the new term "Tungus" 通古斯族 (*Tonggusi zu*) or "Siberian races" 西伯利亞人種 (*Xiboliya renzhong*) to emphasize the heterogeneity of the Manchus. We can now easily see that their grounds for claiming this were modern Western theories of anthropology and racial classifications introduced via Japan.

2. *The Reformist Idea of Race*

Turning now to the role of the reformers, such as Yan Fu 嚴復 (1854–1921), Kang Youwei 康有為 (1858–1927), Tang Caichang 唐才常 (1867–1900), Liang Qichao, and others, most scholars would accept the fact that, in the late Qing period, they played a highly important role in introducing modern Western systems of thought into China and transformed the Chinese intellectual world. Their contribution is evident in the field of anthropology as well. Tang Caichang, a well-known reformer who died in an abortive uprising in Wuhan in 1900, was the most prominent among them. Tang's detailed study of race, published between September 1897 and

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[9] *Jinshu hen*, vol. 2, p. 39.

[10] Sir Daniel Wilson, *Anthropology* (New York: Humboldt, 1885); Shibue Tamotsu 澁江保, trans., *Jinrui gaku zen* 人類學 全(Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1894); Hunan bianyi she 湖南編譯社, trans., *Renlei xue* 人類學 (Tokyo: Hunan bianyi she, 1903).

[11] Torii, *Jinshu shi* (Tokyo: Sūzanbō, 1902) [Chinese trans. Lin Kaiqing 林楷青, trans., *Renzhong zhi* 人種志 (Tokyo: Minxuehui, 1903)]; Torii, "Jinruigakujō yori mitaru Ajia no jūmin ni tsukite" 人類学上より見たる亞細亞の住民に就て (An anthropological view of Asian peoples), *Chigaku zasshi* 地学雑誌 16.182–183 (1904) [Chinese trans.: "Cong renleixueshang lun Yaxiya de zhumin" 从人类学上论亚细亚的住民, *Hubei xuebao* 湖北學報 2.14 (1904)]; Torii, "Jinruigakujō yori mitaru *Kō Shin shokkōzu*" 人類学上より見たる『皇清職貢図』(An anthropological view of the *Huang Qing zhigong tu*), *Taiyō* 15.14 (1909) [Chinese trans.: "Manzhou renzhong kao" 滿洲人種考 (An inquiry into the Manchu race), *Dixue zazhi* 地学杂志 1.3 (1910)].

[12] Torii, "Jinruigakujō yori mitaru Ajia no jūmin ni tsukite," *Chigaku zasshi* 16.182 (1904).

February 1898 in *the Xiangxue xinbao* 湘學新報 (Hunan news), may be considered as the first anthropography written by a Chinese. In the opening paragraph of his article, "Geguo zhonglei kao" 各國種類考 (Inquiry into the world races), Tang introduces Western classifications as follows: "Westerners divide mankind into five races: the Mongolian race, the Caucasian race, the African race, the Malaysian race, and the American Indian race. Their skin color differentiates them into yellow, white, black, brown, and red peoples."[13]

This paragraph is lifted in full from the article in the *Gezhi huibian*, "Ren fen wulei shuo," introduced above. In addition to "Ren fen wulei shuo," Tang's knowledge about races came from some Japanese writings. Particularly important among them was the *Bankoku shiki* 萬國史記 (World history) by a Japanese publicist by the name of Okamoto Kensuke 岡本監輔 (1839–1904), who wrote this volume originally in literary Chinese in 1879. Although the *Bankoku shiki* is usually classified as a history book, it also contained a lot of information about the geography and races of the world. This fact leads to the inescapable conclusion that so-called world history at that time was inseparable from geography and race. The influence of the *Bankoku shiki* seems to have been greater in China than in Japan, largely because it was written in Chinese. Okamoto's book was said to have had a circulation of more than three hundred thousand in China.[14] Such a circulation was huge at that time, and, needless to say, all of it came from pirated editions.[15] In any case, Okamoto's now forgotten bestseller, as had been the case with "Ren fen wulei shuo," followed the racial classification of Blumenbach.[16] And, we should note once again how popular classifications based on physical anthropology were.

It is unnecessary to go into detail about Tang Caichang's article, which did nothing but enumerate so many bits of information about the world's races by quoting all manner of Japanese books. However, it may be worth mentioning in passing the reason he was so interested in anthropology or

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[13] Tang Caichang, "Geguo zhonglei kao," *Xiangxue xinbao* 15 (1897), in Tang, *Juedianmingzhai neiyan* 覺顛冥齋内言 (Essays on political and historical matters) (Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe, 1968), p. 472.

[14] Hazama Naoki 狹間直樹, "Chūgoku kindai ni okeru teikokushugi to kokumin kokka" 中国近代における帝国主義と国民国家 (Imperialism and the nation-state in modern China), in Hazama Naoki, ed., *Seiyō kindai bunmei to Chūka sekai* 西洋近代文明と中華世界 (Modern Western civilization and the universe of China) (Kyoto: Kyoto University Press, 2001), p. 21.

[15] Okamoto Kensuke, *Wanguo shiji* 萬國史記 (Shanghai: Shenji shuzhuan, 1897), for example, is one such pirated edition.

[16] Okamoto Kensuke, *Wanguo shiji*, p. 1.

the races of the world. Another article by Tang Caichang written almost simultaneously with "Geguo zhonglei kao" helps explain why. In his "Tongzhong shuo 通種說 (On racial communication)," Tang wrote:

> After discussing this issue frankly with many gentlemen of our country, I have found that only through racial communication can we realize the construction of a peaceful society, the fusion of religions, and true universal equality. Why so? We all know that good fruit trees are always made by grafting or cross-fertilizing... The same is true of human beings.... [As a matter of fact, in Southeast Asia,] there are so many people who were born of white and yellow parents. They are all naturally clever, healthy, and vigorous. Moreover, they are self-confident of being the best race in the world and demonstrate their powerfulness. It proves, beyond the shadow of a doubt, that the amalgamation of the white and yellow races would produce offspring of unparalleled intelligence and strength.[17]

What this passage makes clear at once is that Tang Caichang considered anthropology a scientific method of strengthening the yellow race, including the Chinese. At that time, differences among races were generally considered congenital, so that the only way to improve the race was through amalgamation of the white and yellow races. As is well known, *baozhong* 保種 (preservation of the race) was one of the slogans of the Reform Movement of 1898, along with *baoguo* 保國 (preservation of the state) and *baojiao* 保教 (preservation of Confucianism). *Baozhong* is usually interpreted as "preservation of the race," but judging from the articles of Tang Caichang, perhaps the term *baozhong* at the time also contained an implication of preservation of the Chinese race by means of racial improvement or racial amalgamation.

In discussing the introduction of anthropology by the reformers, we cannot ignore Liang Qichao. After he "began to discover that there were five continents and various nations"[18] by reading the *Yinghuan zhilüe* 瀛环志略 (A short account of the maritime circuit) in 1890, Liang gradually deepened his understanding of the human races through such magazines as *Gezhi huibian* among others. Suffice it to say here that he, as well as Tang Caichang, repeatedly advocated the fivefold classification of mankind, and much of his account of mankind was suffused by what we would now consider vulgar stereotypes. It is noteworthy, however, that in an

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[17] Tang Caichang, *Tang Caichang ji* 唐才常集 (Works of Tang Caichang) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1980), pp. 100–01.

[18] Liang Qichao, "Sanshi zishu" 三十自述 (Autobiography at the age of thirty), in Liang, *Yinbingshi wenji* 飲冰室文集 (Selected essays of Liang Qichao; hereafter, *Wenji*) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 11: 16.

1897 article, Liang tried to explain the differences among races using his own scientific terms such as *"nao zhi jiaodu"* 腦之角度 (cerebral angle) and *"xueguan zhong zhi weishengwu"* 血管中之微生物 (microbe in the blood vessel).[19] The former is similar to the cranial index mentioned earlier, while the latter corresponds to blood type which was scientifically confirmed finally in 1900. These vague, groping terms show that Liang was susceptible to the newly introduced Western natural sciences as well as to the social sciences.

After the *coup d'état* which abruptly ended the Reform Movement in 1898, Liang Qichao took refuge in Japan, and there he resumed his energetic writing activities with his journals *Qingyi bao* 清議報 ("The China Discussion") and *Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報 (New people's miscellany). As is well known, the multifaceted influences he experienced in Meiji-era Japan were overwhelming.[20] Years later, Liang would write: "My mind was so changed by reading Japanese writings that, in thought and speech, I am like a different person."[21] The knowledge of race was, needless to say, one of those things that transformed Liang, and it exerted tremendous influence upon his outlook on the world. Before his exile to Japan, though, race or the idea of races was just one of the new tools useful to him for observing and analyzing the world of his day, but after he absorbed more detailed information in Japan, the idea of races developed into the most fertile perspective for explaining the entire history of mankind at a single stroke. We can easily see how important the idea of race was for him by reading his "Xin shixue" 新史學 (New historiography), especially the chapter on "the relationship between history and race," which was written especially to adorn the February 1902 founding issue of *Xinmin congbao*. In the opening paragraph of it, he stated:

> What is history? History is nothing but the account of the development and strife of human races. There is no history without race.... I don't know whether we can enjoy the great harmony of mankind across the boundaries

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[19] Liang, "Lun Zhongguo zhi jiangqiang" 論中國之將強 (About the future power of China), in *Wenji*, 2: 13.

[20] For further details, see Hazama Naoki, ed., *Kyōdō kenkyû: Ryō Keichō, Seiyō kindai shisō juyō to Meiji Nihon* 共同研究梁啟超—西洋近代思想收容と明治日本 (Joint research: Liang Qichao, modern Western thought and Meiji Japan) (Tokyo: Misuzu shobō, 1999); Chinese edition: *Liang Qichao, Mingzhi Riben, Xifang* 梁啟超—明治日本—西方 (Liang Qichao, Meiji era Japan, and the West) (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2001).

[21] Liang, "Xiaweiyi youji" 夏威夷游记 (Travel notes on Hawaii), in Liang, *Yinbingshi zhuanji* 飲冰室傳集 (Selected works of Liang Qichao; hereafter, *Zhuanji*) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1989), 22: 186.

> of race in the future. Today, however, it is no exaggeration to say that the racial problem is the biggest problem in the world.... The essence of history is to follow the tracks of the rise and fall of every race over thousands of years. The spirit of history is to uncover the reasons for the rise and fall of every race over thousands of years.[22]

In short, race was everything in his historiography. As for the classification system of the races of mankind, while he had adhered to the fivefold classification ever since the era of the 1898 Reform Movement, he also introduced various schemes which ranged from four to sixty-three races. The fourfold classification had been advocated by Immanuel Kant (1724–1804), and the sixty-three-fold classification by Henry T. Buckle (1821–62). In addition, he made a chart of races of the world which took into account the elements of language and explained the development of each race in detail. It is noteworthy here that these classifications and charts were Liang Qichao's obsession, because they lent an aura of "scientific" authenticity to his racial message. Liang hungrily absorbed this sort of "scientific" authenticity from Japanese writings. His "Xin shixue" is, as is the case in many of his other works, based on several writings of Japanese publicists, especially *Shigaku tsūron* 史學通論 (Overview of historical studies) and *Seiyō jōko shi* 西洋上古史 (Ancient Western history) written by Ukita Kazutami 浮田和民 (1859–1946), a professor of history at *Tokyo senmon gakkō* 東京專門學校 (Tokyo Higher School, the forerunner of Waseda University) and editor-in-chief of the journal *Taiyō* 太陽 (The sun).[23] For example, the various classifications of races and the chart of the world's races that Liang introduced in his essay were carbon copies of those in Ukita's writings.[24]

However, comparing more carefully Liang's article with Ukita's writings, we can also see that Liang did not completely accept Ukita's view of the relationship between history and race. The differences here between Liang and Ukita are important to analyze, because it is certain that Liang based himself on Ukita's work. By comparing them, we can understand more clearly what Liang accepted and what he did not accept from Ukita. The most significant difference between them concerns the interpretation of the term "historical races" (歷史的人種). Ukita interpreted "historical races" as historically formed races—that is, the races formed by non-physical factors, such as language and culture; whereas Liang used the term to describe history-making races, races which played important roles in the drama of mankind's history. These different interpretations further produced the exact opposite understandings of the relationship between history and race. That is, Ukita denied a racial interpretation of history, because "the historical races were the effect of history, not its cause",[25] by the same token, Liang wrote: "History is nothing but an account of the development of and strife among the human races."[26] In this way, for Liang races had developed side by side until they eventually engaged in struggle—that is, racial war.

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[22] Liang, "Xin shixue," in *Wenji*, 9: 11–13.

[23] Ukita Kazutami, *Shigaku tsūron* (Tokyo: Tōkyō senmon gakkō, 1898); Ukita, *Seiyō jōko shi* (Tokyo: Tōkyō senmon gakkō, 1898).

[24] See Ukita, *Shigaku tsūron*, p. 78; Ukita, *Seiyō jōko shi*, pp. 18–19.

Reformers like Liang and Tang Caichang, though, could not propound a racial interpretation of history when they discussed domestic Chinese matters. Needless to say, it would easily give rise to anti-Manchu racism which they as royalists could not accept. Liang had shown an interest in anti-Manchuism even before the Hundred Days Reform, when he served as Academic Director at the *Hunan shiwu xuetang* 湖南時務學堂 (Hunan academy of current events). He is said to have distributed some anti-Manchu pamphlets, such as *Yangzhou shiri ji* 揚州十日記 (Record of ten days in Yangzhou), to his students in 1897 and emphasized the racial differences between Han and Manchu.[27] Furthermore, in a 1902 letter to his mentor Kang Youwei, Liang still retained his anti-Manchuism:

> Now is the time that the nationalistic idea has become highly developed. If we lack this idea, we can never found our nation.... In order to rouse the nationalistic idea, naturally we cannot keep from attacking the Manchus. Anti-Manchuism is the best-timed idea in China, just as was anti-Tokugawa (*tōbaku* 倒幕) sentiment in Japan.[28]

In spite of these early inclinations toward anti-Manchuism, however, it was impossible for Liang Qichao and other reformers to advocate anti-Manchuism in public after the revolutionaries, mortal enemies of the reformers, began to clamor for anti-Manchu racism among their most popular slogans.

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[25] Ukita, *Shigaku tsūron*, p. 86.

[26] Liang, "Xin shixue," in *Wenji*, 9: 12.

[27] Liang Qichao, *Qingdai xueshu gailun* 清代學術概論 (Intellectual trends in the Qing period), in *Zhuanji*, 34: 62.

[28] Ding Wenjiang 丁文江 and Zhao Fengtian 赵丰田, eds., *Liang Qichao nianpu changbian* 梁启超年谱长编 (Chronological biography of Liang Qichao) (Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1983), p. 286.

3. *Revolutionary Anti-Manchuism and the Rise of Anthropology in China*

Now that we have touched on both the introduction of anthropology into China and the reformists' idea of race, we can proceed to consider the relationship between revolutionary anti-Manchuism and the rise of anthropology in China. As is well known, anti-Qing revolutionary propaganda was initially made through reprinting and distributing a number of older pamphlets, such as *Yangzhou shirt ji* and *Jiading tucheng jilüe* 嘉定屠城紀略 (Record of the massacre of Jiading), which described atrocities committed by the Manchu invading army at the beginning of the Qing era. Although these works were officially prohibited throughout the Qing, they were reprinted continually and secretly for more than two hundred years to provide Han Chinese with a sense of racial hostility toward the Manchus. The late Qing revolutionaries were, in this sense, descendants of the anti-Manchu loyalists of the early Qing period. The late Qing revolutionaries, however, were more than that. It was not long before they discovered that the newly arrived anthropology could furnish their anti-Manchuism with a new "scientific" authority. We thus find a complicated situation in the late Qing—that is, both reformers and revolutionaries trying to apply anthropology and ethnology to advocate pro-Manchuism and anti-Manchuism, respectively.

For the most of the revolutionaries, of course, the Han and the Manchus were two completely different "races." For example, in his *Geming jun* 革命軍 (The revolutionary army), the most widely circulated political pamphlet before the 1911 Revolution, the young revolutionary Zou Rong 鄒容 (1885–1905) claimed: "For revolution, race must be clearly distinguished" (*geming bi pouqing renzhong* 革命必剖清人種).[29] Zou divided the yellow race into two main branches: the "races of China," including the Han, the Tibetan, and the Cochinese races; and the "races of Siberia," composed of the Mongolian, the Tungus, and the Turkish peoples. Obviously, the Han belonged to the former; and the Manchus, one of the sub-branches of the Siberian race, belonged to the latter. The racial classification he used was the commonly held view at that time and suited anti-Manchu propaganda well. Zou undoubtedly found this classification in Japan, because it is obvious that his classification followed exactly that of Kuwabara Jitsuzō 桑原隲藏 (1870–1931), one of the founders of modern

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[29] Zou Rong, *Geming jun*, in John Lust, trans., *The Revolutionary Army: A Chinese Nationalist Tract of 1903* (The Hague and Paris: Mouton & Co., 1968), p. 106.

Japanese Oriental studies. Kuwabara's racial classification can be found in his high school textbook *Chūtō Tōyō shi* 中等東洋史 (East Asian history for middle school) published in 1898.[30] From Zou's point of view, because the Han and the Manchus were two completely different races, it did not matter if the Han expelled the Manchus from China or killed them to take revenge.

In the face of this revolutionary propaganda, the reformers found themselves in a great difficulty. Before Zou Rong's *Geming jun* was published, Liang Qichao had always divided the yellow race into three groupings: the first consisted of East Asians, such as Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and Siamese; the second consisted of North Asians, such as Mongolians, Tartars, and Siberians; and the third consisted of Europeans and "Near Easterners," such as Turks and Hungarians. At that time, Liang included the Manchus among the Chinese.[31] But, after the revolutionaries repeatedly emphasized the racial differences between Han and Manchus with reference to physical anthropology, the reformers could not repeat their former classification any longer, because it became impossible for anyone to deny the racial differences between Han and Manchu as long as one followed the then commonly held view of physical anthropology. Because of this dilemma, Liang, when he later classified the "Chinese" into six different groups—the Miao, Han, Tibetan, Mongolian, Huns, and Tungus—had to admit reluctantly, "the Qing dynasty originated from the Tungus. . . . Compared with the white, brown, red, and black races, we are definitely a yellow race; compared with Miao, Tibetan, Mongolian, Huns, and Manchus, we are generally speaking Han."[32]

Liang and other reformers, however, did not surrender to the logic of revolutionary propaganda. What they produced as the alternative to the method of physical anthropology was, so to speak, the method of cultural anthropology. To put it the other way round, they tried to use the cultural classification of race, which took cultural, linguistic, and customary elements into consideration, to reinforce their pro-Manchuism. Kang Youwei, the leader of the reformers, for instance, noted in 1902:

> The relationship between so-called Han and Manchu is no more than that between natives (*tuji* 土籍) and immigrants (*keji* 客籍). In norms and

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[30] Kuwabara Jitsuzō, *Chûtō Tōyō shi*, in *Kuwabara Jitsuzō zenshû* 桑原隲藏全集 (Complete works of Kuwabara Jitsuzō) (Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1968), vol. 4, pp. 22–24.

[31] Liang, "Xin shixue," in *Wenji*, 9: 13; Liang, "Zhongguo jiruo suyuan lun" 中國積弱溯源論 (On the source of China's weakness)," in *Wenji*, 5: 36.

[32] Liang, "Zhongguo shi xulun" 中国史叙论 (About Chinese history)," in *Wenji*, 6: 7.

> culture, both conform to Confucianism; in lifestyles and social systems, both conform to the traditions of the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties. The Manchus are very different from the Mongols of the Yuan dynasty who did not conform to Chinese culture. In short, the Manchus have been assimilated into China for so many generations that there is no difference whatsoever between Han and Manchus.[33]

To add just one more example, Liang Qichao, as well as his mentor Kang Youwei, refuted certain points used to classify the Han and the Manchus by Wang Jingwei 汪精衛 (1883–1944), an eloquent revolutionary leader. Liang pointed out:

> It has been said that the Manchus and we are completely different races, but that is not strictly true. . . . Actually, the Manchus have been definitely assimilated into us in four out of the six elements which the debater [namely, Wang Jingwei] applied to classify races. In the remaining two elements, we cannot easily draw a conclusion that they and we are different. . . . We therefore conclude that, judging from the sociological definition of race, that the Manchus have already assimilated into the Han and have sufficient qualifications to be members of our mixed nation (*huntong minzu* 混同民族).[34]

The word "sociological" is important in this context, because it shows traces of painstaking efforts made by reformers, who had to do something to oppose the revolutionary anti-Manchuism which was supported by the methods of physical anthropology. In spite of these efforts, their reformist explanation of the relationship between Han and Manchu was virtually helpless in the face of the emotional slogans of the revolutionaries. In actual fact, the reformist ideas, such as *Man-Han bufen lun* 滿漢不分論 (the inseparability of Han and Manchus) and *Manzu tonghua lun* 滿族同化論 (the assimilation of the Manchus), were refuted one after another by the revolutionaries in articles published in *Minbao* 民報, the organ of the Revolutionary Alliance 中國同盟會.

Let me offer just two examples here. Liu Shipei 劉師培 (1884–1920), an extraordinary classical scholar and a revolutionary activist, tried in a 1907 article to argue that *Jianzhou wei* (建州衛), the homeland of the

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[33] Kang Youwei, "Nanhai xiansheng bian geming shu" 南海先生辨革命書 (Mr. Kang Youwei's letter about revolution), *Xinmin congbao* 新民叢報 16 (1902).

[34] Liang, "Shenlun zhongzu geming yu zhengzhi geming zhi tezhi" 申論種族革命與政治革命之特質 (About the nature of racial revolution and political revolution), in *Wenji*, 19: 29–31.

Manchus, was in no way part of the territory of the Ming dynasty.[35] He went on to claim, by referring to nearly one hundred sources, that the homeland of the Manchus had never belonged to China, a view often later accepted by many Japanese militarists when they tried to separate Manchuria from the Republic of China in 1920s and 1930s. On the other hand, Tao Chengzhang 陶成章 (1878–1912), another famous revolutionary activist who died just after the founding of the Republic, agreed with Liu and declared that Manchuria was the enemy of China as early as the end of the Ming period.[36] One could find many similar examples from *Minbao* which tried to demonstrate the fundamental difference of the Manchus by using countless historical materials.[37]

Compared with their enthusiastic inquiries into the origin of the Manchus, though, the revolutionaries seemed to be indifferent to the question of the origin of the Han race. In fact, they had only a vague, at most psychological or emotional, concept of the Han race at its beginning. As is well known, the Han race was, and sometimes still is, generally considered the descendants of the Yellow Emperor or *Huangdi* 黃帝, the first Chinese emperor in the mythological age. But, no one knew where the Yellow Emperor had come from. Thus, over the first decade of the twentieth century, the origins of the Han race provoked a great deal of controversy in the political world as well as in the academic world. And the problems surrounding the origins of the Han race and its relationship to minority nationalities in China were so closely connected with the blueprints for future state-building that both the revolutionaries and the reformers devoted themselves to the study of Chinese prehistory. This was not only an academic subject, but also a political one. As we shall see, almost all the early Chinese paleoanthropologists were late Qing revolutionaries or reformers, and this has much to do with the political character of the issue. In a word, although the inquiry into the origins of the Han Chinese was an academic study in name, it was actually a form of political action.

Almost all the early studies of the origins of the Han race were, as I have suggested, made by late Qing political activists. Included among them are

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[35] Weiyi 衛裔 (Liu Shipei), "Bian Manren fei Zhongguo zhi chenmin" 辨滿人非中國之臣民 (Manchus have never been Chinese subjects), *Minbao* 14, 15, 18 (1907).

[36] Sigu 思古 (Tao Chengzhang), "Lun Manzhou dang Mingmo shidai yu Zhongguo wei diguo" 論滿洲當明末時代於中國為敌國 (Manchuria was the enemy of China at the end of the Ming period), *Minbao* 20 (1908).

[37] For further details on the revolutionaries' anti-Manchuism, based on articles in *Minbao* after 1905, see Michael Gasster, *Chinese Intellectuals and the Revolution of 1911: The Birth of Modern Chinese Radicalism* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1969), chap. 3.

Liu Shipei and Tao Chengzhang, as well as Zhang Binglin 章炳麟 (1869–1936), Song Jiaoren 宋教仁 (1881–1913), and Jiang Zhiyou 蔣智由 (d. 1929, also known as Jiang Guanyun 蔣觀云), among others. Some of them, such as Zhang Binglin and Liu Shipei, were extreme anti-Manchuists at that time; others, such as Jiang Zhiyou who collaborated with Liang Qichao, were typical reformers who opposed anti-Manchuism. It is clear that the problem of the origins of the Chinese or Han race was an important issue in the political views of both groups.

One important point to note here is that their inquiries into the genesis of the Han race were dominated by the influence of the so-called theory of the Western origin of Chinese civilization, advocated by the controversial historian Albert Etienne Jean Baptiste Terrien de Lacoupérie (1845–1894). Terrien de Lacoupérie was a Frenchman brought up in Hong Kong where he appears to have been educated in the Chinese classics. In the 1870s he went to Britain where he established a position on the fringes of academic life, editing his journal *The Babylonian and Oriental Records* and propagating his theories.[38] In this critical era in modern East Asia, we often find obscure Western scholars whose views have been taken up respectfully as if they were the greatest authorities in their fields. This was the case with Terrien de Lacoupérie in the field of prehistory.

Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory, which appeared in publications throughout the 1880s mainly in his own journal and later compiled in his major work of 1894, *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilization*,[39] is a work of great interest, especially for laymen. He proposed that the "Bak Sings," ancient Babylonian tribes, were the origins of the later Chinese, who often called themselves *baixing* 百姓. The "Bak Sings" were, according to him, headed by the Yellow Emperor, whose name (*Huangdi*) was similar to Kudur Kakhunti, the generic title of the kings of Babylonia. The Yellow Emperor led his people to the southwest of present-day Gansu, where he eventually founded a Chinese kingdom by conquering the Miao 苗 people, the real native Chinese. In his articles, Terrien de Lacouperie mentioned numerous coincidences between ancient Babylonia and China to support his theory, such as the notion of a cycle of twelve years, allusions in the names of the planets, knowledge of twenty-eight stellar points, and the like. In spite of many far-fetched interpretations, his ideas created a great sensation among Orientalists who had vaguely believed in a common origin between Westerners and Chinese.

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[38] H.M. Mackenzie, "Memorial notice of Prof. Terrien de Lacoupérie," *The Babylonian and Oriental Records* 7.11 (1894).

[39] Terrien de Lacoupérie, *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilisation* (London: Asher, 1894).

The first introduction of the theory of Western origins of the Han race was made by Jiang Zhiyou in his long article, "Zhongguo renzhong kao" 中國人種考 (Inquiry into the Chinese race), in 1903,[40] and many similar introductions followed in rapid succession by Liu Shipei, Tao Chengzhang, Zhang Binglin, and others. Jiang Zhiyou's article not only introduced Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory for the first time, but was also in itself the first, full-fledged ethnological research study written by a Chinese concerned with the so-called Chinese race.

At first glance, it seems strange that Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory on the Western origins of Chinese civilization would be accepted not only by reformers like Jiang, but also by revolutionary nationalists like Liu, Tao, and Zhang, because the theory stressed the derivative nature of Chinese or Han culture. The best explanation for their acceptance of this theory, however, can be found right in their articles. After introducing key sections of the *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilisation*, Jiang's article went on to say:

> As early as four thousand years ago when all mankind was too primitive to have any transportation such as boats or carts, the ancestors of our race trekked a long way across high mountains, steep precipices, and deserts, and finally founded the great Eastern country. How great and brave were our ancestors! They accomplished the greatest undertaking that other races had not ever done. What they did is the best encouragement for us.

The same explanation is even truer of the revolutionary nationalist Liu Shipei. He went so far as to note:

> When the Han race entered China for the first time, the Chinese mainland was inhabited by the Miao. After conflict between the races, the superior defeated the inferior. Thus, all the rivers and mountains of our great continent finally fell into the hands of the Han race. That being the case, we should never forget that China wholly owes what she is to the Han race. China belongs to the Han race.[41]

It should be clear from these examples that the theory of the Western origins of Chinese civilization had appeal paradoxically because it satisfied the pride of its advocates as Han. This helps explain why Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory was introduced in the first issue of the journal *Guocui xuebao* 國粹學報 (National essence journal), published in 1905 and dedicated to the preservation of the national essence of Chinese civilization.[42] It may be, however, too much to say that all Chinese nationalists accepted this sort of paradoxical logic. For example, Zhang Binglin, whom most historians consider the most typical nationalist and anti-Manchu racist, later did modify and abandon this theory. In a 1904 book, he acknowledged the truth of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory; later, in 1908, he disagreed with the notion that the Yellow Emperor was an immigrant; and at last in 1910, just a year before the Revolution of 1911, he abandoned the theory altogether.[43] He wrote at that time:

> A French scholar once advocated that the Chinese originally came from Babylonia and China was originally inhabited by the Miao people who were later expelled from her heartland by the Han people. Although I believed in it before, I have found, after thorough inquiry, that this theory isn't correct at all.[44]

One explanation for Zhang's change of view may be that, as an ultranationalist, he could not accept a theory which stressed the derivative nature of Chinese culture, and as a realist politician, he noticed the latent threat posed by such a theory—namely, that it was likely to divide the Chinese people into several hostile camps and therefore be harmful to the future Republic.

In any event, we can be fairly certain that Terrien de Lacoupérie's bold hypothesis exercised a huge influence over Chinese intellectuals who, be they revolutionaries or reformers, had a much firmer grounding in the Chinese classics than Terrien de Lacoupérie did. This brings us to the question of how they got to know of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory in the first place. Strange to say, the English original of the *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilisation* never appeared in Chinese translation, nor was a complete Japanese translation ever published. How then did they encounter this book? Japan's role as middleman is, in fact, the key to explain why Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory suddenly became so widespread in early twentieth century China. Let me now look briefly at the introduction of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory into Japan.

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[40] Jiang Guanyun, "Zhongguo renzhong *kao,*" *Xinmin congbao* 37 (1903).

[41] Liu Shibei, "Lun Zhongguo duiwai sixiang zhi bianqian" 論中國對外思想之變遷 (On the changes in Chinese ideas concerning foreign countries), *Jingzhong ribao* 警鐘日報, June 20–21, 1904.

[42] Huang Jie 黄節, "Huangshi" 黄史 (History of the yellow race), *Guocui xuebao* 1 (1905).

[43] Zhang Binglin, "Xu zhongxing" 序種姓 (Introducing races and clans), in Zhang, *Qiushu* 訄書 (The book of raillery) (1904; Shanghai rpt.: Gudian wenxue chubanshe, 1958), pp. 41–56; Zhang, "Pai Man pingyi" 排滿平議 (About driving out the Manchus), *Minbao* 21 (1908); Zhang, "Lun jiaoyu de genben yao cong ziguo zixin fachulai" 論教育的根本要從自國自心發出來 (The basis of education should come from our own country and our own hearts), *Jiaoyu jinyu zazhi* 教育今语杂志 3 (1910).

[44] Zhang, "Lun jiaoyu de genben yao cong ziguo zixin fachulai," *Jiaoyu jinyu zazhi* 3 (1910).

As far as I have been able to determine, the introduction of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory into Japan goes back to 1896, seven years earlier than that in China, when Miyake Yonekichi 三宅米吉 (1860–1929) published an article titled "Rakuperi-shi ga Shina kodai no kaika no kigen ni tsukite no setsu" ラクウペリ氏が支那古代の開化の起源に就ての説 (Professor Lacoupérie's theory about the origins of ancient Chinese civilization).[45] Miyake Yonekichi was then a professor of history at Tokyo Higher Normal School and had just returned from London, where he had an opportunity to read Terrien de Lacoupérie's essays. In his article, Miyake introduced the outline of the *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilization*, and concluded: "We cannot completely agree with his interpretation. However, I cannot help being surprised to find numerous coincidences between ancient Babylonia and China. It is likely that there were certain relationships between ancient Babylonia and China."

It is also interesting to note that, in the same year of 1896, another Japanese historian offered a commentary on Terrien de Lacoupérie's book. He is none other than Kuwabara Jitsuzō, mentioned earlier as a founder of modern Japanese Oriental studies. In his maiden academic essay, "Shina no taiko ni kansuru Tōyō gakusha no shosetsu ni tsuki" 支那の太古に関する東洋學者の所説の就き (On some Orientalists' views about ancient China), Kuwabara, after quoting some key sentences of Terrien de Lacoupérie's book, leveled a biting critique of it. He produced numerous pieces of evidence to counter Terrien de Lacoupérie, and noted: "I can not agree with his interpretation at all. Some Orientalists in the West seem to advocate the Western origins of all world civilizations out of a certain racial emotion or religious faith of theirs. This kind of theory will never be accepted in the academic world."[46] It will be clear from these two examples that Terrien de Lacoupérie's book was criticized as soon as it was introduced into Japan. That is, the Western origins of early Chinese

civilization was treated as a suspicious theory by some Japanese professional scholars from the very beginning.

As we often see, however, academic evaluation is one thing, and public evaluation can be quite another. Despite these refutations, interest in the fascinating and easily grasped theory of the "Western origins of early Chinese civilization" did not die. The bestseller *Shina bunmei shi* 支那文明史 (History of Chinese Civilization) was a typical example.[47] Written by two non-academic historians in 1900, four years after Kuwabara's criticism, *Shina bunmei shi* devoted an entire chapter to a favorable and detailed introduction of Terrien de Lacoupérie's book and emphasized that it was an epoch-making work. One can safely assume that Terrien de Lacoupérie's name and his theory became widely known in Japan through the introduction in *Shina bunmei shi* rather than in the academic writings of Miyake or Kuwabara.

We should note that *Shina bunmei shi* was not a translation of Terrien de Lacoupérie's book in the exact sense of the word. That is, the two Japanese writers of the book did translate some of the main points of Terrien de Lacoupérie; but, they added, without making mention of it, some examples of their own on the similarity between ancient Babylonia and China. Initially, I believed that the chapter of the book in question would be a translation of the *Western Origin of the Early Chinese Civilization* or other pamphlets of Terrien de Lacoupérie.[48] But, after gathering almost all of the works of Terrien de Lacoupérie, I ultimately came to the conclusion that some parts of the chapter were, surprisingly, invented by these Japanese writers using Terrien de Lacoupérie's name. In spite of this, why they introduced him the way they did remains something of a mystery—Terrien de Lacoupérie's book was a mishmash of various articles by him published in his journal, and was thus highly awkward in its construction. In this sense, we might say that *Shina bunmei shi* made Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory more palatable by adding some clear examples and simplifying the original theory. Indeed, *Shina bunmei shi* owed its rise on the bestsellers' list to its style.

The impact of *Shina bunmei shi* was so immense that there appeared a sort of Terrien de Lacoupérie boom—or, to put it more precisely, many began quoting from Terrien de Lacoupérie via *Shina bunmei shi* in the first decade of the twentieth century. Almost all of the Chinese articles which referred to the Western origins of early Chinese civilization were this kind of second-hand quotation. To take just one simple example, Jiang Zhiyou's article "Inquiry into the Chinese race," the first introduction of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory into China, was little more than a translation, or rather adaptation, from *Shina bunmei shi*. The same is true of numerous articles by Liu Shipei, Tao Chengzhang, Zhang Bingling, and others.[49] One should note in passing that a Chinese translation of *Shina bunmei shi* was published in 1903, three years after the Japanese edition and the same year as Jiang Zhiyou's essay.[50] I cannot say for certain whether these Chinese intellectuals, including Jiang Zhiyou, referred to this Chinese translation, because information on it is limited. We do not know, for example, who translated it, or what the Jinghuashe 竞化社 which published it was. One thing, however, is certain: the Chinese translation of *Shina bunmei shi* must have convinced more Chinese intellectuals that their ancient civilization had originated in Mesopotamia, the heartland of all civilizations. Space prevents a full discussion of the subsequent development of the theory of Western origins of early Chinese civilization in China. Suffice it to say here that although the theory is largely denied today, some Chinese ancient historians, such as Lu Maode 陸懋德 (b. 1888), Dong Zuobin 董作賓 (1895–1963), Guo Moruo 郭沫若 (1892–1978), and Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 (1893–1980), were influenced to a greater or lesser degree by this theory before the 1940s.

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[45] Miyake, "Rakūperi-shi ga Shina kodai no kaika no kigen ni tsukite no setsu," *Shigaku zasshi* 史学雑誌 79 (1896).

[46] Kuwabara, "Shina no taiko ni kansuru Tōyō gakusha no shosetsu ni tsuki," *Kokumin no tomo* 国民の友 287–88 (1896), in *Kuwabara Jitsuzō zenshū*, 1: 132.

[47] Shirakawa Jirō 白河次朗 and Kokubu Tanenori 国府種徳, *Shina bunmei shi* (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1900).

[48] See, for example, Terrien de Lacoupérie, *Early History of the Chinese Civilisation* (London: E. Vaton, 1880); Terrien de Lacoupérie, *The Old Babylonian Characters And Their Chinese Derivates* (London: The Babylonian and Oriental Record, 1888).

Let us move to a discussion of the different meanings that the theory of the Western origins of early Chinese civilization had in Japan and China by analyzing the case of Song Jiaoren, and then advance a perspective for explaining the characteristics of Japanese influence on modern China. Song Jiaoren (1881–1913), one of the eminent revolutionary leaders, was also one of the advocates of the theory of the Western origins of early Chinese civilization. From 1904 to 1907, Song kept a diary largely covering his

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[49] Liu Shipei, *Zhongguo minzu zhi* 中國民族志 (Chinese Ethnography, 1905), in *Liu Shenshu yishu* 劉申叔遺書 (Posthumous works of Liu Shipei) (Nanjing: Jiangsu guji chubanshe, 1997), p. 603; Tao Chengzhang, *Zhongguo minzu quanli xiaozhang shi* 中國民族權力消長史 (The history of the rise and fall of the might of the Chinese people, 1904), in *Tao Chengzhang* 陶成章集 (Works of Tao Chengzhang) (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1986), pp. 231–47; Zhang Binglin, *Qiushu*, pp. 41–56.

[50] *Zhina wenming shi* 支那文明史 (Shanghai; Jinghuashe, 1903).

experiences in Japan.[51] His diary is extremely useful for us to understand the relationship between his reading and writing in Tokyo, and demonstrates vividly how eager Chinese students were in absorbing modern Western systems of thought via Japanese translations. How then did he come to encounter Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory in his reading?

According his diary, in September 1906, after he had been in Japan for ten months, Song saw, for the first time, Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory cited in a newspaper. Song records excitedly on September 3, 1906: "I found an interesting article in a newspaper. According to it, the French Orientalist Lacoupérie recently proved conclusively that the origin of the Chinese race was the Sumerians and Akkadians of Mesopotamia who later came to the East. His theory is not a conjecture but a conclusion drawn from scientific research in several fields."[52] The article he referred to here was Sasaki Yasugorō's 佐々木安五郎 "Takakusu hakase no 'Monju shosetsu shukuyō roku ni miyuru nijūhachishuku jūnikyū shichiyō no meimoku ni tsukite' o yomu" 高楠博士の「文珠所説宿曜録に見ゆる二十八宿十二宮七曜の名目に就て」を讀む (Review on Dr. Takakusu's "On the names of the twenty-eight stellar points, the twelve signs of the zodiac and the seven days in the Buddhist scriptures"), which was published in the Japanese newspaper *Yomiuri shinbun* 讀賣新聞 on that very day.[53]

This article was Sasaki's interpretation of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory as well as his impressions of another interpretation of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory written just before by Takakusu Junjirō 高楠順次郎 (1866–1948), a leading figure in Japanese Buddhist studies.[54] Sasaki's article which acknowledged the Western origins of the Chinese stimulated Song Jiaoren so much that Song kept on reading Sasaki's subsequent articles later published serially in *Yomiuri shinbun's* Sunday edition, and wrote down summaries in his diary.[55] Thus, guided by Sasaki's explanation, Song became yet another follower of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory.

Song Jiaoren's acceptance of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory can probably be explained along the same lines as that of Jiang Zhiyou, Liu Shipei, and other Chinese intellectuals. That is, the theory of the Western origins of the early Han race could satisfy their self-respect as Han, the great conquerors. But a second question now rears its head: Who in the world was Sasaki Yasugorō? And, why did he advocate Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory? At first glance, Sasaki's article is just one of many rehashes of Terrien de Lacoupérie which appeared like so many mushrooms in Japan following the publication of *Shina bunmei shi*. But, when we look into his background, we find another hidden interpretation of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory.

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[51] *Song Jiaoren riji* 宋教仁日記 (Diary of Song Jiaoren) (Changsha: Hunan renmin chubanshe, 1980); Matsumoto Hideki 松本英紀, trans., and annot., *Sō Kyōjin no nikki* 宋教仁の日記 (Diary of Song Jiaoren) (Kyoto: Dōhōsha shuppan, 1989).

[52] Song, *Song Jiaoren riji*, p. 228.

[53] Sasaki Yasugorō 佐々木安五朗, "Takakusu hakase no 'Monju shosetsu shukuyō roku ni miyuru nijūhachi-shuku jūnikyū shichiyō no meimoku ni tsukite' o yomu," *Yomiuri shinbun*, September 3, 1906.

[54] Takakusu's article was published in *Yomiuri shinbun* on August 12 and 19, 1906.

[55] Song, *Song Jiaoren riji*, pp. 235, 245–46, 254–56, 265–67, 277–80, 282–83.

Sasaki Yasugorō (1872–1934) was a Japanese authority on Mongolia at that time, a so-called *Mōkotsū* 蒙古通, and a hard-liner or expansionist, often dubbed the "King of Mongolia 蒙古王" by his buddies, those generally called *tairiku rōnin* 大陸浪人 (continental adventurers). In the first decade of the twentieth century, he also developed some new theories of his own, such as the theory of the same origins of the Mongolian and Japanese peoples (Nichi-Mō dōsoron 日蒙同祖論) and the theory of the Hebrew origins of the Japanese race (*Nihon jinshu Heburai kigenron* 日本人種ヘブライ起源説). Obviously, the aim of these highly suspect theories was to justify Japanese continental expansion. We can now see his advocacy of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory was, by no means, motivated by a desire to develop historical research, but to support his expansionism: The Chinese were just an immigrant people from the West. So, why can't we expand our territory onto the Asian Continent? For Sasaki, this was the implied meaning of the theory of the Western origins of early Chinese civilization.

As far as I conclude at this point, there is no evidence in Song's diary that he was aware of the implied meaning in Sasaki's work. For Song who intended to recover the glory of the Han Chinese by overthrowing the Manchus, the meaning of Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory was no more than that it might be used to remind all Han Chinese of the great feat of their ancestors. In other words, the theory of the Western origins of early Chinese civilization which was regarded as an established theory at that time was, in fact, expected to play different roles by different supporters. In this sense, Terrien de Lacoupérie's theory, as well as modern anthropology itself, was destined to take on political characteristics from its inception.

We need to take the introduction of modern anthropology into consideration when we analyze the anti-Manchu racism of the 1911 Revolution period. Similarly, we need to take the revolutionary movement and the political situation in the late Qing period into consideration when we analyze the rise of anthropology in modern China. Chinese revolutionaries were, on the one hand, propagandists of anti-Manchuism, and on the other hand, they were introducers of modern Western anthropology into China. As anti-Manchu propagandists, they were good at stirring up anti-Manchu emotions among the people to foment revolution; as early introducers of anthropology, they continually absorbed foreign theories and developed historical work on the origins of the Chinese race in their disputes with the reformers. At the same time, however, we need to point out that anthropology in modern China which was initially expected to play a political role, in its subsequent development could not break away from a sense of the superiority of the Han Chinese over other minority nationalities including the Manchus. An American anthropologist by the name of Stephen O. Murray describes this inclination as follows:

> In some basic ways, Han anthropologists have failed to address the charge that their "applied" anthropology is engaged primarily in the process of aiding the assimilation of "primitives" into Han civilization, which is as transparent a goal as the Western civilization colonial anthropologists wanted to bring to benighted "savages."[56]

Not being an expert on anthropology in present-day China, I cannot say for certain whether this comment is fully correct or not. However, if it is correct, we cannot help noting that anti-Manchu racism, the spirit of the late Qing revolutionary movement, which stimulated the rise of anthropology, has exercised a serious and deep influence on the subsequent development of Chinese anthropology.

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[56] Cited in Gregory E. Guldin, *The Saga of Anthropology in China: from Malinowski to Moscow to Mao* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1994), p. 247.

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REINVENTING *CHINA*: IMPERIAL QING IDEOLOGY AND THE RISE OF MODERN CHINESE NATIONAL IDENTITY IN THE EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY

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Abstract

This article uses both Manchu and Han sources to interrogate the relationship between Qing and *China*. After toppling the Ming reign, the Qing rulers identified their state with China as their eighteenth-century campaigns in Inner Asia redefined what China was. By the early twentieth century, educational institutions had facilitated the Manchu efforts to gain the hearts and minds of the Han intellectual elite, who embraced the idea that China was a multiethnic state. Although Manchu rule ended in 1911, the Chinese people never returned to the position that "China" was the property of the Han people: China's modern identity would be that of a unified multiethnic state. In other words, the Qing legacies to modern China include not just the country's vast territory but also a new concept of China that laid the solid foundation for the rise of its national identity.

Almost all historians who have addressed the topic agree that the Qing territorial bequest laid the foundation for the modern Chinese state as a geographic and ethnic entity (Ho Ping-ti, 1967). Until recently, however, few noted that the Qing court's creative reinterpretation of the concept of *China* (*Zhongguo*) as a composite of non-Han and Han peoples provided twentieth-century Chinese nationalists with one of the major components of modern Chinese national identity: the multiethnic state.

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An excellent example of the Qing rulers' dexterity and creativity in employing the Han concept of China is Qianlong's 1755 pronouncement: "There exists a view of *China* (*Zhongxia*),[1] according to which non-Han people cannot become *China*'s subjects and their land cannot be integrated into the territory of *China*. This does not represent our dynasty's understanding of *China*, but is instead that of the earlier Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties" (*HC*, 7338). As the Qing rulers adopted the idea, they invested it with a new meaning that represented the multiethnic nature of the Qing state. We thus are left with two important questions: how did the Qing court adjust the concept of *China* to the development of the Qing multiethnic empire? And what role did that concept play in the formation of modern Chinese national identity?

Before the mid-1990s, scholars of Qing history merely treated the identification of Qing with *China* as a self-evident historical fact, without noting the complexity of the Qing imperial understanding of *China* (*Zhongguo*).[2] Since then, a number of historians challenging the sinicization model have argued that the longstanding conflation of *Qing* and *China* is in need of critical scrutiny, pointing out that a multiethnic empire defined the Qing, while the name *China* referred to no peoples other than the Han group and China proper until the 1911 revolution (Millward, 1998: 9, 12–13, 201, 249; Crossley, 1999: 341).

More recently, scholars have offered more complicated interpretations of the imperial Qing concept of *China*. Mark Elliott has indicated that because of the unification of China proper and Inner Asia under the Qing, by the end of the 1700s, the meaning of *China* was no longer confined to China proper and the people living there (Elliott, 2000: 638). And in Peter Perdue's view, the rise of Chinese nationalism can be traced to the late seventeenth century, when the Qing armies encountered Russia during their northward expansion (Perdue, 1998: 285). Such arguments remind us of the internal connection between Qing history and twentieth-century Chinese national identity. On the final page of his authoritative study *The Manchu Way*, Elliott also emphasizes that analyzing conceptualizations of "Great Qing" and *China* "will furnish the stuff of future debates on the significance of the Manchus and their empire for China and Inner Asia in the modern world" (Elliott, 2001: 361). But whether and how the Manchu rulers accommodated the concept of *China* to the Qing multiethnic enterprise, let alone how the official Qing view affected the formation of modern Chinese national identity, remain open questions.

Drawing on Chinese and Manchu source materials, this article tells a different story about the relationship between Qing and *China*. I argue that after replacing the Ming, the Qing rulers identified themselves with *China*, expanding its scope to include various parts of Inner Asia and to refer to a multiethnic entity. In the final years of the Qing dynasty, because this imperial interpretation was embraced by Han literati and officially disseminated through the educational system, it reached a wide audience and strongly influenced the Han Chinese perception of their own state. More important, it eventually constituted the source of the "greater Chinese nationalism" adopted by the new Republican government as its national identity.

Separating Qing from China: *The View of the Early Manchu State*

The earliest extant records of Qing attitudes toward *China* date from the formative period of the Manchu state. At that time, the Jianzhou clan, from which the Qing emperors would descend, was still a minor tributary of the Ming dynasty, and the Manchus adopted the official Ming understanding of *China* as referring to China proper and to the Han people.

The rulers of the Ming dynasty controlled a territory considerably smaller than that of present-day China. The Inner Asian territories added to China before the end of the eighteenth century—Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Tibet, and neighboring areas—were not yet considered part of *China*; instead they were, like Korea, Vietnam, and other states, tribute countries (*Ming huidian*, 1989: 571–87; Qian Mu, 1980; Fincher, 1972). Under the Ming, *China* referred both to fifteen provinces and to the Han people living in them (Hu Axiang, 2000: 281n35). This usage was common among the Han elite by the early fifteenth century; it had reached a wide audience through the circulation of popular and official maps and geographic works (Li Xiaocong, 1996; Smith, 1998).

In Manchu records, the earliest references to the Han people used the term *nikan*, and the Ming empire was called *nikan gurun* (the state of the Han) or *nikan i daiming i gurun* (the state of the Han's Great Ming) (*Jiu Manzhou dang*, 1969: 21, 223; *Kyū Manshū tō*, 1975: 173, 250, 266; Li Xuezhi, 1971: 57–63).[3] Early Manchu rulers simply adopted the Ming view, treating *China* as equivalent to both the Ming empire and to the Han group. This equivalence is clearly reflected in the Manchu translation of the various Chinese terms for *China*. For example, in his Chinese-language memorial, a Han official serving the Qing court during the Hong Taiji period referred to the Ming state with the word *China*, which was then rendered as *nikan gurun* in Manchu (Li Guangtao, 1959: 95; Liu Housheng, 1993: 199).

With the rise of the Manchu state, the Manchu rulers drew an increasingly sharp line between themselves and China. In 1627, Hong Taiji, the second Manchu ruler, tried to discuss the border issue with the Ming court. In an official letter, he suggested that the Shanhai Guan pass serve as the legal boundary between the Manchu state and *China* (Li Guangtao, 1959: 106). Clearly, he viewed his state as independent of *nikan gurun*. But once the Qing trampled the Ming, this attitude had to change.

Equating Qing with *China*

Shortly after occupying Beijing, the Qing rulers began to identify their own empire as *China*. The term (*Zhongguo*) was first used around the tenth century BCE. Its literal meaning is "central state," but it referred to no specific ethnicity or location (Yu Shengwu, 1981: 1–11; Wang Ermin, 1977: 441–46; Luo Zhitian, 1998: 1–91; Hu Axiang, 2000: 243–91). This vagueness permitted a multitude of states in the Zhou period to assert their political priority by appropriating the label. States we know today as Zhou, Yan, Lu, and Wei often referred to themselves in less formal contexts as *Zhongguo*, especially to distinguish themselves from those tribes that refused to adopt Zhou rituals and institutions (Luo Zhitian, 1998: 35–53; Wang Ermin, 1977: 441–45; Hu Axiang, 2000: 25–62).

Thanks to this tradition, once the various competing states located in what is today called China had been subdued and their territories unified under a single ruler, most of the Chinese dynasties that followed over a period of two millennia boasted of being *China*. They also maintained the tradition of having a distinctive alternative name—Han, Tang, Song, Ming. These dynasties clearly treated the titles as interchangeable and as referring to the same polity (Wang Ermin, 1977: 441–80; Hu Axiang, 2000: 258–64). As in the pre-Qin period, *China* was used in dealing with foreign affairs; in contrast, the distinctive name and its variants, such as Da Wei (Great Wei), Da Jin (Great Jin), Da Yuan (Great Yuan), *guochao* (state dynasty), and *benchao* (our dynasty), were used in domestic contexts (Hu Axiang, 2000: 273–75).[4] By the Ming, *China* was commonly used as the state's official title on edicts and other official documents.[5]

But because those who founded new dynasties often emerged from groups with different ethnic attributes than their predecessors, their understanding of what *China* meant varied over time. Whenever a non-Han group overthrew the rulers of the central country, *China* came to mean a mixture of the Han and non-Han groups. When the dynasty was founded by Han persons, as was the case with the Ming, the term simply referred to the land of the Han (Qian Zhongshu, 1986: 1486–89; Luo Zhitian, 1998: 1–91). This evidence suggests that the concept of *China* was long shared and redefined by non-Han groups, despite its Han origins. Notably, for the non-Han people, the adoption of the concept of *China* did not lessen their sense of their own ethnic identity. For example, though the Jin and Yuan rulers drew a sharp line between the Han and non-Han peoples, they clearly identified their states with *China*.[6]

A paucity of documentary evidence may forever rule out the possibility of determining precisely when the Qing court embraced this cultural resource, but not long after the collapse of the Ming, *China* became the equivalent of Great Qing (Da Qing)—another official title of the Qing state—in imperial edicts. As noted earlier, the Qing rulers distinguished between China and the Manchu state before the Ming. But from the fall of the Ming dynasty onward, the Qing court's view changed: *Qing* and *China* became interchangeable official titles, and the latter often appeared as a substitute for the former in official documents.

There were obvious reasons for the Qing's switch. First of all, rulers of China, whether indigenous or foreign, had often redefined the scope of *China* to suit their needs: the Manchu rulers were not concerned that equating *Qing* with *China* would lead to the loss of their Manchu identity. Second, if they publicly embraced the concept of *China*, such acceptance of Han culture would win them the support of the Han people. Given the political benefits, it is not surprising that the Qing rulers quickly adopted the term as a standard synonym for the Qing state in foreign affairs. The Qing court's routine use of *China* to refer to its state in treaties, diplomatic correspondence, and so forth most clearly demonstrates its identification of *China* with Qing. Despite shifting political conditions, the Qing rulers from Shunzhi to Qianlong always held to the equation of Qing with *China*, only adjusting the latter's scope to match the expanding Qing territory.

An early identification of Qing with *China* appeared in a 1656 edict issued by the Qing court. The subject is a territorial dispute with Mongolia: "Those barbarians (*fanyi*) who paid tribute to Mongolia during the Ming should be administered by Mongolia. However, those barbarians submitting to the former Ming court should be subjects of *China*" (*lishu Zhongguo weimin*) (*Da Qing Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, 1964: 103.10b–11a).

From that date onward, the term *China* was seen frequently in a multitude of official and private writings in the Chinese and Manchu languages, from edicts to treaties to the emperor's personal works to the travelogues of Manchu officials. In a 1710 edict concerning the border between Korea and the Qing state, the Kangxi emperor referred to what had previously been the land of the Manchus as belonging to *China*: "The Hongtong River [now called the Songhua River, in northern Manchuria], which flows from the Changbai Mountains, . . . belongs entirely to *China* (*shu Zhongguo*). To the northwest of the Yalu River is part of *China* (*shu Zhongguo*); the land to the southeast of the Tumen River belongs to *China* (*shu Zhongguo*)" (Jiang Liangqi, 1980: 349).

In both the Manchu and Chinese versions of the treaties with foreign countries signed in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Qing was clearly equated with *China*. Consider, for example, the language used in the famous Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689, which settled a long-standing territorial dispute between the Qing empire and Russia. One passage from the Chinese version reads, "The land lying to the south of stony Xing'an Mountain . . . belongs to *China* (*shu Zhongguo*). . . . In order to preserve good relations with *China* (*yu Zhongguo hehao*) Russia will bring about no new disputes" (*Da Qing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, 1964: 143.16a–16b).

In the Manchu version of the treaty, we find the following: "The official Songgotu, . . . sent by the order of the great emperor of *China* to settle the boundary with Russia, met with the Russian missions at Nerchinsk" (*Dulimbai gurun i enduringge hūwangdi hesei jecen be toktobume takūraha amban . . . Songgotu . . . Oros gurun i . . . amba elcin . . . Nibcoo bade uhei acafi*) (*SDRK*, 7). The Manchu term *Dulimbai gurun* is the standard translation for the Chinese terms *China* (*Zhongguo*), *Zhongyuan*, and *Hua* and appeared in official documents produced by the Qing court beginning in 1689, if not earlier. The origin of the word *Dulimbai* can be traced to another Manchu word, *dulin*, meaning "middle," "central"; *gurun* means "country." The Manchu expression *Dulimbai gurun i enduringge hūwangdi* in the above passage translates the Chinese phrase "the wise emperor of *China*." Some official Manchu documents, such as a passage cited below, used a different Manchu title for the Qing emperor, *Dulimbai gurun i enduringge han* (the wise khan of *China*).[7]

In 1686, three years before the Treaty of Nerchinsk, the Qing court had declared in a Manchu communication sent to Russia, "The Western countries all . . . comply with the procedures established by Our Great *China*." A similar document sent to Russia in 1693 states, "After we report this matter to the emperor of Our Great *China*, we will return" (QD, 64, 144).[8] When Russian writings sent to the Qing court were translated into Manchu, the official titles of the Qing state and emperors were rendered as *Dulimbai gurun* and *Dulimbai gurun i enduringge han*. The same translation can be found in Manchu versions of other Russian documents presented to the Kangxi emperor (Gugong bowuyuan, [1936] 1969: 198–201, 208–9, 214).[9]

Other Manchu diplomatic papers from the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods provide more evidence that *Qing* and *China* were often equated. Of the surviving diplomatic documents from the Qing court to Russia between 1661 and 1734, more than 160 used *Dulimbai gurun* as the official title of the Qing state.[10]

In the Qianlong era, the identification of *Qing* with *China* was more visible than ever. The Manchu and Chinese terms for *China*—*Dulimbai gurun* and *Zhongguo*—were routinely used as the title of the Qing state in official documents and even in the emperor's poems. During the 1980s, the government of the People's Republic of China organized and opened to the public the archives of materials produced during the Qianlong period concerning Sino-Russian relations. According to Qu Liusheng, a scholar who helped to compile those archives, the term *China* (*Zhongguo/Dulimbai gurun*) occurs more frequently in them than in similar documents from the Kangxi and Yongzheng periods (personal communication, June 2002). In 1735, shortly after the Qianlong emperor ascended the throne, he wrote in a poem, "Foreigners appreciate only military power. . . . Thus, they submit to us wholeheartedly and do not dare to despise *China* once we display our hunting techniques to them" (Qianlong emperor, 1993: 3.693). In a poem from 1754, Qianlong advised, "*China* should generously pacify those foreigners" (*Zhongguo huai rou ning cong hou*) (Qianlong emperor, 1993: 3.296). In an edict issued in 1780, he declared, "*China* deals with foreigners from afar only by treating them without discrimination" (*Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, 1964: 15018). The 1793 commercial treaty with Russia states, "*China* trades with your country" (He Qiutao, n.d.: 12.2a).

The Qing emperors sometimes emphasized their identification with *China* by using the phrase "our *China*" (*wo Zhongguo*). In 1712, the Kangxi emperor wrote in a Chinese edict to a Qing mission sent to Russia, "Our *China* has no such place" (*wo Zhongguo bing wu ruci difang*) and "Our *China* has [similar weapons]" (*wo Zhongguo huoyou*) (Tulisen, 1964: 376). In 1729, an official document sent to Russia began, "According to the institutions of our great *China*. . . ." (QD, 528). In 1750, Qianlong wrote in an edict to a chief of Zunghar: "Many people have fled from our *China* (*wo Zhongguo*) to your place" (*Pingding Zhungeer fanglüe*, 1990: 910).

The conflation of *Qing* and *China* was taken up by Manchu officials serving in the court. In the 1720s, a Manchu official named Tulisen served as an ambassador to Russia and then described his experiences in a famous travelogue titled *Yiyulu* (*A Record of the Foreign Regions*), published in both Chinese and Manchu (Tulisen, 1964: 44). The Manchu and Chinese versions of his book use *China—Dulimbai gurun* and *Zhongguo*, respectively—many times to refer to the Qing state; only once does he employ the phrase *Daicin gurun*, Manchu for "Great Qing state." Tulisen often uses *meni Dulimbai gurun*, Manchu for "our *China*," to show where his allegiance lay: "In our *China*, there are no officials who can handle this kind of matter [without the emperor's permission]" (*Meni Dulimbai gurun de umai ere gese baita be salifi yabure amban akū*) (Tulisen, 1964: 112).

The Manchu acceptance of the concept of *China* was visible not only in Beijing—the capital of the empire—but also in Manchuria. As early as the 1660s, Fang Gongqian, a Han-Chinese poet exiled to northern Manchuria, made this point in a poem: "We feel that we have been sent to an extremely remote part of the world, but [non-Han] tributary people who come here say that this is still part of *China* (*lairen you shuo shi Zhonghua*)" (Fang Gongqian, 1992: 257). In the early 1800s, Mamiya Rinzo, a Japanese explorer, arrived at the mouth of the Heilong River and met some Manchu officials there. He noted that while they displayed an official badge identifying them as agents of the "great Qing state" (*Da Qingguo*), they called their country *China* (cited in Hayashi Akira, 1913: 237.155, 159).

The Qing court routinely used other terms as well in referring to its state, such as *guochao* (state dynasty), *wochao*, *wojie* (our territory), and *benchao* (our dynasty). But it treated these titles and *China* as interchangeable. For example, the Chinese version of the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk used *China* as the state title, but in a different version of the same treaty, it was replaced by the term "our territory" (*wojie*): "All of the land to the south of the Xing'an mountains and all branches of the Heilong River belong to our territory (*wojie*)" (Wei Yuan, 1992: 2002).

Similarly, two edicts from the Qianlong period dealing with a military post on the Qing border with Korea treat the terms as synonyms. The first stressed that the post was "within the territory of *China* (*Zhongguo jienei*)," while the second proclaimed that it was "within the territory of our dynasty (*wochao jienei*)" (*Ming Qing shiliao jiabian*, 1972: 665, 690). Until the late nineteenth century, memorialists writing to the Qing emperors made no distinction between *China* and *wochao*. For example, an 1883 memorial reads, "Vietnam has informed *China* of its treaty with France in the hope that our dynasty (*wochao*) will mediate between the two" (*Qingji waijiao shiliao*, 1964: 131). For the Qing rulers, the equivalence of *Qing* and *China* was complete.

Redefining China *as a Multiethnic Entity*

As many scholars have pointed out, by the Qing, there were two ways of defining *China*. The *ethnic* approach created boundaries by constructing a Han Chinese identity, while the *cultural* approach relied on an imaginary divide between Confucian and non-Confucian communities (Santangelo, 1988; Langlois, 1980; Wiens, 1969). According to either definition, the non-Han Manchus could identify themselves with *China* only by adopting Confucian rituals and institutions. Just as important, these two definitions prevented other non-Han peoples—say, those from Inner Asia—from being incorporated into *China* because they had non-Confucian cultures and religions. To avoid these problems, the Qing court relied on a new definition of *China* that was based on Qing territorial administration over different ethnic groups.[11]

The Manchu rejection of the ethnic view of *China* first manifested itself at a lexicographical level. Before 1644, the Qing court had translated the word *China* with the Manchu term *nikan gurun* (the state of the Han people), basically adopting the Ming view of *China* as constituting a single ethnicity. But after the fall of the Ming, the Manchu rulers began using a different Manchu rendering of *Zhongguo: Dulimbai gurun* (the central country).[12] This change made it plain that the Qing court had already gone far toward removing any Han-centered meaning from its concept of *China*.

At the same time, the view of *China* as a Confucian cultural community was being supplanted by a definition that emphasized the Qing political domain. As a result, Inner Asia—a new, utterly non-Confucian territory within the Qing empire—became part of the territory of *China*. The Yongzheng emperor stressed this point in his famous tract *Dayi juemilu* (*A Record of Rightness to Dispel Confusion*): "Since our dynasty began to rule *China*, the Mongols and other tribes living in extremely remote regions have been integrated into our territory. This is the expansion of *China*'s territory (*Zhongguo zhi jiangtu kaituo guangyuan*)" (Yongzheng emperor, 1983: 5; as trans. in Elliott, 2001: 347). A similar view can also be found at the section of geographical studies (*Yudi kao*) in *Huangchao wenxian tongkao* (*A Comprehensive Study of the Qing Imperial Documents*), an imperial work edited in the 1750s. Because the scope of *China* was defined by the dynastic territory, it varied over time, as this book emphasizes. By the Qing, those regions that had been tributaries in previous dynasties were completely under Qing domination, swelling *China*'s territory to an unprecedented size (*HC*, 7413). The geographical section in *Huangchao wenxian tongkao* thus treats as *China*'s territory not just the provinces of China proper but all Inner Asia under the Qing. These sources make clear that for the Qing rulers, *China* extended to all Inner Asia under the Manchu house and to the non-Han people living there.

In the 1750s, a number of Han officials strongly opposed the Qing conquest of the land to the northwest of China proper. What would eventually be called Xinjiang had never belonged to *China*, they declared (Millward, 1998). To refute them, Qianlong added to an article celebrating the Qing triumph over the Zunghars a distinction between the Qing and previous dynasties' concepts of *China*. While asserting his right to the term *China*, he rejected the policies of those who had claimed it before him—specifically, the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties—and refused to exclude non-Han peoples from its scope (*HC*, 7338). By redefining *China*, the Manchu emperors not only legitimated their own rule but also opened the way for the Banner armies to conquer and incorporate a range of ethnically diverse peoples into the imperium.

The declarations of Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong views made the new definition of *China* more clear and systematic, but its roots lay further back. Half a century before the publication of *Dayi juemilu*, a similar idea had already been incorporated into the Treaty of Nerchinsk, which (together with other relevant documents) cast northern Manchuria as part of *China*. The Manchu version of the treaty states, "All the rivers and creeks, flowing into the Sahalian River [the Heilong River] and lying to the south of great Xing'an Mountain that stretched to the sea, are *China*'s territory" (*Amba Hinggan i mudun be jafahai mederi de niketele antu i ergi Sahaliyan ula de dosikale bira birgan be gemu Dulimbai gurun i harangga obume*) (*SDRK*, 8).

Moreover, the treaty refers to the Qing court's promise "to erect a stone monument in the place where two countries meet, inscribed with [the text of the treaty] in the Latin, Russian, and Chinese languages" (*Dulimbai gurun i bithe, Oros gurun i bithe, Latino gurun i bithe arafi, wehe de folofi juwe gurun i acan i bade ilibufi*) (*SDRK*, 10). In 1690, one year after the treaty was signed, the monument was erected: it was inscribed in Latin and Russian on one side and in Chinese, Manchu, and Mongul on the other (QD, 125). The fascinating implication is that by the 1680s, *China* no longer referred to the Han alone: there was not a single Chinese language but three.

During the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, the aggressive Mongolian leader Galdan drove the Kangxi emperor to launch a series of punitive campaigns, which led to Outer Mongolia becoming part of Qing territory. When the new treaties between the Qing state and Russia signed in the 1720s clarified the borders of that region, they described Outer Mongolia as part of *China*: "[All the land] lying to the south of the mountains, from Mount Šabinai to the Erguna River, belongs to *China*" (*Šabinai dabaga ci Ergune birai dalin de isitala antu ergi be, Dulimbai gurun de obume*) (*SDRK*, 64; for more details on the treaty, see Nomiyama Atsushi, 1977: 37–84).

In the 1750s, the Qing won its war against the Zunghars and annexed Xinjiang. Again, this result was taken as an expansion of the territory of *China*: "The mountains and rivers of Zunghar Mongolia have been completely integrated into the territory of *China*" (*Jungar Monggo tala, alin bira de Dulimbai gurun-i nirugan dangse de uherilebuhe*) (qtd. in Elliott, 2001: 503n19).[13]

Other types of documents also shed light on how the Qing court extended the scope of *China* to include Inner Asia in the mid-eighteenth century. In the 1750s, Michael Benoist, a French Jesuit serving the Qing court, drew a world map that he planned to offer to the Qianlong emperor, a great lover of such Western marvels. Because Benoist's map was based on geographical information available before the conquest of the Zunghars, its rendering of *China* did not include what was later called Xinjiang. But after the conquest, some official cartographers made maps reflecting the view that Xinjiang had become integrated into the territory of *China*. Hearing this news, Benoist hastened to revise his work so that *China* would encompass Xinjiang. Qianlong highly approved of the redrawn map, presented to him in 1756, which also placed Manchuria, Mongolia, Qinghai, and Tibet within the borders of *China* (Qin Guojing, 1997).[14]

Late-eighteenth-century gazetteers edited by Manchu officials, of which the most important is Chunyuan's *Xiyu zongzhi* (*A General Gazetteer of the Western Region*), also show how *China* was being rethought. Chunyuan presents Xinjiang as part of *China*: "To the south of Kengertula [a Russian town on the border with Xinjiang] is the territory of *China*" (*yinan ji Zhongguo dijie*) (Chunyuan, 1966: 2.22b–23a). Elsewhere he notes, "Outside the Jiayu Pass is Mount Snow, stretching nine thousand *li* within the territory of *China*" (*xueshan zhi zai Zhongguo zhe, Jiayu guan wai dongxi miangen jiuqian li*) (Chunyuan, 1966: 3.1b). The writings of Benoist and Chunyuan show that once the official Qing view of *China* as a multiethnic entity was articulated in the mid-eighteenth century, it began to affect geography and cartography.

After Inner Asia was incorporated into the scope of *China*, none of its constituent areas was ever categorized as a tribute state (*HC*, 7263–412).[15]

Its inhabitants were no longer to be considered barbarians, a term suitable for the tributary countries, and an error on this score could be dangerous. For example, in 1787, the Shaanxi governor Bayansan referred to a Tibetan mission as a "barbarian mission" (*yishi*) in a memorial sent to the Qianlong emperor. The emperor replied with some asperity, "Because Tibet has long been incorporated into our territory, it is completely different from Russia, which submits to our country only in name. Thus, we cannot see the Tibetans as foreign barbarians, unlike the Russians" (*Da Qing Gaozong Chunhuangdi shilu*, 1964: 19019).

Another immediate result of the incorporation of Inner Asia into the scope of *China* was to redefine the *Chinese* (*Zhongguoren*) as a collection of ethnically diverse groups. The Qing categorization of the Mongols in Chinese and Manchu documents proves this point. As early as the 1650s, the Qing court had referred to the Mongols under its rule as *Chinese* (*Zhongguo zhi min*) (*Da Qing Shizu Zhanghuangdi shilu*, 1964: 103.10b–11a). Within a half century, the same term was being applied to non-Han peoples in northern Manchuria.

The first important example occurred in the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk. Among Kangxi's reasons for signing the treaty was his desire to prevent his Mongolian subjects from fleeing to Russia (Perdue, 1998). Those Mongols living along the border with Russia were called *Chinese* (*Zhongguo zhi ren*) in this treaty.[16] Its Manchu version used *Dulimbai gurun i niyalma*, the Manchu translation of *Chinese*, to refer to the Mongols: "[Both countries agree to cease] seeking repatriation of those who crossed the border into the other's country, whether of *Chinese* now in Russia or of Russians now in *China*" (*Ne Dulimbai gurun de bisire Oros i niyalma, Oros gurun de bisire Dulimbai gurun i niyalma be ishunde niyalma be ishunde gaire be nakafi uthai bibume*) (*SDRK*, 9). The Chinese version said, "[The Qing court] no longer requests that Russia return the *Chinese* (*Zhongguo zhi ren*) who have fled in Russia [prior to signing the treaty]" (*congqian* . . . *Eluosi suoyou Zhongguo zhi ren rengliu bubi qianfan*) (*Da Qing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, 1964: 1936). Later in the Kangxi reign, the emperor was concerned that the Han people would fail to stand as firm as the Mongols and Manchus did when *China* was faced with a Western threat (*Da Qing Shengzu Renhuangdi shilu*, 1964: 3598), suggesting that for Kangxi, the *Chinese* were not uniquely Han but were multiethnic.

The identification of Mongols with the *Chinese* (*Zhongguoren*) was repeated in the 1727 Treaty of Kiakhta, as the Manchu version makes quite clear: "[If found guilty,] the *Chinese* should be beheaded" (*Dulimbai gurun i niyalma oci sacime wambi*) (*SDRK*, 71–72). Because the Mongols accounted for the vast majority of the inhabitants of Outer Mongolia until the early twentieth century, the phrase *Dulimbai gurun i niyalma* must refer to them.

A similar implication is found in the new Chinese version of the Lifan Yuan code (*Lifan Yuan zeli*) issued around the 1820s. A passage reads, "When the *Chinese* criminals (*xi Zhongguoren*) are arrested by the frontier troops on the border with Russia, . . . related information should be reported to the Lifan Yuan and the criminal must be beheaded. . . . The *Chinese* (*Zhongguoren*) must be whipped in accordance with the code if they are arrested for hunting in the Russian territory" (qtd. in Nomiyama, 1977: 63–65).

It appears that as early as the late seventeenth century, the Qing court had shaken off the view of *China* as unique to the Han people and created a new definition of *China* as a multiethnic entity that incorporated the non-Han groups in Inner Asia. More than two centuries ago, the meanings of both *China* and *Chinese* had already come to closely resemble what we now associate with the national identity of twentieth-century China and its citizens.

Continuity and Popularization: The Imperial Qing View of China *in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries*

Beginning in the 1800s, the Qing empire was buffeted by a wave of political, economic, and military crises, first from within and then from without. But these crises did not affect the official Qing view of *China*. Until the fall of the dynasty in 1911, its leaders continued to insist both on the conflation of *Qing* and *China* and on the treatment of *China* as a multiethnic entity.

In a variety of diplomatic documents issued after 1800, the Qing court used the words *Qing* and *China* interchangeably as the state's official title—just as had been done during the previous century and a half. According to Kawashima Shin, who examined diplomatic documents from 1805, 1806, 1807, and 1821, in 28 cases, both terms were used in the same text (Kawashima Shin, 1997: 44). After 1840, the Qing court continued to use *China* as an alternative official state name. Many examples can be gleaned from published collections of official documents; I will cite only a few.[17] The treaty signed with Russia in 1861 reads, "The land to the west of these two rivers belongs to *China*." The Chinese version of the treaty signed with the United States of America in 1880 states that "*China* and the United

States will strengthen their good relationship... [and] *China*... will allow American ships to visit its coastal ports" (Wang Tieya, 1957: 161, 380).

In many other late-nineteenth-century treaties, *China* and *Qing* both appeared as official titles. Among them is the Chinese version of a treaty with Russia signed in 1881: "The emperors of both the great Qing state (*da Qingguo*) and the great Russian state agree to send officials... to sign an agreement on the following items: the officials of *China* (*Zhongguo guanyuan*) will take up the Yili region in accordance with the orders of the emperor of the great Qing state" (Wang Tieya, 1957: 381–82).

As for Inner Asia, the late Qing court maintained the tack of their predecessors. In the 1850s, Russian troops intruded into the lower Heilong River area, claiming that region as Russian territory. Citing the Treaty of Nerchinsk, already more than 150 years old, the Qing court rejected the Russian claim: all the land north of the Heilong River was the territory of *China* (*Zhongguo dijie*) (QD, 82–83, 196). Likewise, Mongolia and Xinjiang remained part of *China*. According to a treaty signed with Russia in 1869 to reestablish a mutually acceptable border between Outer Mongolia and Russia, "To the south of this line is the Kobdo region of *China* [i.e., northwestern Outer Mongolia]" (Wang Tieya, 1957: 236). In the Chinese version of a treaty with Russia signed in 1881, the Qing court described the Yili and Kashgar areas as part of *China*: "The Yili region of *China* (*Zhongguo Yili difang*) is bounded by Russian territory.... Both countries will send officials to define the border between the Ferganah region of Russia and the western region of *China*'s Kashgar (*Zhongguo Kashiga'er*)" (Wang Tieya, 1957: 382–83).

Late in 1911, in its edict of abdication, the Qing court still reaffirmed the view of *China* as a multiethnic entity: "[We] welcome the establishment of a great *Chinese* republic that integrates all of the territories where dwell the five ethnic groups, that is, Manchus, Han, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans" (*he Man Han Meng Hui Zang wuzu wanquan lingtu wei yi da Zhonghua Minguo*) (Zhongguo dier lishi dang'an guan, 1991: 2.72). This edict was issued at the moment when control over China was passed to Yuan Shikai, but it was not a product of Yuan's influence; long before Yuan's rise to power, as we have seen, the Qing court had definitely embraced the concept of *China* as a multiethnic entity. The language of this edict was carefully articulated to effect a transfer of allegiance: both Han and non-Han Chinese would now place their faith in the new republic.

While the Qing court continued to view *China* as a multiethnic entity during the late nineteenth century, there is scant evidence that official efforts were made to convert its subjects to this position. The situation changed substantially only after 1900, when the government began to broadcast its understanding of *China* to the Han and non-Han people nationwide through the new schools. The newly mandated geographical curriculum was deliberately employed as the most direct channel to shore up Chinese national identity and inculcate patriotism. The Qing court stipulated that students be well versed in the geography of *China*, a requirement made explicit in *Zouding xuezhi zhangcheng* (*School Regulations Sanctioned by the Court*), drafted by some Manchu and Han court officials (headed by Rongqing and Zhang Zhidong) and implemented in 1906 in all public and private schools. In elementary school, the regulations stress that "the key goal [of the geography course] is to familiarize students with the contemporary territory of *China*,... so as to cultivate their patriotism" (*qi yaoyi zai shizhi jinri Zhongguo jiangyu zhi dalüe,... yi yangcheng qi aiguo zhi xin*) (Qu Xingui and Tang Liangyan, 1991: 296). In middle school,

> all teachers of geography should familiarize students with the relationship between the world and human beings. In teaching foreign geography, they must emphasize the content most germane to the geography of *China*, illuminating the line between *China* and the rest of the world so as to cultivate a patriotic spirit among the students. [Qu Xingui and Tang Liangyan, 1991: 321]

Also, the court required all students who chose geography as their area of concentration to study one of the four "dialects of *China*" (*Zhongguo fangyan*)—meaning Ugyur, Tibetan, Mongolian, and Manchu (Qu Xingui and Tang Liangyan, 1991: 354). Although clearly wrong in labeling these languages dialects of Chinese, in doing so, the Qing court confirmed that it never relinquished the idea of a fundamentally multiethnic state as it attempted to build a modern state. Also, the Qing court called on educational commissioners to inspect all levels of schools to determine whether the published regulations were being adhered to (Qu Xingui and Tang Liangyan, 1991: 326). Thus, the official view of *China* was inculcated into millions of young people.

In the last decade of the Qing dynasty, publishers throughout the empire produced more than 150 textbooks that focused wholly or prominently on the geography of *China* (Zou Zhenhuan, 2000: 293–94); nearly all of them declared that Inner Asia was part of it. For example, *Zhongguo dili jiaokeshu* (*A Textbook of Chinese Geography*), written by Tu Ji and published in 1905, included Manchuria, Xinjiang, Tibet, Mongolia, and Qinghai within *China*'s territory; so did a 1909 textbook edited by Zang Lihe (Zou Zhenhuan, 2000: 290, 291). This official view of *China* dominated the geographic textbooks in Jiangnan, the cultural and educational center of the empire, but it cropped up in those written and published in South China as well. In 1905, for example, Luo Runan, a scholar in Guangdong, combined materials he had collected for years in *Zhongguo jinshi yudi tushuo* (*A Study of Modern China's Geography*). This textbook conflated Qing and China, using the titles "great Qing state" (*da Qingguo*) and *China* interchangeably (Luo Runan, 1909: 1.2a). While Luo did distinguish the traditional Chinese heartland from Xinjiang, Manchuria, and Tibet by calling the former "China proper" (*Zhongguo benbu*), he nevertheless identified the latter as part of *China* (Luo Runan, 1909: 1.4a–5b).

Geography textbooks streamed out of the doors of the national publishing houses, and some enjoyed multiple reprints—for example, Tu Ji's book was reprinted seven times between 1905 and 1909, and Zang Lihe's book was reprinted eleven times between 1908 and 1913 (Zou Zhenhuan, 2000: 290–94). It has been estimated that during the first ten years of the century, more than 4 million students passed through modern schools (Fairbank, 1980: 376–83). Through these assigned books, the imperial Qing view of *China* reached a wide audience and was imparted to the country's future leaders well before the Republican period, which has often been cited as the time when a modern Chinese national identity was formed.

Textbooks specially prepared for Manchu and Mongol students also reflected the court's efforts to popularize its view of *China*. For example, *Man Meng Han hebi jiaokeshu* (*A Comprehensive Textbook in the Manchu, Mongolian, and Chinese Languages*), edited by a Manchu scholar named Rongde for Mongol schools, contains two accounts of the history and geography of *China*. Like the Chinese texts, Rongde's stressed that Manchuria, Tibet, Qinghai, Xinjiang, and Mongolia were part of *China* (Rongde, [1909] 2001: 92–93). In his view, Manchurian and Mongolian students were *Chinese* (*Zhongguo zhi ren*), and they should love *China*. In a chapter titled "Dulimbai gurun" (*Zhongguo*), he flatly declared, "We are the *Chinese*, and why should we not love *China*?" (*Meni Dulimbai gurun i niyalma ohu manggi, aiku Dulimbai gurun be hairarakuci ombini, wu ji wei Zhongguo zhi ren, an ke bu ai Zhongguo ye*) (Rongde, [1909] 2001: 412).

It is difficult to assess how effective these efforts by the court actually were in influencing non-Han people, especially those living in Outer Mongolia and Xinjiang. But the educational campaign helps to explain why several years before the fall of the Qing, some young Manchu intellectuals consciously accepted the view of *China* as a multiethnic entity and promoted the idea of a new and ethnically diverse *China*.

From Imperial Qing Ideology to Modern Chinese National Identity

During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Han Chinese and Manchu intellectuals played an important role in spreading the official Qing view of *China*, beginning with Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, and other famous literati concerned with frontier issues during the Daoguang and Xianfeng periods (1821–1860). They not only accepted the official view of *China* as a multiethnic entity but also injected this view into a number of books on history and geography.

Recent scholarship has examined the plans promoted by Gong Zizhen and Wei Yuan to exploit Xinjiang by resettling the Han people there and instituting an administrative system molded on that of China proper (Millward, 1998). But these ideas have been seen as the beginning of Han Chinese expansion into Inner Asia when they were in fact a mere reiteration of Qianlong's Xinjiang policy. After his armies had conquered Xinjiang, Qianlong allowed the Han people to immigrate there, established many areas as prefectures and counties, and changed the Mongol names of many cities to Chinese.[18] He also called for civil service examinations to be offered in Xinjiang, hoping to thereby draw local Muslims into the national bureaucracy (*Xiyu tuzhi*, 1965: 36.4b–10b). Since the mid-Qianlong period, many of the Manchu elites, especially those high officials sent to Xinjiang, had embraced the policy of transferring large numbers of Han people to the region. They viewed this as an important step in consolidating Qing rule, despite the considerable hardships faced by the new arrivals (Toru Saguchi, 1983: 278, 296).

Furthermore, Qianlong's project to assimilate the inhabitants of Xinjiang into Confucian culture was more aggressive and ambitious than Gong's later plan to implement the civil examination system there. According to the *Xiyu tuzhi* (*The Imperial Gazetteer of the Western Regions*), drawn up by a team of Manchu officials led by Fuheng, the Qing court planned to Confucianize Muslims through a system of state-funded schools (*Xiyu tuzhi*, 1965: 36). But Gong lacked the same confidence as Qianlong, doubting that Xinjiang's first civil examination could be held within 30 years of its establishment as a province (Gong Zizhen, 1975: 110).

Gong and Wei's revival of Qianlong's policies on Inner Asia makes sense once it is placed in the context of state-sanctioned studies of the history and geography of Inner Asia—mainly Mongolia and Xinjiang. Beginning in the late eighteenth century, the Qing court and regional authorities in Xinjiang commissioned many books on frontier geography and history. Those projects involved almost all of the famous Han intellectuals active in the first half of the nineteenth century: Qi Junzao, Qi Yunshi, Xu Song, Gong Zizhen, Zhang Mu, and He Qiutao (Zhao Lisheng, 1992: 223–58). To assist their research projects, the court granted them special access to various official archives and maps (Qi Yunshi, 1992: 107; Gong Zizhen, 1975: 604).

The complete information they were given persuaded the Han literati to embrace Qing frontier policies. For example, Qianlong claimed that whereas the earlier Han rulers relied on the Great Wall to defend the Chinese heartland from Inner Asian threats, the Qing court addressed the problem more successfully by unifying both the Han and the steppes into "a single family" (Yuan Senpo, 1991: 228–29). Gong Zizhen, who accepted this explanation of the policy differences between the Qing and previous dynasties, used the same language to praise the Qing court's strategy, which alone had managed to bring peace: now he could blithely travel to the areas formerly off-limits to civilians, such as the Great Wall. After describing a day he spent in pleasant games and talk with some Mongols traveling to Beijing, he added,

> In ancient times, the steppes' invasions led the people to build the Great Wall. I am a literatus from Jiangnan. Had I lived under the Song dynasty, I would never have been able to travel to the Yan and Zhao regions [now called Hebei], let alone to enjoy myself with the Mongols. As one who lives under the great Qing dynasty, an era that has seen inner and outer unified into a family, I am proud indeed, especially when I consider those who lived in ancient times. [Gong Zizhen, 1975: 136–37]

Gong reasoned that after the conquest of Xinjiang, Confucian principles could no longer be applied to solving the frontier issue: the unification of inner and outer had fundamentally changed the scope of what was called *China*, and everything was different. New circumstances required new strategies, and the Han Chinese scholars who cited the Confucian canon to criticize the Qing enterprise in Xinjiang were "pedantic Confucians" (*yuru*) (Gong Zizhen, 1975: 105, 117).

Gong's friend Wei Yuan espoused similar views. If the Qing rulers had managed to subdue Inner Asia, their success was due to the flexibility with which they had handled the Confucian canon. Only after Qianlong had rejected the position held by the Han and Tang Confucians—that the western regions were hardly worth the effort involved in subduing and ruling them—did Qing rule over Xinjiang became stable (Wei Yuan, 1984: 512–13). Wei also noted the cultural plurality of the Qing empire and argued that a respect for cultural and religious particularity had helped the Qing court to maintain order in Inner Asia:

> Mongols cannot accept the teachings of the duke of Zhou and Confucius. The wisdom of Gaozong [i.e., the Qianlong emperor] led him to dispatch the Dalai and Panchen lamas permanently to the west, where they were responsible for teaching. As a result, Tibet became peaceful and the northwest frontier was unthreatened. [Wei Yuan, 1984: 218–19]

Because Gong and Wei both denied that Confucian attitudes were relevant to ruling Xinjiang, they could easily shift from a Han-centered view of *China* to the official interpretation that it was a multiethnic entity. At the outset of a well-known article in which he proposed making Xinjiang a province, Gong equated Qing with *China*: "The great Qing state is *China*, which has existed from the time of Yao [a mythical ruler said to have ruled thousands years earlier]" (Gong Zizhen, 1975: 105).

In his famous book *Shengwu ji* (*A Record of the Military Achievements of the Qing Emperors*), Wei Yuan characterized many rivers in Xinjiang and Mongolia as being within *China*'s territory. He also stated that Russian lands were delimited by northern Manchu, Mongolia, and Xinjiang: *China* and Russia were neighbors all along Russia's southern border (Wei Yuan, 1984: 147, 243). For Wei, *China* had come to include Manchuria, Mongolia, and Xinjiang.

The same view can be found in other works of geography published in the mid-nineteenth century. In his *Shuofang beicheng* (*On the Defense of the Northern Frontier*), He Qiutao, a specialist in the history of Sino-Russian relations, referred to the Qing border with Russia from Manchuria to Xinjiang as that between *China* and Russia, and his drawing of the boundary bore a name in keeping with that perspective: "Map of the border between *China* and Russia" (*Zhongguo yu Eluosi jiaojie tu*) (He Qiutao, n.d.: 68.3b–4a). In his well-known *Yinghuan zhilüe* (*An Outline of World Geography*), Xu Jiyu declared that *China*'s territory included Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, Qinghai, and Tibet (Xu Jiyu, 1995: 1.11a–b). As many scholars have indicated, the geographical works of Gong, Wei, He, and Xu powerfully influenced how the Han people thought about geography in the second half of the nineteenth century, functioning as an ideological bridge between the imperial Manchu enterprise and Han elites (Zhao Lisheng, 1992: 223–58).

During the second half of the nineteenth century, gunboats filled with foreign troops exploded conceptions of *China*, which was no longer the "central state" it had long seemed (Wang Ermin, 1977). Yet these changes did not prevent the view of *China* as a multiethnic entity from spreading further among the Han literati. What is more, by the 1900s, this view became a tool exploited by the proponents of "greater Chinese nationalism" in their debates with the advocates of Han nationalism.[19]

One scholar relying on this approach was Kang Youwei, who refuted the Han nationalist view by adopting the official one (Tao Xu, 1995: 197). In a 1902 article, Kang described the expansion of the Qing realm as the growth of *China*'s territory. The territories collected under the name *China* had varied considerably over time, but the Qing conquest of Manchuria, Mongolia, Tibet, Xinjiang, and Qinghai had expanded the Chinese empire so vastly that in comparison, the lands ruled by the Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties seemed quite small (Kang Youwei, 1981: 486–87). According to Kang, with the consolidation of Qing rule over the preceding two centuries, different groups had been woven into a new community that he called "greater *China*" (*da Zhongguo*), a development that laid the groundwork for a "new *China*" (*xin Zhongguo*) (Tao Xu, 1995: 200–201). Kang Youwei strongly opposed talk of establishing a Han-centered *China*, an effort that he viewed as ignoring the new reality of the multiethnic state (Kang Youwei, 1981: 496–97). He proposed instead that the threats from abroad be countered by fostering a strong national identity created from different ethnic groups: "[The Qing government] should establish as [*China*'s] permanent national name the Chinese state (*Zhonghua guo*). Because the Manchus, Han-Chinese, Mongols, Muslims, and Tibetans all belong to a single state, they are all *Chinese* (*Zhongghuo ren*) without any distinction" (qtd. in Tao Xu, 1995: 201).

As Kang Youwei demonstrates, the "greater Chinese nationalism" was rooted, in many respects, in the official Qing view of *China*. Rather than being an ivory-tower viewpoint of a few scholars, it was a way of thinking deeply ingrained in many Han and non-Han people even before the 1911 Revolution. Between 1903 and 1908, memorials by at least eighteen Manchu, Mongol, and Han officials from Beijing, Jiangsu, Ningxia, Heilongjiang, Hunan, Anhui, and Guangxi suggested a similar position (QM, 915–60). They argued that because *China* was a country containing different ethnic groups, only a set of institutional reforms could reduce the divisions between the Han and non-Han people and establish a strong, united state (QM, 915–60). Typical in this regard was Dong Fangsan, an unknown licentiate from Fulu—a small county of Hubei. In a 1907 memorial regarding Manchu-Han relations, he stressed, "The Manchus, Mongols, and Han are different branches of a single tree. Originally, they came from the same ancestor and they will develop into a unity" (*yi er shu, shu er yi*) (QM, 931). His description suggests that "greater Chinese nationalism" had spread not only in the capital but also among regional elites.

Some members of the Manchu elite also promoted their cause by simultaneously publishing newspapers in Beijing and Tokyo (Rhoads, 2000: 116; Huang Xingtao, 2002: 8–9): they conceived of "Manchus, Han Chinese, Mongols, Tibetans, and Muslims as united in a great citizenry" (*tonghe Man, Meng, Zang, Hui, Han wei yi da guomin*) (qtd. in Huang Xingtao, 2002: 8). One of these Manchu activists, a scholar named Henjun emphasized in his essays that the "people of *China*, an ethnically diverse group, have become a single nation" (*Zhongguo renmin, jie tong minzu yi zhongzu zhi guomin ye*) (Huang Xingtao, 2002: 8).

Because "greater Chinese nationalism" depended on the official view, which, as noted earlier, was being broadly disseminated through the educational system, it was far more influential than Han nationalism. But that influence has long been ignored by scholars of the 1911 Revolution, who have tended to pay excessive attention to the anti-Manchu spokesmen in the early twentieth century: Zhang Taiyan, Zou Rong, Sun Yat-sen, and others hoping to replace the Qing empire with an ethnically pure *China* that would no longer include Manchuria, Mongolia, Xinjiang, and Tibet (Zhang Yong, 2002: 6–10; Li Guoqi, 1994; Wang Fansen, 1985: 68–101). This scholarly imbalance may give the false impression that Han nationalism enjoyed greater support among the Han literati than did the vision of a modern multiethnic state propounded by Kang Youwei and his supporters. In fact, until 1911, anti-Qing intellectuals had to work underground; their writings were banned in China proper and thus available only in the Western concessions along the coast. Their views therefore reached a highly limited audience, even after the Wuchang revolt of October 10, 1911.

Zhang Yong's recent study has demonstrated that far from representing the majority position, Han nationalism did not enjoy significant support even among the Han elites. Its lack of adherents was particularly obvious in the Jiangnan region during the interim between the Wuchang revolt and the founding of the Republic of China later in 1912. When Sun Yat-sen, long a loyal advocate of Han nationalism, realized just how powerful the rival camp was, he gave in and adopted the broad concept of "greater Chinese nationalism" (Zhang Yong, 2002: 110–11).[20]

Thus, one might say that while Sun won a political victory over the Qing rulers, the Qing dynasty enjoyed a geographical and ideological victory, having defined the form of the emerging postrevolutionary Chinese state. Thanks to the rise and spread of "greater Chinese nationalism," the official Qing view of *China* as a multiethnic entity has persisted into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, contributing directly to the construction of the modern Chinese national identity.

As we have seen, from the mid-seventeenth century to the fall of the Qing dynasty, the Manchu rulers identified themselves with *China* while fostering a new understanding of that word. They creatively developed the idea of *China* as a multiethnic entity. On entering the twentieth century, the Qing court used educational reforms to promulgate its view among both Han and non-Han groups. The official Qing view of *China* gradually impinged on the Han Chinese conceptions of *China*, spurring a shift from its strict identification with Han people to acceptance of the idea that it had to be ethnically heterogeneous.

A review of the imperial Qing view of *China* enunciated over three centuries provides new insights into the Manchu-centered approach to explaining Qing history. The advocates of the Manchu-centered model have revealed the historic contribution of the Manchus in conquering Inner Asia and forging a multiethnic empire, but they have not completely freed themselves from the traditional view of the Manchu rulers as passive exploiters of Han cultural resources. Thus, while they have investigated the Qing imperial success on the frontier, they have left unexamined another important issue: how did the Manchu emperors accommodate the concept of *China* to the new political reality of the Qing multiethnic state? By tracing the shifting definition of *China* over the course of the Qing dynasty and by linking those shifts to modern Chinese national identity, I have shown that Manchu rule affected not only the historical course of Inner Asia but also the core concepts of Han culture linked to the idea of Zhongguo. In this regard, the Manchu-centered approach helps us to interpret the development of Han Chinese culture under the Manchus as well as the Qing success in Inner Asia.

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Notes

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1. In this article, China and Chinese refer to the state and its people after 1911. *China* is used for the concept of *Zhongguo*—the state, according to the Qing court; its scope varied over different dynasties, expanded with the expansion of the Qing territory, and was similar to the scope of China on mid-eighteenth-century ethnic and geographical maps. *Chinese* translates *Zhongguoren/Zhongguo zhi ren*, the Qing court's label for the people living within its border. On the equivalence of the terms *Zhongguo* and *Zhongxia*, see *Ciyuan* (1979: s.v. "Zhongxia").

2. China's nationalism has recently been a hot topic among American scholars of Qing history, but they have paid little attention to the evolution of the concept of *China*. However, William C. Kirby's (2004) insightful essay does focus on its changes in the twentieth century, and Edward Rhoads notices that the Qing court considered *China* to be a multiethnic entity at the turn of the twentieth century (Rhoads, 2000: 293, 294). In her new book *The Clash of Empires*, Lydia Liu (2004) places the rise of the Western terms for *China* in the context of nineteenth-century imperialism (my thanks to Hu Minghui for drawing my attention to this work). Many Chinese and Japanese scholars have discussed the origin and evolution of *China* (Wang Ermin, 1977: 441–80; Yu Zhengui, 1994; Kawashima Shin, 1997; Luo Zhitian, 1998: l-91; Hu Axiang, 2000), but only one has investigated the official Qing concept, in a brief outline: Kawashima Shin (1997).

3. The etymology of the word *nikan* is not clear; it may derive from the Mongol word *khatai*, which means "Han Chinese" (Chen Yinke, 1980: 91). On the meaning of *nikan*, see Huang Zhangjian (1967) and Li Yanji ([1756] 2001: 2.21a). Manchu archival documents show that the word was used to refer to the Han people. For example, Hong Taiji said in 1635 that he "treated the Jusen, Nikan, and Mongols equally" (Liu Housheng, 1993: 253). In addition, the Manchu archives used it to refer to the Ming state, emperors, and military. For example, the terms *nikan i gurun* (the Ming state), *nikan han i gurun* (the Ming emperor's state), *nikan i cooha* (the Ming power), and *nikan i jasei* (the Ming border) frequently appear in discussions of the Manchu 1618 and 1636 events (Li Xuezhi, 1971: 57–63; *Kyū Manshū tō*, 1975: 173, 196, 224, 266, 349, 360, 362).

4. Hu Axiang thinks that the Chinese dynasties did not identify themselves with *China* until the Ming. But many official documents issued by the Northern Wei, Jin, and Yuan dynasties suggest that this identification began as early as the fourth and fifth centuries. For more details, see Wei Shou (1987: 497, 617, 1947–48), Tuo Tuo (1987: 1915, 2180), and Song Lian (1987: 1729, 3293, 3858).

5. A survey of only the *Ming shilu* materials related to foreign relations yields many edicts and memorials equating Ming with *China*. See Li Guoxiang (1991: 91, 93, 102, 346, 348, 361, 386, 394, 395, 420, 914, 919).

6. On the Jin and Yuan rulers' defense of their own ethnic identity, see Langlois (1981), Chan (1984), and Endicott-West (1989).

7. On the translation of *China* into the Manchu phrase *Dulimbai gurun*, see An Shuangcheng (1993: 713). On the Manchu translation of the term *Huaxia*, see San-e (1700: 3.26b). In the Qing period, *Dulimbai gurun* was also the equivalent of the Chinese word *Hua*. For example, in the Manchu version of *An Illustration of Tributaries (Zhigong tu)*, the word *Hua* was translated *Dulimbai gurun* (Zhuang Jifa, 1989: 107). On the translation of *Zhongyuan* as *Dulimbai gurun*, see Elliott (2000: 638).

8. I have not seen the original Manchu documents cited here. But Qu Liusheng, who recently helped to translate these materials into Chinese, told me in Beijing in 2002 that they do use the Manchu term *Dulimbai gurun* as the title of the Qing state.

9. In 1936, these documents and their Manchu translations were collected into a book titled *The Russian Archives in the Former Palace* (Gugong bowuyuan, [1936] 1969). It is full of examples of Qing officials translating the titles of both the Qing state and its rulers into the Manchu terms *Dulimbai gurun (China)* and *Dulimbai gurun amba enduringge han* (the great *Chinese* khan).

10. This figure is based on my survey of the archives collected in QD, which includes all the surviving official documents on Qing relations with Russia between 1653 and 1734.

11. The Manchu court definitely and absolutely rejected the view of China as the Han state, but it by turns clung to and denied the notion that *China* was a Confucian community, depending on which ethnic community involved. In its dealings with non-Han groups in southwest China, the Qing court claimed that the groups were Chinese only to the extent that they accepted Confucian culture (Rowe, 1994). This standard was never applied to non-Han groups such as Tibetans and Mongolians, however; the court, though treating them as part of *China*, prohibited them from having much contact with Han culture (Zhang Yongjiang, 2001).

12. The paucity of source materials makes it difficult to determine when the new translation was first used in the official documents, but it did appear in 1689: the Manchu version of the 1689 Treaty of Nerchinsk refers to the Qing state as *Dulimbai gurun.*

13. I have modified Elliott's (2001) translation.

14. Benoist labeled the Qing state *China (Zhongguo)* on his map. He said that "in Asia . . . there are more than one hundred countries, of which the greatest is *China*" (*qi dazhe shoutui Zhongguo*) (Qin Guojing, 1997: 41).

15. The authors of the imperially sponsored HC placed the geographical account of Inner Asia not in the "surrounding countries section" (*siyi kao*), which discussed tribute countries, but in the "geography section" (*yudi kao*) devoted to the Qing state.

16. For the Qing court, the terms *Zhongguo zhi ren* and *Zhongguoren* were identical in meaning, and they therefore were rendered in the Manchu translations by a single phrase: *Dulimbai gurun i niyalma.* The word *niyalma* means "people" (An Shuangcheng, 1993: 255).

17. For relevant documents, see, for example, Wang Tieya (1957). Wang's book reproduces all the treaties entered into by the Qing court from 1689 to 1911.

18. In 1760, the Qianlong emperor gave Urumchi the rather Confucian name Dihua. Many Xinjiang towns and cities, even city gates, were assigned similar Confucian names—Changji, Suilai, Fukang, Huifu, Fengqing, and so on (*Xiyu tuzhi,* 1965: 10: 1a, 2b). Shortly after the conquest, Qianlong superimposed on part of Xinjiang the governmental hierarchy of counties, departments, and prefectures found in China proper (*Xiyu tuzhi,* 1965: 10: 1a). Qianlong and his Manchu officials oversaw the compilation of *Xiyu tuzhi,* and its statements reflect the official view on Xinjiang.

19. On the past and present scholarship on Chinese nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Levenson (1968), Townsend (1992), Duara (1995), Crossley (1999), Fitzgerald (1996), and Karl (2002). How the Qing imperial view of *China* affected its formation and development remains unstudied.

20. Many scholars have noted that Sun Yat-sen—long a loyal advocate of the Han nationalism—turned to "greater Chinese nationalism" shortly after the 1911 Revolution. But Zhang Yong (2002) is among the first to observe that the wide influence of the "greater Chinese nationalism" forced Sun to switch camps.

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FROM WARRIORS TO FARMERS: THE CHANGING SOCIAL STATUS OF MANCHU AND MONGOL BANNERMEN ON THE HEILONGJIANG FRONTIER, 1905–1931

Patrick Fuliang Shan*

Abstract

Manchu and Mongol Bannermen were military pillars of the rule of the last Chinese dynasty, the Qing (1644–1912). As the dynasty was declining, the banner system gradually became ineffective in its military duties, which included national defense and bandit suppression. By the early 20th century, the system eventually was abandoned and was replaced by the so-called New Army. Bannermen were encouraged to become self-supporting. While many of them in China Proper tended to join the urban workforce by being police, merchants, artisans, or other professionals, Manchu and Mongol bannermen on the Heilongjiang frontier, the Northeasternmost province of China, underwent a profound change from warriors to farmers during the period between 1905 and 1931. This article investigates this great transformation from the perspective of frontier history and offers interpretations on this distinctive phenomenon of modern China.

I. *The Setting*

The massive social changes experienced by Manchu and Mongol bannermen [qiren] in China in the early years of the twentieth century have been the subject of considerable scholarly attention in recent years. These changes were a direct consequence of reforms enacted by the Qing dynasty in the first decade of the century, which ended the special status enjoyed by bannermen as a subsidized hereditary military caste. Bannermen suddenly had to find a living for themselves in civilian society. The transformation of their way of life, which saw many bannermen absorbed into the urban labor pool of manual workers, was naturally fraught with many hardships and difficulties.[1] Existing scholarship, however, has focused primarily on Manchu bannermen living in China Proper (China south of the Great Wall). It has not examined the changes undergone by bannermen in the frontier region, and has created the impression that bannermen all became part of the urban working class. It is certainly true that many Manchu bannermen in China Proper entered into the urban workforce. However, bannermen of both Manchu and Mongol origin in the Northeast (Manchuria), especially in the northernmost province of Heilongjiang, followed their own distinctive course in changing from warriors into farmers. The materials presented in this article, drawn from a broad range of primary sources, particularly archival materials, suggest new insights into the great social transformation of Manchu and Mongol bannermen in this Northeastern province.

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It was not until 1907 that Heilongjiang was established as a province with a civil administration. For about two hundred years, Heilongjiang, a territory larger than France or Germany, had been designated by the Qing as a military frontier. This region, which looked northwards across the Amur River to the Russian empire, was reserved to bannermen. Chinese immigration was officially prohibited, making the area still sparsely inhabited at the turn of the 20th century. Manchu bannermen were deployed at strategic locations throughout the region, while Mongol bannermen were responsible for defense of the territory held by their banners. Both received subsidies from the central government in Beijing, which was the major provider of their sustenance.

A number of factors were undermining the banner system even before the Qing dynasty introduced its reforms. As the population attached to a banner grew, it could not be sustained by state funds. Pay and provisions were often in arrears, and at times the government defaulted. Even when paid, the amount often was usually less than half or as little as 20% of the officially stipulated sum. The balance owed by government to the bannermen in Heilongjiang soared to several million silver taels by 1900.[2] As a result, most bannermen were living in poverty.

The defeat inflicted on the Qing dynasty in 1900 by Russian troops intervening to suppress the Boxer rebellion demonstrated that banner troops could not provide national defense, and marked the beginning of the end for the bannermen in Heilongjiang. The army dispatched by the Russians to assist in the suppression of Boxer bands operating in Beijing and its environs crossed the Heilongjiang region in massive force. The bannermen displayed heroism in battle with the Russians, but were totally routed. Thousands died confronting the enemy's modern weaponry, as most banner soldiers were equipped with spears, knives and old rifles.[3] The town of Aihui was reduced to rubble after three days of heavy fighting. Many other towns in Heilongjiang suffered the same fate.

The response by the Qing dynasty to foreign intervention was the promulgation of a program of reforms, termed the "New Policy" [xinzheng]. In 1905 the creation of a compact and highly trained "new army" was announced. Heilongjiang was to have a new army of somewhat under 10,000 men. It was open to Han Chinese, as well as bannermen. The soldiers underwent regular military training and were armed with modern weaponry made in the Chinese city of Hanyang. Though small in number, the army marked a revolutionary change from the banner system.[4] Its creation meant the end of the bannermen as a special status group. Apart from the few who found a place in the new army, the bannermen had lost their military role. However, their former privileged status left them with little in the way of practical skills. They looked down upon manual labor, were dismissive of all other occupations, and cherished only their military tradition. In 1907, the Guangxu Emperor said of them: "They are tainted with indolence, and idly consume their official stipends; their numbers multiply and they fall ever more into poverty... but they never think of living as civilians; now, however, they must seek ways of self-support and must survive through their own toil."[5]

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[1] See Pamela Kyle Crossley, *The Manchus* (Cambridge, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 1997); Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990); Mark C. Elliot, *The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2001); Juha Janhunen, *Manchuria: An Ethnic History* (Helsinki: Suomalais-Ugrilainen Seura (The Finno-Ugrian Society), No. 222, Ethnic Studies of Northeast Asia, 1996); Edward Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Police Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000).

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[2] Zhang Boying, *Heilongjiang Zhigao* (*A History of Heilongjiang*) (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe), p. 1201. Zhang worked for decades on this project, which was published in the early 1930s. It is an anthology including valuable primary sources, government documents and other materials on the history of the province. It was reprinted in 1992 by Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe [Heilongjiang People's Press].

[3] Zhang Boying, ibid., p. 2522.

[4] Zhang Boying, ibid., p. 1204, p. 1206, p. 1216, p. 1223, p. 1237.

[5] Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, editors, *Jilin qiren shengji* (*Bannermen Conditions in Jilin*) (Tianjin: Tianjin Guji Chubanshe, 1991), p. 1. This is a collection of primary sources

The transformation of bannermen into farmers was assisted by the full opening of Heilongjiang in 1904 to Han Chinese immigration, which meant among other things the opening of a huge land market. Fears that the border province might fall into Russian hands prompted the Qing government to declare the land open to settlement. In effect a human shield would be built for national defense. After 1904, Chinese immigrants, largely from northern China, arrived in tens of thousands, most to settle on the land. From 1904 to 1931 about four million people settled in Heilongjiang. Since Han Chinese were experienced farmers, they first rented and then bought land; and many eventually established themselves as prosperous farmers. Their experience and example provided both a model and stimulus for the bannermen to take to the agrarian life.

By 1905, the living conditions of the bannermen posed a serious problem for the Qing state. Although their population, estimated at somewhat under one hundred thousand, was not large, they were a heavy burden on the government treasury, even with its underpayment to them. Bannermen lived in poverty, their living quarters "in decayed condition."[6] Even the banner heads had to work in dilapidated offices, such as that in Shuangcheng, where everything was "worn out... the wall falling to pieces, the windows broken and the structure in partial collapse—a truly woeful scene to be witnessed."[7]

How could the bannermen survive when the state had almost ceased supporting them as its designated warrior force? Three possible avenues were open to them. First was to join the new army. Some bannermen did, a notable example being Han Guangdi, who came from a distinguished banner family. He gained a modern military education, rose to brigade commander in only a decade, and became a national hero in the 1929 border clash with the Soviet Union.[8] However, the number of bannermen exceeded by tenfold the number of places available in the new army, even supposing the government was prepared to allot every position to a bannerman. A second possibility was to go into business, but the traditional mentality of the bannermen, combined with a lack of capital, limited this outlet, though a few aggressive bannermen were successful. The

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including government documents, bannermen petitions, materials pertaining to land issues, newspaper clippings and other sources from the first three decades of the 20th century.

[6] E.G. Kemp, *The Face of Manchuria, Korea & Russian Turkestan* (Toronto: Musson Book Company Limited, 1910), p. 7.

[7] Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, op. cit., p. 22.

[8] Zhang Boyin, op. cit., p. 2173.

third avenue, the one promoted by the Qing dynasty and taken by most bannermen, was to turn to farming. In 1908, the Manchu official Rongguang, in his memorial to the Guangxu Emperor, urged that the banner system in Heilongjiang be abolished and bannermen turned from soldiers into farmers. "They should be given frontier land to plough for grain, and should open up the wilderness for their own benefit."[9] The policy that followed was to encourage bannermen to take land as their means of economic salvation.

This policy was to have enormous impact on both Manchu and Mongol bannermen. However, while both Manchus and the Mongols were to seek a common future as farmers, they did so in their own distinctive way. Thus it is best to discuss the two groups separately, with the Manchus treated first because of their greater numbers and more widespread distribution throughout Heilongjiang.

II. *Manchu Bannerman*

Manchu bannermen were not entitled to own land until 1907. Previously, they had been assigned land near their barracks, but this was common banner land [qidi], not for private ownership. In the late nineteenth century, illegal Han immigrants were allowed to rent this land from bannermen, who assumed the role of absentee landlords. The situation inevitably resulted in permanent tenure of the rented land by the Han. Thus the divide between the Han as farmer and the Manchu as soldiers was further sharpened.[10] After 1900, especially after 1905, when the bannermen began to turn to farming in large numbers, the problem arose of Han farmers refusing to surrender the land they had leased. Furthermore, some Han farmers cultivated nearby wilderness, which they declared private civilian land (mindi). Lawsuits proliferated, which officials often found difficult to resolve. The official response was to declare that all uncultivated banner land should henceforth be reserved for cultivation by bannermen, and that every measure would be taken to prevent civilian (i.e., Han

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[9] Zhongguo diyi lishi dang'anguan [China Number One Historical Archive, Beijing], No. 552-93 (35-3-2).

[10] "Jilin Jiangjun yamen husi, huangwu zongju wei Boduna shu qidizhaodian shi gei Jinlin Jiangjun de bingwen" ("Report from the Department of the Household to the Office of the Jilin Military Commander in regard to Tenancy of Banner land in Boduna"), January 1906; in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, p. 4.

Chinese) occupation of banner land.[11] In 1907, an edict was issued under the Guangxu Emperor's name to regularize land ownership in Heilongjiang. It stipulated a policy of private ownership that allowed bannermen to receive a certain amount of land according to the size of their family (*jikoushoutian*). The bannermen were also allowed to purchase uncultivated land at a very low price. The edict also attempted to solve the dispute between bannermen and civilians by setting forth a formula for dividing leased land equally between tenants and bannermen.[12]

The Qing government established a special administration to assist the former warriors to turn to the soil. This administration, called the Bannermen Service Bureau (*qiwuchu*), was established in Heilongjiang in 1907. Its aim was to help bannermen in the acquisition and cultivation of land. During its ten-year existence, the Bureau granted land to bannermen without charge, or at a very low price. The Bureau conducted surveys of official land and nearby wasteland that it then partitioned and distributed. It issued licenses [dazhao] authorizing private ownership and provided transportation, tools, seeds and housing funds to assist those who settled on uncultivated land. It also dispatched instructors to guide settlers in agricultural techniques and promised to maintain security. The Bureau also granted five to six years of tax exemption from the beginning of cultivation.[13] Land obtained from the Bureau by bannermen could not be alienated. Those who refused to accept allocated land were considered as having renounced their privileges as bannermen, and henceforth would be responsible for their own survival. This threat helped enforce the new policy.

Land distribution took nearly a decade, during which an overwhelming majority of bannermen gained land and began a new life. Throughout the frontier region, the former soldiers were converted into landowners. Contemporary official documents provide detailed information on land distribution. For example, in 1908 in Tieli about 1,200 banner families acquired

land. Each received 450 mu [75 acres], of which 150 mu were permanently exempt from tax and 300 mu were to be taxed after five years.[14] In 1909 in Shuangcheng 4,000 banner families obtained over 900,000 mu, on average 225 mu per family [37.5 acres].[15] The following year in Sanxing 1,000 landless banner families (half of the community) received 150,000 mu.[16] In Nehe, adjacent to the Mongol Wilderness, 2,000 banner households (about 11,000 people) each gained 200 mu.[17] On average, Heilongjiang bannermen received about 200 mu [33 acres] per family to underpin their new life as land-holding farmers.

With government assistance, Manchu bannermen endeavored to turn the wilderness into productive fields. The government sent agriculturalists to assist them, and bannermen became familiar with traditional Chinese farming techniques. Many bannermen proved to be diligent workers. They followed the practice of the Han in opening up the land: "First they root out all the grass and shrubs, and turn over the land through ploughing. Then they crumble and rake the land into fine sandy earth. After planting, weeds are hoed two or three times. During harvest season, they use sickles to cut the crops. Finally they use horse-driven round stones to thresh and winnow the chaff from the grain." These old Chinese farming techniques took hold among the Manchus. They achieved good harvests, soon attaining an output of five dan [13.7 bushels] per 10 mu [1.6 acres], which almost matched that of Han producers.[18]

In the course of the transition to agriculture, a Manchu landlord class emerged, though most Manchus remained small family-based owners. Manchu landlords tended to be relatively small landholders, who hired seasonal laborers or in some cases long term farmhands. The hired hands might share a proportion of the produce or be paid a salary. Often Manchu landlords worked some of the land themselves. There were a few Manchus who did become large landholders. For example, Qinglu, a Manchu commander in Acheng, accumulated 30,000 mu at low cost in the first decade of the century. His position as a large landowner increased his local influence. Promotion to higher rank allowed him to "purchase" another 9,000 mu of fertile cultivated land in Fangzheng and to occupy 200,000 mu of wilderness in Sanxing. Qinglu became one of the largest landlords in Heilongjiang.[19]

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[11] "Jilin Jiangjun yamen wei Boduna shu Qidi bei dianmin qinduo de zhaziwen" ("Report of the Jilin Military Commander concerning the Infringement of Banner Land by Tenants in Boduna"), August 23, 1906; in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, pp. 5–8.

[12] "Jilin quansheng diaocha qiwuchu wet biantong qiren shengji gei Jilin Xunfu de bingwen" ("Report of the Jilin Bannermen Service Bureau on Bannermen Living Conditions"), September 20, 1907; in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, pp. 163–171.

[13] "Chouhua qiren shengji shiban jianzhang" [Plans for Solving the Problem of Bannermen Living Conditions], January 23, 1912, in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, pp. 175–181.

[14] Zhang Xiangling, ed. gen., *Heilongjiang shengshi dashiji*, [The History of Heilongjiang: A Chronological Record], Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1992, p. 332.

[15] "Shuangchengbao xieling wei xiangbaiqidinghu Yang Yishun dengren tuidijianding jieling gei Jilin xingsheng de shengwen" ("Statement of Shuangcheng Commander to Jilin Provincial Government on Transaction of Banner Land by Yang Yishun and Others"), April 30, 1909, in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, p. 146.

[16] "Jilin xingsheng guanyu huiyi biantong Sanxing qiwu shiyi de zhawen ji fujian" ("Report of the Jilin Provincial Government on Sanxing Banner Affairs"), September 23, 1910, in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiwu*, 1990, p. 194. This book is a collection of primary sources concerning the bannermen in North Manchuria (Heilongjiang and Jilin).

[17] "Jilin Ziyiju wei qiyi Shoushan dengsishiwuren qing bo Menghuang yichou shengji de chengwen" ("Decision of the Jilin Provincial Assembly to Allocate Mongol Wilderness Land to Bannermen"), October 16, 1910, in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, p. 30.

[18] Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, *Heilongjiang kaifashi* (*A History of the Development of Heilongjiang*), Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1999, p. 51.

By 1911 the Qing government was levying taxes on the bannermen who had first obtained land. This measure was designed to increase local government income. However, it put pressure on those families who were short of laborers. Since the newly acquired land could not be sold, hard-pressed bannermen appealed to the Bannerman Service Bureau for the right to surrender a part of their land. As difficulties mounted, more bannermen surrendered portions of their land, because they were "unable to cultivate and fearful of paying tax."[20] The returned land was not put up for sale, but was reallocated to bannermen from within or without the locality. This land was termed "surrendered" or "fill-in" land.[21] When the Service Bureau reassigned it, the grantees became known as "fill-in" holders. The fill-in replacement process continued throughout the first two decades of the Republican period (1912–31), and attached more and more Manchus to land in relatively compact communities.

By the 1920s, most Heilongjiang Manchu bannermen were fixed on the land. While many Manchus in China Proper sought a living in the urban workforce, and some even participated in revolutionary and social movements, the Manchus in Heilongjiang led a relatively quiet existence on the land. They had lost much compared in terms of their former status as a privileged hereditary warrior class, but as individual petty landholders they had gained a small world of some substance of their own.

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[19] Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, ibid., p. 50.

[20] "Shuangchengbao xieling wei xiangbaiqidinghu Yang Yishun dengren tuidijianding jieling gei Jinlin xingsheng de shengwen," in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, p. 146.

[21] "Shuangshengbao Xieling wei qiding tuidi he dingbu gei Jilin xingsheng de shenwen" [Report of the Shuangcheng Commander on Surrendered land and Fill-in Land], December 26, 1909; in Pan Jinglong and Zhang Xuanru, *Jilin qiren shengji*, p. 148. The surrendered land was called *tuidi* and the fill-in land was termed *dingbudi*.

III. *Mongol Bannerman*

The Mongol transformation from warriors to farmers during the same period in Heilongjiang was basically similar to that of the Manchus, but the process had certain unique characteristics. According to state policy established in the early Qing, all Mongols were organized into the banner system and were to render military service upon summons. However, in contrast to the Manchus, the Mongols led a semi-nomadic banner life. The Qing enforced a special banner system (*Mengqizhi*), which required Mongol bannermen to live within the boundaries of their own banners. In Heilongjiang, there were five Mongol banners: Yikeming'an, Zhalaite, Du'erbote, South Gorlos and North Gorlos. Bannermen were not permitted to cross other banners' borders. Within their banner confines, many Mongols established villages of varying duration of settlement. Unlike their purely nomadic kinsmen in Outer Mongolia or in the Barga region, the Mongols of North Manchuria by 1900 led a semi-nomadic, semi-agricultural life. They still roamed and herded their cattle within their banner border, maintaining their traditional reputation as a people on horseback.[22] But this life co-existed with a primitive agriculture. One source states: "They switch farming fields annually by abandoning the previous 'overused' land. They plant when it rains and allow crops and weeds to grow side by. With no knowledge of weeding, they move on to locate new land for next year." "If it does not rain, the seeds will not break through the soil. Therefore, they suffer frequently from hunger.... Even when harvesting, they gather in weeks along with the crops. The output per mu seldom reaches half that of a Han farmer."[23]

The hierarchal Mongol social system was characterized by rigid class divisions. Each banner had a prince as a ruler. Below him, there were six ranks of nobility.[24] The titles of each level were hereditary. The succession, however, had to be granted by the central government in Beijing. Unlike Manchu bannermen, who relied solely on funding from the government, Mongol bannermen sometimes had to count on their banner to supplement the stipends they received. This strengthened the power of the prince, who governed his banner like a petty monarch. The Mongol hierarchy was so stratified that it was sometimes compared to the social order of pre-Revolutionary France. Unlike the Manchu bannermen, Mongol banners outlived the Qing Dynasty, survived the Republican period, outlasted Japanese colonial rule, and continued their existence in much modified form even under the Communist government.

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[22] Fang Yan, gen. ed. *Heilongjiang shaoshuminzu jianshi* (*A Brief History of Ethnic Minorities in Heilongjiang*), Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Chubanshe, 1993, p. 257.

[23] Shi Fang and Gao Ling, *Chuantong yu biange*, [Tradition and Change], Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1995, p. 175.

[24] Below a prince were, in descending order, yinjun, tuotuosi, jiagansi, meilun, zhalan and daguan. See "Tailai shezhiju zhishu" (A Record of Tailai Administration), Heilongjiang Provincial Archives: *Heilongjiang Shaoshu Minzu, 1903–1931* [*Heilongjiang Ethnic Minorities, 1903–1931*] (HSMZ), 1985, p. 302. This book is a collection of primary sources about the ethnic groups in Heilongjiang.

The Mongols did not develop the concept of private ownership, but conceived of land as a common possession. One reason for this was that most land remained fallow grassland. The Qing termed it the "Mongol Wilderness" (*Menghuang*). Land cultivation remained very limited. The western part of the wilderness in Heilongjiang was near the mountains. Though largely sandy, it was fertile near the Song-Nen plain. Contemporary Chinese visitors were struck by the region's emptiness: "birds and wild animals multiply," "few villages and few people are to be found," "a scarcely inhabited boundless land of lush grass in black fertile soil."[25] As of 1910, the Mongol population in Heilongjiang was no more than thirty thousand, which further explains why they were able to sustain their nomadic pattern of life with only limited attention to agriculture.

The Mongol wilderness, like that of the rest of the frontier region, had been off-limits to Han Chinese settlement for more than two hundred years. During the late nineteenth century, Mongol princes, observing the Manchus employing illegal Han farmers to extract profit from the land, began to follow suit. The princes "hired Han farmers as laborers and established a tenancy relationship."[26] Some princes even fashioned policies to attract Han farmers. For example, the prince of Du'erbote supplied Han farmers with tools and food for the first year and then began to collect rent in the second year, at which time the tenants needed only to supply vegetables to the prince. Such encouragement led to the arrival of more and more Han settlers.[27] This process has been termed the "agricultural penetration" of the Mongolian steppe. It further prompted the Mongols to move towards an agricultural pattern of life.[28]

In the late Qing, government financial assistance to Mongol banners diminished steadily, and the Mongols, like the Manchus, were compelled to seek self-sufficiency on a large scale. The difference is that the Mongols, within their banners, were governed by their own princes. These princes, despite financially straitened circumstances, continued to maintain their sumptuous life. Consequently, most of them ran heavily into debt. In 1902, the prince of the South Gorlos Banner owed 389,000 silver taels. The prince of Zhalaite at the turn of the century had accumulated debts of 567,360 taels, including a sum borrowed from the Russians.[29] To find new income the princes looked to the land. Hence, more and more Han farmers moved in to rent or purchase land. The princes engaged in clandestine sales in order to circumvent the Qing government regulations banning the sale of land. These practices subverted Qing policy and forced the government to lift the ban.

The government opened one part of the Mongol lands in 1899, though the large scale influx of Han farmers came only after the opening of the whole of Heilongjiang in 1904. Income from land transactions was shared equally by the banner prince and the provincial government.[30] Private land acquisition developed rapidly as large areas of land were opened to settlement. The North Gorlos Banner was opened in 1905 and within three years cultivators held 6,323,410 mu [1,041,466 acres] of land. The Du'erbote Banner was opened the same year, and by 1907 cultivators held 2,524,320 mu [415,755 acres]. The Yikeming'an Banner was opened in 1906; and only one year was needed to dispose of an astonishing 2,491,530 mu [410,355 acres].[31] The land was usually rented at first, with tenants paying rent to the Mongol nobles. As time passed, Han immigrants accumulated enough capital to begin purchasing land. Over the first three decades of the twentieth century the Mongol "wilderness" was transformed into farmland held by private owners.

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[25] Wu Jisun, "Duban fu Taonan, Xincheng Qiqiha'er yantu riji" "Diary written on the Way through Taonan, Xincheng and Qiqihar", April 13–23, 1908, in Li Shutian, *Menghuang anjuan, Documents on the Mongolian Wilderness*, Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990, pp. 1–11.

[26] Xu Shichang, *Dongsansheng zhenglue A Sketch of Northeastern Politics*, (Beijing: Wenhai Chubanshe, 1911, Vol. 2 (Mongol Affairs). See also Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, op. cit., p. 52.

[27] Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, *Heilongjiang kaifashi*, op. cit., p. 52.

[28] Wang Jiange, "Nongye shentou yu jindai Menggu caoyuan youmuye de bianhua" (Agricultural Penetration and the Change of Mongolian Nomadic Life in the Mongol Steppe), *Zhongguo Jingjishi Yanjiu* (*Chinese Economic History Studies*), No. 2, 2002, Beijing, pp. 76–86.

[29] Kong Jingwei, *Qingdai Dongbei diqu jingjishi*, (*The Regional Economic History of the Northeast during the Qing Dynasty*), Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1990, pp. 272–273; see also Zhang Boying, op. cit., p. 387.

[30] Zhang Boying, op. cit., p. 383.

[31] Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, op. cit., p. 53; Sun Zhanwen, *Heilongjiang shengshi tansuo* (*Explorations of the History of Heilongjiang Province*) (Harbin: Heilongjiang Renmin Chubanshe, 1983), p. 246.

The newcomers were predominantly experienced Han Chinese farmers. "The people from China Proper settled in the Mongol Wilderness and managed well. Here, there is no-one who has not gained profit."[32] Examples of successful farming influenced Mongol bannermen. "Seeing Han farmers' abundant annual harvest, the Mongols were most admiring of this and began to concentrate more on farming than on raising herds.... In their cultivation of the land they imitate the techniques of the Han farmers."[33] The land opened up to agriculture greatly reduced the pastoral areas. Cattle holdings soon began to decrease. In Duerbote, the number of cattle dropped from 100,000 head to 20,000 head in the five years between 1905 and 1910. In North Gorlos, "since the opening of the Mongol wilderness, a large stretch of grassland, ideal for cattle, was put under cultivation... and cattle raised by bannermen have greatly declined in number." Furthermore, compulsory cattle purchases by the Russians during the Russo-Japanese War of 1904–05 did severe damage to Mongol animal husbandry. "During the war, the Russians drew their supplies from Heilongjiang. Mongol cattle, requisitioned at low price, provided meat and animal skins needed by the Russians. Half of the livestock was lost to this prosperous region."[34]

The decline in cattle-raising compelled more and more Mongols to turn to the soil. With Han farmers as neighbors, the Mongols soon adopted traditional Chinese farming techniques. They also accepted the notion of private ownership by demarcating their own property. The Mongol wilderness required slash-and-burn as the first step in cultivation. Since the wilderness was covered with tall grass, it took days to burn a stretch for setting up a village. With government assistance and support from the princes, land surveys and field clearance proceeded readily. The government also supplied Mongol farmers with ploughs, tools, cattle and oxen. Meanwhile, instructors were dispatched to provide farming tutelage.[35] After the 1911 Revolution, the government in Beijing, in order to hold the

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[32] Li Shutian, *Menghuan anjuan*, (*Documents on the Mongolian Wilderness*) (Changchun: Jilin Wenshi Chubanshe, 1990), p. 8.

[33] Zhang Boying, op. cit., p. 697.

[34] Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, op. cit., p. 53.

[35] "Heilongjiang xingsheng zongdu Xu Shichang, xunfu Cheng Dequan wei pizhun minzhengsi chengqingbo Zhalaite Hala huoshao huangdi banli tunken shizha" ("Approval of Northeast Governor-General Xu Shichang and Heilongjiang Governor Cheng Dequan to Burn the Zhalaite Wilderness for Farming"), April 9, 1908, in HSMZ, op. cit., pp. 328–329.

loyalty of Heilongjiang Mongols and prevent a breakaway along the lines of Outer Mongolia, promoted further favorable policies. In 1913 every adult Mongol noble was given a licensed holding of 900 mu [148 acres], and sons under eighteen years received 500 mu [82 acres]. Among the commoners, every adult male received a licensed holding of 450 mu [74 acres]; sons under eighteen received 250 mu [41 acres], while widows were given 150 mu [25 acres] for sustenance.[36] To avoid disputes with Han farmers, officials repeatedly forbade the Mongols to sell land to them. In 1917, the governor of Heilongjiang intervened to declare such a transaction invalid and to order the land returned to the original Mongol owner.[37] Although Mongol fanners gained experience, their output of crops such as wheat, corn and soybean was roughly half of that of Han and Manchu farmers. Lower productivity was caused by several factors, most important of which were broadcast hand sowing and insufficient weeding.[38] With government assistance, improvement in production slowly took place.

IV. *The Kirgiz Mongols*

The rapidity of the transition from pastoral to agricultural life is particularly well exemplified by the Kirgiz Mongols. Today the Kirgiz in Heilongjiang are considered an independent ethnic minority; but prior to 1952 they were considered as Mongols and they thought of themselves as such. This ethnic group originally lived in Northwest China, but its members were exiled to Heilongjiang after participating in a rebellion against the Qing in the eighteenth century. In Heilongjiang, they adopted the nomadic life of the Mongols and lost many of their distinctive ethnic characteristics. Kirgiz Mongols, like their Mongol neighbors, led a nomadic life, and their livelihood depended on livestock. They left their cattle to graze freely in the vast grassland and checked them only once every ten days. However, as the Mongol wilderness was opened for cultivation at the turn of the century, the Kirgiz began to move into agricultural life. The government allotted land to them and waived taxes for a certain period of years. Some Kirgiz even became landlords. Their farming techniques were greatly influenced by their Han neighbors, and step by step the Kirgiz caught up in productivity. At the same time cattle-raising declined. Around 1900, it was common for every Kirgiz family to have at least a hundred cattle. For example, in Wujiazi village, Fuyu County, the Kirgiz had several thousand head in total, with six households each in possession of 100–800 head. By 1930, however, there were less than 200 head in the village. Four households each held between 10 and 40, and ten households held 1 to 10. Most families had no cattle at all. In three decades the Kirgiz Mongols had gone over almost completely to an agricultural way of life.[39]

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[36] "Xufang Zhaqi Mengfang zhangcheng jianyao shicheng" ("Report concerning Continuing the Opening of the Mongol Wilderness"), October 30, 1913, in HSMZ, op. cit., p. 330.

[37] "Heilongjiang Shengzhang Gongshu wei dujue Zhalaite Mengding jiang shengjidimu dianmai yumin suosheng jiuge bing zhuoding chulibanfashi gei Longjiang daoyin xunling" ("Decree of the Heilongjiang Governor Forbidding the Zhalaite Mongol Banner to Sell Land to Han Farmers"), June 10, 1917, in HSMZ, op. cit., p. 334.

[38] Xin Peiling, Zhang Fengmin and Gao Xiaoyan, op. cit., p. 64.

V. *The Impact of 1911 and Manchukuo*

It is interesting to note that the Manchus and Mongols on the Heilongjiang frontier were little affected by the political turbulence following the fall of the Qing dynasty and end of the empire in 1911, unlike the Manchus living in China Proper, whose life underwent dramatic change. Suddenly stripped of their privileged status and government stipends, the latter had to find a new living in urban society. In Beijing, some former bannermen became police, but many others became common laborers, or even rickshaw-pullers. The same fate was true for bannermen throughout China Proper. The position of the Manchus in Heilongjiang was the "most fortunate and subject to the fewest disruptions."[40] Rather than suffering from the great post-1911 political changes, the bannermen in Heilongjiang benefited from the continuity of the late Qing state policy to assist their transition from warriors to farmers.

The Manchu and Mongol experience illustrated above demonstrates how the two groups were remolded during a crucial period of Chinese history. Both groups underwent profound change as the Qing enforced the new reforms in regard to opening the frontier to Han Chinese settlement and terminating their longstanding subsidized warrior status. In their adaptation to agriculture, they acquired new skills of farming as well as new concepts of private land ownership. It was the cultivation and ownership of land that finally fixed them as sedentary occupiers within a defined space. This process was not always easy, but regardless of the difficulties encountered, the final result was clear: within just three decades their societies had undergone a change of incomparable magnitude.

This change proved permanent. By time of the Japanese invasion and occupation of Manchuria in 1931, the overwhelming majority of former Heilongjiang bannermen were tilling the land of this fertile frontier province. They were mostly private landowners, living in their own communities. The Japanese did not interrupt their life. The name of the puppet state set up by the Japanese army, Manchukuo (*Manzhouguo*), meant the "kingdom of the Manchus," but in reality there was no intention of restoring to the bannermen their former privileged military status. Rather, the Japanese called on them to produce more grain for the Japanese war effort, which had the consequence of further consolidating the Manchu transition to farming.

VI. *Epilogue*

The Manchu and Mongol population of Heilongjiang remains overwhelmingly rural to this day. Recent figures show that more than 90% of over a million Manchus and Mongols in the province are engaged in farming. Their compact rural communities have helped preserve their ethnic identity. The Manchus and Mongols of Heilongjiang lead a life today which is primarily the product of the radical social transformation they underwent in the early twentieth century.

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[39] Ce Ruoyu, "Qiantan Heilongjiangsheng Ke'erkezi zu jingji fazhan jincheng" ("Economic Improvement of Ethnic Kirgiz in Heilongjiang Province"), in Po Shaobu, gen. ed., *Heilongjiang minzu lishi yu wenhua* (*The Ethnic History and Culture of Heilongjiang*) (Beijing: Zhongyang Minzu Xueyuan Chubanshe, 1993), p. 185.

[40] Rhoads, *Manchus and Han: Ethnic Relations and Police Power in Late Qing and Early Republican China, 1861–1928*, pp. 260–263.

■ Source: Shao, Dan, 'Princess, traitor, soldier, spy: Aisin Gioro Xianyu and the dilemma of Manchu identity', in Mariko Asano Tamanoi, (ed.), *Crossed histories: Manchuria in the age of empire*, Ann Arbor: Association for Asian Studies / Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2005, pp. 82–119.

PRINCESS, TRAITOR, SOLDIER, SPY: AISIN GIORO XIANYU AND THE DILEMMA OF MANCHU IDENTITY

Dan Shao

> I am a Chinese. Naturally I hate Doihara Kenji. As a person educated and brought up in Japan, I also hate him because I love Japan. As a member of the Manchu royal family, I hate him too because he destroyed the last good image of the Manchu dynasty in the mind of Chinese people.
>
> —Aisin Gioro Xianyu, "Tribunal Record of the Defense Department," 18 July 1947.

In late March 1948, news agencies in China, Japan, and the United States reported that the Chinese Guomindang government had executed Aisin Gioro Xianyu (1906?–1948) for high treason.[1] In the Japanese reports, she was called "Manchukuo's Joan of Arc" or "a beauty in male attire" (*dansō no reijin*).[2] Americans referred to her as the "Mata Hari of East Asia," while the Chinese knew her as the mysterious Jin Bihui (Radiant Jade) (see, e.g., *Dagong bao*, 26 March 1948; *Asahi shinbun*, 23 March, 26 March 1948; *Life*, 26 April 1948; *Newsweek*, 5 April 1948). Xianyu appears frequently under these names in postwar memoirs in Japanese, Chinese, and English, where her image varies from the licentious to the naïve. Beginning in the 1930s, her story has inspired novels and movies in China and Japan. She even makes a cameo appearance in Bernardo Bertolucci's *The Last Emperor*, turning up in a pilot's uniform at the last emperor's small court in Tianjin.

How did Aisin Gioro Xianyu, alias Kawashima Yoshiko, become the traitor Jin Bihui? Living in an era replete with civil and international wars, Xianyu's repeated crossing of national and cultural boundaries puts her squarely within an entire generation of people with complicated transnational and cross-ethnic profiles. In the following pages, drawing on newspapers, magazines, court transcripts,[3] biographies, autobiographies, and memoirs, I will document and examine the representations of Xianyu's identities from the 1930s to the present. My goal in observing these reconfigurations of Xianyu's identities is to study the interaction between transformation of individual identities and the process of nation building and state formation. Xianyu's case reveals in particular the impact of the Sino-Japanese contest over Manchuria on Manchu identity and the way in which Qing banner identity was redefined and obliterated within a framework of nationalistic legal, moral, and rhetorical codes.[4]

Xianyu was one of many who experienced China's passage from a dynastic empire to a republican state and the transition of Manchuria from a frontier area beyond the control of the Chinese Republican government to a self-claimed independent state whose nationhood was denied by the international world. During the first half of the twentieth century, Manchuria, the legendary space claimed as the Manchu homeland by the Qing court (Elliott 2000), became "the cockpit of Asia," where clashes between the colonialism of an expanding Japanese empire and the nationalism of a fledgling Chinese republic spawned different strains of ethno-nationalist rhetoric and experimental political ideologies. Confrontations arose between different versions of the past and the future for local inhabitants (Duara 2003). Territorial and identity boundaries shifted unpredictably, especially when Japanese imperialism created a transnational space in Manchuria, producing multitiered identities that people living in that space could use. Meanwhile, the Republic of China was also redefining the territorial boundaries of Manchuria as well as identity boundaries in the newly developing concept of the Chinese nation.[5] It was in such turbulent times that Xianyu tried to negotiate her personal ethnic and national identities. This study is an attempt to foreground the individual experience in identity formation.

For some time now, historians have focused on the institutional construction or "imagination" of collective identities, especially as regards ethnicity and nation. While this focus has produced much insightful scholarship, by and large it has come at the cost of examining individual or experiential aspects. That is, while historians often advocate bringing people's voices into historical studies, analyses of racial, ethnic, and national identities tend to dwell on collective identity, relegating individuals to part of a faceless background. As a result, though historical conceptualizations of ethnic and national identities have reached considerable breadth, individual reconfigurations of ethnic and national identities are sometimes overlooked, perhaps under the assumption that communal identities are imagined for the people and not by them. My belief is that biographical research is important in helping us decipher the relations between an individual and his or her community.[6] If we define identity as a "*relationship* between self and others—[which] may hence be applied to any entity, individual or collective" (Dittmer and Kim 1993, 4), there is no reason why individual experiences of identity adjustment should be ignored in favor of the group experience. As Anthony Cohen suggests, "Looking at individuals' boundary transformations may alert us to the qualitative nature of collective boundaries" (1994, 66). I would also like to suggest that biographical studies of an individual's boundary transformations will help us to see the interrelations and disparities between scholarly, or "scientific," definitions and ordinary notions of ethnic and national identities.

Some may challenge my choice of such a well-known historical figure: "Why choose her, and not an ordinary person?" This is a fair question. Historians, of course, often lament their limited access to the voices of the "common man" or "common woman" in the past, and I can only join their lament. Nonetheless, I believe that Xianyu is a pertinent subject because, compared to scholarly and governmental definitions of ethnicity and nationality, her conceptualization of ethnic and national identities is as unscholarly or unscientific as that of less-famous people. An analysis of how Xianyu has been represented since the 1930s shows quite well that national identity is not necessarily the "master identity" by which an individual will identify him- or herself, or be identified by others. Xianyu's experiences and the stories about her in wartime clearly reveal the ambiguous, negotiable nature of ethnicity and nationality. In contrast, her trial for treason after the war demonstrates when and how the boundaries between groups, ethnic or national, are hardened. Furthermore, portrayals of Xianyu in media and literature after her death reveal that moral codes of different historical periods can revise her identity, where once that identity was considered nonnegotiable. Based on Xianyu's case, this chapter will trace how Manchu identity was transformed, negotiated, and redefined during an era of shifting political boundaries. All in all, her case offers the historian many avenues along which the gaps and correspondences between individual and collective identity may be examined. I will use the three names—Xianyu, Jin Bihui, and Kawashima Yoshiko—interchangeably depending on which of her identities is at stake.

"A Flake of Snow Next to a Hot Stove": A Brief Biography of Xianyu

On 25 March 1948, Xianyu was led from her prison cell to be shot. Thus ended the short life of the fourteenth daughter of Shanqi (1866–1922), Prince Su of the late Qing dynasty (Rhoads 2000, 235–256; Shanqi 1928).[7] She told a journalist several days before the execution that she felt her life melting away, confiding, "Today I am like a flake of snow next to a hot stove."[8] How did this flake of snow get close to a hot stove?

Born in Beijing about 1906 (her exact date of birth remains unclear), Xianyu spent her childhood in two countries, China and Japan. A photo of the young Xianyu, taken in China about 1912, shows a girl about six years of age in a traditional Manchu dress (fig. 3.1) (see photos in Niu 1994). In another picture taken in 1916, young Xianyu, dressed in a Japanese kimono, stands by her foster father, Kawashima Naniwa (1865–1949), among a group of military students (Umemoto 1984). Behind the change from Manchu to Japanese dress is the story of how two ambitious men, one a Manchu prince and the other a Japanese adventurer, educated the little girl in their political ideals.

In 1912, when Xianyu was about six, the Manchu imperial court was forced to announce the abdication of its three-year-old emperor, Aisin Gioro Puyi. Xianyu's father, Prince Su, was unwavering in his support of the restoration of the Qing dynasty and the independence of Manchuria-Mongolia. A Japanese acquaintance, Kawashima Naniwa, who helped the Qing court with training at the Beijing Police Academy (Reynolds 1993, 164–172), also actively participated in the restoration movement. To procure assistance from the Japanese and to demonstrate his trust in Kawashima Naniwa, Prince Su gave up his fourteenth daughter, Aisin Gioro Xianyu, to him for adoption in 1912. Xianyu then was renamed Kawashima Yoshiko. The friendship between Xianyu's Manchu birth father and her Japanese foster father was based on the common dream of restoring the Manchu dynasty or, at least, the shared goal of winning independence for Manchuria and Mongolia. Their shared daughter inherited their restoration dream. At the age of twenty-two, Xianyu was married to Ganjurjab, the son of a Mongolian general who had once helped Prince Su with the restoration project in Mongolia.

Several years later, however, she divorced him and began a colorful life on her own. In the early 1930s she was involved in the establishment of Manchukuo, helping the last empress to flee from Tianjin to Manchuria. She organized an army, the Anguo jun (Pacifying-the-state army), and participated in Japanese military actions at Rehe (1933).[9] During the war, Xianyu was known for her banner identity and Manchu royal blood. This identity gained her access to powerful Japanese and Chinese figures. She befriended numerous Japanese and Chinese military and political celebrities (Tanaka 1979, 449–468), and her social circle included such illustrious names as Tanaka Ryūkichi (1893–1972), Tada Hayashi (1882–1948),



十四格格顯玗一九〇七年五月二十四日生於船板胡同肅王府，時年六歲，此幀似一九一二年攝於旅順。一九一三年（七歲）已在東京師範附屬小學校讀書。

Figure 3.1. Aisin Gioro Xianyu in about 1912.
She is about six years old and is wearing traditional Manchu dress.
Niu 1994.

Matsuoka Yōsuke (1880–1946), Doihara Kenji (1883–1948), and Tōyama Mitsuru (1855–1944).[10]

With the surrender of Japan in 1945, Xianyu was arrested and charged with treason. At her trial, she maintained that she was a Japanese national with Chinese blood on the grounds that she had been adopted by Kawashima Naniwa at a very young age and had been educated in Japan. She also used her banner identity to excuse her activities against the Republican government during the war. In the oral and written confessions submitted during her interrogation and trial, she consistently identified herself as a bannerperson (*qiren*), lending credence to her belief in the righteousness of her devotion to the restoration cause (Niu 1994, 170, 176, 188, 192, 253). Her defense lawyers also argued that Xianyu's wartime activities were motivated by her desire to restore the Manchu dynasty, which was a domestic problem between Manchus and Han, not a problem of treason against China. In the end, she was tried as a Chinese traitor. The court accepted the prosecutor's argument that because her father had Chinese nationality, she was a Chinese citizen. Accordingly, Xianyu was sentenced to death by the Supreme Court of Hebei on 3 March 1948, and on 25 March, she was executed in Beiping (now Beijing) (Niu 1994. 604–605; Masui 1977, 273–282; see also *Dagong bao*, 26 March 1948; *Asahi shinbun*, 23 March, 26 March 1948; *Yomiuri shinbun*, 26 March 1948; Life, 26 April 1948). Her body was claimed by a Japanese monk, Furukawa Daikō, and was sent to a cemetery for the Japanese in Beiping (*Dagong bao*, 26 March 1948; Kamisaka 1984).[11] In 1949, ashes from her bones were buried beside her foster parents' tomb at Matsumoto City, Japan.[12] Her birth father would most likely never have imagined that on the last legal form she signed before her execution his daughter would use her Chinese name, Jin Bihui, not her Manchu name, Aisin Gioro Xianyu (Niu 1994, 599).

How did her Manchu identity get lost in contemporary historical memory?

Xianyu Represented in Japan and America

Among the thousands of publications on Manchuria in Japan in the 1930s, Xianyu's background and her legendary adventures in Manchuria became well known. Her fame in Japan can be ascribed to a contemporary Japanese novel, *Dansō no reijin: Kawashima Yoshiko den* (A beauty dressed in male attire: A biography of Kawashima Yoshiko), written by Muramatsu Shōfū (1889–1961) and published in 1933.[13] Muramatsu's heroine, Mariko, is a princess from a Qing royal family who has a family background identical to Xianyu's. Mariko's birth father is "Shuku shin-ō" (Prince Su) of the Qing dynasty. Her Japanese foster father, a man named Kajiwara Yoshiru, is a close friend to Prince Su, and trained the Chinese police in Beijing. This obviously corresponds to an exact description of the real Kawashima Naniwa.

As he reported in the afterword to his novel, Muramatsu Shōfū interviewed Kawashima Yoshiko in person. Mariko's view of Manchurian problems in the novel reflected Xianyu's opinion. In the novel, when Mariko is asked whether Manchuria belonged to China, she answers:

> No, this is what the Chinese believe. We Manchus (Manshūjin) wouldn't think in that way. We Manchus annexed China. Now the Chinese are annexing Manchuria. Therefore, China is China, while Manchuria is Manchuria. They are different. Since we have our own serene emperor, we don't obey the rule of the Nationalist Party or Jiang Zhongzheng [Jiang Jieshi/Chiang Kai-shek] wherever we are. (Muramatsu 1933, 127)[14]

Mariko's view clearly reflects a very different understanding of the nature of relations between Manchuria and China, and between Manchus and Chinese, from that held by the Republican government.

Besides Muramatsu's novel, Japanese news reports and stories about Xianyu in wartime catapulted her to fame. She was invited to give public speeches on radio and in the city hall of Matsumoto, her Japanese hometown. She contributed an article to Fujin kōron.[15] News of Xianyu, a media darling, was plastered all over various newspapers. A report in Asahi shinbun, with a photo of her in military uniform, added ethnonationalistic and exotic color to the Japanese press coverage of the Rehe campaign, introducing her family background and praising her involvement in political affairs (22 February 1933; fig. 3.2).[16] The *Manchuria Daily News* (*MDN*), an English newspaper in Dalian, often reported her activities.[17] A young American woman who met Xianyu in China was surprised at the high reputation that Kawashima Yoshiko enjoyed among the Japanese, both in Japan and overseas: "I've never met a native-born Japanese who hasn't at least heard of the princess. Even in America the Nippons who read magazines from their home country know of her" (Woods 1937, 29).

Written accounts by the Japanese for the most part represent Xianyu as a brave woman, determined to restore the Qing dynasty. Although they never missed the point that she was a princess of the Qing royal house, they seldom used "Manchu" or "Manchus" to describe their heroine's ethnicity. Perhaps this was because Japanese popular notions of racial or ethnic conflicts between Manchus and Han were not as strong as scholarly notions. These authors took great interest in Xianyu's resistance to the Republic of China, her royal blood, and the unconventional social role she assumed as a woman (see, e.g., Umemoto 1957). For example, in the afterword to his novel, Muramatsu used the word *joketsu* (outstanding woman) to express his admiration for Kawashima Yoshiko's involvement in military campaigns and politics (Muramatsu 1933, 341–343).

Xianyu's life and career caught the attention of Americans, too. Kawashima Yoshiko was a myth from the Orient and came to attention at a time when the ostensible mystery of the Orient exercised a potent hold on the public imagination, as evidenced by the popularity of such figures as Fu Manchu and Charlie Chan. Willa Lou Woods was an American college student who took the opportunity offered by the Japan-America Student Conference held in Tokyo to travel around in Asia in the early 1930s. She met Aisin Gioro Xianyu in Tianjin and lived in her house for five days. When she returned to the United States, she published a memoir titled *Princess Jin: the Joan of Arc of the Orient.* Woods summarized Xianyu's experiences on the cover of her book as follows: "The remarkable story of a Chinese girl of many accomplishments. Born of royal blood, she was made an orphan by the Chinese rebellion of 1911. Educated in Japan, she returned to her native country at nineteen in an effort to help her people. While she is not in sympathy with the present government of China, she does not approve of the Japanese tactics" (Woods 1937). This young American woman observed Princess Jin's daily life and listened to her stories. Woods seemingly was unaware of Xianyu's Manchu name, but she was fully aware of the complicated identities of "the Joan of Arc of the Orient." Woods brought up the question directly to Xianyu. She asked, "Up in Peking they sometimes call you Miss Yoshiko Kawashima, and sometimes Princess B.H. Jin, and sometimes Girl Commander. Why is that?" (Woods 1937, 8). Unfortunately Woods did not write down Xianyu's response.

Xianyu showed full hospitality to this young American, taking her to the theater, to the dance hall, and on bicycling excursions in Tianjin. She told Woods about her military experiences, including the Rehe campaign, and her espionage activities, such as her underground life as a taxi dancer and as an intelligence collector in Shanghai. Although some details about her life and career in Woods' memoir are wrong or exaggerated, Xianyu made the American fully aware of her determination to "restore the lost Manchu dynasty" (Woods 1937, 9). In Woods' eyes, Princess Jin was "between



Figure 3.2. "A beauty in male attire: Ms. Kawashima Yoshiko" (*Dansō no reijin: Kawashima Yoshiko jō*).
Asahi shinbun, 22 February 1933. Reprinted by permission.

two fires"—"her adopted people" and "her own native country"—at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 1931. Xianyu explained to Woods that she chose to support the Japanese because "she thought of the way in which her parents had been treated and her brothers killed" (Woods 1937, 18). How badly Xianyu's parents were treated or how her brothers were killed is unclear. In fact, her birth mother and Prince Su died when she was very young. Some of her brothers were still alive in the 1980s, when Kamisaka Fuyuko interviewed them. Nevertheless, Xianyu's complaint about the Republican government's treatment of her family reflects the awkward situation of the lives of Manchus in the years following the 1911 Revolution.[18]

Although Xianyu lived in Japan for a long time and perhaps experienced no prejudice for being Manchu, there are two possible reasons why she told Woods about the bad treatment her family suffered while in China. First, she was informed by her contacts or relatives in China of the bad conditions in which many Manchus lived. Second, she justified her support for Japan's stand in the Sino-Japanese War with the assumption that one was always right to defend the interest and honor of one's family and community against the forces or foes that hurt them. Perhaps she also tried to use Woods, who she thought could give her publicity in the West, to amplify her own importance and to enhance the image she had of herself—a Manchu princess and soldier with a mission of revenge. Xianyu succeeded.

In Woods' memoir, Xianyu's political views are presented as being independent from both the Chinese and the Japanese side. When Woods expressed her support of China as a republic and her opposition to the Japanese invasion, she was reprimanded by Xianyu, who said that neither the Nanjing nor the Manchukuo government was satisfactory. Woods' memoir also emphasized Xianyu's critique of Puyi. Xianyu told Woods that "Puyi is too... too 'tender.' He does what Japanese tell him to." She added, "I will never do what they [Japanese] say" (Woods 1937, 12). Xianyu seems to have expressed her criticism of the Japanese frankly in front of Woods. Given the extent of Xianyu's Japanese connections this is a little surprising, and we cannot rule out the possibility that Woods, considering her American readers, might have wanted to highlight Xianyu's negative views of the Japanese in Manchukuo. Nevertheless, Woods describes Xianyu as a "truly remarkable girl," someone who held special political aims not in accord with the official views of either Republican China or imperial Japan, and who crossed the national boundaries between Japan and China geographically and culturally. Woods described Xianyu's house as "a strange mixture of Chinese and Japanese!... And they said that while the royal family itself is of Manchu descent, the princess acts for all the world like an informal American" (Woods 1937, 6). The ambiguity of Xianyu's complicated identities is further implied in Woods' alternating use of the terms "Chinese princess" and "Manchu princess" to describe her. Woods does not seem to be conscious of any difference between these expressions, suggesting that she believed them to be interchangeable. As a result, the reader is left to puzzle out on the meaning of "the Joan of Arc of the Orient": whose Joan of Arc was Xianyu? Was she the heroine of the Chinese or the Manchus?

This 1930s image of Xianyu as the Joan of the Arc of the Orient was replaced in the 1940s by that of the "Mata Hari of the Orient." Xianyu's espionage activities and her lifestyle no doubt contributed to this reputation (Burke 1947). In 1946, a military officer at the American embassy in China sent a request to the Military Committee of the Nationalist Party asking for an investigation of Xianyu's espionage activities (Niu 1994, 132–135). Her reputation as a spy was not limited to intelligence agencies. Western media called her Eastern or Japan's Mata Hari. An article in *Newsweek* (5 April 1948), reporting on her execution, opened with the following lines: "To the Japanese she was 'Manchukuo's Joan of Arc.'... To the incautious Chinese officers she was Radiant Jade when, as the Mata Hari of Greater East Asia, she masqueraded as a dancing girl or prostitute in the cabarets and opium dens of Shanghai." In the 26 April 1948 issue of *Life* magazine, the title of an illustrated report on Xianyu's execution in Beiping reads, "Death of a spy: Chinese shoot 'Eastern Mata Hari' and display body outside the jail." Although this news reported Xianyu's Manchu identity, her Manchu name was unmentioned. Her image as a Mata Hari has lasted: in an October 1990 *Cineforum* movie review of Fong Ling-Ching's movie *Kawashima Yoshiko*, she was still referred to as "una Mata Hari." Her reputation as a Mata Hari predicted how her trial was going to end.

Manchu Joan of Arc or Chinese Traitor: Jin Bihui on Trial

About two months after the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, Aisin Gioro Xianyu was arrested at her house in Beiping. The Nationalist government accused her of being a traitor and charged her with the following crimes: serving as an official at the Manchukuo court and as chairman of the Manchukuo Overseas Students' Association in Japan, recruiting bandits and organizing the Dingguo Army for Manchukuo, participating in the Rehe campaign against China, passing confidential information to Japan, and trying to "revive the Manchus" (*fuxing Manzhouzu*) and move Puyi back to Beijing (Niu 1994, 148–150).

In the records of a series of interrogations as well as in Xianyu's written confession (*zibaishu*), Jin Bihui is the name most often used by herself and by the court. Name selection had subtle ethnic and national implications in Xianyu's case. The earliest official communications and files on her case all addressed her as Chuandao Fangzi (the Chinese pronunciation of Kawashima Yoshiko) followed by brackets in which her Chinese name, Jin Bihui, was added (Niu 1994, 8, 15, 19). Gradually, the Chinese name was used as the original name in official documents. One communication between Chinese authorities underscores the importance of this name change: "If her Japanese nationality (*riji*) is confirmed, she should be tried as a war criminal at the tribunal. If her Chinese nationality (*benji*) is confirmed, she should be tried as a Chinese traitor.... This question has been posed by the Committee on Trial for Treason" (Niu 1994, 97).

Xianyu did not notice the legal immediacy in the nuance of her choice of names until her defense counselors tried to base their defense statement on her Manchu ethnic background and nationality as a Japanese. At the beginning of a series of interrogations, Xianyu only used her Chinese name, Jin Bihui. In almost every interrogation the defendant was asked the same questions about her name, age, hometown, and address. Except for her address, Xianyu's answers varied over time. On 11 December 1945, her answer to the opening question was, "Jin Bihui. Age 32. From Beijing" (Niu 1994, 24). Later, Xianyu chose to emphasize her identity as a bannerperson and reclaimed her Manchu name. At an interrogation on 18 July 1947, Xianyu offered a very different answer to the routine opening questions:

> [My name is] Aisin Gioro (it means Jin, gold, in Chinese). [I'm] the eleventh generation with the generation name Xian. People of the eight banners [use] the generation name as the surname. My given name is Yu. My literary name is Dongzhen. Because I lived with a Japanese, Kawashima Naniwa, and for convenience in school, I was also named Kawashima Yoshiko. After the September 18 Incident [Mukden Incident], for the first time I knew that I was actually Chinese. I asked my elder brother Jin Bidong [about my background]. He reported to Puyi, who gave me the name Jin Bihui.[19] (Niu 1994, 242) (fig. 3.3)

On 15 October 1947, her answer to the routine opening questions at a debate session at the court indicates that she and her defense counselors tried to negotiate her identity. Her answer reads, "I am Jin Bihui. [I am] thirty-two years old. [I am of] Japanese nationality" (Niu 1994, 372). The next day, she added one short sentence to her answer. "I am Jin Bihui. Thirty-two years old. [I have] *Chinese blood lineage* (*Zhongguo xuetong*), [but] Japanese nationality" (Niu 1994, 384; emphasis added). Throughout her written confession, the interrogation records, and the defense statements, Xianyu never denied that she was of Chinese blood and that she was Chinese (*Zhongguo ren*). However, her usage of the identity label "Chinese" was different from the prosecutor's; it was not related to citizenship. This difference revealed the slipperiness of the identity label in both dimensions of self-perception and others' designation.[20]



Figure 3.3. "Written Record of Investigation by the Tribunal of War Criminals, Department of National Defense."
Here Xianyu explained why she had Manchu, Japanese, and Han names. Niu 1994, 242.

What she and her lawyers were negotiating was the relation between her Chinese, Manchu, and Japanese identities. Their defense focused on two questions: Did Xianyu have Chinese or Japanese nationality? And were her anti-Nationalist and pro-Japanese activities during the war pardonable, considering her Manchu background?

Xianyu demonstrated her identity as a Manchu bannerperson on various occasions. Although her lawyers used the phrase "Manchu-Han relations" in their defense statement, she did not use the term "Manzu" (Manchu) or "Manren" in her vocabulary of identity. To her lawyers, the



Figure 3.4. Xianyu's handwritten confession (in Chinese).
The character of "*qi*" for "*qiren*" (bannerpeople) is wrong. Niu 1994, 64.

tension between Manchus and Han Chinese was identical to that between *qiren* (bannerpeople) and Han people. To Xianyu, banner identity distinguished her from the Han population. She repeatedly demonstrated her consciousness of being a bannerperson in her interrogations and during her trial.[21] Her written confession and court transcripts will help us discover more about her self-perception and her use of banner identity to justify her activities during wartime.

Xianyu confessed that at first she was glad that Puyi had returned to the land of their ancestors during the early Manchukuo years. She even had a dream that the north should be ruled by the emperor, and the south by Jiang Jieshi. However, the dire conditions in which most bannermen lived shattered her dreams of restoration. She concluded that the Japanese had no intention of helping either the Han or the bannerpeople, and that they just wanted to use the emperor. At the end of this written confession, she demonstrated her understanding of the relationship between Han Chinese and bannerpeople: "It does not matter whether [I am] a Han or a bannerperson. [The two groups] are an inseparable family. This is what I finally figured out while I am in prison" (Niu 1994, 46–65; quotation at 65) (fig. 3.4).[22] Whether or not she sincerely believed in the above statement, we do not know, but she seems to have concluded that mouthing the rhetoric of Manchus and Han as a single "family" was something that those who would examine her written confession wanted to see.

Xianyu's statement on bannerpeople and Han being as a single family is unexpected, given that Xianyu elsewhere justified her support for Manchukuo by insisting on the distinctiveness of her banner identity. In her early written confession she explained how her banner identity affected her political views as follows:

> Bannerpeople had a strong sense of who they were (*qiren de xinli henzhong de*). I was often unsatisfied with myself. I hated myself for being powerless. I always tried to restore the imperial palace and to invite the emperor back to the palace. If the emperor was in Beijing, and the south was given to Chairman Jiang [Jiang Jieshi] and if they cooperated and quickly built more and more industries, no one would dare to invade [China]. This was my dream when I was young. (Niu 1994, 58)

When asked if she wanted to restore Manchukuo to the former glory of the Qing dynasty, she answered, "I am a bannerperson. Of course I hope for that. However, bannerpeople are not talented. They are useless." She further challenged the investigator, who suggested that she could have helped Emperor Xuantong (Puyi) to restore the Qing, by stating, "If bannerpeople had enough power, [we] would not ever have given up the Qing dynasty to the Nationalist Party" (Niu 1994, 190, 192). Her repeated use of "bannerpeople" and comments on the weakness of her community showed not only her way of referring to "the Manchus," but also the mixture of great pride and great self-loathing, a key element of twentieth-century Manchus' self-perception of their ethnic identity (see Shao 2002, chaps. 2 and 5).

On other occasions Xianyu used her banner identity not only to defend herself, but to underscore the distinction between herself and her interlocutor as the Other, a Han Chinese. Asked once to state her father's name, she answered that she didn't know what it was. Clearly surprised, the investigator asked, "How can it be that you do not know your father's name?" She answered, "We bannerpeople do not call our fathers by their name" (Niu 1994, 170). What's more, when Xianyu needed to defend her unconventional life and style of dress, she used both her banner and Japanese identities to explain her Otherness. When she was asked whether it was Kawashima Naniwa's idea that she dress in man's attire, she answered, "Many of us bannerwomen dress in man's attire" (176). Later, when she claimed herself to be a Chinese with Japanese nationality, her answer to the question on cross-dressing was that it was a fashion among Japanese women (326).[23]

Xianyu's self-identification as a bannerperson is also supported by her emphasis on the relation between herself, her ancestors, and the birthplace of her ancestors. Ethnic identities are often constructed with the notion of kinship, respect for ancestors, and a poeticized place defined as the original homeland of one's ancestors (Eller 1997; Smith 1986). Xianyu spoke repeatedly about her love for her ancestors when she explained why she thought Puyi should rule the north, why she allegedly stopped the Japanese plan to bomb Beijing, and why she went to Rehe to support Japanese military action. Because Puyi was her "lord" *(zhuzi)*, she said, she had to help him; because her ancestral heritage lay in Beijing, she could not let the Japanese bomb the city; and because her ancestors originated from the Changbai Mountains, she went to Rehe and Manchuria to support the restoration movement (Niu 1994, 29, 181, 188, 192, 273). In this, one can see that Xianyu conceived of her banner identity as an Us that differed from the Han Other and that—despite her earlier statement on the "single family" of Manchus and Han—she perceived the relationship between the two groups as one of tension or even hostility. She regularly deployed not just her direct genealogical ties to the imperial family but her status as a member of the Eight Banners to justify her activities against the Republican government in wartime. In this respect, Xianyu's actions lay bare the legacy of the banner system in the formation of contemporary Manchu identity, as well as the alienation of some bannerpeople from the Republic of China.

Xianyu's defense counselors also believed that her wartime activities could be mitigated if her motivation could be explained as a Manchu-Han conflict, not a Sino-Japanese conflict. One of her lawyers argued: "According to the prosecutor's indictment, the defendant had intended to restore the Manchu dynasty because she inherited her father's will and received Kawashima [Naniwa]'s family education. This idea of restoring the Manchu dynasty is just a problem of domestic conflict *(neiluan wenti)*, which does not deserve a charge of being a *hanjian*" (Niu 1994, 413).[24] The underlying assumption of such an argument is that because Xianyu was a Manchu, her wartime activities were targeted at the government that overthrew the Qing dynasty founded by her ancestors, and not at China per se, and that therefore her crime should not be considered treason against China. The prosecutor rejected this argument, and in a series of documents equated restoration of the Manchu-Qing dynasty to treason against China.

On the other hand, Xianyu did not completely deny her Chinese identity, either. Sometimes she even adopted Chinese nationalist rhetoric to express her understanding of what patriotism meant and what an individual's responsibility was to the nation-state. Questioned several times as to why she returned to China about the time of the 1931 Mukden Incident, she answered that she was a young girl who had just discovered her Chinese identity, and she wanted to see China with her own eyes (Niu 1994, 271, 325). In her "Bianbaishu" (Notes of self-defense and explanation), she not only acknowledged her Japanese nationality, but also appealed to her "Chinese blood" when she explained why she wanted to be a good Chinese.[25] To prove her loyalty to the Chinese during the war years, Xianyu and her lawyers found several Chinese witnesses who testified that Xianyu saved them from Japanese imprisonment or persecution. One of the witnesses was a secretary of the Central Bureau of Investigation of the Nationalist Party who worked underground in Beiping in wartime.[26]

Besides using the rhetoric of nationalism and patriotism, Xianyu emphasized her love for the common people (*laobaixing*) several times in the last months of her life. In her last *jihaku sho* (confession), written in Japanese,[27] Xianyu claimed that she believed in *rōbyakushō shugi* (literally, "common-people-ism"). She ascribed the motivation behind some of her wartime activities, such as making public speeches on China in Japan, to her goodwill for China and the common people, insisting in her final appeal that she would not sacrifice the common people in order to restore the Manchu dynasty. Among other things, this shift from patriotic rhetoric to populism reveals to a certain degree Xianyu's dissatisfaction with the legal system of the Nationalist government. She frankly criticized the wrongs done by the court and the investigation authorities in her final appeal. Before her death, she left several notes to her defense lawyers in which she expressed her disappointment at the Chinese government in its treatment of her, asking, "When can our China have a real 'Harmony of the Five Ethnic Groups'? When can we see real happiness on the faces of ordinary people?" (Niu 1994, 516–517; Chinese translation, 518).

Xianyu was disappointed with the handling of her case by the Nationalist government. She was frustrated by the lack of serious investigation and was appalled that the officials involved used only some letters, a Japanese novel, and a movie as evidence. Indeed, to dismiss her claim of Japanese nationality, the prosecutor made little serious effort to collect solid evidence, but simply claimed that the letter provided by Kawashima Naniwa, which Xianyu had expected to be useful to prove her Japanese nationality, was legally worthless. The same prosecutor had no legal documentation to verify the official confirmation of Xianyu's Chinese nationality either, offering the following argument:

> Those who volunteer to obtain nationality from a foreign country should get permission from the Department of [unclear in original; probably Civil Affairs]. . . . The defendant in this case cannot provide solid evidence to prove her foreign nationality. What's more, she had never obtained any permission from the Department of Civil Affairs [before she renounced her Chinese nationality], which means that according to the above law, she should not claim herself to be a foreigner in order to be tried as a war criminal. (Niu 1994, 494–495)

In her final appeal Xianyu complained with some justification about the requirement to secure permission from the Department of Civil Affairs of the Republican government before obtaining foreign nationality, pointing out that when she was adopted by Kawashima in 1912, Chinese nationality law was ambiguous. She questioned further, "What is nationality *(guoji)*? I know nothing about such laws. How should I have known how to renounce my Chinese nationality?" (Niu 1994, 503).

Being Bannerperson or Manchu-Chinese-Japanese?

Xianyu's question, and her difficult relationship with the Republican state, touches a long-ignored problem in studies of the Republican era, that is, the complicated identity transformation of bannerpeople. Not everyone identified themselves with the newly built community of the Republic of China. During the Qing dynasty, bannerpeople had a clear notion of their attachment to the Eight Banner system that was confirmed constantly by the regular intervention of banner officials and detailed practice of banner regulations in their lives. However, during the early Republican years, after the collapse of the dynasty, their emperor was suddenly treated as a "foreign emperor."[28] As his former subjects, how and when did they realize that they were the citizens of the Republic, not aliens themselves? How did legal codes and institutional rules define their nationality?

The Qing court issued the first Chinese law of nationality on 28 March 1909, as a response to the rising number of disputes over the nationality problem of Chinese overseas between Western powers, which followed naturalization policy, and the Qing government, which forbade Chinese overseas to acquire foreign nationality (see *Daqing fagui daquan* 1901–1909, 2:995; Tung 1943, appendix: 60–61). Three years later, in November 1912, the newly established Republican government promulgated its nationality law and regulations. The Beijing government in 1914 and 1915 modified the 1912 version. In 1929 the Nationalist government issued another version. Nevertheless, the four Republican versions differed little from each other; all were based on the principle of jus sanguinis (right of blood).[29] The major difference between the Republican and Qing law of nationality is that the Republican law placed more emphasis on the right of blood in its articles concerning the loss of Chinese nationality. The Qing law of nationality allowed one who was adopted by a foreign father and lived with the foster father to renounce his or her Chinese nationality, while the 1929 Republican version did not have such an article concerning a foreign foster father, and only allowed "one whose father is an alien and has recognized him as his child" to renounce his or her Chinese nationality (Tung 1943, appendix: 28, 66).

Another point of relevance here is the stipulation under the Republican nationality law that one had to receive governmental permission as a precondition to renouncing one's Chinese nationality. Moreover, for Xianyu to have had her Japanese nationality recognized, she was required to produce household registration records (*koseki*) certified by the Japanese government. Xianyu failed to get such certification. According to a Chinese author who interviewed Xianyu's brother in the 1960s in Japan, Kawashima Naniwa sent a letter to the Chinese court with a statement that Yoshiko once had been listed on the household register of Kawashima's Family. The statement was signed by more than three hundred residents of Shinanokō village (Nagano prefecture), where the Kawashimas once lived. However, Kawashima Naniwa himself did not provide any excerpt or copy of the family registration (Zhu n.d., 186; Yamaguchi 1987, 237).[30] A copy of the manuscript of Kawashima Naniwa's letter and a certification note from the Shinanokō village head collected in Niu Shanseng's *Miwen* lends credence to the testimony of Xianyu's brother. In addition, Kamisaka found several letters between Xianyu and Kawashima Naniwa discussing how to forge some legal documents to prove her Japanese nationality (Kamisaka 1984, 203–206). According to an article in the *Manchuria Daily News*, it was Xianyu's younger sister who was formally adopted by Kawashima Naniwa, renamed Kawashima Reiko, and naturalized as a Japanese subject. At no time did Xianyu herself acquire Japanese citizenship (*MDN*, 11 October 1933).

Interestingly, Xianyu's Chinese nationality was not proven by any legal document, either, but by logical inference from the Nationality Law of the Republic of China. The confusion over her nationality can be attributed to the shifting borders between ethnic and national identities, as well as to the lack of a well-defined concept of nationality in the years immediately following the demise of the Qing. Indeed, it was only toward the end of the trial that Xianyu and her lawyers realized the importance of nationality in defining an individual's responsibility to his or her country, and thus what constituted treason. The failure to appreciate the importance of nationality earlier suggests that, despite the rise of Chinese nationalism, the concept of nationality as such remained vague for many people of Xianyu's generation. In fact, the Republican government failed to provide nationality certificates for Chinese overseas for quite a long time. It is reported that many overseas Chinese were expelled or abused because they did not have such a legal document. Twelve years after the establishment of the Republic, in 1929, various borderland provinces still had to appeal for issuing of nationality certificates from the ROC government (*Rehe sheng gongshu dang*, no. 1248, December 1929), which reveals that the notion of nationality and its legal importance had been weak even among the policy makers of the early ROC.

Meanwhile, in her own confession and court statements, Xianyu never denied being Chinese (Niu 1994, 384), but in arguing that her nationality was not that of the Republic of China but of Japan, she and her lawyers aimed to expand the definition of "being Chinese." However, her case reveals that in the early Republic, Manchu ethnic identity appears to have been subordinate to a larger "Chinese" identity. The term *Zhongguoren* (Chinese) as used by Xianyu and the court is less related to the idea of nationality, associated with the character *guo* (the state), and more related to ethno-national identity, which associates along the notion of historical heritage based on the inseparable interrelation between Manchus and the Chinese state, as well as the concept of one single bloodline lineage from Emperor Yan and Emperor Huang shared by all the peoples of China (*Zhonghua minzu*, or *Huaxia zisun*). *Zhongguoren* in this case became an intermediate identity label somewhere between ethnicity and nationality. The central point of Xianyu's defense was that she was a Manchu by genealogy, *Zhongguoren* by historical heritage, but a Japanese national by technicality.

In the final verdict issued by the Supreme Court of Hebei Province on 22 October 1947, the Chinese court ignored Xianyu's use of her Manchu identity to justify her wartime activities. Although her Manchu lineage was mentioned, only her Chinese and Japanese names were used to refer to her (Niu 1994, 423–425). A notice from the Supreme Court of Nanjing, which denied the defendant's appeal for a retrial and supported the previous verdict, also used only her Chinese and Japanese names (Niu 1994, 435–441; Masui 1977, 278–280).

Xianyu's *hanjian* crimes are summarized in the verdict as consisting of her espionage activities for the Japanese government, her participation in the organization of the "Puppet State of Manchukuo," her close relationships with Japanese high officials and officers, and her official and nonofficial positions in a series of "puppet" organizations in Manchukuo and China (Niu 1994, 423).

What is noteworthy is that in this 1947 verdict, the court did not mention the previous charge, raised in the 1946 indictment, of her efforts to revive the Manchus. This omission reveals to a certain degree the prosecutor's efforts to avoid directly answering the defense's argument that, because she was ethnically Manchu, Xianyu's restoration activities did not deserve the charge of treason. It is also worthwhile examining the Republican state's justification for trying Xianyu as a Chinese subject:

> The defendant, Jin Bihui, is a daughter of Shanqi, Prince Su of the late Qing court. She was adopted by a Japanese named Kawashima Naniwa. Although she was allegedly born in 1916 in Tokyo, Japan, and obtained Japanese nationality after her adoption, *according to Article I of the Chinese Law of Nationality, based on the principle of* jus sanguinis (*the right of blood,* xuetong zhuyi), *wherever one is born, in China or in a foreign country, no matter whether this person obtains the foreign nationality of his or her birthplace, as long as this person is born to a Chinese father, this person should be treated as a Chinese.* The defendant's father, Shanqi, moved to Japan after the Qing emperor abdicated. However, he did not lose his Chinese nationality. Even though the defendant was adopted by Kawashima Naniwa, and obtained Japanese nationality, according to the first item of the Law of Nationality mentioned above, she should be treated as one of the people of the Republic of China. According to the second clause of Article I of the Regulations on Special Criminal Cases, the defendant's crimes should be tried at this court [for treason]. (Niu 1994, 423; emphasis added)

These lines in the verdict directly reply to the defense's argument that Xianyu should not be tried for treason but for war crimes, because she held Japanese nationality and her motivation was to restore the Manchu dynasty (Niu 1994, 407). The verdict (death) was based on her Chinese bloodline, or more accurately, on the Chinese nationality of her father.

The final twist in Xianyu's chameleon-like identity game came when, before her execution, she asked permission to change from her prisoner's uniform into a Japanese kimono. This request was denied.[31] A note she wrote to a Mr. Zhang Pingsan, in which she said "Such a government [the Nationalist government] cannot last long," is written in Japanese (Umemoto 1984, n.p.). And in a note to her foster father, she asked Kawashima Naniwa to tell the young people to pray for the future of China (Niu 1994, 600). She demonstrated her Japanese identity vehemently, showed sympathy to China, and differentiated the Chinese government from China the country at the last moment of her life.

Perhaps because of her complicated background, of the two reports on her execution in *Dagong bao* on 26 March 1948, one expressed no condemnation of the crimes of which she was convicted, but professed strong feelings of regret: "Perhaps she was evil, but she was very smart and pretty till her death."

Xianyu Remembered in China

It is pointless to debate whether Xianyu deserved the death penalty or whether it was fair to try her as a *hanjian*. What is of interest is how she tried but failed to negotiate her identity to save her life, as discussed above. Of equal interest is how she has been remembered in China: the Chinese view illuminates not only the effect of nation-building on identity reconfiguration but also the limited influence of official history on public memory.

Xianyu's Chinese and Japanese names have become synonyms for a female traitor or a female spy in China today. In this, she has suffered a fate similar to such notorious figures as Mata Hari (Gertrud Margarete Zelle, 1876–1917) and Vidkun Quisling (1887–1945). For instance, after the 2000 presidential election in Taiwan ended in favor of the candidates of the Democratic Progressive Party (Minjin dang), Chen Shuibian and Lü Xiulian, Kawashima Yoshiko's name appeared in debates on cross-strait affairs at a Chinese Internet forum. A poster at the forum accused Lü Xiulian, who advocated Taiwan's independence and allegedly praised the Japanese occupation of Taiwan, of being "a Kawashima Yoshiko."[32] Xianyu's image as a Japanese spy is equally unforgettable. Much literature, Chinese and translated, highlights the mysterious life of Kawashima Yoshiko, perpetuating the aura of myth and secrecy surrounding her espionage activities and ensuring that she has remained well known to people in China and Japan long after the war (Zhu n.d.; Umemoto 1984; Yamaguchi 1993; Liu 1997). A summary of her life and career printed on the cover of a 1997 historical novel, *Minguo diyi nüjiandie* (The no. 1 woman spy of the Republic of China), is representative of the major themes in Chinese literature on Xianyu: "[She was] a bloodthirsty woman spy with a poisonous heart and dirty hands soaked with the blood of Chinese people; a flirtatious female who sold her body and stole much important intelligence information from the Nationalist Party and the country; a woman criminal who was shrewd but harmed others and herself, and who finally died for what she had done" (Liu 1997). However, the name Kawashima Yoshiko represents different images to different groups of people. A short news story from Guangzhou's *Yangcheng wanbao* (Yangcheng evening news) provides this account:

> Dateline Urumchi: "A common kitchen knife in China is called by the notorious name 'Kawashima Yoshiko' ": Wang Shiyang, a retired official at the Urumchi Institute of Geological Prospecting and Designing, angrily told a journalist, "Isn't it outrageous that a kitchen knife is branded with the name of *a woman spy*!"
>
> Several days ago, with information provided by city residents, the journalist went to do an anonymous inquiry at the Beiyuanchun wholesale market at Artai Road in Urumchi. With little effort the journalist found such a knife [with the brand name "Kawashima Yoshiko"] at a knife vendor's stand. Clearly inscribed on the knives are the four characters "Kawashima Yoshiko," and a note nearby reads, "Made in Guangdong." When the journalist asked the vendor, "Do you know who this Kawashima Yoshiko is?" he answered, "*Definitely a Japanese*." When the journalist told him that Kawashima Yoshiko was a *Japanese spy*, he sneered, "So what is there to be afraid of? This knife is for chopping vegetables, not a man."[33] (Emphasis added.)

The anger of the retired official revealed that when judged against his standard of morals, the name of Kawashima Yoshiko was detestable. The vendor, who perhaps had less education or knew little about official accounts of her, used a different moral standard.

More than fifty years after her death, Xianyu appears still to be a figure who inspires mostly hatred and contempt in China. Yet because the markers of boundaries change with time and space, objective references to legal or moral codes by which identities are perceived also change. People have recently begun to reappraise historical figures who have been demonized or condemned in official history in late-twentieth-century China.[34] Although few representations of Xianyu express sympathy with her collaboration with the Japanese, her motivations and personality sometimes have undergone reevaluation. A 1995 book on the characteristics of Northeasterners (*dongbeiren*), one volume of a popular series on peoples from various regions in China, claimed that it was impossible to talk about women in the Northeast without first talking about Kawashima Yoshiko although she was a *hanjian* (Yang 1995). But the authors depart from the usual tone of censure and moral outrage, instead praising Xianyu—whom they consistently identify as Kawashima Yoshiko—for her ability to bear hardship and her determination to work for her political ideal of restoring the Manchu dynasty. That the authors refrain from condemning Xianyu for having cooperated with the Japanese and instead express admiration for her motivation represents a notable change in the verdict on Xianyu, especially given that this was a book intended for a popular audience, not a scholarly monograph.

The last decade of the twentieth century saw further permutations on themes relating to Xianyu's life, which have made their way into cinema and the stage. In 1990, the film *Kawashima Yoshiko*, directed by Fong Ling-Ching and based on Lilian Li's (Li Bihua) novel *The Last Princess of Manchuria*, appeared in Hong Kong. The portrayal of Xianyu in this movie is startlingly sympathetic: she is depicted not as the sly and cruel traitor and spy, but as a helpless victim of changing historical trends. The character of Aisin Gioro Xianyu was also a key figure in the Japanese stage musical *Ri Kōran*, based on the life of Yamaguchi Yoshiko (Li Xianglan), the Japanese-born star of wartime Manchurian cinema who specialized in playing roles of Chinese women in colonial propaganda films. In April 1992 the Japanese Four Season Theater Company presented *Ri Kōran* on the stage in Beijing, prompting this reaction from one member of the audience: "For a proper understanding of the history of Sino-Japanese relations, what on earth does it mean to dig out the corpses of people like Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Kawashima Yoshiko, and to have them dance and sing on our stage?" (Wang 1992, 11).

A response to this question came from Wang Meng, a leading writer and prominent cultural figure. Wang addressed his friend's outrage in a 1992 article titled "Man, History, Li Xianglan." In this essay, Wang (who himself suffered greatly during the Cultural Revolution) revealed his sympathy for the helplessness of individuals to steer their life course amid the trends of historical changes. He emphasized the notion—which is not at all well-accepted in China—that even in World War II, when the demarcation between enemy and friend was assumed to be clear, there were shades of gray (Wang 1992, 12). The assumption of a clear demarcation between China and Japan during World War II, Wang argued, is a product of our era of nationalism, and does not accurately reflect the contemporary historical moment. For people like Xianyu who refused, hesitated, or were just too confused to identify themselves with any nation-state, such a demarcation did not exist. Given the continued strength of Chinese nationalism, it remains to be seen how widely this revisionist understanding of Xianyu's historical predicament will spread.

Conclusion

When Xianyu was asked about her view of the war criminal Doihara Kenji (1883–1948), her answer, quoted at the beginning of this chapter (Niu 1995, 253), reveals not only the multiplicity of identity but also the complexity of the individual's relation to communities at various levels. Clearly, Xianyu's frequent crossing since childhood of national boundaries that were themselves shifting resulted in cross-cultural dilemmas and no little confusion in her configuration of who she was and where she belonged. The story of her life and career suggests that more studies of how constructed identities are perceived and consumed will be required for a more comprehensive understanding of the relation between individual and community.

It is natural, of course, that an individual should have a set of identities, rather than a single, unitary identity. Yet scholarly research on ethnic and national identities sometimes forgets this, and overlooks the fact that individuals who have cross-boundary experiences typically embrace a complex amalgam of identity traits that altogether reflect who they are. That is to say, in spite of the idealized wishes of governing regimes, people do not always identify themselves with clearly defined academic or official categories such as X ethnic or Y national group. In addition, the connotations and denotations of the labels for such categorizations change with time and place.[35] Xianyu, for example, was a bannerwoman, a Manchu from the royal family, and a Chinese whose country fought against Japan; simultaneously she plainly felt strong ties to Japan, where she spent most of her childhood and youth, and claimed Japanese nationality. Before being tried for treason, there was nothing to prevent Xianyu from embracing all these identities. However, once hauled before the court on charges of treason, the legal codes produced by state formation and nation building demanded hard identity boundaries, of which nationality was the master identity. At the trial for treason, there was no room for ambiguity.

Xianyu's experiences in wartime and at her trial offer yet another illustration of the constructedness of ethnic and national identities and reveal that identity cannot be negotiated at all times and places. Although Xianyu ascribed her individual responsibility not to the Chinese state led by the Nationalist Party but to her ethnic group and to the foreign state that promised to help that group, the Republican state legally defined her as a Chinese citizen and thus determined her guilt for betraying the community that it believed deserved her primary loyalty—China, the nation-state. Modern states retain the power to assign and determine a person's national identity, even though individual self-identification is the synthetic product not only of legal definitions, but also of individual calculation of interests and external perception. Conflicts over setting an individual's "true" identity are thus bound to arise. Under special circumstances, especially where national security is said to be involved, the law may harden ethnic and national boundaries and attempt to impose a master identity on an individual. During the first half of the twentieth century, when the national boundaries between China and Japan were blurred and the boundaries between "Chinese," "Manchu," and "bannerperson" were likewise fungible, Xianyu could use her complicated ethnic and national identities without encountering legal issues. In the years immediately after the war, however, she was forced to choose and to recast her identity into a singularity. She failed to do this, realizing too late that state formation makes previously ambiguous identities worthless and that nationality would be the basic identity used to distinguish traitors from war criminals.

As one of those who refused to identify themselves with the newly built Republican China, Xianyu was part of a generation who refused to identify themselves with China when the formation of state was not yet completed. Indeed, she was one of many thousands of people who crossed national and ethnic boundaries while those boundaries were shifting in Manchuria in the first half of the twentieth century. Recent studies of the lives and careers of immigrants from Japan and Korea have greatly enriched our understanding of the history of identity making in an era of nation building and nation destroying (see Brooks 1998; Kim 1992; Fogel 1998; Kuramoto 1999). Still, our grasp of the problems associated with border crossing and transnational peoples is limited by the geographical borders that divide China, Japan, and Korea today. We need to ask what borders they crossed, or believed they crossed, when such boundaries were blurred or unclear in the 1930s and 1940s.

My analysis of Xianyu's identities is not an attempt to explain every aspect of the interrelations between the officially defined "hard" boundaries (legal and institutional) and nonofficially perceived "soft" boundaries (cultural and individual) dividing people. This chapter tries to remind people to pay attention to the study of personal experiences and to think about the degree to which individuals can negotiate their ethnic and national identities in an era of nation building and state making. I would like to suggest that to study the transnational flow of people and ideas does not necessarily lead us to ignore hard boundaries between nation-states or to overestimate the negotiability of ethnic and national identities. The case of Xianyu reveals that even those who cross boundaries and reject certain imagined communities nonetheless had to use officially defined legal codes and socially acceptable ethnic and national boundaries to identify themselves. I would also suggest that transnationals can be grouped into two categories—geographical and historical. To nationalize geographical transnationals such as overseas Chinese, cultural tools, such as nationalist rhetoric and narratives of collective historical memory, are important (Duara 1997, 1030–1051). But to historical transnationals such as Xianyu, their self-identification and definition of their relation to the community could be legitimate only in certain historical periods when community boundaries were shifting under historical conditions such as colonialism. The procedure of nationalizing this group of historical transnationals is closely related to the reconstruction of hard boundaries drawn during state formation. Studies of institutional state building are as important as those of ideological nation building to our understanding of the ascription/self-ascription of identities.[36] Ethnic and national identities are constructed not only with cultural and subjective markers (Barth 1969; Anderson 1991; Harrell 1995), but also with written legal and unofficial social codes, which are perhaps made of imagined markers but are used as objective references. Recent emphasis on the negation of nationalism and the political construction of national identity is based on the hypothesis that constructed or imagined parts of a nation-state are not as real as we thought or believed. Nevertheless, imagining the nation-state hardens boundaries with legal and socially accepted moral codes. In China, as Xianyu's case reveals, this process unambiguously defined Manchus as an ethnic group within the Chinese nation, without any right to pursue national sovereignty of their own.

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Notes

This chapter is adapted from my AAS poster session ("Two Yoshikos: Negotiating Ethnic and National Identities in Manchukuo") and chapter 4 of my dissertation ("Ethnicity in Empire and Nation: Manchus, Manchukuo, and Manchuria, 1911–1952"). It could not have been completed without the help of Professors Prasenjit Duara and Gavan McCormack, who read the first draft of a research paper on Yamaguchi Yoshiko and Kawashima Yoshiko and provided constructive and insightful comments; Professor Mark Elliott, who read various versions and edited the final draft; Professor Mariko Tamanoi, who kindly provided me the opportunity to present part of my study of Kawashima Yoshiko at the Sixth Annual Nikkei Bruin Conference at UCLA; and Professor Ding Yizhuang (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), who generously taught me invaluable information on Manchu history and sources of historic archives in Beijing. Special thanks go to Peter Pang (University of California, Santa Barbara, library), who generously provided the first volume ol the collection of court records on the Kawashima case from his personal library. *Figures 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4:* The cover of *Chuandao fangzi de jingren miwen* (The shocking secrets of Chuandao fangzi), ed. Niu Shanseng (1994), does not provide any contact information but only the name of the publisher: Hongkong Jinjian zixun jituan youxian gongsi. Despite my best efforts, I have been unable to locate the publisher to obtain permission to use these three images from their collection. I am grateful for all the help from Peter Pang at the East Asian Library, University of California, Santa Barbara, and Ellen McGill at Harvard-Yenching Library.

Epigraph. Niu 1994, 253. Doihara Kenji (1883–1948) was a Japanese army officer who was involved in a series of Japanese activities in China, such as the Mukden Incident (18 September 1931), when he was the director of Military Intelligence, and the plan for the independence of North China. He was found guilty at the International Tribunal for the Far East and executed in 1948.

1. Xianyu's birth date is not confirmed. According to *Nihon shi daijiten* (2:462), it is 23 May 1907. I checked the Manchoukuo edition of the Manchu royal genealogy (*Aisin Gioro zongpu*, 1938), but did not find her name and dates. On her tombstone in Japan, before her age (42) are two characters: *suitei*, meaning "estimated" or "presumed." See works by Watanabe (1972, 271) and Kamisaka (1984, 245–246).

2. Although most English writings on this regime spell its name as Manchukuo or, in its pinyin form, Manzhouguo, the Department of Foreign Affairs of Manchoukuo officially claimed that the English name of the state should be spelled as Manchoukuo. See its *Bulletin Extra*, 14 October 1932. In this chapter, I use "Manchukuo" to keep consistency with the style of this volume.

3. Photo-offset copies of the court scripts of Aisin Gioro Xianyu's case, collected by Niu Shanseng (probably a pen name) (1994), include interrogation records, Xianyu's written confession, communications with Chinese authorities, verdicts, defense appeals, and interviews.

4. The military basis of the Qing empire was the Eight Banner system, a social-political-military organization that included eight Manchu, eight Mongol, and eight Han banners. Banner identity was hereditary. Banner garrisons were stationed at strategic places throughout Qing's territory. For more details on the Eight Banner system, see Ding 1992; Elliott 2001.

5. For example, Chinese scholars in the early 1930s argued that the Northeast had been an inseparable territory of China since antiquity. See works on Dongbei by Li Ji (1932) and Fu Sinian (1932). The concept of a unified Chinese nation (*Zhonghua minzu*) made up of various ethnic groups, though ambiguous, became very popular in talks and writings about national salvation during the early twentieth century.

6. Pamela Crossley's biographical study (1990) of a Manchu family in *Orphan Warriors* is an example. Mariko Asano Tamanoi's article (2000) on racial categorization also provides a nice example of using diary to analyze individual conceptualization of race.

7. Prince Su was the tenth generation of one of the eight highest-ranking Manchu princes. He was one of the few high-ranking Manchus who preferred war against the revolutionary army to abdication of the Xuantong emperor and demonstrated loyalty to the Qing dynasty. He was exiled to Lüshun (Port Arthur) after the emperor's abdication in 1912. He sold his private property to collect grants to support the independence of Mongolia-Manchuria. Kawashima Naniwa's restoration activities and relation with Prince Su even caught attention from the Chinese government. See telegrams from Zhao Erxun, the governor-general of the three eastern provinces, to his local officers and those between Zhao and Yuan Shikai in *Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian*, 204–205, 212. Shanqi also sent all his children to Japanese schools for education. See the confession by one of his sons, Aisin Gioro Xianjun, in Zhongyang dang'an guan (2000): 708–722.

More information on Prince Su can be found in Kawashima Naniwa's article in *Manmō kenkyū ihō*. I found only part of this article published in installments in no. 2 (1915): 67–71; no. 3 (1916): 92–97; no. 7 (1916): 66–73.

8. See *Dagong bao*, 25 March 1948. "Kōro jō itten yuki" (A flake of snow on a red oven) was the inscription on the tombstone of Kawashima Naniwa's younger brother, who died in the Russo-Japanese War (Watanabe 1972, 271; Kamisaka 1984, 245–246). Kamisaka noticed that the signature beside the inscription was Prince Su's name, which means that Prince Su wrote the inscription (246). Xianyu must have known of this inscription.

9. Rehe province (1928–1956) covered parts of today's Inner Mongolia, Hebei, and Liaoning provinces. In January 1933, Japan declared that Rehe province belonged to Manchukuo. In February and March 1933, Japanese and Manchukuo forces attacked Chinese troops in Rehe. Because of Chiang Kai-shek's appeasement policy, Rehe was soon lost. The Rehe campaign ended with the Tanggu Truce, which drew a demilitarized zone between the Great Wall and Beiping. Chinese troops had to be out of the zone, but Japanese troops could remain in the area because of their rights defined by the Boxer Protocol. Xianyu's involvement in this campaign, especially her organization of the Anguo (or Dingguo) Army, was one of the major crimes listed in the verdict.

Xianyu's army consisted mainly of bandit troops. For her participation in the Rehe campaign and her ambition to expand her military power, see Sun 1993, 3: 114–118. Apparently, the Japanese did not treat this self-proclaimed "Commander" Jin seriously. See *Gendaishi shiryō*, 1964, 11: 793.

10. All were powerful high-ranking military and political figures of Japan during the 1930s and 1940s.

11. See a brief biography on Furukawa Daikō in Asahi Shinbunsha, ed., 1977, 1186–1187.

12. According to Niu (1994), half of Xianyu's ashes were buried in Japan, half in a public cemetery in Beijing. I have not found a second source to confirm Niu's information.

13. This novel was first published serially in a Japanese journal, then published as a book in 1933.

14. The term *manshūjin* used here can refer to either Manchurians (people who live in Manchuria) or the Manchus. Since this term is used to refer to people who "annexed" China, I think that "the Manchus" will be a better English equivalent here in content. In addition, in the context previous to the lines quoted here, Mariko's perception of *manshūjin* contains stronger ethno-nationalistic sentiments than regionalism when she

argues that her self-identification of being a *manshūjin* is very different from her friends' identifying themselves as *Kantōjin* (people from Kantō area).

15. "Boku wa sokoku o aisuru" (I love the country of my ancestors), in *Fujin kōron*, September 1933. Kamisaka (1984) mentioned this article. I could not find the specific issue until Konrad Mitchell Lawson located the article and generously sent a copy from Japan to me in spring 2004.

16. According to this report, she was elected to take the position of commander of the Rehe Dingguo Army and was active in Japanese intelligence work.

17. I am grateful to David Tucker, who generously provided me with information about Kawashima Yoshiko in the *Manchuria Daily News (MDN)*.

18. Information about the killing of Manchus during the 1911 Revolution can be found in several books by Manchu authors from the early twentieth century, such as Wu Zixiu's Xinhai xunnanji (Records of those who died in the 1911 Revolution) with supplement by Jin Liang, and a series of biographies in Qingshi gao (Draft of Qing history). Rhoads 2000 also provides evidence of anti-Manchu activities. Jin Qizong's memoir (1998) also reveals anti-Manchu emotions and movements in Beijing after the establishment of Manchukuo. Many Manchus and bannerpeople did not register as Manchu in the 1950s after the establishment of the People's Republic of China. This reflects to a certain degree that what they learned from their experiences of being Manchu in the first half of the twentieth century did not make them proud of their ethnic identity.

19. Xianyu served as a witness at the tribunal in Shanghai in 1947.

20. Though Xianyu's statement quoted above shows how she was trying to justify her silence on the nationality issue at the early stage of the trial, it also reveals the ambiguity and complexity of the term *Zhongguo ren*. As to the many registers of "being Chinese" and the representation of "the Chinese," see Tu 1994 and Ren 1996.

21. In the late Qing and early Republican period, there was a widespread misunderstanding that all bannerpeople were Manchu. In fact, the Qing Eight Banner system contained not only Manchu banners but also banners made of other ethnic peoples, such as Han and Mongols. See also note 4 above.

22. Xianyu's written confession shows that she was not good at Chinese writing. She wrote the first character of *qiren* incorrectly as "term man" instead of "bannerperson" in her earliest confession titled "My Experiences." See figure 3.4.

23. Cross-dressing became a fashion among Japanese women during the interwar years, thanks to the popularity of Takarazuka Revue, an all-female theater troupe. See more details about the revue in Robertson 1998.

24. Interestingly, during the Qing dynasty the crime label *hanjian* was used to refer to cunning or troublemaking Han people or a Han who served as a spy for the enemy of the court. Here, I refer to memorials in *Gongzhongdang Qianlong chao zouzhe* (1982–1988, 7:82, 34:360–362; 41:773–774).

25. Xianyu claimed, "Actually I am of Japanese nationality. The reason why I did not mention this [before] is that I only have best wishes for the land of my ancestors (*zuguo*). I am a good citizen of a great strong country. My friends often asked me, 'Aren't you Japanese?' It's right that I am of Japanese nationality. However, my blood lineage is Chinese. Therefore I want to be a good Chinese, and to do something good for the country and the people" (Niu 1994, 324–325).

26. Her witnesses include Cui Weiyun, a secretary of the Beiping Department, Central Bureau of Investigation (Niu 1994, 572), a well-known Peking Opera actress, Lian Huanong (Niu 1994, 87, 568), and a middle school teacher (Niu 1994, 340).

27. All of Xianyu's final notes to the judge, lawyers, and friends were written in Japanese. Her Japanese writing is much better than her Chinese.

28. The first clause of Articles of Favorable Treatment signed by the Qing royal household and the Republic of China in 1911 assured that the ROC would treat the emperor of the Great Qing as a foreign monarch (*waiguo junzhu*).

29. Before 1909, China did not have any law of nationality. When international disputes concerning nationality arose, an unwritten rule was followed: the children of Chinese people were considered to be of Chinese nationality. But such a rule proved inadequate for dealing with increasingly complicated international contacts and legal cases. The problem was especially acute in cases where a conflict arose between the principle of *jus soli* of nationality law practiced by some Western colonial powers (who followed a naturalization policy in their colonies) and the Qing principle of *jus sanguinis*. This discrepancy led Qing legal experts to notice that many foreign nationality laws, while retaining *jus sanguinis* as their major principle, combined *jus soli* and *jus sanguinis*. The Qing followed that pattern in the 1909 law of nationality. See Tung 1943, appendix: 60–61. For more details on the articles of the Republican nationality laws, see Tung 1943.

30. Li Xianglan recalled that Kawashima Naniwa claimed that the household register was burned during the Kantō earthquake.

31. According to Yamaguchi's memoir, Yamaguchi's two younger sisters visited Kawashima's mortuary tablet at Guanyin Temple in Beijing. And according to their accounts, in front of the tablet were clothes and facilities used by Kawashima in prison, among which was a new white kimono (Yamaguchi 1987, 236). Reports in *Dagong bao* on 26 March 1948 also mention that Jin Bihui wanted to change clothes, but they did not mention what clothes she wanted to wear for her last hour.

32. The Taiwan Affairs Forum at wenxuecity.com <http://www.chinese-military.com>. Accessed 19 March 2000. A biography of Kawashima Yoshiko was also posted on My China Forum under the title "The Charming Spy Chuandao Fangzi" <http://www.book-sea.net>. Accessed 8 April 2000.

33. "Chinese kitchen knife named 'Kawashima Yoshiko,'" *Yangcheng wanbao*; posted at sina news <http://www.sina.com.cn>. Accessed 7 June 2000.

34. This trend of reappraising historical figures is popular in Chinese mass media too. For example, a 2003 TV series, *Zouxiang gonghe* (Path to the Republic), reevaluates the foreign policies of Li Hongzhang, who has been called maiguo zei (literally, a "selling-country thief"), and portrays Empress Dowager Cixi as a talented female politician.

35. Tamanoi's *JAS* article (2000) on the complexity of racial classification in Manchuria provides convincing examples of the ambiguity of the racial categorization. Manjin can be translated as "Manchurians" or "Manchus." The English term "Manchus" has been frequently used in English writings to refer to the ethnic group whose Qing dynasty took power in China in 1644. Although scholars in the fields of Qing history and Manchu studies have debated over whether "Manchus" or "bannerpeople" is historically a more proper term for the ethnic group, in general English-language publications there is a clear distinction between "Manchus" and "Manchurians." The former refers to the ethnic group. In Manchukuo publications such as *Manshū renkan* (Manchuria year-book) and *Government Bulletin*, "Manchurian" is usually used to refer to *manjin* or *manren* when it means people who lived in Manchuria.

36. The idea of state building referring to an institutional construction of a nation-state and nation building emphasizing ideological construction is borrowed from Eller 1997.

PART SEVEN

MANCHU TODAY, MANCHU TOMORROW

■ Source: Gorelova, Liliya, 'Past and Present of a Manchu tribe: The Sibe', in Touraj Atabaki & John O'Kane, (eds), *Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London: Tauris Academic Studies / International Institute of Asian Studies, 1998, pp. 324–330.

PAST AND PRESENT OF A MANCHU TRIBE: THE SIBE

Liliya Gorelova

The Sibe people are one of the ethnic minorities of China. They belong to the Tungus–Manchu peoples together with the Manchus, Nanaians, Oroks, Orochs, Udekhes, Ulchas, Evens, Evenkies, Negidals and Solons. According to the population statics given in the third pan-China census, 4.3 million Manchus and 84,000 Sibes at present live in various regions of China. In particular they inhabit the provinces of Heilongjian, Kirin, Liaoning, Hebei and Sinkiang. As is well-known, during the Ching period the Manchu language and the Manchu writing-system were officially employed in China. By the end of the 18th century, however, the Manchus had become completely Sinicized and after the Xinhai Revolution the Manchu language fell out of use entirely.

It appears that today the Sibes are the only speakers of a language that can be properly called Manchu.[1] For a number of historical reasons the Sibe Manchu tribe is nowadays settled in two different regions of China, namely in the North-East (Dongbei) and in Sinkiang. The majority of the Sibes reside at Dongbei, but they have almost lost their ancestral language. In Liaoning Province, whose capital city is Shenyang (Mukden), there are three Manchurian autonomous districts (Xiu yan, Feng cheng and Xin bing), but no one in those districts any longer speaks either Manchu or the Sibe language.

In 1982 the Italian scholar A. Pozzi visited Xin bing, the original homeland of the Manchu people, and gathered evidence of the social and linguistic situation that then prevailed in that region. The area is situated a few kilometers north-east of Shenyang in Fushun Municipality, and is characterized by its diversity of ethnic nationalities. At the time the Manchus only made up 30 percent of the local population and coexisted with the Mongols, Sibes, Koreans, Hui and Han peoples. The old Manchu language and culture had been corrupted by Chinese civilization and no more than a few quite elderly people could still speak Manchu and no one could write it correctly.[2]

Likewise, in Heilongjian Province there remain only a few villages where some Sibes, again mostly aged people, can still speak their native language. In 1961–62 a number of linguistic expeditions were sent out to these villages of Heilongjian Province, but the results of this activity were only published in 1984. In that area there were four Manchu towns with a total population of 20,000, only half of which was ethnically Manchu. In the village Daujiazitun all Manchus over the age of fifty still spoke Manchu. In 1982, when a subsequent expedition took place, almost all the Manchu population had turned to Chinese and only some seventy-year-old men could speak their native language. Regarding another of Heilongjian's villages, Sanjiazitun, the Chinese scholar An Jun maintains that the dialect spoken there is close to that spoken by the Sibes in Sinkiang.[3]

The Sinkiang Sibes, whose population runs to over 27,000, are concentrated mainly in the north, in the Sibe Cabcal Autonomous Region in the Ili Valley. More than 17,000 Sibes live there.[4] This group of Sibes has not only retained their ancestral language since the time of their transference from Dongbei to Sinkiang in 1764, but they have also been developing spoken Sibe as well as its written form which is based on the Manchurian syllabic writing-system.

Bearing in mind that the primoridal homeland of the Manchu people was the territory of Aigun and Fu Yui, some historical questions naturally arise. How did the Sibes find their way to Sinkiang? What was the reason for their resettlement in that region? Furthermore, what is the origin of the Sibe language and what connnection does it have with literary Manchu? If we knew the origin and the early history of the Sibe Manchu tribe, we could answer these questions with greater certainty, but in fact very little is known about the early phase of their history.

On the basis of his analysis of surviving Manchu manuscripts and Chinese sources such as the Liao dynastic chronicles (927–1114), the Tan chronicles (651–907), the chronicles of Beishi (386–581) and the *Weishu* (a history of the Yuanwei dynasty, 386–556), the Russian scholar E.P. Lebedeva has suggested that the Sibe tribe originated among the Southern Shiwei which is a separate branch of the Manchu–Tungus Shiwei people. The Russian scholars N. Bichurin and P.N. Menshikov, basing themselves on the Beishi chronicles and the histories of the Tan and Yuanwei dynasties, believed that the Shiwei people were divided into five territorial groups, namely Southern Shiwei, Northern Shiwei, Bo Shiwei, Da Shiwei and Shenmohyn Shiwei. These groups differed from one another in their occupations, the clothes they wore and the dwellings they lived in. It is probable that the general name Shiwei was applied to all these tribes despite their originally being of different ethnic backgrounds. The majority of these people were of Manchu–Tungus ethnic origin, but others among them were of Mongol origin, like for example the ancient Chidans or the contemporary Dagurs.[5]

The Southern Shiwei were engaged in agriculture and cattle-breeding. They lived in settlements similar to small towns. As a means of conveyance they used carts and boats made from animal hides. Those of the Sibes who adopted a nomadic way of life built temporary shelters from branches covered with grass.[6] The Shiwei lived in the territories that had previously formed part of the ancient Tungus state Fu Yui which was destroyed by the Xianbi people in 286 AD. The Sibes not only inherited territory from this earlier state (Chichihar and the area around the rivers Nomin and Nemer, tributaries of the Nonni) but took over from them agriculture as well.[7]

According to Lebedeva, during successive periods of their history the Sibes came under the domination of various peoples. From the 1st century BC to the end of the 3rd century ad they were governed by the Koreans and the Chinese. From the end of the 3rd, and probably throughout the 4th century, they were utterly dominated by the Xianbi people. The Northern Turki reduced them to a subordinate position from the 5th to the 10th centuries. Subsequently, they were absorbed into the Chitan Empire of Liao (10th century), until by the 13th century they came under the dominion of the Qorcin Mongols.[8]

We have no information about the historical period when the Sibes became vassals of the Qorcin Mongols. But this probably took place when the Mongols started to occupy the regions of the Sungari and Nonni rivers and the adjoining areas. Menshikov believed that the Qorcin Mongols belonged to the Mongols of the Jerim Seim who moved to these regions from the banks of the Argun and Haidar rivers and the Dalai Nor lake in 1438 after they had been defeated by the Oirats. The regions of Chichihar and Boduna were the original homeland of the Sibes, whereas the Mongols were newcomers.[9]

Over this long period of time the region of Chichihar and Boduna had been the Sibes' fixed homeland. The Manchu manuscript entitled Sahalian ula vajimbuhe baitai danse (The Journal of Completed Documents Concerning Priamur'ye) contains documents dating from the end of the 17th to the beginning of the 18th centuries. These provide evidence that the Sibes were ransomed from Mongolian slavery in the 17th century by the Manchu emperor Kangxi.[10] The same documents also attest to the fact that by the end of the 17th century there existed two large groups of the Sibes. The one group inhabited the region of Chichihar and the other was located near Boduna.

Later, in 1700–1701, the Chichihar Sibes (nearly 20,000) were resettled in the region of Huhu–Hoto, but the subsequent fortunes of this group of the Sibes still remains unknown. The Boduna Sibes (nearly 36,000) were resettled in the region of Mukden. In 1764 nearly half of the Mukden Sibes (about 18,000 of them) were transferred to Sinkiang to colonize Jungaria, where they still live today.

It is as yet unclear why the Sibes in particular were selected for this purpose. But document number seven of the above-mentioned collection reveals that the Sibe company commanders and their comrades were all removed from their posts in Chichihar. The same document refers to disorder breaking out among these Sibes. On the basis of this source it is not unreasonable to assume that this Sibe tribe had opposed the ruling Manchu dynasty. In the course of their transfer from Mukden to the Ili Valley, these Sibes were escorted by a Manchurian regular military force consisting of 800 men and officers. These details would appear to confirm the hypothesis that conflict had broken out between the Sibes and the Manchu confederation.[11] This is the conclusion that J. Norman draws from the documentary evidence.[12]

Afterwards, in accordance with the Eight Banners' Organization of the Manchu army, the Sibes were incorporated into eight companies and assigned to seven military colonies (the first and the third companies lived in the same military colony) together with the Solons and Dagurs who had been previously absorbed under the Manchu banners. Due to this fact, the Sibes increased in number. But in the second part of the 19th century the Sibes' numbers fell again because they were forced to take part in suppressing the Dungan-Taranchi popular uprising in 1864–1871. In the course of this armed uprising, the villages of the Sibes were captured and they sustained heavy losses.[13]

In Sinkiang the Sibes were engaged solely in agriculture. They grew wheat, barley and millet, onions, garlic, aubergine, cucumbers and other vegetables, and cultivated tobacco and poppies. In old China the standard of living of the Sibes was very low. The Sibe people professed shamanism and Buddhism. There exists a Buddhist monastery in the military colony where the fifth company was located. Moreover, every colony had its own Buddhist temple.[14]

Having settled in Jungaria, the Sibe people found themselves in a peculiar situation. On the one hand, remoteness from the center weakened the influence that Chinese culture and language had on them and, on the other hand, living among people different from themselves with respect to their language and ethnic affiliation stimulated them to be aware of their own national identity. This situation also fostered their efforts for independence as well. None the less, the language of the Sibes was subjected to influence from the languages of the other peoples of Sinkiang, chiefly the Kazakhs, Uigurs and Mongols, as well as the Chinese and Russians. At the same time, however, their language displayed a conservative tendency toward self-preservation and development.

In my view, one is justified in viewing the language of the Sibe people as a dialect of literary Manchu.[15] But according to Norman, the language of the Sibes may properly be called a Manchu dialect because in the late 16th and early 17th centuries when literary Manchu was formed on the basis of the Southern Manchu dialect, the Sibes were not members of the confederation of Manchu tribes under the first ruler Nurgaci.[16] It should be noted, however, that among Chinese scholars, who currently devote much attention to studying Sibe, there are different opinions with respect to whether or not the primordial Sibe language, which the Sibes still speak, was Manchu. Some of these scholars (e.g. An Jun) consider the Sibe language to be a successor of the Manchu language, whereas others hold the view that it is a language apart.[17]

For more than 200 years, since the resettlement of the Sibes in Sinkiang, both forms of the Sibe language, i.e. written and spoken, have been altering and developing. The main difference of the written form of the Sibe language from literary Manchu is the writing-system it uses. The writing-system of the Sibe language, based on the Manchu system, has undergone a series of changes. The way of writing some letters in certain positions has been altered. Likewise, some of the rarer syllables have been eliminated so that 13 out of the 131 syllables which are found in written Manchu in the initial position of a word have been dropped from present-day Sibe. Some new syllables (wi, wo, wu) have also been added.[18]

The internal tendencies, according to which Sibe has developed, are the main reason for the changes in the language. Other reasons are the social realities and interrelations between Sibe and languages of the other peoples who settled at the same time in the multi-ethnic region of Sinkiang.

The most significant changes, primarily in vocabulary, were conditioned by the influence of the neighboring languages, with loan words coming from Chinese, Uigur, Kazakh, Mongol and Russian. Having resettled in Sinkiang in 1764, the Sibe people borrowed a number of words from the local Chinese and other peoples. For example, the following words were borrowed from Uigur: *pochi* 'a boaster', *parang* 'words', *ketman* 'tool for digging', bazar 'market', *kabab* 'barbecued meat', *namas* 'an Islamic feast'. And the following words came from Kazakh: *kemes* 'Mongol tea', *kestao* 'pasture', *baige* 'horserace'. Other words have come into Sibe from Russian: *baston* 'a kind of textile', *mashina* 'sewing-machine', *konsul* 'consul', *miter* 'kilometer', pomidor 'tomato'.

After the Xinhai revolution (*xinhai geming*) some new terms appeared in the Sibe language to designate new realities and notions. Most of them were borrowed from the Chinese language. This process of borrowing from Chinese is still underway. Representative examples include: *geming* 'revolution', *fāngzhēn* 'guiding principle', 'policy', *jiti* 'collective (body)', *jīnji* 'economy', *zhuxi* 'chairman', 'chairperson', *zongli* 'prime minister', *shūji* 'secretary', *daikuan* 'loan', 'credit', *chūna* 'cashier', *gōngfēn* 'centimeter', 'gram'.[19]

The spoken form of the Sibe language differs from literary Manchu to a much greater extent than the written form. The most striking discrepancies can be observed in the area of phonetics.[20] The vocabulary and morphology of the spoken form of Sibe have also undergone some modifications as compared with its written form, but these are not very significant. In spoken Sibe there exist some words which are absent both in written Sibe and literary Manchu. For instance, instead of the Manchu word *niyalma* 'a man', 'a male', the word *nan* (*nan nan*) borrowed from Chinese is used.[21] The changes in grammar, conditioned by the influence of the neighboring languages, are not great. In some cases we are not sure whether certain grammatical characteristics were borrowed from other languages before the resettlement of the Sibe people in Sinkiang or afterwards.

Before the Cultural Revolution teaching in the primary schools in the Sibe Cabcal Autonomous Region was carried out in the Sibe language. At present in Sinkiang Province there exist eight schools where pupils learn Sibe. Despite the fact that teaching in the primary school is conducted in Chinese, lessons on the Sibe language are obligatory. How long the pupils can attend the Sibe language classes depends on the number of qualified teachers available. For the first time the Sibe language has begun to be studied in a higher educational institute. In Ili there is a pedagogical institute where a group of students study Sibe. In Cabucar the Pedagogical Institute of the Sibe Language has been created. This educational institute trains students for teaching Sibe in the national schools.

In 1953, the People's Publishing House was founded in Urumchi. It has concentrated its editorial activity on publishing Party documents, *belles-lettres* and school books in Sibe. There was an interruption during the Cultural Revolution but afterwards, in the 1980s, the foundation resumed publication with great enthusiasm. In the Foreword to *A Catalogue of Sibe–Manchu Publications*, prepared by the young Sibe scholar Jin Ning, G. Stary gives a survey of the editiorial activities of the People's Publishing House of Urumchi. The catalogue itself contains 285 entries and includes the works in Sibe published from 1954 to 1989.[22]

The newspaper *Ice banjin* (*The New Life*) was printed in Ili from 1946. In 1972, the title of the newspaper was changed to *Cabcal serkin* (*The Cabucar Newspaper*). Under its new name *Cabcal serkin*, this newspaper is now regularly published in Sinkiang. In 1980, the Society of the Sibe Language was founded in Cabucar for the purpose of developing and improving the native language of the Sibe people.

By way of closing this brief survey of the history of the Sibe people, it is appropriate to note that this Manchu tribe has not only managed to preserve its specific ethnic features, but in recent decades it has been successful at promoting the development of its own original and distinctive culture.

Notes

1. J. Norman, 'A Sketch of Sibe Morphology,' *Central Asiatic Journal* 18, no. 3 (1974), p. 159.
2. A. Pozzi, 'A Journey to the Original Places of the Manchu People (1982),' *Zentralasiatische Studien* 20 (1987), pp. 208–18.
3. An Jun, 'Xibo yuyan wenzi ji manyu manwen–de jixu' (Research on the Sibe and Manchu Languages and Writings), in *Manyu yanjiu* 2 (1985), pp. 41–7.
4. Li Shulan and Zhong Qian, *Xibo yu jianzhi (A Sketch of the Sibe Language)*, Beijing, 1986, pp. 1–2.
5. E.P. Lebedeva and L.M. Gorelova, *Sidi Kur. A Sibe–Manchu Version of 'the Bewitched Corpse' Cycle*, transcribed by V.V. Radlov, Wiesbaden, 1994, pp. 14–15.
6. Ibid., p. 16.
7. E.P. Lebedeva, 'Fuyui (Puye),' in *Formirovanie kul'turykh traditsii tungusoman'chzhurskikh narodov (Formation of Cultural Traditions of the Tungus–Manchu Peoples)*, Novosibirsk, 1985, pp. 3–26.
8. Ibid., p. 24.
9. Lebedeva and Gorelova, *Sidi Kur*, p. 12.
10. Ibid., p. 11.
11. Ibid., pp. 10–11.
12. Norman, 'Sibe Morphology,' p. 159.
13. Lebedeva and Gorelova, *Sidi Kur*, pp. 7–8.
14. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Ibid., p. 1.
16. Norman, 'Sibe Morphology,' pp. 159–60.
17. Cf. An Jun, 'Xibo yuyan wenzi'; and Li Shulan, 'Xibo yu manyu bi jiao yanjiu juyao' (The Sibe Language Compared with the Manchu Language), in *Zhongguo yuwen* 4 (1983), pp. 298–306.
18. L.M. Gorelova, 'The Sibe and Various Forms of Their Language,' in *Proceedings of the 35th Permanent International Conference*, Taipei (Taiwan), 1993, p. 130.

19. These examples of vocabulary borrowings are all taken from Li Shulan, 'Xibo yu manyu,' pp. 298–306.
20. Ibid., p. 301.
21. Ibid., p. 305.
22. Jin Ning, *A Catalogue of Sibe-Manchu Publications*, ed. G. Stary, Wiesbaden, 1989, pp. V–VI.

■ Source: Bai, Lian, 'Identity Reproducers beyond the Grassroots: The Middle Class in the Manchu Revival since the 1980s', in *Asian Ethnicity*, Vol. 6, No. 3 (October 2005), Carfax Publishing Company, pp. 183–201.

IDENTITY REPRODUCERS BEYOND THE GRASSROOTS: THE MIDDLE CLASS IN THE MANCHU REVIVAL SINCE THE 1980S

Lian Bai

Abstract

A diagnosis of the ethnic empowerment fuelled by the Chinese Manchu middle-class elite provides a useful tool for examining the overall Manchu identity revival movement in the 1980s. The strategy of the Manchu middle-class elite has three parts: re-crafting ethnic identity by strengthening networks and cultural differences, pursuing ethnic economic development, and politically legitimating the group existence. This article explores several important questions concerning the strategy. Why is the ethnic middle class keen to provide vigorous leadership in the ethnic identity reconstruction movement? How do the people of this class invest their bitter grievances with new meaning and empower themselves in the process of bargaining and group confrontation with the State? How can they make their ethnic identity more likely to be 'institutionalised' into the ethnic mosaic of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in the Open and Reform era?

By the 1980s, the Chinese Manchu had become the second largest minority nationality (*shaoshu minzu*) in the PRC.[1] They experienced incredible population growth in the latter half of the twentieth century, from 2,399,228 in 1953 to 4,304,981 in 1982, 9,846,776 in 1990, and 10,682,262 in 2000.[2] This steady increase is due mainly to the re-registration policy over Chinese minority nationalities implemented by China's central government. Under this policy, those who had concealed their original ethnic identities for any of a variety of historical and political reasons were allowed to resume their minority identities by providing solid proof of their claimed minority identity.[3] This has undoubtedly contributed to the Manchu population boom and the identity reconstruction of the Manchu community in the new setting of the post-Mao reforms. Moreover, an array of phenomena in the post-1980s has made the previously weak Manchu identity more salient despite a sinicised image. These phenomena include the newly kindled Manchu studies among Manchu scholars, an extraordinary passion towards the dying Manchu language which has seen Manchu associations mushroom across the country, and the sudden emergence of Manchu autonomous counties in Northeast China and Hebei province where most Manchu reside. Harking back to the reign of their Manchu ancestors during the Qing dynasty (1644–1911),[4] all of these have reified the endeavours of the Manchu middle-class elite and are now manifest in the self-representation by this elite.[5]

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[1] Wuda, 'Yuyan, zongjiao yu wenhua rentong: zhongguo liangshan liangge yizu cunzi de gean yanjiu' (Language, Religious and Cultural identity: a Case Study of two Yi Minority Nationality Villages in the Liang Mountain, China), www.yizuren.com/article.asp?Newsid=341&page=7, 25 March 2004.

[2] *Zhongguo 2000 nian renkou pucha ziliao* (Tabulation of the 2000 Population Census, People's Republic of China), Guowuyuan renkou pucha bangongshi, guojia tongjiju renkou he shehui keji tongji si bian (Compiled by Population Census Office under the State Council and Department of Population, Social, Science and Technology Statistics, National Bureau of Statistics of China), Zhongguo renkou chubanshe (China Statistics Press, Beijing, 2002), p. 18.

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[3] To quote, 'Whenever and for whatever reasons, any minority nationality that had to give up presenting proper national identity and apply to resume their original identity now should be resumed'. See CNAC (The Central Nationalities Affairs Commission), 'Guanyu hüifu huo gaizheng minzu chengfen de chuli yuanze de tongzhi' (Circular on the Measures for Resuming and Amending Minority Status), *Minzu zhengce huibian: 1951–1990* (*A Collection of Policies Concerning the Minority Nationalities: 1951–1990*), Beijing minzu shiwu weiyuanhui (Beijing Nationalities Affairs Commission, 1990), p. 23. As a result, more than four million people re-registered as Manchu on the basis of providing proof that either of their parents had ever been a Manchu. This can partly explain the Manchu population boom. However, it is said that lots of Han people took advantage of the policy and claimed to be Manchu, even though they were not, to legitimise having more than one child. When I interviewed a Manchu researcher who is himself a Han Chinese, he told me there were so many people who wanted to identify as Manchu that the head of the Nationality Affairs Committee indicated that only those Han Chinese with this scholar's reference could be recognised as Manchu. I also observed how a person changed easily from Han Chinese to Manchu identity simply with a few stamped testimonials from his or her *Juweihui* (Residence Committee). It seems that the demographic change alone cannot give us a full and accurate picture of the Manchu transformation. We need to take into account the role played by the Manchu middle-class elite in this social mobilisation from the 1980s.

[4] Derived from the Jurchen Tribe in the Tang dynasty, the Manchu dominated China proper in 1644, and ruled China until dynastic rule was overturned in the 1911 Revolution led by Sun Yat-sen. The Qing dynasty was the last feudal dynasty of China. The Manchu were the second non-Han group that ruled China, the other being the Mongol who dominated China during the Yuan Dynasty. The last Manchu emperor, Puyi, was installed by the Japanese in Changchun, Jilin, as the puppet emperor of the *Manchu Kuo* in 1932, but this was soon demolished.

[5] Fuller understanding of the rising Chinese middle-class requires more research. A report published by the Chinese Academy of Social Science, 'Who Constitute the Chinese Middle-class Stratum', sets out four criteria to identify the Chinese middle class—occupation, income, consumption and life style—as well as identity. Government officials, entrepreneurs, and professionals are likely to see themselves as middle class. Chunling Li, *2004 nian: Zhongguo shehui xingshi fenxi yu yuce* (*Analysis and Prediction of China's Society in 2004*), http://www.peopledaily.com.cn/GB/jingji/1045/2303048.html, 18 January 2004.

What has motivated the Manchu to revive their identity within the ethnic mosaic of the PRC? Why and how is the ethnic middle class involved in the reconstruction of this group identity? And what are the implications of the Manchu identity movement for China's identity politics as a whole?

This article addresses these questions to help uncover some overlooked dimensions of identity politics in China. It is informed to some extent by my interviews with Manchu people. The Manchu have used suggestive gestures in their efforts to renegotiate their peripheral position in Chinese society, conscious of the State's manipulation of the 'political positioning' of ethnic groups.[6] The Manchu Associations scattered around the country have become a useful vehicle as ethnic agencies, for dialogue between the Manchu people and their ethnic leadership and, more importantly, between the Manchu and the State. The membership of all Manchu associations comprises Manchu people in academic organisations or government departments, and Manchu entrepreneurs. This configuration of the Manchu Associations is well explained by Heberer's study of the perceived homogenous 'middle class', pointing to a 'hybrid middle strata' roughly divided into four sub-groups. These are:

1. a systemic group of politico-ideologically socialised officials;
2. a traditional group of traders and artisans, and religious and ethnic personalities;
3. a professional group of professionally oriented officials and managers; and
4. an entrepreneurial group of those involved in new private entrepreneurship.[7]

The four subgroups identified by Heberer represent the middle and upper strata of the Manchu in terms of their cultural, political and economic assets. We find that the middle-class Manchu have played the role of 'collective social actors'[8] to manage their ethnic social mobilisation.

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[6] Louisa Schein, 'Gender and Internal Orientalism in China', *Modern China*, vol. 23, no. 1 (1997), p. 15.

[7] Thomas Heberer, *Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam: Social and Political Functioning of Strategic Groups* (translated by Timothy J. Gluckman) (Brill, Leiden, Boston, 2003), pp. 62–3.

[8] Hannes Siegrist, 'From Divergence to Convergence: The Divided German Middle Class 1945–2000', in Oliver Zunz, Leonard Schoppa and Nobuhiro Hiwatari (eds), *Social*

Enact versus Enacted

With a vast Han population and 55 other minority nationalities, the Chinese nation presents itself proudly as a multi-ethnic family. Since the 1980s, China has provided an arena for expression of ethnic identity and social relocation. This is the context for the Manchu revival, and demographic change is just one of various indicators of the Manchu transformation since the 1980s.[9] A considerable number of Manchu professionals, officials and entrepreneurs have appeared to take leadership roles and they are devoted to evoking group consciousness to reshape Manchu identity. Manchu intellectuals have struggled to reconcile issues within their group, without being influenced by Han ethnocentrism.[10] The crisis facing the Manchu group has been associated with competition among the multiple ethnicities parallel with national economic development.[11] In short, the reawakened Manchu identity has made the Manchus one of the conspicuous minority nationalities in China.

Recalling the moves made by the Manchus after the 1911 fall of the Qing Dynasty can deepen our understanding of how and why the Manchu have rekindled their ethnic identity under the new socio-political circumstances. When the superior status of the Manchu was abolished with the collapse of the Qing dynasty, their history became a heavy burden for the Manchu community. During the Republican era that followed, the Manchu were surrounded by anti-Manchu propaganda in the wake

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Contracts Under Stress: The Middle Classes of America, Europe and Japan at the Turn of the Century (Russell Sage Foundation, New York, 2002), p. 23.

[9] Zhao Zhihui, 'Shinian huigu' (Ten Years' Retrospect), *Shengyang Manzu* (*The Shenyang Manchu*), vol. 1 (1998), pp. 18–19. Many privileges given to the minority nationalities in China, such as the right to some autonomy, legal rights, economic rights and cultural and educational rights, have encouraged minorities to seek different levels of autonomy. In the 1950s, the central government determined eligibility for autonomy by the percentage of the minority living within a specific area. If one minority accounted for at least 30 per cent of the overall population in an area, the minority nationality would be able to become an autonomous unit. As the central government found many minority nationalities could meet the requirement, it increased the minority share to a higher percentage in order to restrict eligibility for autonomy.

[10] Nasiru, 'Lun danqian manzu zhishi fenzi ying you de yishi guannian yu shiming' (Discussion About the Consciousness and Responsibilities that the Contemporary Manchu Intellectuals Should Have), *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Culture Quarterly*), vol. 14, no. 12 (1990) (Taiwan Manchu Association, Taipei), pp. 2–3.

[11] Xiaofang He, 'Ershi shiji manzu de weiji ji manzu yanjiu de zouxiang' (The Manchu Crisis in the 20th Century and the Trends in Contemporary Manchu Studies), *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Culture Quarterly*), vol. 14, no. 12 (Taiwan Manchu Association, Taipei), pp. 4–9.

of the frail and corrupted Qing dynasty and with the puppet Manchukuo installed by the Japanese. Many traumatised Manchu had to deny their stigmatised identity simply to survive. For example, the Manchu banner men[12] in Guangzhou were detested after the Republic Revolution, and so changed their Manchu family names to Han names and identified themselves as Guangdong natives.[13]

Even during the founding period of the PRC, the Manchu were not paid due attention. For instance, it is said that in the first session of the first Chinese People's Consultative Conference (*Renmin zhengzhi xieshang huiyi*), there was no independent Manchu representative in the delegations of minority nationalities and a Manchu was presented merely as a member of the Xinjiang provincial delegation.[14] The Manchu elite, including Lao She, who was a well-known and highly regarded 'people's artist', appealed to Premier Zhou Enlai for the status that they felt the Manchu deserved in the new China. The State's attitude towards the Manchu remained ambiguous until Premier Zhou began to articulate the Manchu's three contributions in the course of Chinese integration: uniting China, developing a large geographic dimension and enriching the Han Chinese culture.[15]

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[12] The Manchu banner system was for military conscription and operated as the hybrid socio-military institution that formed the original core of Qing military power. Companies of Manchu warriors were grouped into brigades, each with a distinctive banner. The banner system integrated former tribal units into a bureaucratic war machine that enabled the Manchus to conquer and rule China as the Qing dynasty (1644–1912).

[13] Xitara, 'Yuanqu de tieqi, baqi zidi' (Faraway Crack Cavalier: The Manchu Eight Banner Men), http://manchu.nease.net/jrmz/wo89.htm, 15 June 2004.

[14] I was told this story by a Manchu elite, but it seems that he did not remember the event precisely. He insisted that the Manchu were neglected in the grand ceremony on National Day because the Manchu were not regarded as an ethnic group at that time. Weihan Li, Minister of the United Front Department (*Tongzhan bu*) and First Head of the Central Commission of the Minority Nationalities Affairs in the New China, mentioned that some Manchu people in Beijing could not help shedding tears when they found there were no Manchu representatives in the new Chinese People's Consultative Conference. Guangshu Shi, 'Jiejue Zhongguo minzu zizhi de yi da xuan'an' (To Resolve One of the Biggest Outstanding Cases in the Minority Nationality Autonomy Issues in China), http://www.56-china.com.cn/mzf/MZF-rw10m24.htm, 25 March 2004. In response to this, the United Front Department pointed out that simply, 'The Manchu is an ethnic group in China' in December 1952. See *Minzu gongzuo diaocha* (*Investigation of the Minority Nationalities' Work*), The United Front Department, 1952, p. 706.

[15] After my interview with the Head of the Minority Nationalities' Affairs Commission, Shenyang, on 12 January 1998, I confirmed this claim in the original speeches of Zhou Enlai. See, for example, 'Guanyu woguo minzu zhengce de jige wenti 1957' (A Few Questions Regarding Nationalities' Policy in Our Country, 1957), *Minzu gongzuo cankao* (*Reference of the Nationalities' Work*) (Shenyang Nationalities Affairs Commission, Shenyang, 1992), pp. 25–30. In an official reception in June 1961, Zhou claimed, 'First, it [the Qing dynasty] brought together the many fraternal nationalities in China and delimited the boundaries

Since the 1980s, what had been the 'formerly weak dimension of identity'[16] has changed in the Manchu Community. Some in the Manchu middle-class elite have worked to develop a more assertive Manchu image, and a surge of ethnic-identity revival has begun.

The Manchu identity reconstruction movement appears to date back to the late 1970s. At that time, a few individuals initiated a network that would facilitate Manchu regional autonomy in Northeast China, and they tried to liaise with influential Manchu figures in political, cultural and social fields to accumulate 'social capital'.[17] They claimed that modern China had inherited a large geographical territory from the sovereignty of the Manchu Qing dynasty but, compared with other minority nationalities, the Manchu had not been granted their own autonomous area. The movement is still not content with Manchu status, although the Manchu have achieved 12 autonomous counties throughout these years. In the view of some within the movement, the size of the Manchu autonomous area is disproportionate to the Manchu population, and this has generated some grievances within the group. As one of the Manchu elite explained to me:

> In the past, nobody cared about the Manchu. The Manchu did not even have their own autonomous region! The Mongols who fought for the rulership got their own autonomous region in the end,[18] but the Manchu who expanded and managed so large a territory have come to have no place of our own.[19]

All the Manchu efforts as a group have been for self-empowerment. A number of Manchu middle-class elites have dedicated themselves to ethnic mobilisation through the invented social vehicle of the Manchu Associations. One of the founders of the first Manchu Association, the Shenyang Manchu Association, told me that he had learned about the Manchu issue from Manchu literature studies. He had become enthusiastic about studying Manchu language in parallel with his interest in literature, and this had put his feelings about Manchurian history into a positive light. He explained how, 'In the 1980s, we took the Manchu literature course hoping to make a breakthrough in our appeal to the State for autonomy. Through these cultural activities, I became acquainted with a lot of Manchu people.'[20]

Research in Manchu studies presents criticism of Han ethnocentrism alongside attempts to put forward a Manchu perspective. The 'reform' program has paved the way for more international scholars to conduct research in China, producing studies concerned with the Qing dynasty, Manchu history and Manchu culture.[21] For example, extinct Manchu shamanism unearthed by indigenous scholars has drawn serious attention from scholars worldwide. Overseas interest in the weakened Manchu culture has pushed forward Manchu studies domestically. Meanwhile, the Taiwan Manchu Association[22] has been providing the *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Culture Quarterly*) as a nationwide forum in this regard.

As the 'Call for Contributors' claims in each volume:

> Every tree has roots, every river has origins, and everybody is bound to derive from somewhere. They should be proud of their hometown and ancestry. It is a pity that many senior Manchu are reluctant to publicize their Manchu identity, so that the young generation has no idea of ethnic history, tradition and customs. If we were preoccupied only with our individual life, we Manchu would disappear in the changing world, and then how would our ancestors feel?... The Manchu people at this historical juncture are compelled to record what is happening and what has happened...

This forum presents examination of historical topics and debates on current affairs. For example, a Manchu elite published an article to refute the well-known *Yangzhou shiri* (*Ten Days Massacre in Yangzhou*),[23] attempting

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of the country, establishing its territory as more than nine million square kilometres. Second, in order to perpetuate its rule the Qing dynasty reduced the feudal land tax, enabling the peasants to recuperate from years of oppression and build up their strength. As a result, the population grew to 400 million today. And third, the Qing dynasty adopted the Manchu language and the Han language simultaneously, thus gradually bringing the two cultures together and promoting the development of the Chinese culture. So the Qing dynasty did three good things—delimiting the territory, increasing the population and developing the culture'. See Enlai Zhou, 'Remarks at a Reception for Hiro Saga, Pu Jie, Pu Yi and Others, 1961', in *Selected Works of Zhou En-lai* (Foreign Language Press, Beijing, 1984), p. 327.

[16] Hank Johnston, Enrique Laraña and Joseph R. Gusfield, 'Identities, Grievances and New Social Movements', in *New Social Movements: From Ideology to Identity* (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1994), pp. 3–35.

[17] Heberer, *Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam*, pp. 130–4.

[18] Inner Mongolia Mongolian Nationality Autonomous Region was founded in 1947.

[19] Interview with Professor Yi in Shenyang, Liaoning province in January, 1999. Most informants remain anonymous in this article.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Many Manchu studies are listed on the homepage of the Taiwan Manchu Association. See http://home.kimo.com.tw/manchusoc/.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Baosen Jin, '"Yangzhou shiri" zheng e' (To Clarify Issues in *Ten Days Massacre in Yangzhou*), *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Culture Quarterly*), Taiwan Manchu Association, vol. 4 (1989), pp. 19–30. It is said that *Yangzhou shiri* (*Ten Days Massacre in Yangzhou*) is an eye-witness account by Wang Xiuchu of how Manchu troops slaughtered people and

to uncover the anti-Manchu rhetoric surrounding this event. A number of articles deal with crisis and the developing path of the contemporary Manchu group.

As Manchu studies began to thrive, the first Manchu Studies Association in Shenyang, Liaoning province was established with only seven members at the outset. By 1998, there were 66 Manchu Associations scattered around the country, including in Hong Kong and Taiwan, and some are recognised officially. All of them function for social liaison as well as academic purposes. As unofficial vehicles, the Manchu Associations have been dedicated to nurturing intra-Manchu intimacy and dialogue with the State for a variety of ends for the Manchu people, including 'legitimation of political power', 'enhanced social status' and 'economic advantage'.[24]

It seems that the existence of a Manchu association hinges on its geopolitical location. For instance, in Beijing the Manchu middle-class elites have been frustrated at their inability to form an official ethnic association due to the governmental censorship. Mr Weng, Vice President of the Taiwan Manchu Association, pointed out this odd situation in his review after visiting Beijing.[25] The Manchu application for an ethnic organisation in Beijing was rejected because, as a Han official retorted, no single minority nationality would be eligible to form its own association in Beijing unless all minority nationalities formed their own organisations.

The Shenyang Manchu Association was approved as a legal and independent ethnic organisation in 1987, but it was already operating actively before that time. Its middle-class members have helped the Manchu community in relations with both the local society and the 'state apparatus'.[26] Until the 1990s, 70 per cent of members were scholars or professionals, and a large proportion held important positions in the local political

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raped women who resisted invasion in May 1645. It apparently revealed the conflict at the eve of the Qing domination through racial discourse, i.e. only the Han monarch was legitimate, and the barbarian rulers would only create racial hatred. Many Manchu scholars are suspicious of the account. They have tried to clarify by investigating the population in Yangzhou at that time and have pointed out that the Manchu banner men could not speak Chinese, and it was Han traitors and bandits who killed their compatriots.

[24] George De Vos, 'Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation', in Lola Romanucci-Ross, George A. De Vos (eds), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* (AltaMira Press, Walnut Creek, CA., 1995), p. 24.

[25] Fuxiang Weng, 'Manzu xiehui dierci dalu fangwentuan jiyao II' (A Summary of the Second Trip in the Mainland II), *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Cultuel Quarterly*), vol. 21, no. 1 (1996), p. 28.

[26] Siu-woo Cheung, 'Representation and Negotiation of Ge Identities in Southeast Guizhou', in Melissa J. Brown (ed.), *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996), p. 245.

bodies.[27] Given the political orientation of this association, we can understand how it operates as an ethnic agency and how members negotiate Manchu identity through 'strategic networking'.[28] Mr Chen took charge of the Shenyang Manchu Folk Village[29] after retiring from his work in the local government, and he has been a pivotal participant in this ethnic enterprise. People like him have undeniable authority to reinterpret the Manchu identity in the context of historical continuity, and to empower the Manchu group on the State's national platform. It is likely that attempts by these people to access power and influence decision makers have 'institutionalised' their collective claims into the national narrative, as Gainsborough has observed of the middle class in Vietnam. We may say that, as members of the Manchu middle-class elite have been dedicated to 're-positioning' the Manchu while 're-positioning' themselves in the State political scene,[30] they have served as a buffer or strategic group'[31] between the State and the Manchu community in general.

We see an interesting example in the annual festival known as *Banjin* (meaning birthday in the Manchu language) now celebrated by the Manchu people. Unlike some minority nationalities, the Manchu did not have their own ethnic festival as a marker of their heritage or reinvention of their identity until around 1989, when they initiated the innovative *Banjin* festival, which highlights the newly reinterpreted Manchu identity. The primary journal of the minority nationalities, *Minzu gongzuo cankao* (The Nationalities' Work References), has questionable importance within the Manchu community and recognises only a Manchu festival called *Bala*. In fact, the Manchu people, even the middle-class elites, have little knowledge of this officially designated festival, and do not celebrate it. The Manchu Associations have therefore embraced the *Banjin* festival as a marker of their identity. Once the Xinbin region achieved Manchu autonomy and was granted legislative rights, the *Banjin* festival was written into the local autonomous law. Here we see how the invented *Banjin* festival has furthered the agenda of local Manchu autonomy and identity negotiation.

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[27] Zhihui Zhao, 'Shinian huigu' (Ten Years' Retrospect), *Shengyang Manzu* (*The Shenyang Manchu*), vol. 1 (1998), pp. 18–9.

[28] Heberer, *Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam*, pp. 73, 341.

[29] See Shenyang Folk Village website: http://www.symzc.com.

[30] Martin Gainsborough, 'Political Change in Vietnam: In Search of the Middle-class Challenge to the State', *Asian Survey*, vol. 42, no. 5 (September/October 2002), pp. 694–707.

[31] Ibid.

Devices for Reproducing Manchu Identity

The flourishing of Manchu language studies reflects and further stimulates interest in Manchu culture. It also does more. Manchu elites believe that the archives in the Manchu language can help to solve contentious historical problems, so capacity to interpret the archives may help to resolve these problems.[32] Enthusiasm for reviving ethnic language can also be taken as a statement affirming the Manchu collective and as a signal of intent to boost ethnic awareness. Here I examine the Manchu language revival and ethnic tourism in a Manchu concentrated area to try to identify their significance for Manchu identity revival.

Manchu Language

A number of the Manchu elites and Manchu Associations have advocated reviving the Manchu language. Their position supports De Vos' claim that 'The manipulation of language as a status marker can also be used by individuals aspiring to change how they are defined ethnically'.[33] In this instance, ethnic language appears to have particular significance, since visible ethnic characteristics usually manifest in religion and habitat do not really distinguish the Manchu from other Chinese. Indeed, many people think that the Manchu are too Sinicised to be a true ethnic group as set out in the State's criteria for identifying minority nationalities. An internal memo states:

> Before liberation, apart from Uygur, Kazakh, Korean, Tibetan, Mongol, Dai and Yi, etc., most minority nationalities did not have their own written languages. After liberation, the Party and State have helped those minority nationalities create and revise their written languages. Thus, there are now 19 minority nationality languages... Ethnic language is one of the characteristics for forming an ethnic group and is also an important component of ethnic culture.[34]

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[32] Baosen Jin, 'Wei peiyang manwen rencai, cujin manxue yanjiu er jianli de Beijing manwen shuyuan' (The Beijing Manchu School: A Cradle for Manchu Language Learners and a Vehicle for Promoting Manchu Studies), *Manzu yanjiu* (*Manchu Studies*), vol. 4, p. 47.

[33] George De Vos, 'Ethnic Pluralism: Conflict and Accommodation', in Lola Romanucci-Ross, George A. De Vos (eds), *Ethnic Identity: Creation, Conflict and Accommodation* (Alta-Mira Press, Walnut Creek, CA., 1995), p. 23.

[34] Propaganda Department of the Chinese Communist Party Commission and Nationalities Affairs Commission, Beijing, 'Guanyu renzhen guanche zhixing dang de minzu zhengce, jiaqiang minzu tuanjie de xuanchuan tigang' (An Outline on Implementing the Policies Towards Nationalities and Strengthened National Union), 1990, p. 3.

The State has encouraged minority nationalities to use their languages and has helped some ethnic minorities to create languages. Ironically, even in 1990, when the Beijing Manchu School had been teaching the more than 300 years old Manchu language for six years, the official document cited above did not list Manchu language as one of the written languages of the minority nationalities.

Yet reconstructing ethnic identity through learning the ethnic language has been somehow very compelling to the Manchu middle-class elites for some time. A noted Manchu-studies scholar who is a Han Chinese asserts that the interest in studying Manchu language stems from the motivation of young Manchus to develop this language ability as a personal asset that will help them to find a different type of job. However, my contacts among the Manchu middle class question this opinion. The first Manchu language school was initiated by the head of the Beijing eastern-quarter district's Political Consultative Committee (*Beijing dongcheng qu zhengxie*), who is the descendant of a Manchu Grand Secretary (*da xueshi*) in the Qing dynasty. When Mr Baoseng Jin (Aisin Gioro Baosen)[35] learned Manchu language in this school, he was inspired by the idea of promoting Manchu language study as a way 'to boost the sense of pride for the Manchu group'.[36] He opened a new Manchu school with other enthusiastic volunteers, most of whom were Manchu, and one Mongol. In 1985, with a ten-person advisory board, including Mrs Jieqing Hu, who is wife of the noted Manchu artist and writer Lao She, Mr Jin and his colleagues established a small Manchu school with 200 yuan (approximately US$20). It is said that Mr Pengfei Zhao, chairman of the Beijing Municipal People's Congress and a Manchu-affiliated official, supported this School until he retired.

Han scholars appear to perceive learners of Manchu language in a rather pragmatic way. As Laura Hess explains,

> In many respects, the students represent a true cross-section of modern-day Beijing. They come from a variety of ethnic groups, including the Manchu, Mongolian, Hui and Han Chinese nationalities (although the majority are Manchus). They range in age from 16 to 72 and in level of education from

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[35] Baosen Jin (Aisin Gioro Baosen), a Manchu teacher in the Beijing No. 24 Secondary School, is one of the founding members of the Beijing Manchu School (Beijing Manwen shuyuan). He has worked laboriously to improve the Manchu school, which is open to anyone interested in learning Manchu language.

[36] Pamela Kyle Crossley, *Orphan Warriors: Three Manchu Generations and the End of the Qing World* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1990), p. 219.

> graduates of junior high school to holders to doctoral degrees. Some are university professors or researchers, while others are college students or workers, and still others are retired professionals, housewives or youth awaiting employment.[37]

An example of this range of students is Ms. Zhu, a Manchu engineer who learned the Manchu language in her spare time and has assisted in translating the Manchu archives in the Beijing First Historical Archives (*Beijing diyi lishi dang'an guan*). Another woman worked in the Nationalities Publishing House (*Minzu chubanshe*) and thought Manchu language study would give her a slight edge in her skills for typing Manchu characters, since rare publications of this publishing house are in Manchu language. In an article written by a Manchu intellectual in the Xinbin Manchu Nationality Autonomous County, the author recalled how he picked up the Manchu language at 60 years of age.

> I have been admiring the Mongol and Korean people because they have preserved their language, costumes and customs until today. But quite to the contrary, we Manchu, apart from a few ethnic remnants, can only see 'us' in dramas, and so we are almost not different from the Han people... (I)f we aim at promoting the native culture, we must make our language live among our people.[38]

The Manchu language is expected to differentiate the Manchu people as an ethnic group when the State emphasises the plurality of ethnic cultures within one united country. Nevertheless, it is difficult for the Manchu to acquire their language, since it has been lost for a long time and is no longer used in regular conversation. It seems that the State has been indifferent to this particular ethnic language, even though there are voluminous archives written in Manchu language stacked in the Beijing First Historical Archives. Only Premier Zhou Enlai was concerned with having these archives translated. The language revival encompassing China since the 1980s has now waned somewhat, and the Beijing Manchu School (*Beijing Manwen shuyuan*), which is the only Manchu school left in Beijing. It appears that a mix of reasons explains why the Manchu language revival has declined in recent years. Mr Jin attributes this failure to serious unemployment (*xia gang*) and worsening social security by the 1990s. And since these schools are non-profit organisations, their financial problems are likely to prevent them from developing.

A study on the growing interest in the Korean language in China since the 1980s observed how, 'The development of an ethnic group can advance the group's ethnic language, which in turn can help to consolidate the group's ethnic community'.[39] The Korean group balked at embracing the Korean language and traditions during the chaotic Cultural Revolution in China. But official treatment of them in the Post-Mao era has enabled Korean students to write any official exam in Korean. More importantly, the national reform program to open the Chinese economy has encouraged South Koreans to invest in China, which has created job opportunities for the Koreans in China, especially those with Korean language skills. Rising interest in the Korean language can help us in considering the destiny of Manchu language revival from another angle, since it alerts us to the potential for ethnic language skills to help generate employment and other economic opportunities.

Manchu Ethnic Tourism

Ethnic tourism is one of these economic opportunities. Ethnic tourism of Manchu areas is, like the Manchu language revival, a useful guide to charting Manchu identity reproduction in recent years. Manchu ethnic tourism is one of the diagnostic projects of what Litzinger calls the 'ethnic minority industry'.[40] It serves to re-manufacture the Manchu image and so has similarities with the cultural reproduction of other contemporary ethnic groups in China, such as the Miao and the Yao. A number of aesthetic features such as costumes, rituals and living habitats have been displayed to differentiate the Manchu for tourists from Manchu as they are perceived in daily life.

The Manchu are more closely assimilated with the dominant Han population than are the other minority groups. So when it comes to tourist consumption, there seems to be little remaining in contemporary lifestyle that is intrinsically Manchu, except the ethnic designation. Virtually all

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[37] Laura Hess, 'The Manchu Academy of Beijing', *Saksaha: A Review of Manchu Studies*, vol. 1, no. 3 (1996), p. 32.

[38] Ninguta Pengyun, 'Wei hongyang Manzu wenhua er xuemanwen' (Learning Manchu language to promote our culture), *Shenyang Manzu* (*The Shenyang Manchu*), vol. 1 (1999), pp. 20–1.

[39] Xicheng Jin, 'Jingji de fazhan cujin le yuyan de fazhan he puji' (The Development and Popularity of Ethnic Language due to Economic Development: On the Prevalence of Korean Language), *Manzu yanjiu* (*Manchu Studies*), vol. 2, no. 90 (1995).

[40] Ralph Litzinger, *The Work of Culture and Memory in Contemporary China* (Duke University Press, Durham, 1995), p. 1.

that the Manchu have that is distinctively Manchu is their past: their shared ancestry and the Qing dynasty.

Shenyang (*Mukden* in Manchu language, meaning 'prosperous capital') was one of capitals during the rise of the Manchu and the Manchu have naturally tailored this city's historical legacy for tourists' ethnic consumption. The Shenyang Imperial Palace (*Shenyang gugong*) and the Eastern and Northern Mausoleums (Dongling, Beiling, Nurgaci and Hong Taiji's mausoleums)[41] serve as tourism resources, given their significance as 'symbolic expression' of the Manchu identity. As Schein comments, they are 'seen not as a consumption of culture, but as a sensible way to preserve and celebrate through commodification'.[42]

Locating places for tourism in Manchu autonomous regions has been discussed vigorously among the Manchu middle-class leadership for some time.[43] Tourism resources in 14 regions where the majority of Manchu reside have been used to form a route known as the Manchu Heritage Trail from Beijing to Heihe in Heilongjiang province.[44] The trail incorporates a few major tourism locations that draw on a variety of legends of the Manchu ancestry, and most of these locations featured in the pictorial *Zhongguo Manzu* (*China's Manchu Nationality*) in the 1990s.[45] Development of the trail suggests that the Manchu middle-class elites are well aware of the need to craft group image to cater to consumption by mass culture, and of the State's inclination that encourages colourful ethnic cultures to coexist in this multi-ethnic country.

To promote Manchu folk tourism, the Manchu middle-class elites have worked tactically and arduously to restore the prominent historical portrait of the group. Fragments of historical memory have been meticulously selected, combined and pieced together to cater to exotic requests from tourists. This has helped to reinforce a certain style of Manchu identity in the new historical context. The newly interpreted Manchu cultural image is readily planted into people's minds and coexists with the group image portrayed by the Qing dynasty costume dramas produced in the PRC, Hong Kong and Taiwan in vast quantities in recent decades.

Just as inadequate financial support has hindered Manchu language revival, limited finance also holds back other activities that would strengthen group identity. The Manchu Associations have therefore cooperated with local entrepreneurs in exploiting their own ethnic historical and cultural resources to develop ethnic tourism as a source of income. The move involves mutual agreement between the ethnic leadership and those working in local development, thus relying on the participation of the Manchu elite to reconstruct tourist locations. This helps to ensure that Manchu cultural traits are well presented to both tourists and the Manchu community.

We can therefore understand Manchu ethnic tourism through the interplay between reconstructed Manchu identity and local economic strategy. Let us consider one of the Manchu enclaves, Shenyang, to illustrate this process. To attract tourists and investment, the Shenyang municipal government has built the 'Qing Dynasty Street', which is adjacent to the Shenyang Imperial Palace (*Shenyang gugong*). The Street has a distinctive style of Chinese classical architecture and forms a coherent entity with the Imperial Palace. The Shenyang Manchu Association, Shenyang Landscape and International Travel Agency, and Lixiang Town have worked together to build a Manchu folk village in the East Mausoleum (*Dong ling*) District.[46] The Folk Village presents the most persuasive evidence of Manchu existence as a living folk culture. It has three houses built in typical Manchu style, with Sūlun totem poles of the traditional Manchu family erected in the yard.[47] There are exhibitions of textile weaving, theatrical performances of a traditional wedding, and dance shows to reveal the live culture of the rural Manchu who are regarded as prototypes of the real Manchu. The Manchu's 'packaged differences' have been made so tangible and visible to tourists that we may say these 'images of timeless primitivity'[48] are an effective tool to re-present the Manchu culture and build the people's knowledge of this ethnic group.

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[41] Nurgaci and Hong Taiji were the founders of the Qing dynasty. The former established the Later Jin dynasty in northeast China; the latter founded the Qing dynasty in 1644, and he was the first emperor of the Qing dynasty.

[42] Louisa Schein, *Minority Rules: The Miao and the Feminine in China's Cultural Politics* (Duke University Press, Durham and London, 2000), p. 31.

[43] Honggang Wang and Yuguang Fu, 'Zhengdai kaifa de Jilinsheng shaoshu minzu diqu de lüyou ziyuan' (The Tourist Resources to be Developed in the Concentrated Areas of the Minority Nationalities in Jilin Province), *Shehui kexue zhanxian* (*The Frontier of Social Science*), vol. 1 (1987) (Jilin renmin chubanshe, Changchun), pp. 298–303.

[44] Baoming Cao, *Changbaishan xia de minsu yu lüyou* (*Folklore and Tourism at the Foot of Changbai Mountain*) (Travel and Education Publishing House, Beijing, 1996).

[45] Jixin Guan and Dianfu Gong (eds), *Zhongguo Manzu* (*The Chinese Manchu*) (Central Minority Nationalities Institute Publishing House, Beijing, 1993), pp. 25–31.

[46] On this Manchu Folk Village see http://www.symzc.com/.

[47] A Manchu legend tells how a crow protected the dynastic founder Nurgaci and saved him from being killed by his enemy. The Manchu people therefore set up prayer poles, known as Sūlun poles, to commemorate crows.

[48] Emily Chao, 'Hegemony, Agency, and Re-presenting the Past: The Invention of Dongba Culture', in Melissa J. Brown (ed.), *Negotiating Ethnicities in China and Taiwan* (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1996), p. 227.

Compared with the majestic mausoleum of the ancestry, the Manchu folk village is recreated as a 'secular myth' to present the natural and unaffected life of the Manchu people. Here the designers and producers attempt to remind visitors of the cultural continuity of this distinct group, which helps to legitimise the Manchu identity in well-grounded historical memory. Yet the Manchu traits shown in the village are too ambiguous and intangible to be seen in the daily lives of the Manchu people. This is consistent with Litzinger's argument that the ethnic cultural reproduction carried out in present-day China merely represents 'scenes which flatten time through the display of a continuous tradition... what we encounter is an upgraded primitivity, the recovering of a difference'.[49] One of the designers told me that the Manchu Folk Village is often used as the location for costume dramas. We see from this example how in the course of re-crafting traditional Manchu appearance, the contemporary Manchu middle-class elites have helped their community to reinvent historical memory in China's new socio-economic context.

A Need for Repositioning

Ethnic tourism is to some extent a manageable vehicle for the Manchu middle-class elites to reclaim their ethnic group legitimacy. As Litzinger observed, '[M]emories are given meaning in the present through narrative strategies'.[50] Since the fabrications of Manchu for touristic consumption encapsulate fragmentary memory and subjective narrative, they have created new opportunities for exposure of this group in the multiethnic landscape of the State.

The collapse of the old paradigm, i.e. the social classification and family background evident in past decades, has opened the way for Chinese people to re-locate themselves through their ethnic classification. Various preferential policies apply to ethnicity in accordance with the positions of ethnic groupings on the State's political panel. The Manchu middle-class elites are deeply concerned with the position of their group under the present regime because the Manchu history is stigmatised history, and the Manchu are more sinicised than other ethnicities. This has produced in the Manchu elites a sense of crisis around their desire for self-representation, self-legitimation and the privileges due to their group as a minority nationality. The anxiety is so strong that the Manchu middle-class leaders have made great efforts to bridge themselves with the most glorious Manchu people in history; they have taken the glorified Qing dynasty as a 'source of power and knowledge with which to align and legitimise'[51] themselves in the present. Salient nostalgia for past glories has been programmed into the manipulated identity reconstruction.

The 'primordial'[52] tie has been emphasised by organising a range of collective activities such as the annual gathering for the recreated *Banjin* festival. One reason for these activities is to legitimise Manchu existence further. But a much more important reason is to reinforce internal cohesion, which is considered the most crucial factor for group continuity. Since the sites of many Manchu historical preservations and other scenic locations are in different regions, the Manchu leadership has tried to use the tours to help rekindle recognition of the shared roots between disparate Manchus by drawing together group members and solidifying sentimental bonds. These moves are attempts to revive their Manchu culture and reinforce their ethnic identity. From the start of the present decade, many Manchu in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, the US and other countries have taken tours to Mainland China to find their ethnic roots. The move appears to reflect strong attachment to their ethnic group.

Some claim that a driving force for Manchu mobilisation could be to correct the distorted popular images of this group. When we take into account the personal experiences of the Manchu middle-class leadership, we recognise that traumatising experiences flowing from both the Manchu designation and memories of past encounters have played an essential part in their efforts towards identity reconstruction. For example, as a young Manchu wrote in the Manchu Forum,

> I am not proud of the Manchu Qing dynasty because the Qing dynasty was eventually eliminated as a result of its pride. In fact, the Manchu helped the Han Chinese to expand their territory, but the Manchu people themselves became almost extinct.[53]

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[49] Litzinger, *The Work of Culture and Memory in Contemporary China*, p. 24.

[50] Ibid.

[51] Ibid., p. 212.

[52] Clifford Geertz, 'The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States', in Clifford Geertz (ed.), *Old Societies and New States* (Free Press of Glencoe, New York, 1963).

[53] Buku, 'Wo buyi Manzu de daqing er jiaoao' (I am Not Proud of the Manchu Qing Dynasty), www.manchus.net/bncbbc/dispbbs.asp?boardid=2&id=403, 7 June 2004.

Other grievances also come from family encounters:

> The original house of my family now belongs to the government, so people can buy tickets to visit it. My grandfather's grandfather was a general and my grandfather's father had lots of land. But my grandfather was overthrown as a landlord, and my father said that in his generation you'd be hit if you identified yourself as a Manchu . . . In my generation, it seems I have dignity again.[54]

Many Manchu scholars who have a strong ethnic consciousness can hardly forget the suffering of their group. For example, *The Sichuan Manchu Transformation*[55] revealed how the Manchu situation had deteriorated since the Republic of China. A number of the Manchu banner men were jobless, and their families could not afford to send children to school. At that time over 85 per cent of the Manchu banner men made a living by rickshaw or wayside stalls. Many Manchu families starved to death. There were three taboos for the Manchu people in Chengdu: to go far from home, to go outside the city, and to go out alone. I did not mention these circumstances in my book, since I do not want to keep discussing the miserable encounters of the Manchu in earlier times.[56] The majority Han public, other non-Manchu people, and even ordinary Manchus may simply not be interested in Manchu identity and past experience.

Geopolitics

It is interesting to look at geopolitical differences between those who are involved in generating Manchu identity in different localities across the country. These differences help us to understand the negotiation of Manchu identity better.

The Manchu middle-class leadership in Beijing is always considered the most influential group owing to its easier access to political authority and cultural resources. However, it seems that the endeavours of these leaders have not produced the desired results, which Manchu agencies in other regions have been able to achieve. The Beijing Manchu have had difficulty obtaining permission to carry out the *Banjin* festival, apparently because local censorship works against such mass gatherings. This has discouraged the Manchu leadership in Beijing, who have complained that there are too few decisive Manchu cadres in the government to generate a powerful influence for the Manchu. Quite a few Manchu officials in Beijing who appear to hold higher positions in the central and local governments do not really speak for their group. Far worse, a few prominent Manchu officials are reluctant even to acknowledge their ethnic affiliation. For example, a Manchu official in the CCP Central Military Commission was reluctant to identify himself clearly as a Manchu until other Manchu luminaries in Beijing pleaded repeatedly with him. This suggests the 'embarrassing positioning' of Manchu in the post-Mao era. A Beijing Manchu cadre advised me in an interview that only one Manchu Minister was not resented for his Manchu identity and was willing to do something seriously for his ethnic group.[57]

Beijing is not only the political and cultural centre of the nation today; it was also the capital under the Qing Dynasty. A large Manchu population is very visible in Beijing, as are a great number of the Manchu middle-class elites. Nevertheless, the visibility of this segment of the population within Beijing has not served to empower the group in their efforts to negotiate their identity with the State.

The Local Scene

The establishment of the Xinbin Manchu Autonomous County as the first Manchu Autonomous county can be viewed as the concrete result of an empowerment project. A similar result is the nationality township that grew out of a former Manchu and Mongolian Banner-garrison in the Qing dynasty and was established on Beijing's outskirts in the 1990s with the help of two devoted Beijing Manchu elites. Nevertheless, the Manchu middle-class leadership thought that this achievement would not significantly influence Manchu self-empowerment in general, since the 'nationality village' is now no more than a designation. In the leadership's eyes, the larger the Manchu administrative unit is, the more mobility the Manchu group has. For instance, the autonomy that the 'county or above' level is supposed to have is not only legislative authority and more seats

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[54] www.manchus.net/bncbbc/dispbbs.asp?boardid=2&id=439, 17 June 2004.

[55] Ibid.

[56] Wenhai, 'Zuowei xiandai manzu yinggai laoji guoqu de xinsuan shi' (The Modern Manchus Should Remember the Miserable History of the Group), www.manchus.net/bncbbc/dispbbs.asp?boardid=19&id=753, 3 September 2003.

[57] Interview with Mr Shu, the Associate Dean of the Beijing Nationality Affairs Committee.

reserved in the autonomous government, but also control of the local economy including, for example, the right to retain taxes.[58]

Transnational Interaction

Among the diversified social actors involved in social mobilisation of the Manchu, the overseas Manchu communities offer us some insight into the transnational scene in recent decades. Generally, transnational influence has unconsciously recharged both the scholarly reconstruction of Manchu identity and the collective self-perception of Manchu since the 1980s.

The Manchu in Taiwan are the most conspicuous of the Manchu communities outside the PRC. Delegations of Taiwan Manchu frequently visit Northeast China. They meet local Manchu organisations and prestigious Manchu individuals during their trips, which helps to form a network among domestic and international Manchu elites. Numerous articles about the feelings these tours inspire have been published in *Manzu wenhua* (Manchu Cultural Quarterly), which reports nostalgically to readers about these trips. A series written by Fuxiang Weng, Vice President of the Taiwan Manchu Association, includes 'Dongbei fangwen ji' (Anecdotes of the Northeast Tour),[59] 'Manzu de rentong yu xingsi' (The Manchu Identity and Our Reflections),[60] 'Manzu xiehui dierci dalu fangwen tuan jiyao I' (Minutes of the Second Trip in the Mainland I),[61] and 'Manzu xiehui dierci dalu fangwen tuan jiyao II' (Minutes of the Second Trip in the Mainland II).[62] Their tours are not merely to taste delicious Manchu foods, visit enchanting historical sites and reminisce at the remaining ethnic features they see. These travellers have reminisced at what they perceive to be an honourable collective Manchu self by equipping themselves with what they have seen and experienced in their travel.

Fuxiang Weng as author of these articles cannot help but eulogise these historical sites, which contain the cultural essence of the Manchu and endow the identities of his Manchu compatriots. As he says, 'Whoever are the Aisin Gioro or descendents of the Manchu eight-banner men,... we are linked with them in sharing honour or disgrace, and in bonds of blood with the preceding Manchu emperors'.[63] By aligning symbolically with a powerful collective image portrayed in history, these travelogues become battlefields for combat against the current depreciation of Manchu. They also suggest that these tours, with their primordial orientation, have minimised cultural distance between past and present and have yielded a rediscovered and self-valued ethnic identity. The extraordinary involvement of the Taiwan Manchu helps us to comprehend the profound connotations of the passionate statement above.

The Taiwan Manchu Association operates in a political climate different from that for the Beijing and other mainland Manchu Associations. We see how the Taiwan Manchu were able to change their position as a marginalised group within a domineering national landscape, even while they have the same goals as the Mainland Manchu. However, as Fuxiang Weng has proclaimed:

> We Manchu are categorised as the second largest ethnic group in Taiwan, alongside the Han, Mongol, Tibetan and Hui. But our existence as Manchu people is at stake, a position that is impossible for us to overcome in Taiwan. On the Mainland, the central government boasts that minority nationalities have equal status, but that government is wary of the Manchu because while many nationalities have their autonomous prefectures and autonomous regions, only the Manchu have autonomous counties. Therefore, there is no essential difference in the status of Manchu under the KMT and under the CCP.[64]

Apart from their emotional and organisational interactions transnationally, the transnational Manchu groups have been inspired to lend a helping hand to rejuvenate the local economy in some areas where the Mainland Manchu live. Meanwhile, the Mainland Manchu communities' extensive contact with the transnational Manchu communities has come to signify that the Manchu in the PRC are capable of attracting overseas investments and exposing the local area to the international stage. As mentioned above, inspired by the Taiwan Manchu nostalgic tour and continuous requests for research projects in the county territory, the

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[58] 'Minzu quyu zizhifa' (General Law on the Nationality Regional Autonomy), in *Zhongguo minzu nianjian* (*The Year Book of China's Minority Nationalities*) (1996), p. 44.

[59] *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Cultural Quarterly*), vol. 19, no. 1 (1994), pp. 14–25.

[60] *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Cultural Quarterly*), vol. 18, no. 1 (1993), pp. 2–3.

[61] *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Cultural Quarterly*), vol. 20, no. 12 (1994), pp. 61–70.

[62] *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Cultural Quarterly*), vol. 21, no. 1 (1996), pp. 24–35.

[63] 'Manzu xiehui dierci dalu fangwentuan jiyao I' (The Minutes of the Second Trip in the Mainland I), *Manzu wenhua* (*Manchu Cultural Quarterly*), vol. 20, no. 12 (1994), p. 65.

[64] 'Guomindang de qiya yu waiqu lishi, shi jiuqian duo wan Manzu zidi mianlin wangzhong miezu zhi wei' (The KMT's Oppression and Misrepresentation of our History Threatened Nine Million Manzu Compatriots with Elimination), *Manchu Cultural Quarterly*, vol. 23, no. 1 (1997), p. 3.

Xinbin Manchu Autonomous county ambitiously held a Manchu Folklore Festival in September 1999. Many guests were invited, including overseas and domestic scholars working in Manchu studies, the provincial Manchu representatives and many noted Manchu figures, as well as overseas and domestic Manchu entrepreneurs.

How does the Taiwan Manchu, as a transnational referential axis, affect the Manchu in the PRC? The following example sheds some light on another aspect of what is effectively a process of bargaining between the State and the Manchu group.

In the summer of 1999, I visited Mr Jisheng Li,[65] a Beijing Manchu intellectual. Mr Li had returned to the Manchu and Mongol Nationality Township in the Beijing suburb where he grew up, after retirement from a municipal office in Beijing. As I entered his drawing room, two certificates, awarded respectively by the Taiwan Manchu Association[66] and the US-based Universal Manchu Culture Foundation, were immediately evident. It is said that the censors in Beijing have been reluctant to allow these two overseas Manchu organisations to intervene in local Manchu affairs, a claim mirrored in the responses of some Beijing Manchu elites such as awkward expressions and unwillingness to talk about liaisons with these two overseas Manchu associations. Mr Li recalled that the Beijing United Front deliberately called for a meeting where it cautioned a few Manchu to secede as soon as possible if they were honorary members of transnational Manchu organisations, and it affirmed the need for the Manchu elite to be unequivocal on this position.

Beyond the Grassroots

The revival of Manchu identity can be seen as social mobilisation among the Manchu group. It appears that the Manchu middle-class leadership acts as an ethnic agency to stimulate the revival endeavours.

In his paper on the representation of the Yao nationality in post-Mao China, Litzinger argues that the Yao elites have been 'crucial and critically engaged' in crafting new discourse that adapts to the socio-economic and political environment of the PRC.[67] Similarly, the Manchu middle-class elites have become an essential force in the Manchu transformation, so it cannot be taken for granted that ethnic empowerment is solely a grassroots phenomenon. The Manchu middle-class leaders serve as designers-cum-local agencies that exert political influence at this particular historical juncture. Through the fledgling ethnic tourism, the Manchu leadership has orchestrated an authentic primitive profile of the Manchu that is very different from what the Manchu look like in contemporary daily life. The leaders' rationale is that ethnic minorities as defined by the State cannot divorce themselves from the bundle of distinctive ethnic customs that have been popularly internalised to justify the very existence of ethnic groups. Indeed, these leaders have taken charge of reproducing the Manchu identity since the 1980s, particularly after the Manchu associations were approved officially as independent ethnic organisations.

Now a few middle-aged Manchu leaders have succeeded the founding leaders in the Manchu associations. If the language revival and other activities carried out by the senior generation were conservative, the young leaders prefer mass media and ethnic tourism for self-empowering the Manchu. They have put forward through visual media a series of Manchu images that seem to match the standard stereotypes of the ethnic minorities in China. In promoting ethnic tourism in Shenyang, the Shenyang Manchu Association has taken part in a project to uncover local Manchu tourist resources, and it is one of the 'shareholders' of the Shenyang Manchu folklore village. Here they have invested not money, but intellectual property through cultural consultation.

To understand better the role played by the Manchu middle class, it is useful to consider how the revival of Manchu identity has transformed over the generations of leadership, because different generations have placed different emphasis on self-interpretation and expression. At the outset, the Manchu middle class emphasised primordial devotion to their culture. Younger leaders that followed prefer to convey the distinctness of Manchu culture and group image through popular media. Ethnic tourism may well outweigh other means of reproducing Manchu ethnic identity, as a more recent interaction between Manchu ethnic identity and the general social reality. New representations of Manchu culture in the mass media have also helped to alleviate the difficult economic circumstances of Manchu Associations by providing reliable financial support for activities and social mobilisation. The Internet has provided a broad platform for their communication. For example, the Manchu Associations have put considerable Manchu-related information on the Internet, they

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[65] I use a pseudonym for this informant.

[66] http://www.manchusoc.org.tw/contents/cover.htm#001.

[67] Litzinger, *The Work of Culture and Memory in Contemporary China*, p. 8.

discuss Manchu issues, have academic exchanges regarding Manchu studies, and retrieve family names and ethnic roots through the BBS (Bulletin Board System).[68]

Why is the Manchu middle-class leadership keen to perform as an engine for the group's upward movement in Chinese society? How does it contribute to rebuilding an ethnic collective self?

As an ethnic agency, the Manchu middle-class leadership has become a simultaneously self-authorised and publicly appointed spokesperson, in light of the ethnic-based heredity and present social status of these leaders. Distinctive life experiences have differentiated these leaders from common group members. Memories of the depreciated Manchu ethnic identity have driven these leaders to participate actively in the Post-Mao Manchu resurrection. The backbone of their claim to collective identity is the Manchu elites' shared belief that any Manchu individual existence is inextricably part of the collective Manchu existence in plural-ethnic China. Hence, the elites take the State's acknowledgement that their group is part of the mosaic of nationalities as a gesture by the State to console and compensate for personal wrongs. Traumatised memory has engendered both group resurgence and the ardent leadership by the Manchu middle class, and it was a salient factor in evoking collective identity. Aggregated with the current feelings of injustice, bitterly accumulated grievances invest new meaning in the movement and help to empower the Manchu in both their bargaining and their confrontations over the group's positioning.

The Manchu Associations scattered around the country verify how members of the Manchu middle class conduct their identity quest through a well-developed network. For example, one story relates how a few Manchu elites invited a famous Manchu calligrapher to hold a calligraphy exhibition, which they intended to be centre stage at the local dominant group's grand anniversary celebration of Manchu regional autonomy. They achieved not only passionate support nationwide, but also support from transnational groups. Subsequently they took advantage of circumstances by asking the guest calligrapher to engrave the publicly recognised designation of a past Manchu banner garrison on an arch-gate to a new housing quarter that was waiting to be named. This connotative signature of the calligrapher, who affiliates to the Manchu Aisin Gioro imperial family,

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[68] See www.manjuboo.com, www.manchuculture.com, www.qiren.cn, and www.manchus.net.

is thus featured on an arch-gate that represents the vicissitudes of the local Manchu within the city.

Conclusion

The reproduced Manchu identity is metaphorical in all its dimensions. Recalling the enthroned legend of the Manchu monarch at the beginning of the Qing dynasty, the historical construction[69] and contemporary reconstruction have taken surprisingly similar tracks. The made and remade Manchu identity have been interwoven with politicised boundary and legitimised social positioning. The cultural mechanism has been manipulated to serve group empowerment, while the process in turn functions to 'primordialise insiders'.[70]

As China moves into a new historical juncture, those of the Manchu middle class are unwilling to remain as a group obscured and muted in the ethnic panel. Due to their somewhat excluded and uneasy position *vis-à-vis* the State, the Manchu middle-class leadership is painstakingly trying to relocate the group into a significant position, with the Manchu Associations acting as 'functional' agencies.[71] Many individual experiences of the Manchu middle class have been integrated into this dramatic process of empowerment, where collective concern and social action are partly determined by self-judgment and interpretation of the group situation. Constituents of the Manchu middle class are relatively diverse, which results in their varying sentimental attachment to this ethnic group. Generational differences also influence the group's orientation and prospects.

During my field trip, I witnessed mixed manifestations of the Manchu middle-class elite, implying their complex response to 'group positioning' in such a multi-ethnic state. A Beijing Manchu elite interpreted the Manchu ethnic designation with:

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[69] In the early Qing dynasty, the Manchu imperial court enlisted scholars to collect legends on the origin of the Manchu and justified the legitimacy of its rule over China. The imperial court tried to convince people that a god allowed the Manchu to form the monarchy, and so the Han people should accept the arrangement and obey the Qing dynasty rulers, rather than rail against the Manchu and belittle them as barbarians.

[70] Robert Foster, 'Making National Cultures in the Global Ecumene', *Annual Review Anthropology*, vol. 20 (1991), p. 237.

[71] Heberer, *Private Entrepreneurs in China and Vietnam*, p. 2. Heberer takes the entrepreneurial strata as a 'non-ruling functional elite with an important role in the functioning and change of society and its sub-systems'.

> We [Manchu] came here [the central region of China] with generous dowries, didn't we? Why do we call ourselves the 'Manchu'? The pronunciation resembles '*man zu* (satisfy)' in Mandarin, that is, we are easily satisfied with what we can obtain and without excessive demands.

His remarks sound somewhat sardonic. Indeed, many in the Manchu middle class feel frustrated at the lowly position of the Manchu as an ethnic group in China. These people seek to enhance the status of the Manchu in Chinese society, and their actions ensure that identity negotiation in political and cultural domains will continue.

Context and personal experience are vital in making ethnic identity an optional choice in China. Context can shift the meanings that attach to ethnic identity. Sometimes people can derive value from signalling their unique identity, but other times uniqueness or difference stigmatises identity and can help to create social detachment. Symbolic interaction may be a useful tool for analysis of the Manchu because it focuses on putting individuals to a test and observing how these individuals understand their own situation, confer with others and subsequently act. This striking example illustrates well. In the Manchu and Mongol joint nationality township mentioned earlier, intermarried couples are less inclined to register 'Manchu' for their children. Only 40 per cent of all Manchu intermarriages register their offspring as Manchu, whereas 94 per cent of Manchu-Mongol couples choose Mongol, and 100 per cent of Manchu-Hui couples choose Hui as their children's ethnicity.[72] These data expose how the people respond to the State's 'ranked positioning' of the ethnic minorities in China.[73] They also indicate what motivates the Manchu middle-class leadership to strive for a larger sphere of representation within the State's political framework.

The Manchu middle class, as the social agency of the Manchu community, takes pains to stress cultural differences and sharpen the ethnic boundary in their struggle for power. The various components of their identity reconstruction, such as reviving ethnic language, reinventing a traditional Manchu image for ethnic tourism, and striving for regional autonomy, can all be seen as necessary tactics. As Schein has proposed, 'The grouping and their hierarchisation are, in other words, fundamentally contingent upon the representations of difference that are crafted daily in popular practice.'[74] The reconstruction and adjustment of Manchu identity is therefore actually a cultural process of identity reconstruction. It is an attempt to cater to the criteria proposed by the State and non-Manchu people, to identify the Manchu in a different social context. Evaluating the authenticity of these representations has no essential significance, because ethnicity has become more concerned with the symbols of ethnic cultures than with the cultures themselves. And as Alba claims of ethnicity as a symbolic entity, it is 'easily reshaped in response to varying situational contexts and growing social needs'.[75] The psychological rewards of remaining a minority could outweigh the instrumental social advantages, as Romanucci-Ross and De Vos have observed of ethnic groupings generally.[76] Yet more importantly, by forming a maturing ethnic network, a middle-class collective is emerging from the politico-economic landscape of the PRC. This group may influence not only the prospects of identity politics, ethnic economy and social mobilisation, but also the general character of the Chinese middle class in the long run.

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[72] Dru Gladney, *Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality* (Harcourt Brace College Publishers, Fort Worth, 1998), pp. 130–1.

[73] Louisa Schein, *Popular Culture and the Production of Difference: The Miao and China* (UMI Dissertation Services, Michigan, 1993), p. 12.

[74] Ibid.

[75] R.D. Alba, *Ethnic Identity: The Transformation of White America* (Yale University Press, New Heaven, CT, 1990), p. 306. Cited in Karen A. Cerulo, 'Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions', *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol. 23 (1997), p. 387.

[76] Romanucci-Ross and De Vos, *Ethnic Identity*, p. 373.

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